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The thesis has as its consistent theme the questioning of the nature of 
empirically based sociological inquiry. Deriving its initial impetus from 
the Social Studies of Scientific Knowledge, Part I pursues the methodological 
implications of the problematic of reflexivity through an empirical research 
project - what counts for lay people, non-scientists, as knowledge - via 
the analysis of interviews with people for whom the irruption of Multiple 
Sclerosis has breached their belief in the nature and efficacy of medical 
science. The failed 'solution' of Part I's culminating chapter however 
- to embody reflexivity in the form of analytic writing - begins the turn 
of the thesis against its original grounds. In a pivotal central chapter, 
it is recognised that the transformative acts of recording and transcription 
means the transcripts (upon which the analysis has been based) are irrecoverably 
different from the original speech. The object of analysis is not talk, 
but texts. 
Attention shifts from the question of analysis to the data as writing, 
texts whose value for research depends on their being different from either 
fiction or pure speculation (philosophy). Drawing then on contemporary 
work in philosophy and literary theory, Part II pursues this as a three- 
fold question of the datatexts' relation to their referents, re-reading 
them in turn through their bearing on the philsophical Question of the 
Self, against the quasi-literary form of autobiography and as dialogue, 
an event in (written) speech in which the knowledge was produced. As the 
work proceeds, it is recognised that their epistemological status derives, 
not from their ostensive referents, but in the work of reading against 
their form, producing particular iterpretable meanings. Finally, engendered 
by re-reading the datatexts against Plato's Phaedrus qua dialogic inquiry, 
the thesis shifts from the question of referents towards the chiasmic relation 
betwen the form of the written and the figurality, the rhetoric of reading, 
which raises fundamental questions about the knowledge produced in/by socio- 
logical inquiry on the basis of the interpretability of data. 
As itself a written text, the final form of the thesis - which has moved, 
not towards a forseen conclusion but by putting into question the grounds 
of each position as it is achieved yet consistently focused on 
'the same' 
data - is of substantive theoretical import: essential to 
its questioning 
of what such knowledge 'is'. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The excitement of current work in the social studies 
of science is that it is struggling with a hundred 
years of tradition. Its significance lies not just 
in providing more or different news 'about science', 
but in its potential for reevaluating fundamental 
assumptions of modern thought. 
Woolgar 1988a: 30 
This extraordinarily bold claim by Woolgar in fact underplays 
the position. For as at least this thesis will suggest, the 
tradition which here becomes challenged has its roots in the 
fourth century BC, in Plato, in (what is held to be) the 
founding moment of western philosophy. 
This thesis, written over the past six years, had as its impetus 
the position held within the social studies of science as it 
then was, the practitioners of which, unlike, 'most ethnomethod- 
ologists (who) tended to play down the scepticism in Garfinkel's 
writings, in favour of developing an empirical research programme' 
(Woolgar 1988a: 37, Fn 4) were committed to the endeavour of, as 
it were, pursuing an empirical research prograrrme sceptically. 
This scepticism was manifested in a struggle with the phenomenon 
of reflexivity, conceived, after Garfinkel, as: 
The relationship between document and underlying 
pattern (which) is reflexive. That is, there is an 
intimate inter-dependence between document and any 
associated underlying pattern such that the sense 
V 
of the former is elaborated by drawing on 'knowledge 
of' the latter; at the same time, the sense of the 
latter is elaborated by what is known about the 
former. The character of the document, as perceived 
by the actor, changes to accomnodate the perceived 
nature of the underlying reality just as the latter 
simultaneously changes to accommodate the former. 
The establishment of a connection between document 
and underlying reality is thus a back-and-forth 
process. In Garfinkel's terms, "'members' accounts 
are constituent features of the settings they make 
observable (14-67)". 
Woolgar 1981: 13 
Almost uniquely, 
1 the adherents of this position in the social 
studies of science, amongst whom I counted myself, accepted 
that the problem of reflexivity applied not only to the knowledge 
production of others, the subjects of research, but must apply 
to their own (cf. for example Ashmore 1983, Latour & Woolgar 19791 
Mulkay 1984, Walker 1984, Woolgar 1983). 2 
From the beginning, then, the work was conceived to entail both 
a problem and a problematic: the problematic of reflexivity 
pursued through an empirical research problem. 
The problem had as its immediate sociological context the 
observation that, whilst the sociology of science had studied 
the practices and institutions of science (Merton 1973), its 
social construction (Barnes 1977; Bloor 1984) and even had 
latterly turned to the constitution of scientific knowledge in 
the laboratory (Latour & Woolgar 1979), little attention had 
been afforded, in this 'age of science', to how lay people, 
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non-scientists, conceive of science. This problem was not 
posed as a question of whether they understood science properly, 
have accurate knowledge of scientific facts, know what science 
is. Rather the question was what, for lay people, counts as 
knowledge (as opposed to opinion or belief and so on), and 
what is the methodology by virtue of which that knowledge is 
held to have a special and perhaps exclusive ontological/phenom- 
enal reliability. And how is this knowledge related to the 
concept of science as understood in the sociology of science? 
The research project on which the thesis is based comprised a 
study of lay accounts of the chronic neurological condition 
multiple sclerosis (MS), given in interview by people who them- 
selves suffered from the condition. 
For those sociologists interested in knowledge as a 
social phenomenon, so the argument runs (cf Knorr-Cetina & 
Mulkay 1983: 4), a focus on science is especially fruitful because 
the production of knowledge and its epistemological status are 
topics for the practitioners, the scientists themselves, and 
thereby rendered unusually visible to the sociologist for 
analysis. 
In that medicine operates at an interface between lay 
and scientific knowledge, in that medicine is perhaps the only 
science directly applied to and explicitly visible to non- 
scientists, it seemed a particularly appropriate field for my 
research. 
Furthermore, within the domain of medicine, there are 
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features of the condition MS which made it an especially 
appropriate topic for the pursuit of both the problem and the 
problematic: for the nature of science - both as method and a 
body of knowledge - is immediately problematic for the partici- 
pants in the research project, people who themselves have MS. 
To put it briefly, although MS has been the object of 
concentrated medical research for more than a hundred years 
since it was first discovered by Charcot in the late 1800's 
(but see Chapter 2 and Appendix 2.1), according to the research 
literature, it is a condition which continues to defy the most 
concentrated scientific study: 
For over a century, MS has intrigued workers in all 
the neural sciences, with perhaps more publications 
resulting than for any other neurological disorder. 
However we face today a situation little different 
from that of Charcot: it is still really a disease 
of unknown cause, inadequate treatment and unpredict- 
able outcome. 
Kurtzke 1980: 1970 
For individuals, the experts' self-admitted lack of effective 
knowledge about a condition they can more or less define yet can 
do little about would seem to violate the common knowledge - if 
such there be - that science is both powerful and omniscient. 
MS would appear to induce a scepticism about science that would 
leave its victims with no reliable basis for knowledge. How, 
in that situation, did people go about making sense of their MS? 
The pursuit of this problem was, as has been indicated, regarded 
from the beginning not as an end in itself but as an occasion 
for addressing the implications of reflexivity for research, 
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a position which involves the doubting of the model of scientific 
method as the paradigmatic basis for research. There was, 
therefore, a terrible resonance between the problem and the 
problematic. 
This is how the thesis opens. As the work proceeds however the 
theoretical position and particularly the key problematic of 
reflexivity has to be reconceived, and is eventually discarded. 
The disciplinary context shifts away from sociology towards 
literary theory and continental philosophy; away from science and 
the problem of analysis towards the question of the interpret- 
ability of data. Beginning, then, with ethnomethodology and, to 
use Pollner's phrase, 'of necessity' "backing into Philosophy" 
(1987: xiii), the thesis ends with Plato's Phaedrus and the 
relation of language to inquiry. But although the work has indeed 
'backed into philosophy', it does not do so in the sense of 
finding there, in that canonical discipline, in the authority of 
Plato, an ultimate resource, a sure ground upon which at last 
to be able to "stop doubting" (Blum 1971: 316). (Hence my 
assertion at'the beginning that, if this thesis may properly be 
construed as belonging, at least in its origins, to "current 
work in the social studies of science", Woolgar is underestimating 
the gravity and the hubris of the challenge). 
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Although the order of concern is philosophical, the philo- 
sophical questions about the nature of knowledge and how that 
question rray be addressed (in particular, the consequences of 
addressing it in particular ways) are produced, not by abstract 
speculation or introspection against the light of Reason and 
Logic and informed by the philosophical disciplinary corpus- 
but by a fierce and consistent concentration on a set of data, 
grounded - however problematically - 'in' the world of the 
actual. The philosophical questions arise in the thesis from 
the practice of sociological research, in the attempt to carry 
out a concrete research project in accordance with the theo- 
retical and methodological concomitants of its starting position. 
The thesis is thus the philosophic order treated sociologically. 
Despite the shifting movement of the argument of the thesis 
(which will be described less cryptically below), it has a 
central and consistent theme - epistemology. I do not mean, how- 
ever, the term in the sense referred to by Hindess as that 
generally understood: as "(A) discipline, bordering on philosophy, 
whose function is to examine the methods which are used or 
which should be used to produce valid knowledge" (Hindess 1977: 
2-3), conceived, that is, on the basis of a specific relation- 
ship between philosophy and the (social) sciences in which the - 
method is produced by philosophy and the (social) sciences, 
cleansed of philosophical incoherence, would be the realisation. 
Rather, and this is vital to the avoidance of misunderstanding, 
the term epistemology is used to denote the order, 
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the level of concern: with the relation between theorising 
and its grounds. As such, 'the thesis', as a representation 
of research, as itself "theorising", has to be included in 
that concern. 
The final form of the written work is essential to its substantive 
matter, its structure essential to the resistance to the 
epistemology inherent in the thesis usually regarded as a virtual 
text, a mere description of research. Hence the. retention in 
the final assembly of the chronological order in which the 
chapters were written? the refusal to 'up date' each chapter 
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and the breaks between the chapters, the staccato effect, were 
risks taken as a way of making a substantive point. For the 
movement of which this thesis consists, from lay understanding 
of science to Plato was not conceived of from the beginning 
as the telös of the work. On the contrary each chapter was 
written in ignorance of where the work could lead. Each 
chapter of which it now consists represents a moment in the 
time of the work, a moment at which it appeared possible to 
move. Each chapter represents the next possible step, not to- 
wards a fore-gone conclusion but away from the previous one. 
As it now stands, this work resists the unilinear, 
consistent model of a thesis, representing in its structure a 
kind of questioning that is open-ended rather than closed, that 
as a problem is addressed and some kind of response produced, 
takes up the grounds upon which the conception of . the problem 
relied. Given the readiness to question the grounds of its 
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own statements, the movement is, rather con-voluted, folding 
back upon itself, moving on from and returning back to, 
but always differently, to re-address sometimes implicitly 
sometimes explicity, the 'same' questions, resonating through 
the work. 
For the thesis is, above all, a work of writing, to be 
read not as a neutral report on a research project -a description 
of what occurred between the posing of a question and its 
resolution by means of appropriate method applied to data - for 
which 'the research' would be the object read about through the 
text] but which requires to be read for the constitutive effects 
of the form in which it is written, subject to a reading which 
is alert to the possibility that the form formulates the thesis. 
However, in editing, in preparing the text for presentation, 
I have to an extent which I cannot but regret, restored a kind 
of mono-linear imperative: lost something of the blindness 
with which it was written. 
This effect is apparent even more markedly in the summary 
proffered below in accordance with conventional requirements, 
where the limits in-posed by the summary to dominate the poly- 
semia of the text, to show how the argument moves from and is 
given rise to by one chapter to the next, to articulate the 
smooth connectedness of each part of the work, means the denial 
of much of what I hope nevertheless remains ambiguous and 
resonant in the text. In an important sense, the requirement to 
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surrmarise the work epitomises the very thing which the work 
is resisting: the conception of a thesis as a work which may be 
shortened or lengthened, for which writing comes after the 
inquiry, the meaning of which is closed and conclusive. It 
is such a view of writing, of the written, of the neutrality of 
language used sociologically to produce and describe knowledge 
that is eventually not merely doubted but directly challenged. 
S"ARY 
The thesis as it now stands falls into two parts, the first 
driving towards chapter 4, the second, turning upon the pivotal 
fifth chapter, moving against the first. 
PART ONE 
RE: WRITING ANALYSIS 
The original problem was, to reiterate, a question about lay 
understanding of science: what counts for lay people, non-scientists, 
as knowledge and what are the means by which it may be known to be 
such. It was through addressing this problem that the impli- 
cations of the problematic of reflexivity for empirically-based 
research were to be worked out. 
The first three chapters are concerned to explicate the grounds 
for the contention that MS, 'medical data', is an appropriate 
topic through which to theorise about knowledge; and to begin 
to elaborate on what is n)eant by that contention. Rather than 
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2 
by direct description, the explication of the concerns is 
approached elliptically, for the difficulty from the beginning 
was in knowing how to proceed with the thesis given the 
problematic of reflexivity applicable, of necessity, not only 
to the analysis of the data but of the research literature, 
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the setting of the research in its disciplinary context. 
The point of the first part of the thesis is to problem- 
atise the dichotomous and hierarchical categorisation of 
knowledge into 'expert' and 'lay'; the means, a disruption of 
the category of 'expert', explicitly of scientific medicine 
but implicitly also of that "disruption". 
Chapter 1 is an extended objection to the acceptance in 
medical sociology6 of the facticity of biological science, both 
as fact and method, and to its complementary reliance on an 
unproblematic scientific methodology as the basis of its own 
research. 
In the last part of the chapter, a further depiction of 
the sense in which reflexivity is being held as problematic is 
made via a consideration of the social constructivist perspective 
applied directly to medical knowledge. 
In Chapter 2, T turn to the medical research literature on 
MS in order to substantiate the unexplicated basis of the 
critique advanced in Chapter 1, that the assumption (by medical 
sociologists) that medical knowledge arises simply from the 
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nature of disease is not tenable. This is done by showing in 
detail how the nature of the disease, ' MS as the thing it is 
taken to be, is reflexively tied to the knowledge brought to 
bear by experts on what are taken to be documents of it. 
The 'document' in question is a lay text, a passage 
from the Diary of the Comte d'Este, written in 1822 before MS 
was first identified but which, according to an authoritative 
textbook on MS research (McAlpine et al 1972) is clearly the 
first recorded case of the disease. The detailed knowledge of 
current research findings and hypotheses which make it possible 
to read the diary as an obvious case of MS is given, going 
line-by-line through the diary extract. 
The significance of the description of his condition 
given by the Count has, it is shown, to be 'already known', 
brought to the document. This allows me to show not only the 
constituted nature of the 'objects' of medical research, of 
'expert' knowledge, but to develop the the of problematising 
the assumption of hierarchical difference between expert and lay 
knowledge of MS. Being readable as about MS only on the basis 
of expert knowledge, the diary, d'Este's account, is absorbed 
into the body of knowledge about MS, which thus in turn 
constitutes the 'layness', the non-expertness of lay accounts of 
'the same thing'. 
An important strategic function of this second chapter is 
to introduce the current epidemiological and neurological 
research into MS as to its nature and genesis; at the same time, 
to link with Chapter 3 and to the thrust of the original research 
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problem, by showing how science has, in the case of MS, failed, 
despite concentrated scientific research effort, to produce 
either reliable or effective knowledge of what MS 'is' or 
means. 
The salience of using lay accounts of MS as a way of 
approaching the question of lay theorising about knowledge is 
further substantiated. 
This chapter is also, inter alia, a means of giving the 
details of MS - its accepted characteristics in terms of 
symptoms and prognoses (in all their ambiguity) and the peculiar 
problem attached to its diagnosis(in a way that is not more 
description, but retains awareness of the problematic) which 
will be necessary in order to understand the data as it appears 
in the thesis (exemplifying nicely the chapter's point, of the 
necessity of bringing 'already knowledge' to the reading of the 
documents of MS, which then constitute, 'back-and-forth' the 
documents' meaning: the inescapability, for the thesis itself, 
of the documentary method). 
3. Having in Chapter 1 placed the thesis' concerns against the 
relevant sociological literature and in the second against the 
literature on MS, in Chapter 3, following the formal structure 
of a thesis, I turn to elaborate on its theoretical auspices 
and the question of methodology. 
However, given the previous chapter's demonstration of 
the problematic inherent in the description of what something 
'is', the approach to ethnomethodology is made again elliptically, 
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through the criticisms made in the literature of 'it'. The 
meaning and implications of ethnomethodology both for theory 
and practice, and 'the troubles' with it identified by its many 
critics are, it is shown, not only different but incompatible. 
The object of their criticism, ethnomethodology, is constituted 
through the theoretical/sociological priorities which they 
(like me) bring to examples of it. 
Although used at this stage to extend the points made 
about the scientific literature on MS to sociology rather than 
in themselves, many of the specific criticisms made of ethno- 
methodology re-emerge in the latter part of the thesis: especially 
the contentious question of the conception of the self, of 
consciousness, of 'the actor': the source of meaning, the 
conceived origin of 'members accounts'. 
Having, although obliquely, fulfilled the requirement to describe 
the theoretical position of the thesis - the suitability of MS 
as an occasion for theorising is then made explicit, through its 
metaphoric resonance with what I take from 'ethnomethodology', 
Garfinkel's breaching experiments, designed as a means of render- 
ing the taken-for-granted 'strange' and thus visible for analysis. 
In the case of MS, it is argued, the risk of the management of 
the methodological horrors being an analyst's artefact, rather 
than a feature of members' practical reasoning, is circumvented 
for the irruption of MS and the failure of science to provide 
valid and effective knowledge about it induces epistemological 
scepticism, not (just) for researchers but for the research 
participants. 
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The second half of the chapter turns to the question of 
method, of how to analyse the data, a set of interviews with 
people talking about their MS. Conversational analysis and 
the interpretive approach to talk data are considered and 
rejected in turn. Although both claim an indebtedness to 
ethnomethodology, both rest on an assumption of the independent 
facticity of the phenomena they reveal 'in' talk: its in- 
variant structures for conversational analysis and the cognitive 
processes taken by the example of interpretavism that is being 
considered, to underly and to be revealed by people's talk. 
Neither method provides any assistance to the question of how 
to proceed to the data whilst remaining committed to the 
problematic of reflexivity. 
There has nevertheless been some movement in the chapter. 
For through the consideration and rejection of these two 
methods of analysing talk, what has been demonstrated is the 
theoretical dependence of method. In that sense it is the 
theoretical problematic that still has to be pursued. 
But the chapter ends finding no way forward. Despite point- 
ing to the achieved nature of the account of the contextualising 
literature, both explicitly and implicitly in the three chapters 
so far written, to quote the final paragraph of chapter 3: 
" analysis, the 'making strange' even of analysis to itself 
is depicted as over. The produced analysis cannot represent 
strangeness: all it may do, as here, is point towards its absence 
... the claim (of privilege) is inherent in analysis. " (100). 
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4 In the next chapter, this observation is refuted. For 
ironically that conclusion provided a possible purchase on the 
question of how to proceed whilst remaining faithful to the 
sceptical programme: that is, by including in analysis its 
own theoretical grounds, its constitutive nature qua an 
occasioned account. A kind of resolution emerges in the 
possibility of writing in such a way, of constructing a text 
in such a way, as to represent the reflexive relation in 
analysis itself. 
The fourth chapter consists of three elements: an 
analysis of the data written according to normal form, with a 
problem, a method, and findings, concerning the research 
participants' accounts of how they came to the knowledge that 
they had MS and how and from what that knowledge was distinguished 
in terms of facticity. 
Interleaved with this analysis, identified by an italic 
typeface, is a text which considers the matters suppressed by 
the third-person objective analysis, raising questions about 
its methodological and epistemological assumptions, its 
management of the 'methodological horrors', that it, of necessity, 
cannot attend to. 
The third element consists of quotations from the data, 
the participants themselves accounting for their knowledge 
that what they had was MS. Whilst constituting the basis for 
the 'straight' analysis, this 'same' data constitutes the basis 
for the italic text's questioning of the grounds of the first. 
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Each of these three elements are accounts in themselves, in 
relation to each other and, as a whole text, an account of reflex- 
ivity. 
This solution however ended in an aporia. For, despite the 
complexity of its structure as a piece of writing, despite its 
radical innovation as a form, my intentions in writing the 
chapter in that way as the only means by which to make the 
theoretical point, utterly failed to produce the intended effect 
(apart from on those readers already concerned with the 
problem of reflexivity). It failed to draw readers' attention 
to the constituted nature of analytic knowledge, to the 
epistemological horrors as a general phenomenon. It was, for 
example, read as an unusually candid description of the research 
process, 'warts and all'; as witness to a troublesome tendency 
to solipsism; and was even used as a teaching text for medical 
sociology students with the advice to 'ignore the bits in 
italics' (Pinch 1983). It was also, and this will come to have 
been of the greatest consequence, read as representing voices 
in dialogue; a kind of dispute between a naive and a sophisticated 
analyst over the data? whereas it was my intention that the 
three elements were the same voice: the voice, so to speak, of 
research. 
This failure of the text's substantive and subversive 
radicality drove attention towards the question of the form of 
the written: to what it was about writing that resists an 
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author's intended meanings; to the relation between writing 
and author, the text and the origin, the transcripts and the 
speakers. 
Written after a gap of more than a year, Chapter 5 marks a 
major shift in the work, a breaking away from the cumulative 
but aporetic first part, a shift which will in turn be turned 
away from as the work unfolds. 
It is the pivot against which the movement of the remainder 
of the thesis turns. Its basis is the simple observation that 
what analysis works on is not talk but writing. To analyse 
the transcripts is not the same as to analyse talk, people in 
the unmediated self-presence of their speech. 
Using extracts from the data, it traces the double 
trans-formation of the original talk, firstly in the active 
process of taping and second in the process of transcription, 
into texts-to-be-read. On the basis of this recognition of a 
crucial difference for research between talk and text, the data 
is now re-named as datatexts (dtexts), to denote what from this 
point is taken to be their critical characteristic. 
Chapter 5 marks then a re-thinking of the assumption grounding 
the thesis so far, that the problem of reflexivity lies in the 
relation between analyst and analysed, for that was to take 
the written as transparent: took it for granted that to read 
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research literature was to have access to their author's 
intentions and assumptions; which took the transcripts as 
the talk of people with MS. 
Broadly speaking, the last three chapters (6-8) of the thesis 
pursue the consequences of this reconception of the nature of 
the data for the research project. 
PART TWO 
RETREADING DATA 
Throughout the first part of the thesis, the project has been 
concerned with 'getting at' the meanings the research popu- 
lation, the people with M5, attributed to kinds of knowledge. 
After the break in the fifth chapter, the barrier set up there 
against that possibility by the recognition of the data as 
texts, the concern has to shift to the meaning of the written] 
to the question of the interpretation of texts. 
The conception of the problematic of analysis has also 
to shift, becoming rather a question of the difference made 
to research based not on 'the knowledge of the research popu- 
lation', but on texts. 
What, then, are the consequences for research that the dtexts 
are not talk but textj not speech but writing? In general 
this turns upon the difference held to exist between writing 
xxii 
and speech as media of knowledge. In particular, it turns 
upon the kind of texts the dtexts are, for they are not just 
any writing, but this writing in particular. 
Fundamental to the possibility of Ethis) sociological research 
is that, even now, the data texts upon which it is based are 
different from the object texts of literary theory and of 
philosophy: they are not fiction nor pure speculation 
but in some crucially different way related to the world'. 
As Part Two opens, the key to this essential difference is 
taken to lie in their relation to their referents, that which 
would confer upon them their epistemological status as knowledge, 
the sources of their authority as not-fiction, as not 
philosophy. 
Providing a cohesive structure to Part Two9 this 
possible relation is conceived of as being, perhaps uniquely, 
three-fold: their ostensive authority lying in their relation 
to the speakers whose words and knowledge they represent, to 
the lives they are about, and to the event, the dialogue 
through which the knowledge of which they consist was produced, 
in the original interviews. 
Each chapter takes up one fold of this three-fold question 
of reference. At the sane time, pushing at the difference data 
makes, the dtexts are re-read first against a philosophical 
question (the Question of the Self), against a comparable 
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literary genre (Autobiography) and finally against a philosophic 
text (Plato's Phaedrus) both written in and about dialogic 
inquiry. By re-reading the dtexts in terms of their similarities 
and differences to these other forms, I am trying to press on 
the problem of interpretation represented by the nature of 
the dtexts as an unprecedented form of text and its effects on 
the problem of their interpretation for sociological research. 
The dtexts have however been read from the beginning as having 
a bearing on and being an instance of the problematising of 
knowledge for the speakers, the people with MS, induced by the 
irruption of their condition, the basis of their "terrible 
resonance" with the methodological problematic with which the 
thesis opened. In that sense the dtexts have been, from the 
beginning, readily interpretable - and with this meaning in 
particular. The question is not, therefore, how should the 
dtexts be interpreted, but how are they? What is it about 
them that had produced their ready interpretability: this 
meaning? 
In Chapter 6, the dtexts are re-read for their contribution to 
a pressing problematic in contemporary philosophy, the putting 
into question of the ontological givenness of the self as a 
consequence of their own philosophical theorising, whose epistem- 
ological status is thereby undermined. A similar irresolvable 
dilen na was part of the epistemological scepticism interpreted 
as having been induced, not by abstract reasoning, but by the 
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disruption of the relation between the concrete embodiment of 
the self - the body by MS - in the conception of MS as a 
'natural breaching experiment' (see xvi above). 
It is shown, however, through a sequence of readings, 
each of which focuses on an aspect of the dtexts the one before 
failed to regard as problematic (their relation to their 
referents, the self-referential grammar of their speech, their 
form as narrative about the self) that the contribution of the 
dtexts to the Question of the Self, the presence or absence of 
a questioning of the givenness of the self, depends upon which 
aspect of the dtexts is being paid attention to, and what is 
assumed to be the referential relation to their origins. 
By the end of the chapter, each interpretation of the 
dtexts' bearing on the Question of the Self that has been 
advanced has been shown to be refutable. The 'real self', 
ethnomethodology's 'practical reasoner' (and of Woolgar 1981, 
cited on pv above) and what it knows - the source of the 
accounting practices traced in the first part of this thesis 
and especially in Chapter 4- as the origin of the dtexts and 
key to their epistemological status is irrecoverable. The 
abstract conception produced through these readings, produced 
through reading, cannot be taken as the empirical origin of 
speech, who can be known through research. 
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A philosophical question pursued on the basis of the 
dtexts raises the question of the relation between the form 
of the text and reading,. in this case, their form as speech- 
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in-writing. As has been shown, their immediacy and authority 
as voice is disrupted by the fact that they are speech-in- 
writing which, in requiring interpretation, allows for 
difference in meaning. Reading mediates the meaning of the 
dtexts, ll 
In Chapter 7, breaking from regarding the dtexts as speech-in- 
writing,, the question of the relation between form and reading 
is raised again, in terms of the second fold of the three-fold 
question of reference: to the life they are ostensibly about 
which, insofar as it is actual rather than imagined, appears 
to authorise the texts as not-fiction and to re-cohere the 
disintegration of the self-as-speaker into the author of the 
text, whose life it readably refers to. 
Re-reading the dtexts as writing against the literary 
genre to which they are most nearly comparable, autobiography, 
raises the question, via literary theory, of the relation of 
author-to-text and of the differences held to exist between 
literal and literary forms of writing to which former 
category the dtexts seem most properly to belong. 
Comparing the dtexts first in terms of their similarity 
to and then in terms of their difference from the characteristics 
of genuine examples of the genre, it is shown that 'the life' 
which appears to give rise to autobiography is rather produced 
as an effect of the form. But this works its way out in a very 
particular way in the case of the dtexts. As autobiographies, 
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the descriptions of their own lives by the authors of the dtexts 
can only be partial. This gulf between what is written and 
what it describes, inherent in the form, allows for, requires 
a reading which identifies and supplements that which is in- 
complete and self-interested in that description, making the 
dtexts, insofar as they are autobiographical in form, peculiarly 
vulnerable to sociological irony (Woolgar 1983). Thus the life 
of the author and therefore the author him/her self is irrecover- 
able from the text itself without the supplement of (rather than 
the mediation of, as shown in Chapter 6) reading. 
According to traditional literary theory, the authority 
of autobiography as the genuine story of a life rests on and is 
identified by the author's proper name attached to the work. 
Because of the requirement to make the dtexts anonymous, it 
becomes the researcher's name, my name, that authorises them as 
genuine, the guarantee for readers of the thesis of the empirical 
status of the dtexts as not-fiction; and not my nano as such, 
but rather as itself authorised by the tradition in/against which 
the dtexts are here being read. The tradition of sociology 
becomes the source of their authority, doubly de-facing the original 
author.. 
According to contemporary literary theory We Man 1979)12 
the defacement of the actual author and the difference between 
the text's description and the life it is about is a consequence 
of the figurality of the form of writing that is autobiography, 
a consequence definitive of and exclusive to literary language. 
It is shown in the chapter that the irrecoverability of the 
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original authors and their lives is a consequence of language 
used literally, the literal description of the life with MS 
of which the dtexts consist, read, that is, as literal by 
sociology and as a consequence of their being interpretable 
against autobiography. In being written texts that are not 
literature. 
It is thus shown that the distinctions between literal 
and literary forms (of language and text) rest on the onto- 
logical status of the referents of each category= the referents 
which are in irrecoverable relation to the text 'itself' insofar 
as the form of autobiography is not itself neutral but produces 
that ontological status as an effect. 
Put more broadly, in Chapter 6, it is the form of the dtexts 
as language - as speech that, in being written, requires 
interpretation and the mediation of reading, that at once 
confers their authority vis 
ä vis the speaker-as-origin and 
undermines it. In Chapter 7, it is the dtexts' form as writing, 
as a particular written text, that requires a reading that 
supplements what is readably absent, that makes than peculiarly 
vulnerable to sociological reading, at once conferring their 
facticity and putting it into question. 
These readings were produced in Chapter 6 by reading the 
dtexts against the form of a philosophical question; and in 
Chapter 7, by reading them against a comparable literary genre. 
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8 In the final Chapter 8, the dtexts are read against a specific 
text, Plato's Phaedrus, which concerns a philosophical question and 
is written in a particular literary form: the form of dialogue, It is 
this text which is held by philosophical tradition to be the 
authoritative source of the prioritisation of voice over writing 
- the basis of the phenomenological philosophy to which both 
ethnomethodology and the sociological problematic of reflexivity 
with which the thesis opened are, more or less wittingly, 
indebted. In re-reading the dtexts against the Phaedrus, the 
major themes of the thesis are set into play. 
The chapter begins by continuing with the 3-fold question of 
reference: the dtexts to the event, the dialogue through which 
they came into being, re-addressing the theme of Chapter 7, the 
relation- of form to . 
interpretability, to readable meaning. 
Taking written dialogue as a form which produces a particular 
referent as its effect -a unique event, in speech, that takes 
time, and is about something (in both these cases, about knowledge)- 
the differences in how these effects occur in the dtexts and the 
Phaedrus are seen to produce particular interpretations of their 
meaning, which are specified in the chapter itself. 
I4 is also shown, however, for the last time, that 
a text's referential status is produced in interpretation. 
Dropping the approach to the nature of the dtexts through the 
question of, their referential status, and following the chronology 
of the Phaedrus, attention breaks to the form of which the 
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dtexts(and the Phaedrus) consists and in and by which their substance 
-as an inquiry - is produced: to what is peculiar about knowledge 
produced in dialogue. 
By the final section of the chapter, the reading of the 
Phaedrus as the source of . 
'Plato's opposition to writing' has 
become radically contested, the source of speech's authority 
itself undermined in/by the Phi, through the convolutions 
of form against content in which Socrates' apparently plain 
statement of the first task of philosophy - withcjt which 
philosophy cannot begin - to "know myself" are enfolded. 
As written dialogue, the knowledge of MS of which the 
dtexts readably consist is similarly produced and undermined. 
In the final section of the chapter, which is also the end of 
the thesis, and again against philosophic tradition, it is 
shown that far from the Fhaedrus consisting of the denigration 
of rhetoric at the expense of dialectic as means of approaching 
the truth, true knowledge, as the haedrus itself exemplifies, 
in order for argument to move, dialectic requires rhetoric 
and that in order to persuade, rhetoric requires dialectic - 
argument against what went before. That they are in chiasmic 
relation which at once is essential to the movement of 
inquiry, the production of knowledge and at the same time its 
undoing. 
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The dtexts themselves an inquiry, are, being argument in 
language, written in dialogue, involved in this figure of chiasm. 
They are, being dialogue, dialectic in form in that they are opened 
to question in the necessary activity of reading) and rhetorical 
in their effect so that their interpretability can only, by 
hard reading, be made problematic, their referential status 
not simply obvious: people present in their speech, talking 
about MS and producing knowledge of it that is recognisable 
as true.. 
Reading back over the three chapters making up the second half 
of the thesis after moving to the end of the Phaedrus, they 
can be re-interpreted as an anticipation of the elements of 
this final chiesmic model of inquiry. The first, Chapter 6, 
reading the dtexts against a philosophical question, moves 
dialectically, putting each reading of the dtexts on the 
Question of the Self into question. The second, Chapter 7, 
looking at the dtexts in terms of the literary effects of 
their nearest equivalent genre, concerns their rhetoricity. 
And both occur in the first two parts of the final chapter, 
where it is the rhetoric of dialogue that is at first addressed; 
then the dtexts/dialogue as, arguement, as an inquiry) and 
both in the final part, the, text of the chapter itself moving 
in dialectic empowered by rhetoric. 
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The thesis as it ends turns from the question of its data 
back against itself - itself as a work of writing of a 
particular form and as a mode of inquiry that allowed, from 
the beginning, the movement against its own questions and 
solutions, chapter by chapter as it unfolds as a work. The 
movement of inquiry represented in/by the thesis is dialectical, 
its form as writing inexorably rhetorical. 
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INTRODUCTION : FOOTNOTES 
1. With the exception of Weider's paper, 'Telling the 
Code' (1974). 
2. To be contrasted with, for example, Collins (1981,1983). 
3. The risk is that of the accusation of solipsism and/or of 
a subjectivist personal history rather than a thesis. 
The effects of chronology discussed in Chapter 8.1 
vis a vis the dtexts apply, however, by the same taken, to 
the interpretability of the thesis. 
4. Reading of 'the literature' at any point in the course 
of the work other than that at which is was done would, 
being in a different context, produce a different interpre- 
tation. (The most striking example of this in the thesis is the later recognition and return to the issues raised as 
'Troubles with Ethno' in 3.1.1) (and see xvi, above). 
It will I hope become clear from reading the thesis itself 
why this would have destroyed the thesis. 
5. There is from the first chapter a significant preference 
for citations from specified texts ie for 'empirically based' 
critique rather than one made on the basis of paraphrase 
or of general trends, perspectives and so on. This preference 
was used at the beginning as a means of eliminating at 
least some of the layers of 'accounting' involved in such 
practices; it becomes of increasing substantive consequence. 
6. It is part of the commitment to 'empirical work' (see Fn 5) 
and its problematic that the medical sociology referred to 
is exclusivly the research literature and not the theoretical. 
7. The paper in first draft was presented in a number of 
research forums and pre-circulated to some of them: 
the Diseourse Analysis Workshop, Oxford Polytechnic, September 
1983; the George Saxton Centennial, Ghent, 1984; a staff 
Research Seminar at Brunel University 1984 and at a meeting of the 
Graduate'Research Forum at Brunel. The readers' responses 
referred to here were culled from those occasions and from 
the comments of other readers of the text to whom it was 
circulated. 
8. See eg Mulkay 1985: 77, Fn 2. 
9. The latter half of the thesis, so described, represents 
the work as an ordered and progressive sequence, as 
dealing with a question in the classical manner by breaking 
it down into its component parts ('three folds of reference') 
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which, separately addressed and then re-assembled, 
would represent the covering of the whole field of the 
question and a resolution of it. It will however be seen 
that this representation of inquiry is that which will 
be contested as the work proceeds. 
18. See Hindess 1977: especially Chapter 2; 49-77. 
11. This Chapter is also in effect a challenge to the concept 
of intentionality, fundamental to Austin's Speech Act 
Theory and to Ricoeur's hermeneutics applied to the social 
sciences (1981) (see Chapter 5, this text). 
12. It seems right that I should at least acknowledge the 
intense controversy that has arisen over the past year 
concerning de Man's war time relation with Nazism in 
his native Belgium and in particular, the matter of his - 
like Heidegger's - subsequent silence. This 'raises in 
a particularly grave form the question of responsibility 
and writing discussed against the Phaedrus in Chapter 8 
written before this controversy arose, having-evoked 
again the anathema pronounced on deconstruction and all 
its works as involved not only theoretically but actually 
in the destruction of the human. 
(See for example) J Hillis Miller writing in the TLS, June 17-23 1988, p676, and Derrida's 'Paul de Man's War' 
in the Spring 1988 issue of Critical Inquiry). 
PART ONE 
REWRITING ANALYSIS 
1 
CHAPTER ONE 
LAY/EXPERT KNOWLEDGE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF MEDICINE 
As far as the writing of a thesis is concerned, the objective of 
a review of the literature is to demonstrate an expertise on the 
part of the author through her familiarity with relevant work 
and, at the same time, to delineate the lacunae in that work 
which it will be the task of the thesis to remedy. 
Although reading the literature is basic to sociological 
(expert) practice, what is involved in such a reading and presentation 
of texts has rarely been attended to, reading and writing regarded 
as mundane, basic, technical skills. What follows is a review of 
the relevant literature from medical sociology. But it is the 
result of 'artfully managed' accounting procedures, and is as much 
constitutive of as constituted by 'the literature'. 
As was described in the Introduction, the interest of MS for the 
thesis lies not in the condition as such nor in the 'people with MS'' 
qua patients, but rather insofar as the ways in which people with 
MS make sense of the condition illuminates the broader issues of 
theorising with which this thesis is concerned. The medical 
sociology literature discussed in this chapter is approached, there- 
fore, not in terms of its substance and findings but at the level 
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of its theoretical and methodological approach to data that is 
similar to mine# people talking about their condition. 
The aim of this first chapter is to explicate those broader 
issues through a critique of the ways medical sociologists have 
treated the patients' perspective and conceived of its relation 
to expert scientific medicine. 
My immediate theme is to trace a double absence: the absence 
of interest, despite-appearances, in the knowledge either of 
patients or of scientific medicine, and the absence of interest 
in their own discipline as a knowledge producing practice. For the 
work which is to be discussed, medical science discovers and 
describes the physiological world, medical sociology discovers 
and describes the patients' perspective. The objects of research 
exist independently of the methods employed to discover and de- 
scribe them. In the first section, this assertion is substantiated 
through a critique of work on the patients' perspective; in the 
second, it is argued that even in those instances in the literature 
where lay perspectives are considered from the perspective of the 
sociology of knowledge, the same applies. It is the unquestioned 
assumption of the facticity of science which accounts for the 
absence of concern with reflexivity: the possibility that research 
constitutes, through its theoretical assumptions and methodology, 
the objects of its study. 
In the third section, a recent work which explicitly takes 
a social constructivist approach directly to medical knowledge is 
discussed. It is this latter theoretical approach which will be 
3 
1, Z 
considered in most depth since it most nearly approaches, and yet 
holds back from, the issue of reflexivity. 
The literature specifically on MS will not be referred to until 
Chapter Two, where it will provide the opportunity for a substantive 
elaboration of the issues broached in chapter one. 
THE PATIENTS' PERSPECTIVE 
There are now many detailed studies of lay perspectives in the liter- 
ature of medical sociology. Much of the focus of the research is, 
however, on the analysis of the interactions between patients and 
GP's or other medical professionals. These studies pay attention to 
the problems to which these interactions give rise as communi- 
cations, the majority of the research having the objective of enabling 
the medical profession to improve that communication which means, 
in practice, the improvement of the understanding by patients of 
doctors' instructions (See Becker *1974; Garfield 1982). There is 
also a strand within this area of work which considers the doctor- 
patient relationship in terms of the differential power statuses 
it exemplifies,, and which seeks to speak 'on behalf of' the patient 
(Cf. Stimson & Webb 1975, Wadsworth & Robinson 1976: Corsaro 1982; 
Hughes 1982; Stimson 1982). It is generally the case that - as in 
most medical sociological research - the theoretical perspectives 
of that discipline, with their concomitant concepts and key issues, 
are applied to a specific area of social life. As the title of the 
4 
discipline makes clear, it is the sociology of medicine. 
CONTENTS PAGE 
Patient Careers and Communication 
Wadsworth, David 
West, Patrick 
Anderson, Elizabeth 
Bloor, Michael 
Coulthard, Malcolm; Ashby, 
Margaret 
Accounts of Medical Work 
Studies of doctor-patient communication. 
The physician and the management of 
childhood epilepsy. 
School placement: interactions between 
doctors and mothers of physically 
handicapped children. 
Professional autonomy and client exclusion. 
A study of ENT clinics. 
A linguistic description of doctor- 
patient interviews. 
Dingwall, Robert Accomplishing profession. 
Webb, Barbara; Stimson, People's accounts of medical encounters. 
Gerry 
Davis, Alan; Strong, Philip The management of a therapeutic encounter. 
Robinson, David Please see and advise: handling 
referrals to a psychiatric hospital. 
Professional Ideology and Mental Illness 
Ryan, Joanna The production and management of stupidity: 
the involvement of medicine and psy- 
chology. 
Goldie, Nigel Psychiatry and the medical mandate. 
Ingleby, David Sanity, madness and the western state. 
Figure 1.1 Contents Page: Studies in Everyday Medical Life 
1 
(Wadsworth a Robinson 1976) 
Of more direct relevance to this thesis are those studies which 
describe how lay people 'make sense' of their own conditions. These 
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tend to focus either on a single medically diagnosed condition - 
epilepsy (West 1979), heart attacks (Cowie 1976), rheumatism (Wiener 
1975) for example; or concern lay perceptions about the nature or 
genesis of disease (for example Lederer 1952; rreidson 1961; Mabry 
1964; Elder 1973; Snow 1974; Helman 1978; Blaxter 1979; Locker 1981; 
Pill & Stott 1982; and Pritchett 1982). Yet even though such studies 
do not directly focus on the doctor-patient relationship, and the 
data upon which they are based is most often gathered away from 
the formal medical setting, nevertheless their avowed purpose is 
to illuminate that relationship. Blaxter's'study of the causal 
models of disease employed by working-class Aberdonian women, for 
example, compares those models with that of medical science in 
order to examine the implications of the "great potentiality for 
conflict" (1979: 161) she discovers in their difference, and there- 
fore, for rpeople'' behaviour as a patient' (1979: 154). Pill and 
Stott, studying working-class mothers' views on the aetiology of 
illnesses, likewise discuss their results: 
Mn relation to current health education policies, 
consultation behaviours in primary medical care and 
consumer attitudes to the services provided by their 
doctors. 
1982: 43 
In that sense, they differ little from the purpose of looking at 
patients' perspectives outlined some twenty years ago in what is 
still (along with Apple's 1960 study) one of the most ubiquitously 
cited research papers in this area, Baumann's 'Diversities in 
Conceptions of Health and Physical Fitness' (1961), in which she 
stated: 
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For the individual physician, an awareness of the differ- 
ences in conceptions of health can produce another tool 
for the management of his patient, enabling him to interpret 
a medical regimen in the focus most meaningful to the 
patien-C s frame of reference and, thus, providing an additional 
incentive to co-operation in achieving their common goal. 
1961: 46 
- the "common goal" being, of course, that of the professional. 
For society, Baumann describes the benefits as assisting, "persons 
interested in planning public health programs, or physical fitness 
campaigns" (46). Although the terminology may appear out-dated, 
the sentiments remain unchanged. 
Even the work which directly addresses patients' perspectives on 
the concepts which medicine employs - of symptoms or of disease - 
retains this orientation towards the improvement of the practice of 
medicine. Jones et al's paper, 'On the perceived meaning of symptoms' 
(1981) for example addresses the question of patients' understanding 
of 'symptoms' but, to endorse the point just made, relate their 
findings to the literature on delay in seeking medical advice. It 
is significant that in this study, the 'symptoms' which were to be 
interpreted by the patients consisted of a list of 45, drawn up by 
the researchers, and rated on eight "semantic properties", similarly 
derived. What Jones et al were looking at in fact was patients' 
understandings of the doctor's perspective. 
Cassell's much cited article on the concept of disease, 
'Disease as an 'it" (1976), although based on transcripts of doctor- 
patient consultations and thus dissimilar to my own data, is more 
directly relevant to my interests in that he is interested in the 
language in which disease is described, pace Jones et al, by lay 
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people themselves. He explains: 
What the present study is about ultimately is a kind of 
'mapping' of the body and its diseases as they are portrayed in 
the language of a person, in an attempt to better understand 
the relationship between mind and body... (Q)uestions of the 
relationship of person to body are crucial to many of the 
ethical and personal dilemmas of modern technical medicine. 
Anything that sheds light on these issues is of the utmost 
relevance. 
1976; 145' 
As the latter part of the quotation shows, the relevance of this 
interesting approach to the patients' perspective is nevertheless still 
confined within the bounds of medicine; the patients' concepts of 
disease interesting only insofar as they need to be understood - by 
medicine. 
This is not to say that there is nothing in this literature that 
touches on medical knowledge in a critical way. But what there is 
is criticism of, primarily, the uses to which medical knowledge 
is put - Illich (1975) being a prime example. There are also 
critiques in terms of its partiality, in the sense of its ideological 
assumptions and outcomes or in its denial of 'the whole person' as 
the relevant subject for its treatments. 
A paper by Balogh (1981) weaves these criticisms together to 
argue that physicians regard medical knowledge as their own "private 
property", an ownership which entails the class subordination of 
the patient and the alienation of her/his self from the body that 
is medicine's sole object. It is the ownership of knowledge that 
is questioned, not its constitution as 'medical knowledge'. 
There has also been a recent move towards the reconceptual- 
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isation of the discipline as the sociology of health and illness 
which, it is argued, will allow for the whole continuum to be 
stulled. This could be seen also as a critique of medical knowledge 
in that it is a plea for 'holisticism', but the omission of the word 
'disease' from this reformulation - reserved, as will be discussed 
below, for the physical conditions identified by medicine - is highly 
significant. By virtue of this re-characterisation of the interests 
of the discipline, new political issues (for example the relation of 
employment to health - of. Brennan & Lancashire 1978; Harrington 1978; 
Townsend & Davidson 1980) can be addressed. The work on de-medical- 
isation of certain phenomena such as pregnancy and childbirth 
also come under this rubric, the argument being that these are 
'natural' functions rather than pathological conditions and, as 
such, not the exclusive domain of medicine (Hall et al 1980; Oakley 
1980; also Crawford 1980; Phillips & Rakusen 1978). 
The research which has been looked at so far is, it has been 
suggested, interested in the way people who are ill make sense of 
their conditions only insofar as they present a problem for the 
practice of medicine. As the almost exclusive use of the term 
'patient' indicates, it is interested in the perspectives of lay 
people only to the extent that they are patients: ie the objects 
of medical practice. The theory and practice of medicine, and of 
medical knowledge itself as a branch of science, are taken as given; 
a firm demarcation is thus able to be sustained between 'lay' and 
'expert' knowledge - with only the former susceptible to socio- 
logical analysis. The marked absence of concern with how they 
themselves produce their knowledge of others is a concomitant 
of 
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the fundamental disinterest in matters of sociological theory 
and their concentration firmly on its acceptance and application. 
That people's sensemaking about illness may illuminate more general 
questions is a possiblity that does not appear to have arisen. 
There are however two other strands within medical sociology, 
broadly conceived, that purport a concern with knowledge about 
medicine; the first from a sociology of knowledge point of view 
which, often drawing on anthropology, looks at the patients' 
perspective in terms of cultural variation; and the second, from that 
of social constructivism, which examines the knowledge of the 
professional discipline of medicine. 
1,2 THE RELATIVISING OF MEANING 
The thrust of medical anthropc. logy seems to be the demonstration that, 
far from being a universal system of practice and meaning, that of 
the west is only one amongst many possible accounts of the social 
organisation of sickness and health. This would seem to allow for 
the opening up of the whole question of medical knowledge. 
However, by the retention of a distinction between the notions 
of 'illness' and of 'disease' - the former being subjective and 
experiential and therefore subject to cultural relativism, the 
latter being objective and empirical and therefore not so subject - 
a universalism at the level of the physiological, that is an objective, 
a-temporal, a-cultural biological reality is sustained. It is only 
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the different meanings attributed to this biological substrate, and 
the arrangements made by various societies to deal with its pathologies 
that, accordingly, can and do differ with time and geography (cf. Chapter 
3.3). 
The medical anthropologist Fabrega (1975) has summed up this 
distinction most unequivocally in his paper, 'The need for an ethno- 
medical science' (see also Idler 1979; Last 1981): 
Terms such as 'diabetes', 'rheumatoid arthritis' or 
'multiple sclerosis' seem deceptively simple. Careful 
analysis will disclose that they represent a complex set 
of physiological, chemical and structural facts. Further- 
more, such diseases can implicate a host of social and 
psychological factors although, in a strict sense, they 
are not seen as necessary features of the disease. 
Fabrega 1975: 960 
The cultural variation in "what is considered as a biomedical 
disease" is accounted for in a lengthy footnote: 
When viewed anatomically, biochemically, and physiologically, 
the human body is often seen as 'common' to Homo sapiens. 
This seems to imply that any disease which is framed in terms 
of the body's systems can be found in any social group and will 
possess a singular form and course. In fact, biomedical 
diseases are built out of negative deviations in the values 
of observed variables, and which of these deviate in a group, 
and in what fashion, reflect physical, social and cultural 
facts. Such diseases and their 'natural histories' are thus 
not invariable or universal. In a proximal sense, the 
functioning of the apparatus is affected by such things as 
climate, altitude, level of physical activity, and items which 
are ingested and serve as food and water. Many of the effects 
of these factors are readily affected by cultural influences. 
The genetic constitution of a population, which in a distal 
sense affects the 'constitutuion' of group members, also 
reflect social and cultural influences. Finally, the actual 
cutoff points which are used to mark deviations in physiologic 
variables should in principle reflect native conventions about 
well-being, health and adaptation. Otherwise the researcher 
runs the risk of applying his own standards indiscriminately, 
forgetting that they have been generated in quite a different 
social context. What is considered as a biomedical disease 
in a native group, then, to some extent will and should reflect 
attributes of the group considered as a social and cultural 
structure. (my emphasis) 
1979: 975 
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But this complex account of variation in the 'human body', due 
directly or indirectly to "cultural" and "social" influences, maintains 
the non-variation of "the apparatus" - the "physical facts" - one of 
which is disease. Whilst diseases may be differently manifested and 
understood, nevertheless, as his discussion of the concept of 
'ethnomedicine' makes clear, for Fabrega, "disease" exists as 
a universal substrate: 
In focusing on fundamental properties of disease 
ethnomedicine can... help to clarify the effects and 
meanings of disease and thereby make its control more 
rational. (my emphases) 
19 79 :9 74 
Furthermore, as the quotation suggests, not only the substance of 
western medical knowledge - the biological bottom line - but the 
epistemology (theory and concepts) upon which it is based are taken 
as unquestionable. The implication is that the production of know- 
ledge of the "physical facts" is not itself subject to "cultural" 
or "social" influences. By his reference to the need for a more 
rational control of disease, the further implication is that the 
understandings of other societies is not only variant but irrational. 
This sanctity of the substance and the method which produces western 
scientific medical knowledge of disease is maintained even by those 
researchers whose explicit theoretical paradigm is the sociology of 
knowledge. Idler, for example, in an article entitled 'Definitions 
of health and illness and medical sociology' (1979) states (in a way 
which echoes 'Mannheim's mistake' as identified by Bloor(1973') in the 
sociology of sciencer2 
12 
Biomedical disease presents no data for sociological 
analysis, it reveals no social facts. Illness, the human ex- 
perience of disease, is an explicitly social phenomenon 
with both an objective and a subjective reality. (my emphasis) 
Idler 1979: 732 
At the end of the article she, too, considers the objectives of her 
kind of approach to health and illness, explicitly placing the role 
of lay knowledge as a complement to and not in any way a challenge 
to, medical knowledge: 
The Schutz and'Douglas LMar frameworks allow researchers to 
accept human health and illness in their own context and on 
their own terms, and they can reveal the subjective meaning 
of the experience of illness and healing and then recognise 
the knowledge of illness and healing as an important stock 
of knowledge that people have constructed for themselves 
from their cultures, histories, traditions and personal 
experience... (B)ut most important of all, perhaps, is the 
fact that these frameworks allow researchers to organize 
and classify cross-cultural material in ways which may en- 
rich the healing practices of both modern and traditional 
societies, 
. 979: 730 
This same distinction between disease and illness, between fact and 
meaning, is maintained by Eisenberg who, like Idler, draws on anthro- 
pology in order to analyse 'Distinctions between professional and 
popular ideas of sickness' (1977): "(T)o state it flatly, patients 
suffer 'illnesses'; physicians diagnose and treat 'diseases'. " In 
a revealing example drawn from the realm of 'psychiatric disorders', 
Eisenberg accepts that Charcot's patients (NB: Charcot is frequently 
attributed with the discovery of MS and the production of its first 
definitive symptomatoloty (see Chapter Two)) learnt to display what 
were to become accepted as the 'classic' symptoms hysteria. But, 
he adds: 
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Let it be clear; the patients were ill before they saw 
Charcot: what changed was the patterning of symptoms; in 
a way, doctor and patient shared a folie-a-deux. He expected 
what they produced; they came to produce what he expected. 
It was the evolution of the clinical syndrome that had been 
altered, not its initiating patho-genesis. 
Eisenberg 1977: 12 
This observation of what, it could be argued, was an instance of 
the reflexive relation between document and underlying reality is 
here provided merely as further evidence of the presence of extra- 
biological components of disease. As Eisenberg explains: 
Models tof disease are ways of constructing reality, 
ways of imposing meaning on the chaos of the phenomenal 
world. This is not to deny the independent reality of that 
world, but to emphasise that it. does not present itself 
organised in the ways we come to view it. (my emphasis) 
Eisenberg 1977: 18 
Eisenberg, like Fabrega cited earlier, argues that medicine should 
incorporate into its practice the fact that diseases are not simply 
technical, physical pathologies, but also social/cultural phenomena. 
It is the mechanistic scientific paradigm of modern medicine that is 
to blame, according to Eisenberg, for disguising this important fact. 
As he concludes: 
(O)nce medicine is reconceptualised as a disruption in an 
ongoing biological process, we will be less likely to pursue 
disease as a thing-in-itself. 
Eisenberg 1977: 21 
The argument is reformist in character: the patients' understandings 
of their condition are regarded as an essential complement to the 
identification and treatment of disease, their cultural variation 
relating only to the social conditions in which illness occurs and 
the meanings attributed to disease, 
14 
1.3 
Thus, in spite of what might have been expected, the 
sociology of knowledge perspective on medicine, like all the 
works cited in the first two sections of this chapter, fails 
in practice to look at medical knowledge at all. Rather, 
medical knowledge is the ground upon which they stand to look at 
others. 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE 
From its title, Wright and Treacher's (1982) The Problem of 
Medical Knowledge: Examining the social construction of medicine 
would seem to be addressing this very topic. In a sense of 
course, that 'everything is socially constructed' is a socio- 
logical truism. How far this refers to a specific, coherent and 
discrete sociological position; quite what is meant by constructi- 
vism; and what it is taken to imply in terms of its concomitants 
for the analyst's own epistemology and practice are, as this 
edited collection both admits and demonstrates, as debateable 
with respect to medicine as it is to other areas of sociology. 
In their Introduction, Wright and Treacher allow that the social 
constructivist perspective as far as medical sociology is 
concerned contains a variety of not always compatible themes 
and assumptions. Those whose work they have collected under that 
rubric are united, Wright and Treacher claim, by their common 
questioning of four assumptions, central to traditional historical 
and sociological approaches to medicine, viz: 
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1. That the identification of medicine or medical knowledge 
posed no difficulties; indeed it was self-evident... 
2. (T)hat modern medical knowledge was distinctive because 
it was characterised by two particular features: it was 
built upon the findings of medical science, and it was 
effective... 
3. (D)iseases, it was assumed, were natural objects which 
existed prior td and independent of their isolation or 
designation by doctors... 
4. (S)ocial forces, whether much attention was given to them 
or not, were assumed to be self-evidently distinct from 
medicine. 
Wright & Treacher 1982: 1-5 
It would appear that much of the foregoing critique in the previous 
two sections concerning medical sociological research on patients' 
perspectives itself shares the constructivist position. However, it 
is this appearance of similarity that makes social constructivism so 
useful here as a way of delineating the approach I am in fact trying 
to take. 
In addition to the shared questioning of traditional work, Wright and 
Treacher discern a unifying and distinctive theme amongst the con- 
tributions to their book: that is, a refusal: 
(T)o regard medicine and technical knowledge as pre-given 
entities, separate from all other human activities. Instead, 
it is argued, medicine is to be seen as a highly specialised 
domain of social practice and discourse, the limits and con- 
tents of which are themselves set up by wider - but not 
separate - social practices. 
Wright & Treacher 1982: 10 
What is undertaken, then, is a search for those "social practices" 
which have "set up" the "limits and contents" of medical knowledge 
and practice. The social practices and discourses identified by the 
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authors of the various papers to be involved in the 'setting up' 
of medicine may be summarised as. power, ideology, technical 
developments, cultural change, social interests, and social relations 
- acting alone or in combination. 
It is difficult to ascertain, however, the precise role being 
claimed for these 'social forces', whether they are intended to be 
explanatory - causal in either a direct sense or in terms of necessary 
and sufficient conditions for x to be as it is - or whether the claim 
is weaker. According to Wright and Treacher, the latter is the case: 
What is being proposed is not that medicine is unscientific 
because it is permeated by social forces; but, in contrast, 
that both medicine and science are essentially social 
enterprises. (my emphasis) 
Wright & Treacher 1982: 7 
Precisely which phenomena the term 'medicine' is taken to encapsulate 
is of course critical. The description of "both medicine and science" 
as "social enterprises" suggests that what is open to sociological 
analyses are only the persons, practices and institutions of medicine. 
The phrase "permeated by" suggests that there is an a priori 
independent phenomenon (of whichever conceptual type) which is in- 
filtrated by social forces which pervert it into becoming something 
it is not in itself. This suggests that there are, underneath the 
patina of social forces, phenomena that are real, independent of 
knowledge of them. The 'social forces' identified in the collection 
seem to be operating on medicine, pushing it one way or the other 
(and interestingly these forces are invariably characterised. as 
negative in the moral or evaluative sense). The modern western 
account of the anatomy and physiology of the body and the phenomna 
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of disease remain inviolable. The body is the body is the body. 
Atemporal and universal. 
The further relevance of the collection to this thesis has to do with 
the methodology used by social constructivists; in particular, 
their use of history as a way of making strange (cf. Chapter Three) 
Wright and Treacher account for the predominantly historical content 
of the collected papers in these terms: 
(U)sing historical data is not an escape from the present 
but a way into it. The apparent strangeness and distance 
of the past enable one to discern features that are camou- 
flaged in the present by the very taken for grantedness of 
everyday experience. We use the past to shake confidence 
in the 'obvious' appearance of medicine today, not in order 
to sanctify it as has so often happened in histories of 
medicine. 
Wright & Treacher 1982: 2 
The difference Wright and Treacher claim for social constructivism 
from the traditional histories of medicine is that previously, 
change was attributed predominantly to the activities of individuals - 
the genuises who made great discoveries. In addition, they explicit- 
ly reject what they call such "positivist" Whig histories according 
to which 'medicine now' is portrayed as the summit or at least the 
high ground of true knowledge, the culmination of centuries of 
onward and upward progress. Their own contention is that by a 
knowledge of past variations, paradigm shifts in medical theory and 
so on, present obviousness loses its solidity. Because medical 
knowledge had been different in the past; if - unless it is assumed 
that past notions of reasonableness were discontinuous with ours - 
that knowledge was once otherwise and sensibly so for people in 
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that past, then 'something' must be acting on the world of the 
physical - producing these differences. 
The object (of medical knowledge) may appear to shift according 
to changes in theories, but this is because the point of view (liter- 
ally) of the observer is held to shift vis a vis the object, each 
of whom thus sees a different aspect of the same thing, that 
'seeing' a result of their location in history. If this something 
that changes is not a change in the physical (because that does 
not change), then it must be social in some sense. It is thus 
history which, according to Wright and Treacher, teaches us that 
the social world is in cöntinual flux. 
Whilst in one sense this is to challenge history, nevertheless 
it is to use historical data and, concomitantly, to regard the 
practice of history as itself a form of knowledge which is a- 
theoretical and therefore immune from those same social forces that 
they claim inexorably effect medicine as a theoretical practice. 
According to the theory of history which Wright and Treacher (and 
the authors in their collection) employ, 'the past' exists independent 
of analysis. For the method depends on looking at 'what actually 
happened' in the past. 
Their study of the past appears to bring to analytic 
visibility the decisive and particular social forces which constructed 
medicine today (because one can now see what happened in the end; 
for example which theory of asthma won out (Gabbay 1982)), it is 
possible, they assume, to trace the story to which 'now' is the 
conclusion; to see, by that conclusion, out of the "melee of conflict- 
ing social forces" (11) acting in the past and in the present, the 
19 
structure and features of the plot which lead (was always leading) to 
things as they are now. It does not seem, at least in this collection, 
that social constructivism leads to any serious doubts about the 
independence of the analyses they themselves produce from the effects 
of 'the same' social forces. 
Social constructivism in medical sociology, as in much of 
the sociology of science, falls short of reflexivity: reflexivity, 
that is, as conceived as the problematic in the social studies 
of scientific knowledge. 
4 
Wright and Treacher themselves use this term in reference to 
Gabbay's paper in their book. According to my reading, Gabbay 
uses the substantive topic of theories of asthma for an examination 
of the theoretical problematics entailed in the demonstration of 
the social construction of medical knowledge. His paper takes the 
form of proceeding to consider a number of possible constructivist 
approaches to the question in turn: the diachronic (theories of 
asthma over long periods of time; synchronic (theories of asthma held 
at the same period); and the single treatise on asthma. He employs 
each of these approaches consi? ering them in terms of (i) their 
resolution of contrived paradoxes; (ii) the homologies between 
domains of thought (for example between concurrent political/medical 
theories); and (iii) in terms of the biographical approach (that is 
the life of a proponent of a particular theory of asthma). But, as 
he demonstrates, each approach,. whilst offering "insights" into 
the question of theories of asthma, entails assumptions about that which 
it set out to examine. Having worked through these constructivist 
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approaches, as he puts it: "Our attempt at proof has, in short, left 
us in a position of historical paralysis. " (1982: 42). Insofar as 
it is not only medical knowledge about asthma that is the product of 
and that produces "the social world", this. "(mutatis mutandis)" also 
applies to historical knowledge. Whilst there appeared to be two 
choices offered as means to escape "paralysis"; there is therefore, 
Gabbay argues, in fact no choice "but to act on the insights which 
have emerged, and develop the analysis further. " (1982: 42). This, 
however, is the final sentence of his article, and there is no 
suggestion as to how this might be done. 
5 
The aporia which his demonstration has produced is, however, 
recharacterised by Wright and Treach er in such a way as to defuse 
the epistemological menace of its implicit reflexivity (a term which 
they, but not Gabbay himself, use). According to Wright and Treacher's 
paraphrase, Gabbay's argument is that: 
It is more justifiable and more fruitful to try to relate 
past medical knowledge to the whole range of social circum- 
stances in which it was generated and used. This however, he 
[Gabbay] insists is no simple or straightforward task for, as 
in medicine, so in historical analysis, the undertaking is 
rooted in our own social circumstances. We only understand 
such processes better if we develop a reflexive form of 
historical method not founded on scientistic notions of 
causal proof. 
1982: 15 
Apart from other indications, their use of the term "scientistic" 
allows for the untainted existence of 'scientific': an opposition 
which, I would argue, marks their non-recognition of the serious 
consequentiality of Gabbay's paper. Defused in this way, Gabbay's 
paper is made to merge with the rest of the collection and Wright 
and Treacher can continue Unperturbed with their depiction of the 
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concrete and constructive purposes of social constructivism; 
The search for a timeless medicine unaffected by its 
social contexts is, in our view, as misconceived and 
as misleading as the quest for the Philosopher's Stone. 
The way forward to forms of medicine which better serve 
the ends which their clients require of them is not, we 
would contend, through such a search, but through re- 
cognising the inherently social nature of medicine and 
through developing its. structures, institutions and 
relationships in which forms, of medicine that are 
considered desirable are most likely to grow. (my emphasis) 
Wright & Treacher 1982: 15 
As this quotation makes clear, the relation of medical knowledge 
to its object remains as given; it is not medical knowledge, despite 
the title of the collection, but the practices and institutions of 
medicine that require sociological analysis. Similarly, with the 
exception of Gabbay, the means by which social constructivists 
produce their own knowledge remains, for them, autonomous. For them, 
the term "reflexive analysis" operates as an antonym for 'scientism': 
a kind of sensitive self-reflection. 
A Critique of Social Constructivism 
The critique developed by Bury of social constructivism (1984) 
6- 
upon 
which all of the works cited so far could be seen more or less 
explicitly to be premised - nicely encapsulates a"common view of 
reflexivity: and the grounds upon which it is rejected. An examination 
of Bury's critique thus provides a timely reminder of the difference 
and difficulty of the path I am attempting to pursue in this thesis - 
that which might cone after Gabbay's last sentence. 
Whilst I share some of Bury's criticisms of social constructivism, 
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I differ fundamentally from. the conclusions he draws about its value 
as. a theoretical position. 
Bury concedes that social constructivism7 is interesting in 
that it brings "normal, physical" medicine under the gaze of the 
sociological perspective (previously only done in regard to mental 
illness); and in that it regards it as inherently problematic. 
According to Bury, social constructivism challenges the notion of 
"disease" as an autonomous entity, arguing that medical knowledge 
is "deeply implicated" in social relations. It has gone beyond 
what he dubs as the "crude views" of medicine-as-sinister to develop 
certain marxist analyses in a more sophisticated form (citing 
Figlio 1982 as an example). Social constructivism is of interest 
because in addition it is "strongly counter-intuitive"; it makes 
the "mundane enigmatic"; 'and in any case it is influential (and 
here he cited Ian Kennedy's 1980 Reith Lectures ' The Unmasking of 
Medicine' and the work of Sontag (1979)). 
However, in spite of these virtues, for Bury social constructi- 
vism remains deeply unsatisfactory. For, he argues, few of its 
practitioners have even recognised let alone attempted to tackle 
the fact that their work falls into the problem of "all such 
relativist approaches"; that is, that it is inevitably self-under- 
cutting. If, as under its own logic it should, "scientific method 
becomes a myth", then all that remains possible for an analyst is 
a "radical relativism", a position from within which - as, according 
to Bury, everybody knows .. anything and therefore nothing can be 
said with certainty. 
8 
This failure of recognition is made possible, Bury. explains, 
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by social constructivits' simplistic misuse of their own claimed 
theoretical sources. They invoke Foucault for example yet completely 
ignore the strong influence of the nihilistic philosophy epitomised 
by the influence of Nietzsche evident in Foucault's later work. They 
invoke Kuhn as if he was, like them, "anti-science" whereas in fact, 
according to Bury, Kuhn was only against the "liberal-rational myth" 
of science, and indeed, quite on the contrary, "celebrated" science 
for its emphasis on notions of community, consensus and authority 
as its authenticating values. Furthermore Bury argues to embrace 
the constructivist perspective is to do in effect what is, ironically, 
conservative sociology, which "merely records" the status quo. 
Even the work of Foucault itself, Bury remarks, contains an "ideo- 
logical elusiveness" and not, as constructivists assume, the "clear 
radical commitment" which is his popular reputation. 
Bury is equally sceptical of the emphasis in social construct- 
ivism on the ideological power of medicine, He surmises that 
research into 11' knowledge would reveal that far from being the 
passive subjects constructivists presume, individuals are in fact 
far from being dominated or cowed by the single all-powerful para- 
digm of scientific medical ideology. 
Bury also attacks social constructivism at the level of its 
outcomes. As with all perspectives derived from the sociology of 
knowledge, in its attempts to produce analysis at a generalised 
and universal level, social constructivism perforce places sociology 
at the "margins of social debate. " By which he means that it quite 
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excludes the possibility of medical sociology's ever engaging 
in the collaborative work with other disciplines that is, Bury 
claims, essential for good and influential work (and thus sociological 
work at all). 
This debate and the specific points that are attacked by Bury 
parallel some of those made within the sociology of science by 
critics of the social constructivism of researchers such as Collins 
Collins (eg 1981) who are, as discussed in the Introduction, one 
of the formative influences for the beginning of this thesis. 
Wright and Treacher themselves acknowledged such parallels: 
From the late 19th century until recently, medical know- 
ledge lay behind a seemingly unbreachable conceptual 
barrier. 
Wright & Treacher 1982: 1 
In a footnote to this they added: 
So, for that matter, has the study of scientific knowledge. 
There are many parallels between the history/sociology of 
science and the history/sociology of medicine. In social 
studies of science, studies of scientific knowledge were 
extremely rare. Over the last ten years or so however, a 
body of writing has developed which devotes far more attention 
to the structure of knowledge. 
Wright & Treacher 1982: 198 
To be noted, however, is their reference to the "structure of 
knowledge" as a topic amenable to sociological analysis - yet at 
the same time, as has been argued in the previous section, the 
paradoxical immunity of biological/scientific fact from their 
critique. It is the legitimation of one theory and the de-legitimation 
of others that they see as subject to social forces: but the consti- 
tution of theory, how the knowledge is itself produced from 'evidence' 
that they fail to regard as amenable to constructivism's critique. 
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The crucial point as far as my own research is concerned is Bury's 
rejection of the 'relativism' of'social constructivism on the grounds 
that it leads to 'radical relativism'. The grounds upon which this 
rejection is based are explicitly practical/strategic. That is, 
'radical relativism' is banished not because Bury argues that there 
is anything inherently incorrect in it but in order that sociology 
may be continued. 
This move, it seems to me, contradicts his own adherence to 
the canons/possibility of research; for it is, by his own account, 
the pursuit of knowledge of "normal physical medicine", by traditional 
sociological methods,. that has inexorably produced the relativism of 
social constructivist theory (if not its practice). And thus, to 
follow the same logic on, it cannot be rejected on the grounds 
simply of its unwelcome implications. 
What Bury has found and rejected in social constructivism is 
the problematic of reflexivity; paradoxically found through his 
critique of the failures of social constructivists to pursue. the 
implications of their work to the bitter end. 
One of the major factors enabling the problem of reflexivity to 
simply not arise is, as I have been arguing, the acceptance both 
by traditional medical sociology and social constructivism of the 
mundane facticity of science - both in its method and its theoretical 
basis as an objective means by which to discover And describe the 
world. 
Part of that 'world' which medical science discovers and 
describes is the patient in terms of her physiology and diseases; 
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medical sociology discovers and describes the patients' perspectives. 
Both objects of research are deemed to have the status of objective 
fact. It is because science is regarded at simply factual that 
the patients' perspective, lay knowledge, is by definition subordinate 
to scientific medical knowledge and practice. 
In the chapter which follows I turn to the medical research 
literature on MS - in order to substantiate, through the analysis 
of a single text, what has been implied throughout this one: that 
the assumption that medical knowledge arises simply from the 
nature of disease is not tenable. The 'nature of the disease' 
is constituted in reflexive relationship with the theorising 
practices brought to its study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LAY/EXPERT KNOWLEDGE OF MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS * 
THE CASE OF THE COMTE D'ESTE 
In the previous chapter, the resort by social constructivism to 
history as one means of 'making strange' was opposed by the assertion 
that history is not merely a matter of letting documents of the past 
(or of the present) speak for themselves. The objective of this 
chapter is to substantiate that assertion, through the close read- 
ing of one such document, an entry in the diary of Augustus, Comte 
D'Este, dated 1822 (See Figure 2.1 overleaf). 
The extract appears in McAlpine et al's multiple Sclerosis: A 
Reappraisal (1972), one of the most frequently cited texts on MS 
(in 89 papers in 1982, according to the Science Citation Index). 
As shown in Figure 2.1, the Comte's diary is described by McAlpine 
as: "(T)he earliest description of multiple sclerosis" (1972: 112). 
However, since the Comte does not describe what is wrong with him 
as MS - the first (expert) naming and description of the disease not 
appearing until some thirty years later - in order to read the 
diary as a case of MS, it is necessary to be armed with substantial 
'already knowns' about MS: to be an expert reader. 
For a summary of the non-medical 
literature on ? 4S, see Appendix 2.1 
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1 The earliest description of multiple sclerosis is contained 
2 in a small diary bearing the title, the Case of Augustus 
3 d'Este, now in the library of the Royal College of Physicians 
4 in London, from which extracts were published by Firth in 
5 1948. At the age of twenty-two, the first entry occurs: 
6 In the month of December 1822 I travelled from 
7 Ramsgate to the Highlands of Scotland for the purpose 
8 of passing some days with a Relation for whom I had 
9 the affection of a son. On arrival I found him dead. 
10 I attended his funeral: there were many persons present 
11 and I struggled violently not to weep: I was however 
12 unable to prevent myself from doing so. Shortly after 
13 the funeral I was obliged to have my letters read to me, 
14 and their answers written for me, as my eyes were so 
15 attacked that when fixed upon minute objects indistinct- 
16 ness of vision was the consequence. Until I attempted 
17 to read, or to cut my pen, I was not aware of my eyes 
18 being in the least attacked. Soon after I went to 
19 Ireland, and without anything having been done to my 
20 eyes, they completely recovered their strength and 
21 distinctness of vision. 
22 Subsequent entries in the diary leave no doubt about the 
23 diagnosis. 
McAlpine 1972: 112 
Figure 2.1 The Text: From 'Some Aspects of the Natural History 
of Multiple Sclerosis (Contd)', Chapter 4 in McAlpine 
et al (1972) Multiple Sclerosis: A Reappraisal, 99-131. 
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That the reading of a text requires what Barthes (1975) has called 
'already knowledge' is not a privileged secret amongst cogniscenti. 
It is common knowledge, upon which McAlpine himself relies and 
presumes in other readers.: 
Doubtless owing to difficulties in evolving valid methods 
of assessing the effect of emotional factors on the onset 
and cause of MS, recent data is not available. Relevant 
material from our first book and quotations from case 
histories of which the Comte's diary is one being discussed 
while meaningful to those with experience of this ubiquitous 
disease, will for others merely underline the need for 
further studies. (my emphasis) 
McAlpine 1972: 1111 
For McAlpine, the meaning of a case history depends on its reader 
being able to bring to the text a body of experience. By impli- 
cation, the meaning of the text is there waiting to be discovered. 
It is in the light of this reading through experience that the 
diary can be understood as being ... a case of MS; 
by drawing on that 
prior knowledge, this case history can be seen as having 
been a 
contribution, Dathing towards that - same - knowledge of MS 
(Smith 1978) 
In what follows, I will go through the extract quoted by McAlpine 
step-by-step (Barthes 1975), bringing out (bringing in) those 
features which enable me to see it as relevant to certain themes 
current in MS research; pointing out some of the significances I 
can now see lying behind the surface of the diary's text. 
The point of. this chapter is to demonstrate that medical 
knowledge is not simply a matter of the discovery of natural facts 
but is produced - and re-produced - by theorising practices; 
practices which, furthermore, operate on and engulf 'lay accounts' 
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in such a way as to render them precursors or 'merely documents' 
for medical knowledge. MS is itself constructed. out of such 
artefacts as the Comte's diary. 
But let me be clear. The contention in this chapter is not that 
people do not suffer, nor that neurologists, epidemiologists and 
clinicians are fools. It is that the object of research -. in this 
case MS - is constituted in theorising practices as the thing it 
is held to be; an object which then hasan indeterminable relation 
to what 'is': an object which is constituted in its particularities 
by the knowledge brought to bear upon documents taken to be 'of' 
MS (cf. Latour & Woolgar 1979). 
*** 
"The earliest description of multiple sclerosis... " (line 1) 
A description is always 'of' something: the concept of description 
entails an object: the object here is multiple sclerosis, a name 
for a disease, which is to say, a disease with a name. That is, 
a disease is taken to be an object with the capacity to be described. 
Even if current descriptions are in detail incomplete, as is the 
case with MS - see Kurtzke 1980a2 - there are at least conceptual- 
isable if not yet discovered boundaries between 'it' and everything 
else. The enterprise of research rests on the assumption that MS 
is a describable, discrete entity in some way, existing independent 
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of description: an assumption that is never questioned. Although 
some current researchers are exploring the notion that the term MS 
as hitherto used may have mistakenly embraced more than one disease 
(this being a possible explanation of the wide variety of symptoms, 
manifestations and prognoses currently and somewhat awkwardly 
having to be included under this name), that there is something to 
be properly called MS is not seen thereby to be challenged. The 
question merely concerns correcting or refining that which should 
and should not be included in the category, not whether MS is - 
there waiting to be dis-covered by research (Stazio et al 1964; 
see also Bauer 1978; Broman et al 1981). 
The concept of disease is consequential for knowledge about 
it: if there is a something (because it may be described), then it 
is not the same as, coterminous with, a normal body but is something 
in addition. This opens the way to particular hypotheses. 'It' 
may invade the body (cf. theories of MS as an infectious disease, 
or as an exogenous virus entering vulnerable bodies (Isager. et al 
1980; Poskanzer et al 1980a)); or be 'created' by the body as a 
reaction, for example by the body's normally protective auto-immune 
system turning against itself (Poskanzer et al 1980b). Certain 
effects are noted (as in the Comte's diary), taken to be the effects 
of something, and that something, the particular effects taken 
together and thus differentiated in that association from other 
diseases (with other groupings of effects) that are known to exist, 
constitute MS. How could you, it could beýobjegted, seek for a 
description of something that did not exist, underly the documents 
which, as the Comte's diary bears witness, may be described? The 
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reflexivity inherent in this relation of document to underlying 
'reality' (Woolgar 1981) is rehdered invisible by the technical 
level at which the problem of what MS is are addressed, which is 
in turn entailed by the operative concept of disease. The task of 
research, then, is to identify the object: MS in its uniqueness. 
The nosology of diseases rests - at least in principle - on the 
possibility of accurate description. Once this accuracy is deemed 
to have been achieved, then not only what is, but also maybe why 
and how it is will be illuminated. How then may something unknown 
be described? 
One way to begin is on the basis of what is already known, 
by distinguishing it from other things or by drawing analogies with 
something similar in effect. MS is seen as being both like and 
unlike other diseases: 
The symmetrical relationship between incidence, prevalence 
and age in MS is not shared by other such obscure diseases 
as rheumatoid arthritis which is said to be due to an auto- 
immune process... or ulcerative colitis. 
McAlpine et al : 1972 
Thus diseases which are currently described (and obscure? ) are 
used as models for possible revelations about MS itself (cf. also 
Poskanzer et al 1963). What is unknown is sought through what is 
known, on the basis of assumed similarities and differences between 
critical features, like finding the size of an angle in a triangle 
given knowledge of two of them. 
4 
However, as far as the example 
cited by McAlpine et al quoted above is concerned, as will be 
discussed below, none of the three 'angles' - incidence, prevalence 
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and age, and neither, therefore, the relationship between them - is 
known with any degree of certainty in the case of MS. Nevertheless, 
the ordering of knowledge, that assumes diseases conform to universal 
logical patterns provides for, links to, is possible to deduce from, 
what is not yet known. This ordering is regarded as a task in 
principal completeable. 
A disease, MS, is taken not only to be a discrete, describeable 
phenomenon, but, although unnatural in the sense that it is con- 
ceived of as a pathology of the normal, it is assumed nonetheless to 
conform with one characteristic of the normal-natural: it will have 
a 'natural history', both as a disease and in the body of an 
individual, that may be traced. 
The Comte's diary is cited by McAlpine in his chapter 'The 
Natural History of MS', a history that has a beginning. McAlpine 
says the diary is "the earliest" description of the disease; thus 
that there is a sequential story with a beginning (and therefore 
implicitly one which will have an end) of its discovery. But the 
beginning of MS is not unproblematic. 'The beginning' is identified 
by the date as 1822. There are however other versions of the 
"earliest description" of MS (and see Appendix 2.2). 
Previous to the nineteenth century, MS was unknown. 
Knowledge concerning this disease began in development 
of pathology and it was an English student, Carswell, 
who first described plaques of MS in the, human spinal 
cord, and Cruveillher, a French Neuropathologist, wrote 
the first important treatise to show the morphology. The 
clinical picture, recognition of the. symptoms and the 
course of the disease emerged gradually within the next 
thirty or forty years, culminating in the classical 
descriptions of the French neurologist Charcot. 
Bauer 1978: 3 
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- which places Carswell in around the 1830's, Charcot's classical 
works being published in the late 1860's and 1870's (Charcot 1868; 
1872; 1877). 
McAlpine refers to the diary as a first description, noticeably 
not as 'the discovery'. This first description of MS comes from 
an account by a lay person, the Comte D'Este; it is not 
the discovery. He did not discover MS, only experienced its This 
point will be elaborated below (cf. also Chapter Four). 
A 'natural history' though, it seems, can only begin with 
a written record: what is not written, preserved, cannot become 
history. 6 Bauer declares in his account of its origins that 
"previous to the nineteenth century, MS was unknown" (my emphasis); 
but perhaps this is no more than saying it might well have existed 
but we (and this 'we' is not everyone) did not know about it. That 
is, its existence prior to the record does not count as, cannot 
count as, historical data. So 'the beginning' cannot be the begin- 
ning. Natural history begins, rather, with a particular kind of 
knowledge: the diary thus becomes an example of a pre-historical 
period, a kind of precursor to history proper. Let me take the next 
step, following the text. 
"... is contained in a small diary... " (1-2) 
The source of this "first description" is a. "small diary", the 
private record of a non-doctor. By reading this phrase in con- 
junction with the next: "... now in the library of the Royal College 
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of Physicians in London" (3-4) and McAlpine's remark: "subsequent 
entries in the diary leave no doubt about the diagnosis" (22), we 
have an example of how lay knowledge - as was described in the previous 
chapter - is incorporated into the medical account in such a way as 
to deny it significance in its own right, a significance that 
might perhaps challenge the assumptions upon which the medical 
model is premised. It is by being included in the archives of 
the Royal College of Physicians that the Comte's amateur description 
of his condition has become source materal, raw data, to be re- 
created by experts (physicians, McAlpine) as the first documented 
case of MS. It is this recreation that 'confirms' that D'Este's 
description was the product of ignorance, by its very difference 
from the physician's account. Thus, lay knowledge of disease, 
the Comte's selection and depiction of events in his body which 
seemed to him to be significant, are allowed for in expert knowledge: 
but it is by the admission of the diary into the library of 
the RCP that it becomes data, and only by the explication of its 
'real' medical significance by those qualified to do diagnosis in 
retrospect (expert readers of the diary) that elevates it above 
mere subjective reminiscence. The expert readers are those, of 
course, who can recognise MS in the Comte's account. 
"... a small diary... " (2) 
One fundamental problem that concerns epidemiologists in respect of 
their research into MS is the difficulty of accurate data collection: 
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specifically relevant here is the oft-stated need for prospective 
rather than retrospective data, in order to identify accurately the 
point of onset of the disease in a patient (the beginning of the 
natural history of the disease in the individual). For what 
usually happens is that by the time a patient presents herself to 
a doctor, MS, it is assumed, will have been present in the body for 
some time, Given, however, that only one person in 20,000 it is 
said is likely to develop MS in any one year, even in those areas 
of the world where it is most prevalent (McAlpine et al 1972: 3), 
it is held to be impracticable to carry out prospective longitudinal 
studies on populations, the only form of study which would allow 
for the very earliest signs to be recorded before they were recognised 
to have been MS (see Kurtzke et al 1979)7 
A diary is by definition written in the present rather than 
retrospectively (although the verb tenses plus the several weeks' 
events referred to in this single extract from the diary raises 
doubts about just how closely it was written to the events it 
records) - and thus could not have been influenced by what will 
later be known to have had significance. In that the Comte seems 
not to have known what was really the matter and, at the time of 
writing, (according to this extract at least), gives no sign of 
understanding his recovery to be temporary, his record of symptoms 
can thus be taken less problematically as recording the accurate 
point of onset of MS. 
One could add however that this problem is not merely tech- 
nical: for once named, MS is available to. operate - like a prefatory 
statement - providing for the re-interpretation of not only the 
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present but the past as leading up'to the present, the diagnosis of 
MS. Thus the identification of occurrences in that past as occur- 
rences signifying the . MS to come is not a matter of mere description 
but of ret"construction. This, one could also add, is not a 
problem confined to events in the past, but also to the accounts 
of those in 'the present'. 
"... bearing the title, 'The Case of Augustus D'Este... " (2-3) 
History depends on documents in another sense. One may speculate 
that the diary of a less well-connected person may not have found 
its way into the library of the Royal College of Physicians (Field 
mentions that Sir (sic) Augustus D'Este was in fact the illegitimate 
son of one of the sons of George III and an English lady he met in 
Göttingen (Field 1978: 31)), and consider the factors involved in 
any one piece of evidence being preserved qua evidence, or even ever 
being'noticed at all; and of course the consequences for knowledge of 
what will thus always be indeterminantly absent from any collection 
of evidence. 
The diary is described as a "case". It is noticeable that of the 
earliest published research papers on MS - as. recorded in the index 
Medicus, first published in 1877 - the case history was frequently 
used as the basis for medical research articles on ISIS. In 1879, 
11 out of 25 articles (44%); in 1889 12 out of 21. (48%) and in 1899, 
18 out of 42 (43%). (This may be an underestimate if some papers 
are based on cases but do not specifically say so in their titles). 
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By comparison with the titles of current research papers in the 
Index, it is clear that the case history has fallen into disuse as 
a research tool. The most recent articles on MS indexed under 'case 
histories' in the Index were in 1959 when there were 3 out of 105 
(3%), although it remains in use at the anecdotal level (and is 
used in McAlpine et al in this way) and, of course as a basic 
tool for- diagnosis. 
This movement away from the case history is not without its 
critics. As Bauer remarked, in his talk to the Annual General - 
Meeting of the Charity ARMS (Action for Research into Multiple 
Sclerosis) in 1978, in discussing the slow progress of MS research: 
Elf 
yoj sum up the amount of money that has been spent on 
animal models, on basic questions, on things that have been 
tagged with MS more-or less optionally to count as basic 
research, I think that the amount that has been spent on 
MS proper has been very low. I made a rough calculation a 
few years ago, and found that less than twenty percent was 
spent on observations in patients. This is one of the 
important areas requiring expansion. 
Bauer 1978: 6 
For Bauer, research into "MS proper" means looking at patients. 
g 
This involves, however, "observations" of them, as objects rather 
than participants in research. The clinician's 'case history' is 
elicited from a patient; unelicited cases, like that of the Comte, 
are not used for MS research. 
One should note that, although not alluded to by McAlpine, 
Firth's original article includes a remarkably overt example of 
evaluative interpretation by a doctor of a patient's case history. 
Quoting from the final passages of the Comte's diary, Firth, himself 
an MD, comments: 
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Whatever his] end, it can hardly be mourned, as the last 
picture n his diary] is that of an afflicted man, pre- 
maturely aged, bald, becoming deaf, with a spasticity of 
such severity that locomotion was only possible with the 
aid of the shoulder of his servant, or his chair on wheels. 
Firth 1948: 22 ' 
Whilst I am not suggesting that such a 'better dead' view of 
disability would be held today, nevertheless Firth's gloss on the 
case of the Comte highlights the fact that no patient's account 
can be interpreted, as it were, neutrally. Doctors, too, have to 
'make sense' of the 'facts' of history. 
"... now in the library of the Royal College of physicians... " (3-4) 
I have already commented on this elevation of lay knowledge tö 
the status of 'raw data'. The statement that the diary is now 
deposited in this library may also be considered in the light of 
the fact that each discipline has its own special archive, con- 
sisting of particular documents picked out from all possible ones 
as especially being about, related to, informative about, the 
discourse of medicine as a practice, and discipline. They are 
commonly regarded as records of the history of the discipline; 
seldom as reflexively constitutive of the discipline itself, or 
of the knowledge upon which that discipline is grounded. 
"... from which extracts were published by Firth in 1948... " (4-5) 
That Firth's article is cited by McAlpine in McAlpine et al; 
that Field, who also cites McAlpine et al also referred to the 
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Comte; that I am citing their work and their citations , is a 
small loop in the sLrik-Ongly incestuous web whereby certain com- 
ponents of 'the literature' on MS, and thus particular items of 
knowledge rather than others are perpetuated, whilst others never 
seem to be included in it. It may be one of the ways in which, in 
practice, that the almost exponentially growing mass (Figure 2.2) 
is reduced to manageable proportions, access to what counts as 
1971 17.2 column inches 
1972 20.0 
1973 30.0 
1974 35.0 
1975 36.2 
1976 49.0 
1977 57.5 
1978 67.0 
1979 68.5 
1980 77.2 
1981 80.5 
Figure 2.2: Entries re. 'Multiple Sclerosis' in the8 
Permuterm Index; Science Citation Index 
1971-1981 
the literature made through citation indices such as the Index 
Medicus (which I have myself used) and via works already referred 
to by others (and see Wynne & Robinson 1983). 
Whether the incestuousness is more marked in the PSS research 
corpus than in that on other topics is difficult to say. But 
certainly particularly, although not exclusively, in the epidemio- 
logical literature, a mere handful of names are kept in circulation, 
by both quotation and reference. 
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A warrant for this repeated re-circulation of citation could 
be, as Kurtzke has suggested (1980a), 
9 
that once the reputation of an 
individual researcher or research team is established, their 
name may be taken to guarantee a certain standard (conformity 
with desired standards) of practice, which in turn would guarantee 
their findings. But whatever the reason, one consequence is that 
whilst the number of publications increases, the core literature 
remains confined and, since it remains rooted in the unquestioned 
authority of a few key texts and authors, research into MS - 
ironically, given the admitted lack of progress in over a hundred 
years - appears to be working on the right lines; the lines that 
will, 'given more time and money', produce the answers to MS. 
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".. at the age of twenty-two... " (5) 
As has been indicated, a problem acknowledged by epidemiologists 
working in MS is the difficulty of ascertaining the age of onset of 
MS in any particular person with any degree of accuracy; made 
more difficult because the knowledge is that there are early, pro- 
dromal symptoms which, to those who know, mark the onset of the 
disease but which may be so ordinary - pins and needles, fleetingly 
blurred vision (as in the Comte's case), headaches and so on 
(Kuroiwa 1975) 11 that they would not be remarked sufficiently by 
a person to cause him to go to a doctor, where they would have 
been entered into the case notes, become part of that person's 
case history. The earliest signs have to be recalled retrospectively. 
Some of the nrobleas arising from this necessity Nave already 
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been discussed. Why, however, 'is it deemed crucial to pin-point 
onset? And what, therefore, is the consequentiality of the 
problems of doing so? 
According to the fundamental concept of disease, MS 'must' 
have a beginning, a natural history within the body of the patient. 
If it was possible to establish onset then the search for the 
causes of MS would be simplified, for it could be targeted on the 
period immediately prior to that point. 
Yet at the same time, current knowledge of. MS is that "the 
onset of MS 
¶is\ in young adulthood" (Ricarp 1981: 1290); this 
despite the acknowledged current impossibility of marking its 
beginnings in an individual and despite reports in the literature 
of its occurrence in children (Gall 1958; Brandt et al 1981 for 
example). Putting the latter to one side as aberrations, the 
Comte's age of twenty-two would be typical and, as such, another 
ground for the diagnosis of his condition as MS. 
The age of onset is taken as significant also in terms of the 
prognosis for an individual, the later the onset the higher the 
probability of rapid deterioration or degree of severity of the 
disease (Kurtzke et al 1977; Herndon & Rudick 1983). 
The matter of onset is an instance of what in one place 
in the literature appears an apparently full awareness of the 
problems of the, data upon which-the knowledge of MS has had to be 
based, and yet whose unreliability at another is put into the 
background, becoming rather the unquestioned basis for another 
element of the description of MS. 
12 
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".. in the month of December, 1822... " (6) 
If this is, as McAlpine avers, the first entry in the. Comte's 
diary, that it was the state of his body at that time that., 
provided the impetus for keeping a record, then December 1822 
marked a noticeable event, what was, to him, a non-normal bodily 
occurrence. Notions of normality-abnormality, bodily health 
and bodily ill health, something wrong and nothing-wrong, all too 
often go unexamined, as if everyone knows what they mean and how 
these. antitheses mark out the parameters of what is possible. 
Pins and needles may be - just pins and needles, or the start of 
MS. Signs are taken as symptoms of, documents of the underlying 
reality of the condition of the body. The signs are however only 
significant in retrospect - or ä projected retrospect which enables 
them to be ignored or brought to notice - and against the parameters 
of the normal - dependent on the meaning attributed to the signs. 
Social anthropologists have noted the cultural specificy 
of meanings of bodily events: the tribe where the men feel the 
labour pains and the women briefly pause in their field work to 
give birth and so on. It is not events - the blurring of the 
vision - but. the meaning attributed to them - as not-normal that 
constitutes them as 'events' in the first place. The identification 
of December 1822 as being the time of the event'which began the 
Comte's MS, constitutes it as an event. 
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"... I travelled from Ramsgate to the Highlands of Scotland... " (6-7) 
A significant fact for epidemiologists is the geographic distri- 
bution of MS, one thesis currently much in favour being that there 
are three distinct zones, the prevalence of MS differing between 
them, the higher the prevalence the more distant from the equator 
(Hyllested & Kurland 1966; Acheson 1972; Kurtzke 1980b; Baum & 
Rothschild 1981; Fischman 1982). In that the Comte lived in the 
zone furthest from the equator, where the incidence of MS is 
currently high (and, presumably, by extrapolation, then), that he 
would develop MS - and therefore that MS was what he was developing - 
is more likely than if he had lived in a low incidence zone. 
The geographic distribution, taken to be increasingly con- 
firmed as more studies are done (but see 32-33 above), opens 
the way for a number of causal hypotheses - specifically that 
environmental/social factors must play a part in the aetiology of 
the disease, which in turns opens up (determines a concentration on) 
particular lines of research. Alternatives being pursued are that 
MS is caused by an endemic virus, climatic or geophysical conditions, 
social environmental factors, racial specificity (although this 
theory is out, of favour now) (Barlow 1960; Alter 1971; Russell 1971; 
Xurtzke et al 1979; Taylor et al 1980); or a combination of 
facilitating and precipitating factors -a genetic disposition, an 
endemic virus, and a precipitating factor such as 'stress'. The 
(geographic distribution' has of course to be ascertained on the basis 
of counting cases; timt, in turn, dependent on the occurrence of 
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diagnosis (which is not the same as the occurrence of onset) 
(and see Chapter Four, passim, on the lengthy process of the 
diagnosis of MS). There are in addition multiple technical problems - 
non-standardised record-keeping practices, no universally used 
diagnostic criteria and so on. 
"... I struggled violently not to weep: I was however unable to 
prevent myself from doing so... " (11-12) 
McAlpine cites the Comte's diary in his sub-section 'Emotional 
Stress', thus directing attention towards the record of the 
violent emotion the Comte vainly endeavoured to suppress at his 
Relative's graveside. It would be possible, however, to suggest, 
on the basis of common knowledge, that the physical stress a 
journey from Kent to Scotland would involve in the winter of 1822 
as much as 'emotional' stress may have been the-precipitating 
factor. Either interpretation would be plausible and how could 
they be adjudicated between? For both are similarly reliant on 
knowledge brought to rather than arising simply from the diary. 
Certainly stress theories of various kinds have a common 
sense plausibility (and were offered to me in my own research by 
people with MS as reasons for the onset of their case of MS), and 
many linking emotion to onset occur in the literature (see 
Brickner & Simons 1950, and the extensive references cited by 
McAlpine 1972). But there is no theory which offers a precise 
explanation of the mechanisms that would be capable of trans- 
forming psychological events into physical effects. 
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The term stress is in any case so general that it would 
seem almost by definition always applicable - but not, by the 
same token, explanatory. McAlpine admits the limits of the Diary 
as a support of the hypothesis linking emotional stress to the 
onset of MS: 
Striking though individual case reports may be, the 
part played by emotional stress can only be established 
by prospective studies. 
McAlpine 1972: 114 
This is however to settle the matter technically, regarding the 
weakness of case studies as one of numbers (and of course begs 
the problems inherent in carrying out prospective studies already 
discussed). It apparently omits any scepticism about either the 
concept of stress or about the causal relation between the mental 
and the physical. It is the context of the Comte's reference to 
his suppressed emotion - as immediately prior, the noticeable event 
immediately prior to the blurring of his sight - that constitutes 
the plausibility. 
"... shortly after the funeral... " (12-13) 
The events, the noticeable blurring of his sight, according to the 
Comte, occurred "shortly" after what, according to McAlpine, was 
an emotional trauma. The temporal proximity of one event with 
another is one way used to connect them causally. There are argu- 
ments about this in the literature, but these revolve around how 
long or short a gap between two events has to be in order to 
establish their connection; nothing about why this event and that 
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are 'obviously' connected as opposed to any number of other two 
or more events (Smith 1978; Woolgar 1981). What is seen to join 
them perhaps is their shared remarkableness; extreme distress and 
then a strange symptom; an eruption of grief then blurred vision. 
Bob, one of the interviewees in my research group, said his 
daughter's MS was caused by a fall from a horse. It emerged 
only later in the interview that his daughter was now in her late 
thirties and had only recently had symptoms and been diagnosed 
with MS. The fall had been when she was about eighteen. This 
particular claim for a causal relation between two events appears 
unconvincing. But is it in essence any different than experts' 
connections? In any case, on what grounds is a short time - 
"shortly after the funeral" - more likely to indicate causality than 
a long one? 
To read the Comte's case as "striking" evidence for the 
thesis that emotional stress is a precipitating factor for MS as 
claimed by McAlpine is to put aside these problems, or, more properly, 
not to recognise them as problems. 
"... I was obliged to have my letters read to me and their answers 
written for me, as my eyes were so attacked that when I fixed upon 
minute objects indistinctness of vision was the consequence. Until 
I attempted to read, or cut my pen, I was not aware of my eyes 
being in the least attacked... " (13-18 
According to the literature, optic neuritis or astygmous is frequently 
an initial indication of the onset of MS (Feasby & Ebers 1982; isayama 
1982). It is thus only with prior knowledge of what are held to 
be early symptoms of the disease ("indistinctness of vision") that 
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the Comte's unwitting report of what it really signified: the 
onset of MS, a signification which both endorses and is endorsed 
by the expert reading of the whole diary extract. 
Given the wide variation included in the symptomatology of 
MS, it is likely that some putative symptoms (not only blurred 
vision) are never noticed as symptoms of MS. If, in this case, 
D'Este had not been literate, able and wanting to read and write, 
he may not have noticed anything wrong with his eyes and, for all 
practical purposes, these 'first symptoms' would not have existed. 
13 
Given the crucial role of onset in the general conceptualisation 
of MS and for research into its nature and cause, the possibility 
that first signs may be invisible should compound the uncertainty 
accorded to the data taken to mark onset. For it is not just the 
unlikelihood of experts being there when the first signs occur, but 
that the signs first noticed by an individual cannot be assumed to 
be really the first ones, nor, thus,. to signal the real beginning 
of the disease. 
"... Soon after I went to Ireland, and without anything having been 
done to my eyes, they completely recovered their strength and 
distinctness of vision... " (18-21) 
The disappearance of his sight disturbance without treatment, taken 
with his age when it occurred and with the emotional stress he had 
endured shortly before, cumulatively add up to evidence for the 
presence of MS - given medical knowledge of what to look for and 
what things signify: an expert reading of the diary. 
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The report of the recovery of his sight without treatment 
further endorses this reading: the knowledge is that early attacks 
are frequently temporary. It is thus the very temporariness of the 
one recorded in the diary that adds to the likelihood of his con- 
dition being MS. 
"... Subsequent entries in the diary leave no doubt about the 
diagnosis... " (22-23) 
The establishment of a diagnosis is clearly the key foundation 
upon which all knowledge of MS must rest: it is desirable - crucial - 
that those who have MS may be distinguished from those who do not. 
Yet there is currently no laboratory or clinical test which will 
establish without doubt that MS is present in the body. Schumacher 
et al described, almost twenty years ago, a situation that has not 
substantially changed (Kurtzke 1980a): 
(L)aboratory tests may lend support to the diagnosis or aid 
in ruling out other conditions but, for the present at least, 
are not of use in confirming the diagnosis. 
Schumacher et al 1965: 554 
Diagnoses are arrived at generally over a period of time (and see 
Chapter Four, passim by a combination of clinical observations, 
tests and case histories. This situation is not, according to Lewis, 
uncommon in neurology: 
As in other branches of medicine, the art of the neurolo- 
gist consists of making a diagnosis from the patient's own 
account of his illness and from the physical examination; 
aided by appropriate radio-graphic or laboratory . 
tests... 
For the neurologist, a complete and accurate history is 
essential. Very often, a precise diagnosis can be Made from 
the history and examination is simply confirmatory; the 
converse, a physical examination which provides signs not 
predictable from the history tend to come as a surprise. 
Lewis 1982: 13 
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In the light of this account, McAlpine's confidence in being able to 
diagnose the Comte's condition solely on the basis of his diary's 
report (read, that is, by an expert reader) is unremarkable, since 
the method by which he has arrived at the diagnosis of MS is not 
that different from current normal practice, a practice not 
confined to clinical situations. Kuroiwa et al (1975) for example 
report that for their epidemiological survey of the prevalence of 
MS in Japan, they examined the case records of 1,084 patients, 
assessing on that basis alone whether each person had had MS or not. 
The method is clearly dependent ultimately on lay accounts, 
patients' descriptions of their symptoms - but "a complete and 
accurate history"? Such a thing has already been put into question. 
The other element of diagnosis, after the noting of the case history, 
is the application of the appropriate disease category, which 
consists of those characteristics taken to be of MS and which thus 
constitute MS itself. There have been a number of diagnostic 
criteria developed for what is to count as is, against which the 
patient's history and the neurologist's/physician's observations 
are compared. None of the several diagnostic criteria are used to 
the exclusion of all others, but Schumacher et al's (1965) remains 
one of the most ubiquitous and highly regairded. (It is worth 
noting the list of authors involved in the development of this 
criterion, and comparing them with that closed core of epidemiologists 
commented on earlier). 
Figure 2.3 overleaf consists of a copy of the Schumacher 
criterion. 
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Figure 2.3 
C%uWW "gwwk eNsaia The diagnosis is most uses, avea wbea termed 
% aiedly delaitc" must remain am merely of high probability because of ehe lack 
of specific diagnostic tests. The familiar list of common symptoms and signs of the 
disease is of li mited value since these may be caused by other diseases or be absent 
in multiple sclerosis. As emphasised below. laboratory seats may kid support to 
the diagnosis or aid in ruling out other conditions but. for the peseat at least. are 
mot of use in confirming the diagno-. 
The following six criteria arc deadsd essential to characterise the disease state 
as diaically "definite multiple s4cres$: ' 
a. There most be objecs rboormalities on neurologic exami- 
nation attributable ina. octiou of the central nervous 
system. Symptoms aloees a matter bow suggestive, cannot 
be accepted as diagnosti of multiple sclerosis. 
Is. On neurologic examination or by history there must be evi. 
deuce of involvement of two or more separate parts of the 
central nervous system. (In determining multiplicity of lesions. certain signs or com- 
bination of them require cautious interpretation. For example, 
paleness of the temporal half of the optic disc is pathologic 
only itbeyond the average range and if supported by evidence 
of impairment of visual acuity and/or fields or by a history 
suggesting a previous attack of retrobulbar aeuropathy. It 
must also be kept in mind that "multiplicity of structural 
involvement" may occur in other central nervous system dis- 
ease without fulfilling the requirements of "separateness, ' 
'multiplicity, " or "dissemination' of lesions. Thus. if the 
involvement of several structures can be attributed to a single 
lesion at one locus, as is the case, for example, in tumor or 
infarct of the brainstem or compression of the spinal cord, 
such involvement cannot be considered as fulfilling the cri. 
terioa of "multiplicity. " Further, evidence reflecting the simul. 
mucous and symmetric involvement of the lateral and 
posterior columns of the spinal cord. found commonly in 
disease of the central serious system other than multiple 
sclerosis, cannot be interpreted as caused by multiple sclerosis 
in the absence of additional sites of involvement) 
c. The objective neurologic evidence of central nervous system 
disease must reflect predomasnely white matter involvement. 
Lae., fiber tract damage. Thus, sips must consist mainly of 
optic nerve, cerebral subconieal. conieobulbar, eorticospiosl, 
medial longitudinal faseiculus. cerebellar subcortical, spin 
cerebellar, and long sensory tract (especially posterior column) 
dysfunction. More than a minor proportion of signs of lower 
motor neurone (brainstem, spinal nuclear gray mailer. or 
peripheral serve) dysfunction will disqualify a subject as 
having multiple sclerosis for purposes of an experimental trial 
therapy. 
The involvement of the seuraxis most have occurred tempo. 
tally in one or the other of the following patterns: (1) In two or more episodes of worsening. separated by a 
period of one month or more, each episode lasting at 
least 24 hours. 
(2) Slow or stepwise progression ofsigns and symptoms. over 
a period of at least six months. These arbitrary sime. limits are necessary to exclude: (1) floc. 
enatiag or vaasnory sevrotogic impairment due 10 other 
causes (e: b, vascular). and (2) acute disseminated acurologic 
disease which is short-lived and soaucurrest (such as en- 
cephalamyelitis). 
a The ages of the patient at the oases of the disease must fall 
within the cause of 10 to 50 years. inclusive. 
f. The patient's signs and symptoms cannot be explained better 
by some other disease process, a decision which must b. 
made by a physician competent in clinical neurology. 
It it realised there will be patients who do sot meet precisely these a . tsew,, yet 
have multiple sclerosis. coa. enely. Out will be those who saehsieapyett[gtjse 
eeiteria, yet will sot be considered so have multiple adereds by the . I. nioan. 
$evertbdess, al these criteria should be no our inclusion of pasismu is a toss series. 
Schumacher GR, Neve C. Ribler R F, Kurland K T, 
Rurtske J r, NdW*eil F. Nagler R, Sibley W A, 
Tburtellotte MV and Minoan TL (1965) 
'Problems of experimental trials of therapy in 
Nnltiple Sclerosis: Report by the Panel on the 
Lvaluation of lsperiNntal Trial Therapy in 
Multiple Sclerosis. nn MY Acad Sei 122 SS2-68. 
52 
According to the authors, it consists of: 
(S)ix criteria which are deemed essential to characterise 
the disease state as 'definite multiple Sclerosis'. " 
Schumacher et al 1965: 552 
It is noticeable that, for example, for criteria 'd' and 'e' - 
a particular pattern of remission-relapse, and a limited onset 
period (between the ages of 10 and 50) - are both 'characteristics 
of MS' disputed in/by the literature (and further problematised in 
this chapter). Yet they are taken as the distinguishing features 
characteristic of the very disease state which the criteria are 
intended to define ("definite MS"). That is, the nature of MS is 
presumed prior to its definition. (Cf. Hofstadter 1980). 
Criterion 'f' on the other hand, almost suggests that MS is a 
residual category, simply the collection of those cases not other- 
wise accountable for by other diseases. 
As can be seen, the Schumacher criteria depend not only on 
symptoms and on "neurological examination" but on a patient's 
"history". As the case of the Comte itself exemplifies however, a 
person's account of their condition - the origins and early 
occurrences of their MS - cannot be ascertained independent of a 
very specific set of 'already knowns'. A 'history' simply is not 
the ascertainment of the facts of the matter, and thus cannot, 
pace Schumacher et al, provide a third, independent, source of 
objective evidence. 
The Schumacher criteria is not simply a means of establishing 
a diagnosis of MS for an individual but is the basis upon which 
knowledge about MS is both built and evaluated. Kurtzke - one of 
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those researchers dominant in the field of MS epidemiology (and co- 
author of the Schumacher paper) - in his "update" on the geographical 
distribution of MS, evaluates the validity and reliability of the 
various research findings on the basis of whether or not the 
researchers used the Schumacher criteria for definite MS as the 
basis for counting prevalence (Kurtzke 1980a). It is only those 
who did who are admitted into his 'Class A'; those papers whose 
results are to be the most trusted. It is the geographic distribution 
of MS which, as described earlier, provides for the theories that 
MS is at least partly socially/environmentally caused, a thesis 
that has been the source of a concentration of research effort 
into particular lines of enquiry. One can begin to see the con- 
sequentiality. 
Yet according to other diagnostic criteria, for example Broman's, 
the only 'definite' cases of MS are those verified by autopsy. 
Broman's system: 
(W)as presented in preliminary form at the Gottenberg 
Symposium in 1972, and... on the whole corresponds to the 
proposals made by Helmut Bauer at the Gottingen Symposium 
in 1978. 
Broman 1981: 69 
Be categorises the diagnosis of MS into a range of degrees of 
certainty, each defined on the basis of a matrix of symptoms/pattern 
so far experienced by the patient: 
Category 1- MS possible but improbable. 
2= MS possible but doubtful. 
3= MS probable but not quite convincing- 
4- MS probable beyond doubt. 
5= MS verified by autopsy. 
Broman 1981: 30 
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Since Schumacher et al's criteria are intended to be the basis for 
the selection of subjects in clinical trials, one can see that 
Broman's category of verified MS would be, to say the least, 
unfruitful. The increased number of categories available under 
Braman's system make his version appear more capable however than 
Schumacher et al's of capturing the complexity of MS, incorporating 
the variation of its experience. into its basic definition, thus 
paradoxically appearing to constitute a more precise description 
of the 'underlying realities' of MS. 
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Broman adds that there is of course no sharp delineation 
between these groups: 
We are aware of the fundamental fact that... the clinically 
estimated onset of the disease often (always? ) is 
illusory. (His query) 
Broman 1981: 31 
It appears that he is, unusually for authors in this literature, 
admitting a serious problem with the basic data on MS. But as 
his further comments make clear, these problems are conceived of 
as restricted, technical and temporary. 
1. With the methods available today, no complete 
material of MS patients is conceivable. 
2. (as quoted above) 
3. The most ambitious follow-up study of MS patients 
could never be entirely prospective, un]eoj considerable 
bias is allowed for the purpose. 
4. The correct evaluation of neurological symptoms 
sometimes is impossible to accomplish (at leas in cases 
with pronounced mental symptoms). 
Broman 1981: 31 (My emphases) 
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It is because of the manner in which "the problems" are conceived 
that Broman is able to urge that, despite the difficulties: 
(A)n attempt must be made to diagnose mil in order 
to come closer to the hidden realities. 
Broman 1981: 31 
That is, despite all the problems, even those admitted by Broman 
to be inherent in its diagnosis (let alone those I have been raising 
15; here) the independent reality ty of MS is never doubted. The 
imperative is to continue with the research rather than to go back 
to first principles. 
** 
It is not only the diary extract read, phrase by phrase, that 
constitutes it as documentary evidence of a case of MS but the 
extract read as a whole; the accumulation of indications - the 
symptoms, the circumstances in which they occurred, the age of the 
Comte and so on - which, taken together along with the "subsequent 
entries" (22) in the diary - that make it so. 
It is also the context in which the diary is itself cited: 
in the authoritative text on MS (and see ? igure 2.3 overleaf). 
Guided by McAlpine's (expert's) statement of what it means, any 
alternative interpretation of the diary is thereby rendered 
redundant. 
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Chapter 2 in 'Re: Reading Written 
Data' (Wynne 1989: 27-59) 
'Lay/Expert Knowledge of MS' 
(Wynne 1983) 
Multiple Sclerosis: A Reappraisal 
(McAlpine et al 1972) 
'Some Aspects of the Natural History 
of Multiple Sclerosis: Precipitating 
and aggravating factors' 
(McAlpine 1972) 
0 
'The Case of Augustus, Comte d'Este' 
(Firth 1948) 
'The Diary of the Comte d'Este' 
(D'Este 1822) 
A 
.0 
i 
Figure 2.4: The Embedding of the Text 
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In taking this passage from McAlpine step-by-step, I have been able 
to bring out themes within MS research that seem to be to be in- 
vokable by the text itself, relevances to the body of knowledge 
which constitutes (in both senses), is specific to, research into 
this disease but invokable only by those who already know what 
this body of research consists of and who thus may be defined as, 
included in the category of, experts-in-MS. 
The relevance to my own theme concerns the way in which those who 
know about MS acknowledge certain methodological difficulties that, 
it would seem, are sufficient to throw doubt on the very bases for 
theory making and discovery, and yet continue researching in spite 
of them. For each theory relies on the existence of other already 
known features of MS, but each of these features, is admitted else- 
where to be problematic. For example: to argue for a specific 
pattern of geographic distribution of MS requires that it be possible 
to select cases to count; detailed criteria for diagnosis lay down 
limitations in onset age although there is work in the literature 
that finds a much earlier onset age than ten, the borderline used 
by Schumacher et al (Landis 1898; Brandt et al 1981; Sheremata 1981); 
the 'significant' accumulation of specific symptoms into recognise- 
able patterns of MS requires the possibility of an accurate diagnosis 
to confirm that the earlier symptoms were significantly patterned: 
and so on and so on. The whole edifice of 'knowledge of 14S' seems 
like a house of cards, each layer resting on an equally fragile 
layer beneath, each member of each layer propping up its fellow. 
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And yet the method of research, its epistemoligical theory, 
remain inviolable; the ambiguities 'discovered' in respect of the 
facts about MS are taken as definitive of the disease itself, an 
awareness of the fragility of its foundations paradoxically 
construed as being the mark of expertise in the area. 
The history of MS as a phenomenon looks to the origins of that 
history and finds that MS has been ever the same (emotional stress 
a precipitating factor, then as now). By that very similarity, 
the object of research, MS, comes off as universal and atemporal 
and as such, a phenomenon in the world 'out there'. Yet insofar 
as the Comte's diary is one example of the historical artefacts 
used for such a history, the analysis in this chapter at the very 
least has put into question the assumption that history is simply 
the recounting of what happened. 
At the same time, insofar as the Comte's diary is an example of a 
lay account of early MS, it and accounts like it are basic both 
to an understanding of what MS is, and to all the research into it. 
The expert knowledge of MS thus depends on lay knowledge of it: 
but that lay knowledge is. constituted as referring to MS by means of 
that very same expert knowledge. It cannot therefore be construed 
as independent of it. Contrary to what the medical sociologists of 
the social constructivist school assume, expert knowledge (of MS) is 
constituted by the accounting practices of experts. The relationship 
between expert and lay knowledge is reflexive rather than independent. 
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Chapter One showed that for medical sociology, the accounts of 
lay people, either of their own conditions or of the concepts 
involved in health and illness, are understood to be as it were by 
definition, different from medical knowledge of the same phenomena; 
the relation between lay accounts and medical knowledge viewed as 
essentially hierarchical. That is, lay knowledge is constituted 
as lay by the very assumption of its difference from expert 
knowledge, the latter being regarded as simply concerned with the 
facts of the matter. 
However, these assumptions have been challenged in this 
chapter: the expert knowledge about MS ultimately depends on the 
accounts people with MS give of their condition and yet at the 
same time the understanding of those accounts as accounts of MS 
is only possible by bringing particular (expert) knowledge of MS 
to bear on them. Instead of a hierarchical relationship, there 
is a double reflexivity: between lay and expert knowledge of MS 
and between what is already known with what is discovered by MS 
research. It is not merely that accounts of MS, but MS itself 
which is constructed out of such artefacts as the Diary of the Comte, 
not because they necessarily give rise to a reading of MS but 
because there is activity upon the texts out of which MS emerges 
as the thing it is taken to be; a process that has as a crucial 
component, what is 'already known'. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
TALKING ABOUT MS - AN OCCASION FOR THEORISING 
3.1 
The presentation in Chapter Two of current 'expert knowledge' 
about MS constitutes the context against which the respondents' 
reference to medical science in respect of their experience and 
understanding of their condition is to be placed. 
What now has to be blocked in are the theoretical auspices 
(Blum 1971) 1 of the thesis. For it is against that background 
that the next question, of how the data for the thesis - talk - 
can be analysed has to be taken up. This is a question however 
not merely of method but of methodology: one which appears almost 
intractable. For, unlike Gabbay (cf. Chapter One 19-20), I am 
(have been) trying to begin with the problem that, for him, came 
at the end of his analysis. 
ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 
Having argued at some length that the object of MS research is 
constituted by the research practices and assumptions of that 
which is 'already known' brought to bear on what are taken to be 
simply the documents of that object, it would be absurd to produce 
an account of the theoretical auspices of this thesis - ethnomethodology - 
as if that was immune from the same problematic. 
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Insofar as a thesis has to conform to form, however, some 
kind of account of ethnomethodology has to be given 
2 
What ethno- 
methodology essentially 'is' however is a question that cannot be 
addressed straightforwardly. For the deep difficulty is that the 
question of how such a question can be responded to, of what that 
very question assumes (in respect of HS, of ethnomethodology and 
so on) is part of the very problematic that I am trying to address. 
As a way of conforming, then, I will take an elliptical approach 
to the question, focusing on the critics rather than on ethno- 
methodology 'itself'. For its critics, although, as will be shown, 
their answers to the question of what that theory/method is and 
entails for sociological research differs, that it may be described - 
and critiqued on the basis of those descriptions - is unproblematic. 
I am bound to take that assurance to be the very mark of their 
failure to comprehend what the theory of ethnomethodology entails: 
but in doing so, accept that my own critique is no more and no less 
assuredly grounded. What follows is, likewise, an account of 
accounts of ethnomethodology. 
3.1.1 Some 'Troubles' with Ethnomethodology 
For its critics, there are a number of 'troubles' with ethnomethod- 
ology, but, as will be seen, the troubles they each identify are 
tied to what each conceives ethnomethodology 'itself' to be. 
(i) Locker (whose work will be discussed further in the next 
section) regards ethnomethodology as a limited but useful adjunct 
to sociological practice. In the Introduction to his research on 
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lay accounts of symptoms and illness (1981), he explains that, 
unlike other medical sociologists, he regards "social reality 
as a construct" (1981: x), an approach which allows in his view 
for the acceptance of ethnomethodology's methods despite a 
rejection of its theory. As a theory ethnomethodology, for Locker, 
fails to be able to account for the social action in which he is 
interested, for it "(S)ees man as a skilled cognitian but not... as 
an actor" (1981: 135). As a consequence, it "(W)ould take a 
description of the interpretive process 
[in interview talkI as all 
there is to say. " (1981: 135) Therefore in his own work: 
Some of the propositions of symbolic interactionism 
and labelling theory are used to demonstrate the centrality 
of meaning in social life, and the writings of Schutz and 
the ethnomethodologists are used to identify the cognitive 
processes involved in their production. " 
Locker 1981: x 
(ii) For Maryl, however, the trouble with ethnomethodology is 
that, although the "Major appeal of this school is that it seems 
immediate and concretely human, " it is not in fact "fully human" 
(1977: 277). It has its roots in phenomenological philosophy, from 
which it derives its focus on the "consciousness of the solitary 
individual" (1977: 277); but, neither being philosophers nor under- 
standing the "basic implications of their position" (cf. Bury's 
attack on social constructivists in medical sociology, Chapter One), 
ethnomethodologists are simply ignorant of the fact that their 
position is premised on: 
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(T)he one abstraction which is not justifiable. Un- 
like economic, political, religious and familial 
processes, it individual consciousness] cannot be 
concretized by being put back into a larger structural 
context of which it is a part. 
Maryl 1977: 277 
Citing Marx and Mead as his authorities, Maryl continues: 
(S)ocial relationships are derivable (and explainable) 
from social relationships, and not individual conscious- 
ness. The only thing that can be derived from the 
solitary ego is the solitary ego. 
Maryl 1977: 277 
By its prioritisation of human consciousness over "history and the 
division of labour" ethnomethodology constitutes "an exercise in 
avoidance, like all idealism" (1977: 277), an avoidance derived 
from the "fundamental similarities between tit and the hippie 
movement. " (1977: 277). It is both mistaken and ideologically 
unsound. 
(iii) On the basis of his reading of Garfinkel(1967) Gellner describes 
ethnomethodology as a "cult of subjectivity in the idiom of... scientism" 
(1975: 45), a concept of subjectivity that is a consequence of its 
having social /historical roots of a "very specific, volatile, 
unconstrained, fantaisiste, Californian kind" (197.5 : 63). Its 
tendency is to slip into having to argue that "onl concepts ever 
constrain" individuals (1975: 57). Even if it usually manages to 
resist this extreme and absurd concomitant of its theoretical 
position, even no, ethnomethodology cannot account for the relation- 
ship between the concepts it identifies and the other constraints 
which, as according to Geilner, everybody knows exists: social forces. 
64 
(iv) Ingleby (in his article in Wright & Treacher 1982) argues 
that because it has its roots in linguistic philosophy, the trouble 
with ethnomethodology is that, like that philosophy, it is basically 
a-political. For: 
In its concern to respect the logic of everyday practices, 
[it3 rules out the possibility of criticising those 
practices: the root cause of this being its implicit pre- 
supposition of a social order free from contradiction. 
Ingleby 1982: 124 
Ingleby regards ethnomethodology as holding 'common sense' to be 
the "unadulterated core of human wisdom" (1982: 129). 
The 'sense' which actions make is inherently a social 
construction, on which the common knowledge of social 
members is the ultimate authority; science can only shed 
light on the realm of human beliefs and conduct to the 
extent that it invokes this common sense. Deciding which 
actions and beliefs 'make sense' is 
[for 
ethnomethodologists) 
essentially a lay activity. 
Ingleby 1982: 129 
It is clear from the context that this is pejorative. Because of 
this elevation of lay human consciousness, Ingleby, like Gellner 
and Maryl, regards it as unable to address the real questions of 
power relations. Crucially for Ingleby, its conception of the 
means by which to address such questions - (social) science - is 
clearly untenable insofar as it is regarded as itself dependent 
on 'common sense'; not because it is necessarily incorrect but 
(and of. Bury in Chapter One) because it has undesirable consequences. 
Ethnomethodology is antithetical not only to the objectives of 
sociology but to the very discipline itself As a practice. 
(v) Rogers contends that 'other sociologists', in attempting 
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to comprehend ethnomethodology, fail to do so because they are, on 
the whole, ignorant of literary structuralism and its de-authoring, 
de-constructing project. They have therefore failed to (be able to) 
see the dangers inherent in it to the idea of the human. For the 
trouble with ethnomethodology is that it ignores human consciousness. 
Pace the critics cited above: 
(E) thnomethodologists make rare reference to and adopt 
no clear, explicit perspective on human consciousness. 
Rogers 1984: 166 
For ethnomethodologists, she contends, "a member is a course of 
activity"(1984: 171), people merely: 
(F)unctionaries in social situations structured, first 
of all, by language and the rules of discourse. 
Rogers 1984: 171 
Such a depiction clearly and mistakenly denies the existence of 
that which patently society is composed: "person[s] with motives 
and subjectively meaningful experiences. " (1984: 171). Therefore, 
despite Garfinkel's expressed desire to reject the traditional 
sociological treatment of the individual as a "judgemental dope", 
in the practice of ethnomethodology, "the human centre is missing" 
(Rogers 1984: 171). 
(vi) Wolff quotes with approval Natanson's observation that, 
far from 'challenging the involvement of man in the 'natural 
attitude'", Garfinkel in fact reinforces it, and thus fails to 
build on the work of Schutz, his claimed precursor (Wolff 1978: 540). 
But over and above this failure, for his own part, Wolff rejects 
ethnomethodology on the grounds of its double amorality. 
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Mn Garfinkel and most if not all ethnomethodology, 
'ethnomethodological indifference' stands for indiffer- 
ence towards the very question of Is and Ought, including 
the question of a meaningful or good society. 
Wolff 1978: 539 
It is amoral not only in respect of society, but also of individuals: 
If the traditional sociologist knows better than do the 
people whom he studies, the ethnomethodologist... has no 
relation whatever to his 'subjects' because, as we have 
already seen, they are exclusively cognitive; but this 
means they are not subjects at all, but agents - who, further- 
more, 'achieve', 'accomplish', 'work at' establishing and 
maintaining social order. 
Wolff 1978: 539-40 
Thus ethnomethodology suffers from the "lack of a world" and is 
doomed to the triviality of its methods "at the expense of moral 
concern" (1978: 539). 
(vii) And finally, an account which, by placing ethncmethodology 
in the context of the currently "intense ferment in the republic 
of letters" (Dallmayr & McCarthy 1977; 2-3), accounts for the very 
contradictions and differences in the depictions of ethnomethodology 
so far invoked. As they observe: 
In a sense the same ambivalence 
[regarding the'respective 
weights of consciousness and intersubjectivity". 
] over- 
shadows contemporary 'ethnomethodology'... Basically 
committed to the investigation of commonsense experience, 
or 'the practical activities of men in society as they 
make accountable to themselves and to others, their every- 
day affairs', ethnomethodologists tend to differ on whether 
ordinary life reflects invariant or transcendental cognitive 
structures or whether cognition is itself shaped by cultural 
contexts. In the first case, social reality is in danger of 
being dissolved into mental or 'ideal' properties; in the 
second case, cognition faces the hazard of historial and 
cultural contingency. 
Dallmayr & McCarthy 1977: 10 
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Such differences and contradictions that have been remarked upon 
would be explicable, by this account, by the 'fact' that ethno- 
methodology is -a divided discipline: the divisions themselves 
reflecting the "Crisis in Understanding" (the title of Dallmayr 
and McCarthy's essay), with its central quandary: 
(R)egarding the relationship between science and 
understanding, knowledge and self-knowledge. 
Dallmayr & McCarthy 1977: 10 
Thus, rather than the 'troubles with ethnomethodology' being unique 
and specific to that discipline as a theory and practice, by this 
account, the 'trouble' with ethnomethodology is that it is itself 
the unwitting product and exemplification of 'troubles' in 
contemporary society. 
In sum, the critics of ethnomethodology point towards a variety 
of 'troubles': its methods (but not its theory) are a useful 
addition to the sociological repertoire; it is utterly impracticable. 
Its focus is on the individual at the expense of the social; it 
ignores human consciousness. It is vilified as an absurd and 
idealist Californian cult; it is a-political, conservative, a-moral. 
It undercuts the possibility of science. It avoids contemporary 
crises in society; it is the very embodiment of the contemporary 
crisis. 
By the juxtaposition of these accounts, the question of what 
"it", ethnomethodology, "is" or entails for sociological research 
is rendered problematic. But could the heterogeneity of the 
accounts be accounted for? 
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It would be possible to account for many of the differences and 
contradictions on technical grounds. 
3 
For example to point out 
that each critic is taking a different set of texts as represent- 
ative either of the practice or the programmatics of ethnomethodology; 
that each critic is assuming a homogeneity within the 'school' that 
does not and has not been claimed to exist by its members. Mayrl 
in fact offers a nice hostage to this kind of account, when he 
declares that: 
(T)aken on its own, Garfinkel's presentation of the 
objectives of ethnomethodology is virtually indecipherable. 
Mayrl 1977: 265 
but that: 
(I)t can be clarified somewhat through consideration of 
the works of Cicourel, McHugh and Sacks. 
Mayrl 1977: 265. 
He then proceeds to base his critique of ethnomethodology on the 
texts of those latter authors. To admit to not only being unable 
to 'decipher' but to have settled for others' secondary texts, not 
in addition to but instead of Garfinkel's provides ample grounds 
for the dismissal of his characterisation and therefore of his 
refutation of ethnomethodology. 
On the other hand, the critics of ethnomethodology could 
be countered on the grounds that they had seriously mis-interpreted 
the texts they cite: Garfinkel did not say that, intend that, and 
so on. 
Alternatively one could point to the fact that the critics invoke 
different sets of theoretical precursors for ethnomethodology: 
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French structuralism, phenomenology, linguistic philosophy; 
arguing on that basis that therefore it of course appears differ- 
ently in eac`, one of these lights (putting to one side the re- 
complicating fact that the previous point applies to each of the 
attributed precursors too). 
At a more trivial level, though not without consequentiality, 
one could argue that the depictions of ethnomethodology would 
differ because of chronology: Mayrl was writing in 1977, Wolff in 
1978, Rogers in 1984 and so on, the extant corpus naturally differ- 
ent at each time point. 
Or one could argue that, differing as they do in respect of 
their own theoretical positions and view of what sociological 
theory and/or practice ought to be - that matters of conflict, of 
morality, of consciousness or meaning - are both essential to 
sociology and absent from the works of ethnomethodology, it is 
unsurprising that their conclusions about it are unanimous only in 
their negative evaluation. According to this counter-argument, 
even had the critics each cited the same works and even had they 
cited the same extracts from them to substantiate their cases, their 
'already knowns' about ethnomethodology's key absences would have 
been sufficient grounds for their depictions still to differ, and 
to contradict, each other. 
All these possible accounts would be to argue, then, that the 
contradictions and differences are in the depictions of ethno- 
methodology, and not problems for 'the object' depicted, the 
character of ethnomethodology 'itself': that what is in operation 
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is (merely) the parallax effect. 
4 
What is occurring is that 
whilst the object - ethnomethodology in its real character - is 
stable, it ears to move, due to the operation of the mechanics 
of vision, the differences in perspective from which it is viewed 
which make it appear to shift. Given different viewpoints, merely 
different aspects of the same phenomenon move in and out of 
visibility, in relation to the point from which it is viewed and 
to the different segments of the background - the theoretical 
auspices - against which it is seen: the contradictions the effects 
as it were literally of the mechanics of perspective. 
Another observation of the differences in the depictions of ethno- 
methodology altogether however would be to notice that both the 
technical arguments produced above to account for the differences 
in the depictions of 'the trouble' with ethnomethodology and the 
critiques they seek to explain, share certain epistemological 
assumptions. Principally that the project, to argue about what 
ethnomethodology 'is' - may be done by taking certain works as 
documents which stand for their authors' intentions, motives, 
practices and so on: the critiques are then constituted in comparison 
with what each critic argues is - the meaning of the work and of 
the world to which the texts are taken to refer; a world which is 
presumed: in which "social forces", persons with "subjectively 
meaningful experiences" and so on unquestionably exist, ontologically 
given; against which ethnomethodology is compared and found wanting. 
They share, in short, a method of reading texts. 
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I do not propose to become involved in texts in that inconcludeable 
way. it is a crucial part of my own theorising Auspices that 
the pursuit of the meaning of any document in that sense is mis- 
conceived; based on the very epistemology that I am trying to work 
out how to question; and what is taken as ontologically given is, 
in being fundamental to that epistemology, what also has to be 
questioned. 
As has been both observed and practiced throughout this 
first Section of the thesis, 'the object', that which is critiqued, 
cannot be taken as independent of that critique. Reflexivity is 
in operation not just between analysis and analysed, researcher 
and researched but, as has been shown explicitly in the case of MS 
in Chapter Two and implicitly in Chapter One and now Three, what is 
taken to be the object of discourse - MS, medical sociology, ethno- 
methodology - is characterised by, constituted by the grounds of 
that discourse. 'The literature' is not the documentary archive of 
an independent object: the reading of 'the literature' cannot be 
immune from the problematic of the documentary method but is itself 
subject to the same reflexive constitution. 
** 
However, although the settling of the matter is, according - how 
else may one put this - to the theoretical auspices of ethnomethodology, 
in principle inconcludeable, the authors, the critics whom I have 
cited, have clearly managed to conceive of what ethnomethodology is, 
for the purposes of their critiques, both in terms of which works to 
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cite, their meaning and implications, their relevant theoretical 
precursors and so on. What is problematic in principle is managed 
for practical purposes. As I have managed it here. I want there- 
fore to say that they have misread the texts; failed to comprehend 
what ethnomethdology is. But how far it is is possible to be said 
to distort a text, to stretch its meaning illegitimately is a 
critical and highly puzzling matter. Although I am contending that 
texts are not in principle documents of anything definitively 
deducible from them, I am not wanting to contend that they are 
infinitely indexical. How this paradox is possible is a matter to 
be considered throughout this thesis. 
Texts cannot be taken to mean anything at all! But it was this 
assumption of the implications of ethnomethodology's 'methodological 
horrors' that provided the grounds for Bury's contention, discussed 
in Chapter One, that social constructivism inevitably leads to an 
anarchy of meaning; and to Geilner's contention that the concomitant 
of ethnomethodology is that it no longer matters what is said by 
research; that its logical and only outcome is that there can be 
no standards, no criteria whatsoever by which either to speak, to 
practice, or to judge anything about the world. That, as Russell 
has characterised other's (mis)understanding of the project within 
the sociology of science to replace empiricism, it is assumed that 
therefore 'anything goes': which is taken in turn to mean that 
because nothing goes for sure, nothing can 'go' at all. Or rather, 
only 'anything' (1983) . 
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3.2 
Russell concludes her article with the observation that 
such issues are better addressed through sociological studies than 
through abstractions. My difference from her adherence to the 
social constructivist thesis notwithstanding, at this apouetic 
point is seems sensible advice to take. So let me move towards 
the substantive matter of this thesis, towards the analysis of 
the data: people talking about their MS. 
MS: AN OCCASION FOR THEORISING 
To recapitulate: the purpose of the research is to look at lay 
knowledge of MS, in particular at the question of whether and if 
so how people operate with a concept of science as a special cat- 
egory of knowledge in their own sense-making practices. it is 
to look at the taken for granted, at that which 'everybody knows' 
about science: the everybody who is not an expert in scientific 
medicine, people who themselves have MS. This would seem, then, to 
be a question about the difference between expert and lay knowledge 
(of MS). However, following what has emerged from the previous two 
chapters - the double reflexive relation between expert and lay 
knowledge and between the already knowns of expert knowledge and 
the objects it discovers - it is no longer possible to proceed by 
identifying lay knowledge in terms of its difference from experts'. 
How, then, may one proceed? Following Schutz and more recently 
Geertz, the notion of 'making strange' is currently seen as a key 
to the exploration of the mundane, the way to make visible the 
world of what everybody knows (Schutz 1954; Pollner 1974; Geertz 
1975). But is it possible to make strange? 
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3.2.1 Making Strange 
In the literature of the imagination, for example in science 
fiction, an alien is envisaged who enters the familiar world; 
by reading the world described in the text through its eyes, the 
reader is enabled to see the strangeness in the familiar. 
However, as Oldman (1983) has pointed out in 'Making Aliens: 
Problems of description in science fiction and social science', even 
in the complete freedom of fiction, the author has to imagine both 
how an alien would 'see' our world and something not only of what 
the objects of such seeing would be like, but what that way of 
seeing would be. 
5 
The inherent impossibility of doing this is 
demonstrated in Amis's recent novel Other People (1981), which is 
written in the first person of an amnesiac. Amis can have her 
find strange many of the things 'we' take for granted - the 
difference in light signifying night and day, what clouds are, 
what bodily sensations signify (those that indicate a need to 
defaecate, for example) - because she has forgotten their meaning. 
But the way, in the novel, she finds out what she has forgotten, 
the means by which knowledge of the unknown can be achieved, she 
has not and Amis cannot have her forget. Asimov et al's collection 
of robot stories, Machines that Think (1984) is similarly witness 
to the limits of the possibility of imagining strangeness, 
because of the essential requirement for fiction (and all texts) 
6 
of intelligibility to the reader, predicated on familiarity. 
Oldman however argues that some writers do achieve a: 
(T)acit quality of alienness in their depictions of non- 
human or future human societies, just as some anthropologists 
achieve both explanation and a sense of wonder in their 
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accounts of other peoples and translators turn others' 
poetry into their poetry. They achieve, in other words, 
an apparent transcendence of their own ethnocentricity. 
Oldman 1983: 49 
That some think this is impossible in principle is due, according 
to Oldman, to their mistaken assumption that there is: 
(A) stable hub or centre to one's own culture 
`when 
rathe 
j 
culture and language should be seen for what they are: 
fluid, reflexive, and political... The dynamic quality of 
language is forgotten and its tendency to drift and develop 
independent of the way it is pinned to the world of events 
in its descriptive role is ignored. (my emphasis) 
Oldman 1983: 63 
Be that as it may, anthropologists are by their own definitions 
strangers to the worlds they observe: those worlds are obviously 
stange, and visible to them by virtue of that strangeness. 
7 
But 
even no, as was argued in the case of medical anthropology in 
Chapter One, like science fiction's Martians, both that knowledge 
and the method by which 'natives' produce their knowledge is 
discerned by comparison with that which is not questioned at all: 
western epistemology. 
In order to stand outside one's own culture, in order to see 
it more clearly, the social constructivists in medical sociology, 
also discussed in the first chapter, -and challenged in Chapter Two, 
use the technique of invoking history in order to see the present 
taken-for-granteds of medicine through the eyes of the past. This 
effort fails, as I have argued, because of the glossing over of 
the fact that it is necessarily the case that not only now, the 
present, but 'then', the past, can only be seen from now. That 
which becomes strange is constituted by what is taken for granted 
to be familiar. 
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This is not a problem to be solved. However, what I want to take 
from this is the fact that 'making strange' is, in all these cases, 
regarded as a problem for the analyst - the novelist, the anthro- 
pologist, the sociologist - attempting to render unfamiliar to her- 
self the world that others, it is taken for granted, take for 
granted. 
For the case of studying people with MS is profoundly 
different. What the subjects describe to me in the interviews about 
the experience of MS, what has been happening to them and how they 
make sense of it is, in effect, a world already made strange. To 
use Garfinkel's (1967) terminology, they are already involuntary 
participants in a naturally occurring breaching experiment, in 
which their ontological and epistemological taken-for-granteds about 
themselves, about knowledge, and about the world in which they live 
have been breached, force majeure, by MS. Thus, unlike in all 
those instances discussed above, the notion of strangeness is not 
mine, as analyst, but theirs. 
8 It is for them that the world has 
become strange and themselves strangers in it - and this strange- 
ness is a problem with which they have daily to wrestle and work 
to make mundane again. 
This is not to say that MS is a naturally occurring breaching 
experiment, but that thinking about it in that way may provide a way 
to pursue the question of lay theorising about science that does not 
banish the problem of reflexivity. 
77 
3.2.2 The Breaching Experiments 
In his Studies in Ethnomethodology (1967), Garfinkel describes 
9 
the experiments as ''demonstrations", "aids to the sluggish 
imagination" (although, as has already been said, even the most 
actively unconstrained exercise of the imagination that is allowed 
in the form of fictional writing, cannot be totally boundless): 
Proceedurally, it is my preference to start with familiar 
scenes and ask what can be done to make trouble. The 
operations that one would have to perform in order to 
multiply the senseless features of perceived environments; 
to produce and sustain bewilderment, consternation and 
confusion; to produce the socially structured affects of 
anxiety, shame, guilt and indignation; and to produce dis- 
organized interaction should tell us something about how 
the structures of everyday activities are ordinarily and 
routinely produced and maintained. 
Garfinkel 1967: 37 
The outcomes of the experiments were, according to Garfinkel, that: 
(T)he members' real perceived environment on losing its 
known-in-common background, should. become 'specifically 
senseless'. Ideally speaking, behaviours directed to such 
a senseless environment should be those of bewilderment, 
uncertainty, internal conflict, psycho-social isolation, 
acute and nameless anxiety along with various symptoms of 
acute depersonalisation. Structures of interaction should 
be correspondingly disorganised. 
Garfinkel 1967: 54 
These "outcomes" have much in common with what, in the literature 
on MS, are taken as symptoms of the disease (see Chapter Two, this 
thesis passim; and Appendix 3.1). Thus I can argue that 'ergo,, 
MS is, for members, a naturally occurring breaching experiment... 
because it has these outcomes amongst its consequences. 
But there is also an important difference, "procedurally". As 
Mehan and wood state: 
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Its [breaching'] prime function, however, is to make 
the researchers aware of the way they normally do the world 
by requiring them to learn to do it otherwise. (my emphasis) 
Mehan & Wood 1975: 233 
In terms of that account, it is the members, the people with MS, 
who are equivalent to the "researchers", not myself as analyst. 
There is a further not inconsequential difference. In all the 
breaching experiments in Garfinkel's book, the breaching is done 
by his students, at his direction, on their own everyday inter- 
actions with others. The description and analysis of what occurred 
is then written up by Garfinkel, who uses his students' reports as 
his data rather than material collected at the point of breaching 
by the analyst himself. In the extension of the breaching metaphor 
to my own data the procedure is different. However, it is not 
necessary to claim a total identity between MS or this thesis and 
the breaching demonstrations in order to explore what happens when 
the data is read in the light of this metaphoric resonance. 
It has to be said, however, that Mehan and Wood, at least, identify 
certain limitations in the breaching procedures which raises another 
resonance with this thesis' concerns: 
The linkage between any specific incongruity demonstration 
and a feature of social knowledge or interpretive procedure 
is obscure. The logic of the demonstration does not follow 
from the theory in any determinative way. One must not look 
to these breaching studies as a way of building a theory of 
the reality constructor that will be comparable to the truly 
experimental sciences. 
The value of such demonstrations is great nevertheless. 
Mehan & Wood 1975: 113 (my emphasis) 
79 
This caveat, that the procedures are "no way of building a theory" 
is telling in that it reveals how entrenched in (a version of) 
the scientific paradigm even the most 'idealist' interpreters of 
ethnomethodology are. For it is not, as it could have been, 
from the very predicates of ethnomethodology ("that sweeet poison" 
10 
as they call it) that they regard the breaching studies as less 
than experiments, but from the retention of an unquestioned, 
privileged epistemological status accorded by them to the knowledge 
produced by the "truly experimental" sciences. 
The point of the breaching experiments is to attempt to make 
problematic and therefore visible to analysis some taken for granted 
methods of practical reasoning. I want to extend from 'methods' 
to theorising in a more fundamental sense. 
The case of MS is possibly not unique amongst medical con- 
ditions; but it is particularly apposite for my purposes in that 
there is no certainty, no closure on what it means or signifies 
(cf. Chapter Two). It is a natural breaching experiment in which 
not only the methods but the substance of practical reasoning, by 
individuals about their lives, their bodies and their selves; 
the doing of knowledge which has become problematic, for members. 
In a parallel with the argument that science is interesting to 
the sociology of knowledge in that it is a discipline wherein 
reasoning about theory, method and content are made explicit by 
its practitioners - is the practice of science - so with the occur- 
rence of MS. The extent of the disruption is the mark of its 
richness as a resource for analysis. With the occurrence of MS, 
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3.3 
the methodological horrors are not dismissible as an analyst's. 
artefact - but are a matter of lived experience. 
With the onset of ethnomethodology, the mundane practice of research 
is breached, sociology itself made strange. 
To substantiate that assertion it is necessary to turn to the 
data upon which this thesis is grounded- people talking about MS 
to consider the question of how it may be analysed. 
In the light of what has already been written, this can no 
longer be a question merely of selecting the most appropriate 
method from those available but is deeply problematic. For, to 
make explicit what has been perhaps implicit so far, there is a 
fundamental resonance between MS and the question of theorising. 
THE ANALYSIS OF TALK 
The data that is the basis for this thesis consists of the tran- 
scripts of twelve unstructured interviews about MS. Eight 
interviewees had been diagnosed by the medical profession as having 
MS; two were people under the process of being diagnosed; and two 
were relatives of those who had died from it. Appendix 3.2 gives 
details of the research group. 
The data then is a collection of accounts of MS, 
from personal experience, A unting to some 25 hours of talk. 
They are closer to naturally occurring conversations in character 
than to anything that would have been produced by structured 
interview techniques; the objective was, as far as possible, to 
allow the people to speak for themselves free of the assumptions 
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that would have been inherent in any formal pre-scheduling of 
'relevant questions'. 
In the first chapter, reference was made err passant to the ways in 
which medical sociologists have used talk as data; but their use 
of it is simply as a concomitant of their interest in patients' 
perspectives. The talk is treated unoroblematically as simply the 
available evidence for patients' understandings of their conditions, 
of their relations with medical professionals and so on, an approach 
to (talk) data consistent with their generally realist approach to 
research practice. 
However, given the theoretical position within which this 
thesis is being produced, the question of how to analyse talk cannot 
be taken as immune from the question of reflexivity. Its meaning 
cannot be taken as independent of the means by which it is analysed. 
But how then? 
The most appropriate resource to turn to for thinking about 
this question must be those works which have approached the analysis 
of talk from the same theoretical framework as my own; ethnomethodology. 
3.3.1 Conversational Analysis 
Outside medical sociology (and sometimes within it, eg Corsaro 1982), 
the most highly developed technique applied to the analysis of talk is 
that of conversational analysis (CA). Although it claims its theo- 
retical roots to lie in ethnomethodology 
11 
- particularly invoking the 
work of Sacks as well as Garfinkel himself - in many ways as will 
be shown, conversational analysis epitomises the failure of 
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practitioners of ethnomethodology to take seriously the epistemo- 
logical problematic that at least my conception of Garfinkel's work 
involves. 
By paying close attention to naturally occurring conversations 
(another relevance of their work to my data), CA has over the 
last twenty years or so been in the process of developing what 
might be described as a taxonomy of invariant features in the 
structure of talk - greetings, pauses, turn-taking and so on (see 
for example Sudnow 1972; Schegloff & Sacks 1973; Sacks et al 1974; 
Schenkein 1979. See also Leiter 1980; Benson & Hughes 1983). 
Conversations are transcribed according to rigorous 
conventions. At its best - and the transcription work of Gail 
Jefferson (see Figure 3.1) is regarded as the sine qua non amongst 
CAs - what emerges is awesome in its exquisiteness, like the 
eyes of insects revealed under the microscope to consist of an 
utterly unfamiliar, perfectly ordered, beauty. 
Such an analogy between CA and science is not fanciful: it 
is both claimed and runs through what is being practiced - the 
application of science to talk: 
[CA] work Lis) to explore the possibility of achieving 
a naturalistic observational discipline that could deal 
with the details of social action(s) rigorously, 
empirically and formally. 
Schegloff & Sacks 1973: 233 
Qua science, in this process of revelation through microscopy, what 
becomes observable and thus significant attains an independence of 
the methods through which it is brought to visibility, The arcane 
transcripts are taken to stand for their object - naturally 
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1. Conjunctional - Intra-Utterance Pause (ca. 109 'pickup' cases) 
(1.1) [0: 8B1S(A): 20) 
Andrea: Mistuh Topp's in Munich is'e? 
Bette: - Uh:::: m (0.8) He's either in Munich or Colo: gne now, ah 
-f gT oh- ah'v lost track. One or the o(h)ther, Uh::, hh (2.7) 
I think he's:::: 
(1.2) (NB: IV: 9: R: 2) 
Emma: Honey ah'll come down after I had muh liddle bowl a'soup'n 
salad'n ah'1l call'= ba: ck to yuh uh'd love it. 
(0.8) 
Penny: - Well (0.7) oka: y 
(1.3) [SBL: 3: 3: R: 2) 
Keith: a)h'll t-call lTe: d en (0.2) let im go over this agreement 
(1.4) [NB: II: 2: R: 21) 
Nancy: Assooming yihknov that he'd be taking th'payment 
b 'k b*a: c k with im 
Emma: 
['M 
m: 
)h 
m 
Nancy: - 'hhh'hhSo:: (0.7) 'tch he said Dad js didn't trust me .. 
(1.5) (Fr: USI: 4: RJ 
Mike: "- She es no use fer it but (0.5) she jis don't like the 
idear 
'v im givin anything away b'fore'e essuh. 
(1.6) (SBL: 3: 5: R: 2) 
Milly: tahh'm gunna learn that it cert'nly is easy an all you haf 
tuh do is tru: st an just sorta go alahng an I hhope it's 
this way becuz 'hhhh tthis's gunnuh be: jis IIWOghNderful 
(1.7) (TCI(b): 9: 5) 
Linda: Yih don't have enough money tuh git Joshua a chew borne; 
- Jr (. ) or 'hhh milk en e: ggs y'don'have enough money tih git all tha: t. 
2. Conjunctional - 'Clean' Speaker Transition (ca. 59 
'pickup' cases) 
(2.1) (SBL: 2: I: 8: R: 131 
Nora: but I c'n (. ) close muh bedroom o: ff it gets so hot'n' 
there. 
(0.3) 
Bea: - Yah. 't'hhhhhh'hhh Uh: m 
- 71.0) 
Nora: - W'1 who wouldju drum u: p. 
(. ) 
Bea: I don't kno: w. 
Figure 3.1 Jefferson's (1984) Transcript : "'Conjunctionals' as 
Overlap-Vulnerable. " (Extract) 
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occurring conversations - but, to continue the microscopic analogy - 
at a higher level of resolution, their natural transience fixed 
in order to enable close study. 
This technique has been taken. one step further. In the 
pursuit of a more fully captured phenomenon, using a concealed 
video camera, Heath, for example, has recorded medical consultations 
in vision as well as sound (Heath 1982; 1983). He has developed 
a technique for transcribing the gestures with which the interaction 
talk is embellished, and has produced transcripts of the interactions 
which are to be read like a musical score (Figure 3.2). What 
Heath has thereby produced is a demonstrable orchestration between 
voice and gesture on the part of patients, methods used by them to 
elicit the gaze of doctors. Work such as Heath's presumes that 
there is no in principle limit on the possibility of achieving a 
complete and accurate record of interactions. 
The claim by CA is that the structures of conversation are 
discernible to analysis quite independent of both their content and 
context: and indeed by their own theory this has to be the case. 
However, an informal study of how the work is done demonstrated 
the difficulty of holding to that claim in practice. Attendance 
at a BSA Sociology of Language Group Conference in Plymouth (1984) 
which was predominantly concerned with/attended by CA's, provided 
me with the opportunity to participate in and to observe conversational 
analysis in practice 
12 
The discussion which follows is based on 
the fieldnotes made at the time. Although this was not in any way 
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a formal study, nevertheless the issues about the practice of 
CA which were brought to light over the course of the conference 
are of direct relevance to the current discussion: by definition, 
the practice of conversational analysis cannot appear in its 
writings. 
The conference took the form of a series of workshops, formal 
papers and seminars in which all the participants met together. 
It is the latter on which I shall concentrate. What was said 
in the final seminar is to be held in juxtaposition with comments 
made on a paper given earlier in the conference by Grimshaw (1984), 
which had been received very critically, on a ten-year and on- 
going project in which a core piece of data -a dissertation 
defence and subsequent discussion about its merits amongst the 
examiners - was being worked on by a variety of sociologists, 
a variety which, however, did not include any CA. 
The dissertation defense had been both stereo-taped and 
filmed. Each workshop group at Plymouth had been given a section 
of the audio tape, with its transcript, to work on, after Grimshaw's 
presentation. In the group of which I was a member, the workshop 
participants declared themselves unable to work "properly" on it, 
because CA transcript conventions had not been used (particularly 
concerning the marking of pauses and the layout of speakers' turns); 
but also because they felt the transcript was inaccurate in detail. 
13 
That is, certain words heard by them on the tape as one thing 
appeared in Grimshaw's transcript as another. One of the workshop's 
conclusions had been that this showed, once again, that an accurate 
.. -Ilv 
data record was absolutely essential for CA analysis. 
However, when it came to the analysis of a 'properly tran- 
scribed interaction, the transcripts alone proved (also) insufficient. 
In the final seminar, a new passage from a tape which had been 
worked upon separately in the groups was used, and people were 
invited to analyse it together. 
Competing versions of what was going on in the transcribed 
interaction were out forward: what was most interesting were the 
grounds upon which proponents of each version claimed their own 
to be the most plausible. These grounds were, in essence, the 
invocation of 'common sense' - that 'in their experience' people 
meant this or that by what they said. Much of the discussion 
revolved around the personalities of and the weight of conflict 
between the two women in the interaction. That is, the character 
of the speakers was read off from their talk; they (the CA's) 
presumed they were 'able' to know just what each one of the women 
on the tape was/would be like, quite outside the brief taped 
exchange, and indeed needed to know that, in order to discern the 
structures of the talk. 
There was a basic consensus: that when the interaction was broken 
down in detail, a great deal of conflict between the two women 
could be clearly seen; and yet, they said, they expected that the 
two women, if asked, would claim to be friends. (One member of 
the conference asked at this point whether the meeting thought 
that CA's were more inclined to discover conflict than consensus 
underlying talk. The Chair, with some asperity, asked whether he 
was proposing that the findings of CA analysis were an artefact of 
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the analysis rather than of what was really there: but the 
response to this challenge, and the topic, got lost amongst the 
discussion. Certainly this possibility did not re-appear in 
any of the subsequent debate, but it obviously underlies my 
description of the proceedings). it was remarked how fortunate 
it was that, because of the speed with which talk normally occurs, 
these conflicts get glossed over and, in the ongoing context of 
relationships, mostly get 'ironed out'. 
The suggestion was then advanced that maybe the disputes 
in the seminar over the meaning of the interaction would be 
settled if it had been possible to appeal to the women themselves 
for their accounts of how they felt about each other, and asked 
for their version(s) of what was going on between them. As a 
response to this, someone replied that even if the women were 
asked this would not settle the matter at all, ordinary people 
being unable to reach the level of analysis that CA's are able to 
achieve. The only objection voiced to the original suggestion 
concerned, then, its political but not its theoretical, implication )-4 
Another participant suggested that a way out of the diffi- 
culty might be if there was some sort of machine which could 
record "tension" in a speaker. That record could be placed along- 
side the transcribed speech, enabling the analyst to have more 
and better information about the real feelings of the speakers, 
and therefore be able to produce a more accurate. analysis; in 
response to which, descriptions of galvanic skin response machines 
were offered as just such a possible recorder (see Figure 3.3). 15 
No-one objected on the ground of theoretical principle. 
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This biological sub-strata to talk had been invoked 
once before in the conference, when Jefferson, presenting a paper 
on the first day had tentatively suggested that according to her 
analysis of pauses and overlap - who begins after a pause and 
the relevance of the length of pause to what happened after - 
it seemed that there was a critical one-second period which is 
granted to other speakers as a reasonable reaction time, this 
minimum time corresponding to the' time the brain needs to process 
reception and response (Jefferson 1984b). That is, pauses are 
as long as they are because of the nature of physiology: this, 
like the reference to skin tension referred to above had caused 
no remark except enthusiastic interest amongst her audience. 
Once again, reference was made to physiology as the basis for 
filling in the gaps in the explanations arrived at by analysis: 
the biological basis of behaviour acting as a residual category 
but regarded as the absolute bottom line of the structures of 
talk. 
Grimshaw at one point raised the question of how disputed 
versions of the tapes could be settled - that is, as I heard it, 
asking the meeting to make explicit 'the rules' of their practice. 
But this appeared to be heard as a condemnation on his part of a 
lack of consensus in the discussion. His comment was responded 
to with some vehemence by a participant saying that they couldn't 
be expected to do fine analysis in workshops or meetings such as 
that one: that workshops were for 'being courageous', 'risking 
various ideas' which only in the solitude of writing afterwards 
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could become 'fine'. That is, such disputes as there were over 
the meaning of the taped interaction were only temporary, a 
result of the informal situation in which they were being dis- 
cussed. This 'solitude' of 'writing' echoed the account 
Jefferson had given earlier of the process by which she analyses 
her data: that transcription involved listening to the tapes 
over and over, then reading and rereading the transcripts, far 
into the night (a description strongly reminiscent of certain 
accounts of scientific discovery, only achieved through the blood, 
sweat and tears of devoted and self-less scientists). The 
patterns that lie within talk are discoverable only through an 
arduously achieved familiarity with the data. Inexorably part 
of the technique, it is only this hard labour that will reveal 
the elaborately and minutely ordered structures of conversation. 
This informal ethnography of the practice of CA at the conference 
also suggested something of a paradox: although CA posits itself 
upon 'scientific analysis' (with which the precision demanded of 
their transcription is consistent), the grounds upon which the 
disputed versions of a transcript were warranted came from the 
realm of "gut feeling", and "intuition" about their meaning, both 
concepts used explicitly and frequently in the various accounts 
of what was going on in the tape. At the same time, CA's relied 
upon a close attention to 'what was really going on' in the talk, 
although in the light of their debates as to the accuracy/usefulness 
of asking the speakers themselves to say what they had meant (i. e. 
acknowledgeing that there were still other possible versions that 
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could be produced), what sense that 'really going on' carries is 
not at all clear. 
What was being analysed in practice was the interaction 
which gave rise to what was recorded, not only the records them- 
selves. They are regarded merely as the 'traces' (Latour & Woolgar 
1979) through which the phenomenon, talk, can be approached, the 
transcripts taken as accurate, fixed and detailed records, which 
merely preserved the talk that had taken place. But as has been 
discussed, in the event, the transcripts, however accurately re- 
produced, were not in themselves the sole basis for that analysis. 
They could not be deciphered without recourse to their meaning 
content. 
The attraction of atomism is difficult to resist; that is, the 
conclusion that somehow the attention to all that fine detail will 
inexorably make a method fruitful, 'what is really going on' 
easier to discern. As Mehan and-Wood have observed: 
CA's have been willing to ignore the indexical relations 
between talk and its context. They have treated talk as 
possessing finite meanings. In doing so, CA's have 
suspended consideration of the consequences of reflexivity 
that other researchers have treated as ethnomethodology's 
essential phenomenon. 
Mehan & Wood 1975: 135-6 
Conversational Analysis is often, however, rejected simply on 
practical grounds rather than with a fundamental critique. Locker 
(whose analysis of talk. will be discussed below) explains for 
example that it does not provide a practicable means of analysing 
his own data: 
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[What I am concerned with is] the analysis of interview 
talk about health and illness. This talk consists 
mainly of long descriptions of events by the respondents. 
CA tends to be undertaken in short exchanges between two 
participants in a conversation. 
Locker 1981: 24 
For critics such as Locker, CA is simply one among the sociologist's 
available repertoire of interchangeable and homogeneous methods, 
which are selected on the basis of their appropriateness to the 
analysts' intentions vis a vis her data. That CA can be considered 
on those practical grounds alone assumes that it constitutes no 
epistemological challenge to 'normal practice': that it is, on 
the contrary, a practice which shares the realist and scientific 
theory of knowledge which is the basis of traditional sociology - 
in fact is a high-class exemplar of it. 
3.3.2 Interpretavism 
It is true that after reading the work of conversational analysis, 
other ways of analysing talk, lacking its fine detail, appear 
crude and gross. The assumption that microscopy, atomism, brings 
one closer to the phenomenon is very seductive (analogous 
to the contemporary move in MS research to look for the disease 
beneath the skin, via NMR scanners, electron microscopy and so on). 
16 
But it has to be rejected here. For that very reason I cannot use 
it to address my own concerns. 
Even if one were to put aside the pioblematics involved in 
the practice of CA it would still be unsuitable (pace Locker) for 
my own data, for, in being concerned with 'lay conceptions of 
science', it is the meaning of the interview talk that I am bound to 
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address. And at the level of its theory, the 'meaning' of talk 
is in principle irrelevant to CA. 
There is, however, an interpretive approach to the analysis of 
talk that lays claim to at least ethnomethodlogical influence, 
which is concerned with meaning, of which Locker (1981) is an 
exponent. 
His research ccnceri: s the analysis of a number of interviews 
with six women, conducted at intervals over the period of a year, 
consisting of, "their accounts of their own experience of health 
and illness" (1981: 21) - data somewhat similar to mine in that by 
using only a "brief schedule" (1981: 20) he too endeavoured to : "make 
the interviews as much like a conversation as possible" (1981: 21). 
As he explains in the introduction to Symptoms and Illness, 
unlike other medical sociologists, but 'like' ethnomethodologists, 
he regards, "social reality as a construct" (1981: x). His approach 
is however to reject ethnomethodological theory whilst accepting 
some of its 'findings': 
Some of the propositions of symbolic interactionism 
and labelling theory are used to demonstrate the centrality 
of meaning in social life, and the writings of Schutz and 
the ethnomethodologists are used to identify the cognitive 
processes involved in their production. 
Locker 1981: x 
As a theory, ethnomethodology has to be rejected by him, for it 
fails to be able to account for the social action in which he is 
interested, for it, "(S)ees man as a skilled cognitian but not... as 
an actor" (1981: 135). It would, thus, 
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(T)ake a descripti n of the interpretive process 
in interview talkk as all there is to say. 
Locker 1981: 135 
And for Locker there is much more to his data than that. 
How, then, is talk analysed from such a position? At the end of 
his book, Locker discusses what he has been doing which is, by his 
account, to provide simply: 
(A) relatively superficial explication of the practices 
and procedures integral to the cognitive organisation of 
one aspect of experience, that of health and illness. 
Locker 1981: 177 
But this 'superficiality' is meant almost literally: 
(I) say superficial since every extract presented could 
be subject to a more detailed and extensive analysis. 
Much more is involved in the accounts I have analysed than 
has been described so far. 
Locker 1981: 177 
That is, there is a finite depth to the meanings of the interviews 
that could (have been) increasingly revealed with increasing levels 
of focus -a view that is clearly at odds with certain central 
tenets of ethnomethodology, for example Sacks on 'Sociological 
Descriptions' and its in-principle inconcludeability (1963), and 
clearly in conformity with the practice of CA (and, one might add, 
the latter clearly not in conformity with Sacks, the ethnomethodologist 
to whom they attribute their own position). 
For Locker the talk that constitutes the interviews un- 
problematically represents simply what his respondents meant: the 
analyst's task is to read not only the words on their surfaces 
("relatively superficially") but what the words are the documents 
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of, what lies behind them in the people themselves, viz: the 
underlying "cognitive organization of disorder", to quote the 
sub-title of his book. 
Locker acknowledges that what the women said has to be 
recognised for "what it is", an acknowledgement that appears to 
be accepting an element of reflexivity in his analysis when he 
explains that: 
Accounts given in interviews are to be read as such 
and not more or less adequate descriptions of some 
independent reality. 
Locker 1981: 177 
However, despite this caveat, they can, he continues be read as 
demonstrating that: 
(It) was by means of the skillful use of common under- 
standings that the women were able to display their 
status as moral persons and competent members. 
Locker 1981: 177 
Thus Locker specifically disclaims any necessary connection between 
what was said in the interviews and the external events to which 
they referred: he makes no such disclaimer however in respect of his 
conclusion that there was a relationship between the accounts which 
the women provided and the "cognitive organizations" revealed to 
be lying behind the document of their talk, in their minds, so to 
speak. For Locker, this relationship was not 'an account'. 
For him, then, it is the women's talk about matters of 
health and illness that have to be understood as accounts, the 
product of their interpretive practices and the cognitive processes 
underlying them. The role of the analyst is to understand them as 
such, and pay attention to those practices rather than evaluating 
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them in terms of their accuracy, validity and so on. 
The interpretive practices are, however, for Locker all on 
one side; his own analysis a straightforwardly achieved, accurate 
description of the women's meanings. That an analyst's description 
must, by the same token, be similarly constituted through inter- 
pretive practices is not something that appears to trouble him, 
despite the extensive discussion of his analysis that he appends 
as the final chapter of the book. 
** 
This use of the documentary method in the analysis of talk is 
routine research practice, the ability of the analyst to see 
through the surface appearances to what lies beneath, that which 
analysis is taken to be. Analysts are analysts by virtue of 
the very fact that there is more to data/the phenomena of social 
life than appears to its participants. It is in making plain 
what is hidden that provides the possibility for knowing what is 
'going on' in talk - both for CA and now for Locker. The careful 
application of correct method will represent that aspect of 'the 
world' in which analysts are interested. In that Garfinkel was 
himself cutting about this: "Ethnomethodological studies are(.. ) 
useless when they are done as ironies"(1967: vii), their persistence 
with 'instrumental irony' (Woolgar 1983) marks their work as, 
in practice, very little influenced by ethnomethodology. 
98 
What we have found is, once again, an assumed immunity from 
the 'horror' of reflexivity'in the analysis of talk, at both 
extremes. By relying on the scientificity of its method, CA 
reproduces the metadiscourse of science - the topic and not 
the resource of this thesis. The interpretive approach, on the 
other hand, that examines the interpretive practices of talkers 
in producing meaning fails tö Address the possibility of the 
existence of 'the same' phenomenon in analysis itself. It 
appears from both that (expert) analysis. uses some other kind 
of method than that/those used by its subjects. Despite their 
apparently diametrically different interests in talk - (only) in 
its structure, (only) in its meaning - they share at a more 
fundamental level a confidence that what is dis-covered about 
talk is there in the phenomenon; that method is merely a means 
of discovery of aspects of that phenomenon. To re-cite Blum, 
both are interested only in "the phenomena themselves" (1974: 2-3; 
Fn 1), looking only outwards : to the world. 
The selection of an appropriate method begins analysis: 
and marks the place where analysts have "stopped doubting" (Blum 
1971: 316). What is strange, remarkable, worth analysing, is what 
comes after, not before, that stopping. 
Having thought about both the work. of, CA and of Locker in terms 
of the theoretical bases from which they begin, it appears that 
it is the analysis of talk as data and not merely data in relation 
to what the data is about that has to be considered in order to 
99 
continue doubting. Reflexivity -is involved not only in the 
relation of data to that which it is taken to be. data of but in 
the relation of analysis to data. But what of this chapter? 
At the beginning, I argued that, in that MS was conceivable as 
a 'natural' breaching experiment, it is possible to say that in 
this instance, as the warrant for using MS as an occasion for 
theorising (about theorising), the methodological horrors are 
horrors already for the people whose talk is the concern of the 
thesis. In moving on from that assertion to discuss extant 
approaches to the analysis of 'similar' data - talk - as part 
of identifying an appropriate method with which to proceed, it 
is as if the question of what that talk concern s was not yet 
addressed. 
And yet of course to assert that the 'methodological horrors' 
operate for the people with MS, that MS makes 'knowledge' strange, 
is to have already found a very specific meaning in that talk. 
An interpretation (analysis) of the data has already preceeded 
the discussion of method and in fact has already constituted the 
impetus for the thesis. 
In the ordering of the chapters of the thesis so far, in 
conforming to the proper procedures, in beginning with 'the question' 
and with relevant literature prior to addressing the selection of 
a method, what is written represents the process of analysis in 
a way that rhetorically re-presents scientific method - the 
independence of analysis from 'the data' (be it talk about MS or 
other analysts' analyses of talk): the immunity of the analysis 
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from 'the same' phenomena; inexorably covering over the fact 
that the expertise of analysis is in itself an achieved account. 
! jZ analysis, the 'making strange' - even of analysis to itself 
by means of ethnomethodological theorising - is depicted as 
over. The produced analysis cannot represent strangeness: all 
it may do is, as here, point towards its absence. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ACCOUNTING FOR ACCOUNTS OF THE DIAGNOSIS OF MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS 
The basic research question with which this thesis is concerned 
is with lay conceptions of science. But given what has already 
been written, the question is no longer addressable from a point 
of view that would, in resting on an acceptance of the givenness 
of expert knowledge (scientific medicine) then approach the 
depiction of lay theorising in terms of its difference. Rather 
the question has to be approached directly from the lay point 
of view, as far as possible looking at how people with MS them- 
selves categorise knowledge of MS in terms of degreees of 
reliability, looking for what they count as knowledge. 
The people in the study knew they had MS. 
I 
In seeking to under- 
stand how they. came to know that fact it may be possible to 
discern how and from what that was distinguished and thus, in 
effect, what counted for them as definitive, taking the point of 
diagnosis, for analytic purposes, as marking the achievement of 
correct knowledge, the taken-as-authoritative statement of what 
was wrong with them. This chapter therefore focuses on those 
sections of the interviews concerned with the process of 
achieving that diagnosis. 
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There is an irony for an analyst such as myself, whose theoretical 
auspices are, as evinced by what has been written so far in this 
thesis, an epistemological scepticism, in producing an analysis 
still based on data collected in the real world rather than on, 
say, imagined conversations between fictional characters. 
One could of course side-step this irony by saying that 
I'm not claiming that this analysis is really true, that the talk 
is evidence of what these people actually think; that this analysis 
is not claiming any special status in virtue of the data's relation- 
ship to a 'real' world. I am, I might say, simply conforming to 
the usual requirement to base analysis on data collected in the 
field, complying with that convention merely in order to remain 
within the discourse of sociology: That there is no harm in going 
along with it. 
But this instrumental conformity has profound epistemo- 
logical consequences. For the data is very seductive: it has the 
feel for both researchers and readers of the stuff of life. Before 
you know where you are it has convinced you that it 
is reality, 
reality captured, preserved beyond the moment of its original 
existence for the remembrance of others who were not there. The 
people whose talk this is are so immediately recognisable as 
members, with us, of the everyday. They are describing a world 
we know to be like that. Ergo, the data not only is the reality 
of talk preserved on tape, but analysis based on it is about the 
world outside the talk. 
This conclusion is deeply ironic in that it itself 
exemplifies how we reflexively create reality from what we take 
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to be the documents of it - and the talk of others is one such docu- 
ment. 
But this irony is intrinsic: it cannot be expelled from 
analysis since it is itself the outcome of the very theorising 
which has made it visible; it is rather a matter for 'celebration' 
- even though how to express such rejoicing is tantalisingly 
unclear. 
The traditional form of writing sociology makes Invisible 
the role of the writer and the reader in creating a reading of a 
text of analysis; it displays what is written as if disconnected 
from the processes which made. it possible. The form of writing 
itself creates what can be said. 
2 
What then counts, for the people in this study, as a correct 
diagnosis? How, and from what is this distinguished? ' And what 
does this have to say about their concept of science? 
The interviews were designed to explore what having MS 
meant to individuals and to allow them to tell their stories in 
their own ways rather than in terms assumed relevant beforehand 
by the researcher (myself). To this end I did not compose a prior 
list of questions to be answered or topics to be covered. The 
interviews were so unstructured that they might be better charac- 
terised as 'conversations' (Dawe 1978). 
3 
To suppose that each interview begins from the same point of 
'strangeness' - in the Schutzian sense - for the interviewer is 
to ignore as irrelevant the existence of the researcher as a 
104 
continuity behind and between each interview. Although the inter- 
view may have been the first occasion on which each interviewee 
represented their experience of MS in this particular form, the 
interviewer, I the researcher, am present in each of the 
interviews, cumulatively learning what constitutes 'talking about 
MS' from one interview to the next, feeding that knowledge back 
into each subsequent one as the then taken-for-granted assumptions 
grounding that talk: eliciting 'MS talk' whose appropriateness 
is self-confirmatory. Although. the interviews were designed to 
be unstructured, what develops over the period of the fieldwork 
is an increasingly narrow theorising base rather than the pre- 
supposition-free situation I was supposing I was providing each 
time for each of the participants by virtue of planning not to 
have preformulated questions. 
If an interviewer could be the passive recorder of subjects' 
talk about MS (the objective interviewer gar excellence), then 
this would not matter. But interviews, these conversations, are 
inter-actions, mutually created by-. both speakers. What the 
interviewer cumulatively 'already knows' helps constitute what 
is said. 
And yet to point out this researcher's learning of the 
MS culture and her active participation in its creation as a 
phenomenon through the talk matters, is to imply that this is a 
distortion of some other, more pure, way of researching: is to 
suppose that there could be a collection of date that was unmediated. 
Mulkay and Gilbert (1982) found that when scientists talk about 
the truth and error of competing scientific findings, they employ a 
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flexible repertoire of social and psychological mediating factors. 
These factors are invoked by the scientists to account for what they 
deem to be errors, but they are not invoked when referring to what is 
considered to be correct knowledge. This asymmetrical accounting 
practice, Mulkay and Gilbert argue, allows for and continually re- 
creates the traditional conceptualisation of science as a body of 
knowledge which arises rationally and objectively simply from the 
unmediated discovery of the nature of the physical world. 
Can the notion of asymmetrical accounting. be used to discern 
what the people in this study view as differential statuses of 
knowledge about their condition? If this asymmetry should be found 
to be present in their talk, does it work similarly to preserve 
people's faith in the truth and power of scientific medicine; a 
faith which, from the long history of failure both in the case of 
the disease in general and their own cases in particular would 
seem to be fundamentally undermined? 
For an analyst seeking to discern the accounting practices 
of individuals which may work to manage the challenge to their 
confidence in knowledge posed by the phenomenon of MS, 
it is also 
an occasion for reflecting upon how analysts settle these challenges 
for themselves. How is it possible for me, as analyst, to account 
for how people accounted for their knowledge of their condition? 
Since this analysis is interested at a general level 
in lay conceptions 
of science, it begins by looking at how the people in the study 
initially accounted for their going to the doctor rather than 
anywhere else when they first thought there was 'something wrong'. 
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For to ask the general question pre-supposes that it is from 
doctors as experts that the most authoritative knowledge will be 
sought. The focus will then be on those sections of the interviews 
which relate the process of discovery of the diagnosis of MS. 
Examination of the data shows, however, that several distinguish- 
able categories of incorrect and correct diagnoses were used by 
the respondants rather than Mulkay and Gilbert's simple dichotomy 
between correct and incorrect. 
The analysis is organised around these categories, viz: 
Doctors' 'incorrect' diagnoses; patients' incorrect diagnoses; 
patients' 'correct' diagnoses; and doctors' correct diagnoses. The 
inverted commas are used as a textual device in order to indicate 
the difference between what were deemed apparent and actual 
instances of correct and incorrect. 
GOING TO THE DOCTOR/ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE 
Bearing in mind Mulkay and Gilbert's analytic device of asymmetrical 
accounting, are there differences in how the patients accounted for 
their recourse to medicine and to its alternatives? First, then, 
what was an interactionally sufficient way of introducing 'going 
to the doctor' as topic? The following extracts show how, typically, 
this was introduced. 
Daniel: 
4 
[symptoms] and I didn't know what it was and the 
doctors.. first I went to an eye doctor because that's 
what was worst affected. 
* 
Anne: This [symptoms] lasted, went on for about two or three 
weeks. I thought well I'd better go and see the doctor. 
Des: but [symptoms] so I went to the doctor and I saw the 
elder statesman of the practice and he... 
ri 
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George: [symptoms] just didn't make sense to me and I went to 
the doctor you know and.. 
Each account comprises a list of 'signs of something wrong', 
immediately followed by reference to "the doctor" and what the doctor 
said or did. The decision to go to the doctor - rather than anyone 
else - was simply reported. The reason lies implicit in the 
sequencing - first symptoms so then doctor. What is taken to be the 
most natural requires the least explication (Sacks 1974). 
The symptoms were taken as signs of 'something wrong', the 
documents of an underlying reality whose nature was not known by 
the patient although its signs were discerned. The respondents 
thus had knowledge of 'the facts' but not what the facts meant. It 
was because "I didn't know what it was" (Daniel) and it "just didn't 
make sense to me" (George) that makes the hearable implication, with 
what is spoken of next - "the doctor" - that the doctor would 
obviously possess the knowledge that they lacked (Woolgar 1980). 
The interactionally adequate reasonableness of the related course of 
action - symptoms followed by going to the doctor - relies also on 
members' intersubjective knowledge of the relation between a con- 
ceptual category 'symptoms' and the category of persons, 'doctors', 
with whom it is natural to consult. 
That one will inevitably have to discard the vast majority of the 
data so painstakingly collected is an admonition commonly proffered 
to neophyte sociological researchers. 
5 The tapes used for this 
study consist of over twenty-five hours of talk. The quotations 
used here constitute only a fraction of that mass. The practice 
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of selective quotation is one way of coping with such over- 
abundance; and that selection is usually passed off as a. solution 
to a merely technical problem. Yet what does the practice of 
selection assume? Firstly and crucially that an extract, a few 
lines ex-tracted from their original site in the whole talk, can 
be read independently of that context; and second that they can 
adequately 'stand for' a set of 'similar instances' in the whole 
corpus of data. 
At one level this is sheer delusion, as known by all 
afficianados of playbills which so judiciously quote from press 
reviews. But even granted the faith of the reader that I have not 
practiced quotation quite so creatively, the matter remains 
fundamentally problematic. For the in-principle indexicality of 
documents (here, extracts of talk) is (only? ) managed in practice 
through reference to context, context and extract reflexively 
producing meaning through their juxtaposition (Garfinkel 1967). 
Therefore extracts divorced from the contexts in which they 
originated and inserted into another - the context of my analysis - 
would seem to be particularly vulnerable to a radical distortion 
of their original meaning. 
But to make this objection is to propose that they have an 
original meaning which is fixable - even if fleetingly and reflex- 
ively-tied-to-context; that there is, potentially, a crucial 
difference in meaning between the same words in their original 
context and in another. 
Taking each quotation from its original site in a person's 
whole talk and re-placing it together with others in a common 
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context, the context of analyst's topic, facilitates the inter- 
pretation that the quotations are, singly and together, about 
the topic: going to the doctor, for example. 
But the in-principle flexibility of re-interpretation is 
not unlimited. For it would be difficult to select just any 
quotation and, by the same process of recontextualisation, make 
it work as relevant to as (analyst's) topic. The extract: 
Meg: I do respond to cortisone very well so that I 
suppose my own sort of peculiar psychological 
defence is that every time I get it (attacks of 
MS] I'm going to have cortisone, I'm going to get 
better. 
would not work as a convincing account of 'going to the doctor'. 
Why not? 
One way for an analyst to discern what may be a noticeable absence 
(here the absence of reasons provided for going to the doctor) 
is through comparison with similar yet different instances. 
Respondents referred in other parts of their talk to alternative 
medical practitioners, for example to acupuncturists and faith 
healers. Was a different kind of account given for going to these 
alternative resources? 
The greater complexity of the accounting practices concerning 
recourse to''alternative medicine' both requires and is demonstrated 
by the necessity for longer quotations from the data. 
George: Someone said try faith healing, I tried him and he 
did nothing. Mind you I have no faith in anything 
before I went so you know. . . and 
basically being 
scientifically minded myself, I think that's the way 
it's [a cure] going to come. [-j I went to an acu- 
puncturist, not an acupuncturist, a faith healer. He 
moved me around and asked-me you know he sort of 
twisted me in various directions and said what was 
the major problem and I told him and he said, sounds 
to me like MS. Oh, he was the one, thinking back now. 
Yea, I think in the meantime I had decided that's 
what I had 
AW: So you'd seen the television programme 
George: I'd seen the television programme, then I went to 
him and he really confirmed my beliefs. 
* 
Meg: From my own point of view the most difficult thing 
about having an illness like this is that everybody 
has a cure for you [-] all of which sound fine but if 
you, I mean if you can picture a situation where you've 
come out of hospital, you're feeling fairly shattered, 
you you're not you definitely don't feel as strong as 
you used to feel and you get this barrage of advice 
and you must try my osteopath, you must try my this and 
and [-] and 'a' you find it difficult to resist it but 
'b', which is much worse, is that - now now whether 
this is sort of conjectural or whether this is true - 
but I was left feeling that if you don't do it, then 
it's your fault that you're so ill [laughs]. So I 
went through a stage where I just thought, well, I 
had nothing to lose [-] 
AW: And how did that end then? 
Meg: Oh well because I was talking to my neurologist about 
it and I said that I found this quite a pressure and 
he said well fine, he said, well look he said, if you 
come across a faith healer or a homeopath or anybody 
else who can cure this please ask them to get in touch 
with me because believe me, he said, I'll go along with 
Aabody who can cure you. And so then when people sort 
of wanted to do things I just ask them if they would 
mind talking to my neurologist, and that sort of stop- 
ped it all. 
Meg provides an elaborate account for her resort to alternative 
medicine - the grounds of social pressure from others combined with 
her initial vulnerability to such pressures. By contrast, talking 
to her neurologist appears the normal thing to do, requiring no 
explanation. By appealing to 'proper' medicine, she eventually 
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managed to resist the pressure. Even though her neurologist was 
clearly prepared to listen to any genuine alternative ("body who 
can cure you"`, Meg implied that the people who had pestered her 
were too afraid that their alternatives would fail to stand up 
to scientific scrutiny to take up his eminently open-minded offer. 
The implication is that should alternative medicine be endorsed 
by a medical professional, then Meg, like her neurologist, would 
have accepted it; but it was unlikely. Real medicine is the 
natural and final arbiter. 
The data also included an account of why an individual did 
not go to alternative medicine: 
Daniel: Yes the whole thing with that [the 'laying on of 
hands] is you believe in it. It may well have an 
effect for people who believe that whatever charlatan 
offers them something is going to work. Maybe it 
will. But since I think they're charlatans I'm not 
going to accept that they might work, and therefore 
they won't work for me. Which leaves me a rational 
loser in an irrational environment. 
For both Daniel and George (quoted earlier), the efficacy of alter- 
native medicine depends on a person's belief in its power. They 
both invoke 'science' as the reason for their own lack of such 
belief. George's comment suggests however that being "scientific- 
ally minded" is just one of his personal quirks, a personal 
rather than a universal faith. Certain treatments are not con- 
sidered either credible or effective because they are grounded 
on an alternative knowledge (not-science). It is not that he 
regards science as an absolute truth about the world, just one 
that he 'happens' to believe in. Daniel's comment allows for 
a similar interpretation: that his own belief in rationality 
112 
(which I am conflating with 'science' as a possible hearing) 
paradoxically excludes him from what could be, had he at belief 
in it, actually effective. Daniel spoke elsewhere of the power 
of illusion in western medicine: 
AW: I mean maybe that's got something to do with the 
expectations of people in the medical profession 
Daniel: oh yes 
AW: that we tend to believe that they can do miracles 
anyway 
Daniel: and in some doctors it's certainly encouraged, that 
sort of witch doctor attitude. Well, and again, the 
witch-doctor thing, the best doctor that I had any 
dealings with was the consultant in neurology at the 
UCH, a man called G, and he's a real witch-doctor 
man, full of shaman technique and so on, fostering 
the illusion that he actually can do something for 
you. Now is that really bad? Because as any witch- 
doctor will tell you, the illusion is all. And 
people are cured with illusions so... 
This on the one hand implies a relativist view of medical knowledge 
rather than a universal one; yet on the other, that unless the 
person has faith in the illusion - or rather sees it as real 
rather than as the illusion it really is, it is ineffective. So 
although there is an acknowledgement that knowledge is relative - 
that in principle there are many ways of knowing - the effectiveness 
of knowledge is possible only when the grounds for that knowledge 
in particular are also believed in: a belief that it is not possible 
to create at will. 
We can see then that 'going to the doctor' is a course of action 
that is spoken of as simply arising from the fact of having 
symptoms: doctors are the obvious place to go for knowledge of 
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what they signified, for expertise. By contrast, 'going to alter- 
native medicine' was accounted for by the invocation of intervening 
factors - social pressures and temporary vulnerability. Although 
it was said that both alternative and scientific medicine 
required a person's faith in order for them to be effective, it 
must be noted that the necessity of having 'faith' in science was 
not invoked when people were speaking of the initial going to 
the doctor; only as part of accounting for their actions vis ä vis 
medicine's alternatives. 
None of the respondents claimed it would be sensible to 
have gone to alternative medicine to settle the matter of what 
was wrong with them. 
5 
Alternative medicine was portrayed only 
as a source of possible alternative treatment, not of alternative 
diagnoses. 
The distinctions between what was counted as medicine and what 
alternative medicine are themselves constituted through this 
analysis. That which is accounted for by people's invocation 
of the necessity of faith as a prior requisite for its effect- 
iveness or by the invocation of intervening social or psychological 
factors is, by analyst's definition, what is countable as 
alternative medicine. That which is presented in the talk as 
requiring no elaboration beyond that implicit in the sequencing 
of symptems-so-doctor becomes what alternative medicine is 
alternative to: scientific medicine. The possibility of distinguish- 
ing between two kinds of knowledge and the capabilities of those 
two kinds of knowledge are created by the process of this analysis: 
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and demonstrated because they have been demonstrable. 
At the same time, the grounds for the analyst's proposition 
of the possibility, of there being 'two kinds' of medicine relies 
on her member's knowledge of the possibility of this kind of 
distinction. She 'knows' that medicine means (in some sense un- 
explicated before the analysis but explicable through it) a coherent, 
Identifiable, scientific body of knowledge and practices; and that 
there are alternative knowledges and practices which purport to be 
relevant to bodies and their conditions but which are premised on 
different, non-scientific, theoretical grounds. Thus the analysis 
and what is analysable - the phenomenon of scientific medicine 
and its alternatives - are reflexively bound together. 
DOCTORS' 'INCORRECT' DIAGNOSES 
The fact of MS, taken as the fact of the matter, is for these 
people a fact only (and obviously) to be sought through doctors' 
knowledge. Given the exclusive power granted to scientific 
medicine to classify accurately what is wrong, how did the 
respondents account for the fact that they also said their doctors 
had, in every case, initially made a diagnosis other than that of 
MS? 
Des: I saw the elder statesman of the practice and he 
diagnosed iron deficiency 
AW: Oh that's a good one. ' Southampton doctor was it? 
Des: No it was a doctor up the road, Doctor G. 
AW: So what did he give you for that? 
1-1 
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Des: [-] I saw the other doctor, Doctor R, later on and he, 
he's got seventeen MS patients so he knows all about 
it. 
* 
Jane: .. but they did lumbar punctures and tests like that 
and they were all clear, and they put it down to 
hysteria because [recounts her history of mental and 
physical stress at that time]. 
* 
George; He [the doctor] said that probably I'd just overdone 
it you know, too much walking. But I'm not the sort 
of person that overdoes exercise and II thought 
perhaps it was just me. 
Although his first doctor made an 'incorrect' diagnosis, this was 
accounted for by Des in terms of the fact that the doctor had 
lacked direct experience of MS. 'Lack of experience' works to 
limit the potential generalisability of this criticism to all 
doctors to just this one individual, Doctor G. With sufficient 
experience of MS (as "Doctor R" had had) doctors were capable of 
knowing what was not iron deficiency. Thus Doctor G's inexperience 
was confined to him as an individual; it was Doctor R's knowledge 
which was typical of doctors in general. 
George also invoked experience as the grounds for his 
doctor's mistake, but in this case it was the doctor's insufficient 
experience of him, George, as a whole person,. in terms of his 
habits of physical activity. Since the doctor did not (and could 
not have had, it is implied) have this whole picture, he could 
not appreciate that the grounds for his diagnosis - "overdoing 
things" - were unfounded. George recalled concluding that it 
was, then, probably "just him", which seems to mean that since his 
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symptoms could not have been the result of over-exertion, and 
since the doctor had offered no other reason than that for them, 
they "must" have been due not to disease but to some weakness in 
himself; the responsibility for the mistake comes to rest not 
with his doctor but with him. 
In Jane's case, the 'incorrect' diagnosis of hysteria was 
even less of a mistake on the doctor's part since, according to 
her account, given the symptoms she was displaying at the time 
and her then recent history of stress, no doctor could have 
known that it was really MS. And "the tests" (the lumbar puncture 
being a commonly used indicator of the condition) had in any case 
been done but had showed nothing. In the fullness of time the 
doctors would know what had been wrong all along (as indeed had 
been proved to be the case three years later). Thus the diagnosis 
was not incorrect; but a reasonable conclusion given the circum- 
7 
stances. 
Accounting for 'incorrect' diagnoses, then, introduced intervening 
factors to do with deficiencies of particular kinds: an individual 
doctor's lack of direct experience of other cases of MS; insufficient 
(but understandable) knowledge of the patient as an individual; 
the absence of unambiguous symptoms; an insufficient elapse of 
time for the disease to have developed clearly. These deficiencies 
are all presented as the upshot of mediating factors which - only 
temporarily - obscured the relation between the evidence and its 
true significance: they are not presented as grounds for regarding 
the diagnoses as really incorrect. And most critically, they are 
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either deficiencies in the knowledge of specified individual 
doctors or deficiencies in the disease itself - in the sense 
of its notorious ambiguity. The mistakes are accounted for. in 
a way that preserves the efficacy of doctors and of medical 
knowledge per se. 
The possibility of these diagnoses being erroneous comes from 
the knowledge that what was really wrong was MS, both at the 
time being recalled when the 'incorrect' diagnoses were being 
made and at the time of the interview. I selected these people 
for interview in the first place because they were 'people with 
MS'. Consequently their talk was understandable in terms of 
that basic fact. In the light of that knowledge, held by both 
of us, any other illness was known at the time of the interview 
not to have been the case. My response to Des, "Oh that's a 
good one" speaks both to our knowledge that iron deficiency was 
not the correct diagnosis and to a wealth of other 'incorrect' 
diagnoses of which I had been told. 
That there is 'something wrong'; that it is possible to 
'know' what 'it' really is and therefore also that it is possible 
to be wrong about it, are all assumed unproblematically by both 
Interviewer and interviewed - and now analyst. Arriving at a 
diagnosis comes off in this talk as a technical matter of, as in 
these extracts, achieving sufficiency of contextual knowledge to 
understand 'the facts' (the physical signs of something wrong) 
to make up for what was once lacking, The fact that, in the end, 
the right diagnosis was made provides, as a prefatory statement, 
118 
4.3 
for the possibility of this analysis which makes distinctions 
between 'incorrect' and incorrect, 'correct' and correct know- 
ledge. 
By means of their accounting practices, the respondents consti- 
tuted doctors' mistaken diagnoses as not having been really 
incorrect. That category was reserved for their own attempts to 
find out what was wrong with them. 
PATIENTS' INCORRECT DIAGNOSES 
Daniel: I actually looked, somebody I've forgotten who, 
did it for me. It wasn't my wife, somebody else, 
read up something in a medical handbook thing. Some 
other mad disease. But I had a lot of the symptoms 
of it certainly and it was a very very nasty thing. 
And when I went to the doctors and asked if I had it 
they just laughed 
AW: Did they say what you had then? 
Daniel: Yes they said stop reading those books! 
George: I mean I hadn't gone into other illnesses at all. 
I hadn't even thought about-the only thing I'd heard 
before this, I mean I'd heard of MS, was muscular 
dystrophy and so I thought well, I wonder if its 
muscular dystrophy. In my mind. 
* 
Meg: Oh no well I started off, I was absolutely, I knew 
it was a brain tumour, I mean absolutely convinced. 
[-] I was absolutely petrified. I mean I, and that 
sort of blocked everything else out because I was so 
sure I was going to have the, that awful brain scan, 
they were going to say yes, it's a tumour, because 
because of the paralysis. 
* 
Each of the incorrect diagnoses mentioned were of diseases which 
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the person now viewed as 'worse than, MS -a brain tumour, 
muscular dystrophy and even syphillis (extract not quoted)8 - 
all frightening and terminal diseases. 
Accounts of their own incorrect diagnoses were often pro- 
duced in the context of speaking of their-relief on eventually 
hearing from the doctor that it was MS that they had. Thus their 
own attempts at self-diagnosis acquired from the context in which 
they were spoken of a kind of added frisson in that those imagined 
complaints had been more dire than the actual one - an exaggerated 
and now faintly silly over-dramatisation of what was really wrong. 
By this contrast, medical knowledge gained both credibility and 
a kind of benignity, for its diagnostic pronouncements had always 
turned out to be more optimistic than those the patients had 
thought they could reach by themselves. 
Although the sources from which the respondents had drawn 
their versions of what was wrong were still regarded as reliable - 
it was not that medical dictionaries contained untrue facts - they 
were acknowledged to be, in hindsight, an inadequate substitute 
for real medical knowledge. Medical knowledge was thus held to 
consist of something in addition to 'the facts', a something by 
definition not available to themselves as proven non-experts. 
People said they had sought the name of a disease which would ex- 
plain the whole range of their symptoms, a disease of which their 
symptoms could be understood as sensible documents, based on 
their knowledge - crucially flawed as it had turned out - of 
physiology. It was the grounds which link facts and explanation 
together, the theories behind medicine, that they had been unable 
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to supply and which had lead them - in spite of following the 
correct method - to draw their incorrect conclusions. The 
doctors' ability in the end to make the correct links - from 
the same facts - maintained and reinforced the interviewees' 
view of experts qua experts, and of themselves as mere amateurs. 
George gave this version of ignorance an added twist. In 
our interview he said he had very early on seen the letters "DS" 
written on his physiotherapy card, but he had not understood that 
the initials stood for Disseminated Sclerosis (an earlier and 
now almost entirely superseded term for HS). Now, however, he 
could see that the true diagnosis had been available to him long 
before he had finally known that he had MS. This demonstrates 
that knowing also entails a prior understanding of what that know- 
ledge could be - in order to recognise it as knowledge. 
Arriving at the correct relationship between their symptoms and 
the disease of which they were the manifestations required, as 
the respondents' accounts show, an underlying theoretical ground 
which would bind these two necessary but not sufficient elements 
of knowing. For the people, though,. there was in the end an 
independent external criterion by which to adjudge the accuracy 
of diagnostic attempts - the correct fact of MS. 
There is no equivalent external criterion-in sociology with 
the facticity of 'having MS' to settle the supremacy of one theory/ 
account over another. Thus for me as analyst there is no way of 
knowing for sure whether the links made in analysis between the 
documents - the data - and the features noted in the analysis 
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which have lead the analyst to draw the conclusions she does, are 
correct. 
It is possible to refute the contention that this is a 
handicap unique to sociological analysis. One way would be to 
argue that 'the disease MS' is not, actually, an external 
criterion independent of the discourse of its discovery but that 
it, too, is constituted by discourse. The 'fact' that the 
symptoms and the disease, when matched by an expert, make sense 
is to say no more than that experts count these symptoms as 
indicating MS and that MS is the name given to that which is 
constituted by those symptoms. If these symptoms are not co- 
present then ergo it is not MS but something else. The certainty 
bestowed by the existence of an external criterion depends, 
according to this line of argument, on an externality which is in 
fact spurious. To argue this way would be then to say that 
medicine - one discipline within science - can really be no better 
than sociology at achieving certainty of knowledge. We only 
appear to be less able to be certain because science claims to be 
more so. Demonstrate that medicine is no more firmly grounded 
and it will be stripped of its false facticity. A familiar 
argument. 
9 
But what about the current analysis? I am using people's 
talk as raw data and, through the use of my expertise as analyst, 
demonstrating features not visible to the people themselves, but 
claiming that they are features which the people themselves rely 
on in order to produce their accounts. Only the analyst can 'see' 
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what lies behind. I am implying, if not explicitly claiming, a 
special status for my own analysis. 
But it is I who have proposed both that patients accord 
themselves lacking in the expertise necessary to do accurate 
diagnosis and that this 'expertise' is itself a closed reflexive 
loop. Both the analysis and that which is to be analysed are 
inescapably my creations through this text. Inescapable because 
there is no other way of writing. I have to speak for both the 
data and for myself. 
Can I then also say that the patients themselves provide 
their raw data and their analysis of it? is it possible to say 
anything? What cannot be said? 
PATIENTS' 'CORRECT' DIAGNOSES 
Although as I described earlier respondents admitted they had 
made mistakes, they did not portray themselves as altogether 
ignorant. They may have made incorrect diagnoses, but they were 
also capable of arriving at the 'correct' one by themselves. 
George: I found out -I was watching a television programme 
and it wasn't a documentary or anything - and there 
was something on about MS in it and the, I thought 
these symptoms are very like mine. Afterwards in 
fact I went to a book, a medical dictionary, looked 
up to see what MS was and read all about it and thought 
that's me. Definitely. So I went to my doctor and 
said have I got MS? And he said yes. 
* 
Meg: The reason I switched to MS las being that which 
was wrung] was very simply I was on the private floor 
at the National and in the next ward was a woman with 
MS. And I wandered in to talk to her one day [-] and 
she started to tell me about her disease and I thought 
my god, that's what I've got. So that's why I asked 
her (the GP] - if I had MS. 
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John: II saw one evening by chance I saw a programme on 
television and I saw these people I thought god, 
they look like me. And so it came to my mind that 
possibly I'd got this disease you see. So when I 
went to the hospital, confronted them with it, they 
said no, definitely not. They were really adamant 
about it in fact. j-J This was about three years 
after I had had this lumbar puncture so they were 
adamant about it and I was, well what could I think 
other than the fact that it couldn't be, then. And 
then after two years they decided that I might have it. 
In these instances, the interviewees' source of knowledge was a 
direct comparison between themselves and people who they knew had 
MS. But these striking similarities were not thought sufficient 
to count as knowledge that they themselves had MS. They each went 
to their doctors for confirmation. In all three examples, the 
doctor's response was presented as an essential pre-condition of 
the factual status of their suppositions; the people themselves 
could only know the epistemological status of what they thought 
they knew by virtue of medical arbitration. John's account 
strengthens this point. He first accepted from the doctors that 
he had guessed wrongly, then subsequently that he might after all 
have been right all along. But this did not mean that the 
doctors had been wrong; merely 'wrong'. 
There is, it should be noted, a striking contrast in the 
elaborate accounts people gave for how they themselves arrived 
at their 'correct' diagnoses and the monosyllabic verdicts they 
said their doctors had produced: "and he said yes" (George); 
"they said no" (John): an asymmetry which itself works to bear 
witness to the stumbling and hesitant seeking after knowledge that 
people themselves managed and the precision of the doctor's verdict. 
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At one time I was very struck by a metaphoric resemblance between 
the idiosyncratic patterns of individual's figures of speech, the 
substance of their stories about their MS, and their personalities. 
I wondered if it would be possible to use such noticeable speech 
patterns as indicative evidence - good evidence because it was 
"unintended witness" (Marwick 1968) - of how each person dealt 
with their MS. The symmetry held convincingly in every case. 
For example George's constant use of the phrase "you know" - 
appealing to a hearer's understanding and approval of his statements - 
tied in nicely with his readiness to admit his own misunderstanding 
of what his symptoms might indicate ("I thought it was just me") 
even when he had had clear evidence of what was really wrong with 
him (the "DS" written on his medical card), and what seemed, 
throughout his talk, to be a particularly. passive acceptance of 
his disease. I was able to produce for myself a highly detailed 
correspondence. 
But now, given that my theoretical auspices have changed 
from an earlier 'interactionist' perspective to a concern with 
the "methodological horrors" with which all knowing is ineluctably 
involved (the in-principle reflexivity, indexicality, inconclude- 
ability and defeasibility of all statements (Garfinkel 1967; 
Woolgar 1981)), it is 'obvious' that I would have noticed this 
symmetry. After all I could find this symmetry because of the 
reflexive relationship between reality and what I took to be the 
documents of that reality. I was reading George's character from 
what he said, taking his talk as documentary evidence of what he, 
underlying those documents and giving rise to them, was like; 
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understanding what he said in the light of what I deduced his 
character to be; noticing what was idiosyncratic about his talk 
because it expressed and revealed what he was. There were/are no 
independent criteria; they were/are all reflexively constituted 
by me as hearer/analyst. 
The auspices for my theorising when the symmetry first 
struck me and the different auspices for my theorising now 
created both what was then and is now 'obviously' discernible in 
the data. 
My current theorising auspices also provide grounds to 
account for the seductive quality of people's talk as data. Part 
of its immediately recognisable 'reality' is that we take talk to 
be the documents of the selves of others. The people talking on 
tape seem real because we are practiced in the deduction of people 
from their talk. There may be other documents too - bodies, 
gestures, smells, textures - but no medium that is any more direct; 
no way unmediated. All we have to go on are the documents of 
selves - behind which to read the selves of others: and our own. 
DOCTORS' CORRECT DIAGNOSES 
By comparison with the accounts of the other categories, the 
eventual achievement of the correct diagnosis is recounted as 
curiously matter-of-fact by those who at the time of the interviews 
were in posession of what they regarded as a definitive diagnosis 
of MS. The fact of MS is as simply reported as 'going to the doctor' 
was in the first place. 
10 
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George: So I went to my doctor and said have I got MS? 
And he said yes. 
* 
Des: But I think he his doctor sussed what it was quite 
quickly [-] I think actually he told me on my birthday 
what it was. 
* 
Anne: [I went to see] the doctor and he then arranged for 
me to go and see this consultant at UCH and by the 
time I got to see him, you know how long it takes to 
get an appointment, it [the symptoms] had gone. And 
he in fact diagnosed it then but he didn't tell me 
because you don't know whether it's going to come 
back again. And then about a couple of years later 
when I started getting symptoms and went back, and 
he told me. 
The fact that the correct diagnosis was eventually made, and the 
facticity of what it was - MS - is merely reported rather than 
'justified', However, crucial distinctions between "doctors" (GP's) 
and "consultants" are being made here. The status of correct 
diagnosis was in every case in these interviews reserved for the 
pronouncements of specialists, made either face-to-face or conveyed 
via GP's to patients. 
The only way in which "consultants" are criticised - and 
for which accounts are proffered - is over the question of their 
telling or withholding the diagnosis from the patient: that is, not 
their knowledge per se but what they did about it; a criticism 
made of consultants not in terms of their expertise but qua 
persons. 
How the experts eventually decided that it was MS is not 
detailed here - but evidence of the expertise that decision involved 
is conveyed by recounting the leggth of time since the first symptoms; 
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the different stages that had to be gone through. of hope and 
despair; the visits to GP's, hospitals and so on. The sheer 
arduousness of the pursuit contrasts iiith the laconic reporting 
of the final verdict. The efforts of both patients and the medical 
profession also work to reaffirm that diagnosis is an exclusively 
expert skill. 
These factors of time and effort are also involved in 
accounting for the lack of arrival at a diagnosis, so far. 
John: [I have a-typical symptoms] which has been a bit 
of a complex really, bit of a red herring to the 
hospital, what with having the polio of course [in 
childhood]. So they were'nt quite sure what was the 
matter with me. It took them quite five or six 
years before they came to the conclusion that it might 
be MS because they can't find anything else. And in 
fact I still have to go back into hospital within a 
week or two for other tests. Although they confirmed 
it was MS, they still think there's an outside chance 
it may not be. 
* 
Meg And it's really only in the last, oh I should think 
in the last six months that I haven't cared that it 
doesn't have a name or that no-one wants to give it a 
name [- ]. I mean because for me it just wasn't, it 
obviously is some sort of demyelination and I don't mind 
what they call it. 
AW: So how do you feel about them not actually acknowledge- 
ing that it is MS? I me-, are you a hundred percent 
sure that it is? 
Meg: No, no, because I think that MS has become 'how long 
is a piece of string' j--] My own feeling is that in 
twenty year's time there won't be a diagnosis of MS. 
I mean I think it umbrella's a whole lot of things. 
John's account provides for the re-appraisal-of the validity of 
the diagnosis by invoking his atypical symptoms and the confusing 
residue of his childhood polio. The doctors in any case, he said, 
had only concluded it was MS "because they can't find anything else. " 
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it was always a merely contingent diagnosis because of the inter- 
vening factors. So the re-consideration of his diagnosis due in 
a few weeks' time does not force him to characterise re-diagnosis as 
the correction of an error, a doctor's mistake: they had not been 
sure when they initially made it. Thus this is not a questioning 
of a correct diagnosis: the epistemological validity of diagnosis 
is not undermined by his account, nor is the expertise of doctors. 
They had always known enough to know that. they didn't know for sure. 
Meg invokes the problem of taxonomy to account for her own 
case. What the doctors had diagnosed -3 "demyelinating disease" - 
was both sensible and sufficient and not incompatible with the 
possibility of it turning out in the end to have been MS all along 
whatever, she says, that means. Her scepticism is thus addressed 
to the question of the re-definition of boundaries of what is to 
count as MS. She does not fundamentally question the basic con- 
ceptualisation of the disease, nor the doctors' abilities to apply 
its taxonomy correctly. 
These accounting practices portray what might have seemed to have 
been a fundamental confusion on the part of doctors as merely the 
result of peculiar, non-typical circumstances in their own cases 
and of the long time period that has to elapse before certainty 
can be achieved. The doctors' not knowing becomes the mark, not 
of ignorance, but another example of their expertise. 
All the accounts concurred that the authoritative diagnosis 
of MS is merely the revelation of what truly is the matter. By 
means of their special expert abilities and knowledge, doctors 
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are uniquely able to see clearly through the documents of appearance 
to what lies beneath them - multiple sclerosis. 
There are at least three ways in which 'MS' is working as a pre- 
fatory statement here. First, the respondents' accounts can be 
seen as pathing towards the known-at-the-time-of-the-talk but not-at- 
the-time-being-referred-to true fact of having MS (Smith 1978). The 
indexicality of what they say is contained by the eventual diagnosis, 
in the light of which everything else makes a particular sense 
and acquires a particular relevance from the tale of that pathing. 
At the level of making sense during the interviews and on 
earlier re-hearing of the tapes, I as analyst knew I had made the 
same prefatory statement by my conducting the interviews with 
these people in particular, because I 'knew' them to have MS. 
Detailed attention to the data shows how much that could have been 
questioned on the grounds of its relevance to the story of having 
MS was passed over as interactionally, for the moment, adequate - 
because the talk by definition was 'about MS'. 
At the level of this current analysis, the prefatory 
statement is available that this analysis is about people accounting 
for MS and for various versions of knowledge about what was wrong - 
in particular, knowing the diagnosis and differentiating it from 
guesses and mistakes. 
This is additionally complicated by my references in the 
analysis to my recall of earlier, different, thoughts about this 
material - rememberings which cannot perhaps be 'counted' as them- 
selves data for this chapter because they were not recorded -a 
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4.6 
conventional prerequisite for what may be counted as data. 
11 
And yet all that process too is an intrinsic component of 
how I am re-reading this material now; that and all my other 
knowledge about MS, medicine, sociology, research, the world - 
an inconcludeable list - and which are all unrecorded (invisible) 
yet constitutive grounds for my theorising now. 
All these levels reverberate together and are only arbi- 
trarily distinguishable on the basis of chronology - this reading, 
my analysis, the conversations, the times the interviewees were 
recalling, and so on - for the purposes of this current writing. 
I'M NOT A DOCTOR 
There were in the interviews occasions when people directly refer- 
red to the fact that they were 'not doctors', references that may 
be used to elucidate what being a doctor, and expert, was held 
to entail: 
Daniel: I'm not a doctor so I'm not going to say anything 
about certain facts - but I think there is some reason 
to believe that ACTH [a steroid used to control attacks] 
is a good deal less than I was origianlly led to 
believe that it was, let's put it that way. [-] But I, 
I don't really know anything about medicine therefore 
my opinions are not really worth having. 
* 
Anne: I think I've really said all I know about it really 
[Mc] I mean I'm not an expert in it by any means 
because I haven't plunged myself into it properly, to 
sort of delve into all the sort of research. 'Cos 
you know it's a major field in itself. 
* 
George: No I feel that I mean I'm not saying that I know as 
much about MS as doctors do, but I feel that I know 
enough to help myself you know - but there are some 
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doctors I have no faith in [-j a couple I've got no 
respect for whatsoever. Some of my friends have- 
become doctors; if I was to walk into a surgery and 
find them sat the other side I'd think, cor, I remember 
what you were like when you were younger. How on earth 
could you treat people? [-) You can't convince jsome 
doctors] that they could possibly be wrong. What'they 
say is right. And what right have I got to - he's a 
doctor after all. That's his view. I didn't say it 
was my view. [-] OK so they know, alright they must 
know more about the illness than I do but they don't 
know more about me than I do I'm sure. 
* 
Daniel's scepticism about the effectiveness of the steroid treatment 
which appears to be contesting medical facts is however limited by 
his phrase: "is a good deal less than I was lead to believe, " an 
implication that it is a matter of belief rather than fact that 
is open to scepticism. George makes distinctions between doctors' 
knowledge - "about the illness" and doctor's opinions. His exper- 
ience of doctors before they qualified introduces the notion that 
doctors become doctors after they are persons, and thus, behaviours 
such as stubbornly clinging to their own opinions is a, quality of 
the person, not the doctor. It is their weaknesses as people that 
make them want to be right in all things, even in matters that, by 
George's account, are not within the domain of their medical 
expertise. 
George claims a domain of expertise of his own - knowledge 
of himself as a unique individual. This has been George's continual 
theme, that doctors can't and don't know all relevant matters about 
him - matters which are relevant to the course of his disease but 
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which do not arise from it. This lack in what doctors can know gives 
him the right and freedom to act without their advice and to accept 
or reject what they say according to whether he thinks they are 
speaking on the basis of their legitimate medical knowledge or 
of their personal opinions. In the realm of opinion, doctors 
and patients are equally non-expert. 
There is evidence from the transcripts that patients do make 
distinctions between themselves as lay and doctors as expert 
although these are couched in some telling caveats which delimit 
what 'not being a doctor' and 'being-a doctor' entails - which 
allow them to make some authoritative statements themselves. But 
these do not work to undercut the expertise of medical experts, 
only to provide for the fact that not everything doctors say arises 
from that expertise. However, these distinctions are not divided 
between 'lay' and 'expert' persons; instead there are distinctions 
between kinds of knowledge and persons. 'Expert' and 'individual' 
are not co-terminous. Thus the patients give the domain of facts 
up to the doctor; but it appears that 'facts' are not co-terminous 
with 'knowledge' either (as was said in relation to the patients' 
accounts of their inability to make correct diagnoses out of 
valid facts and information). It also seems that 'facts' are not 
accorded an exclusively or necessarily higher status than other 
kinds of knowledge; facts have a contextually contingent status. 
It is notable that it is Anne who gives the most self-effacing 
grounds for not calling herself an expert in MS; she is herself 
a protozoologist by profession and thus, being a scientist, is 
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aware perhaps of the fine distinctions within science which would 
be insider's knowledge of what an expert in MS would have to know. 
(This is rather like the fact that-it takes a sociologist to be aware 
of what it would entail to claim to be an expert in, say,. 
conversational analysis). 
It is not, then, that doctors are experts and 1-ay people in-expert. 
The domain of expertise is delimited. Outside that domain doctors 
may be subject to or suspected of the weaknesses and pressures of 
society which impinge on all its members. The patient is himself 
an expert in the details of his own case of the illness - the 
atypical, idiosyncratic features of it, a domain not available to 
the doctors, even with their expertise in medicine. Correctness 
and incorrectness then are shifting, conditional, contingent 
categories for the interviewees: but they are categories which 
shift between. persons - they are knowledges residing in, arising 
from the experience of individuals, be they doctors or patients. 
4.7 BELIEF IN SCIENCE 
But what of medicine beyond the point of diagnosis? There is no 
cure and precious little effective treatment available for MS. 
Yet in the teeth of what their own experiences revealed to them 
of the inabilities of both doctors and medicine to grapple with 
their condition effectively (even though, in the end, it had been 
named), the respondents retained a faith in a science'which will 
save them. This is a faith in a knowledge uncontaminated by 
the exigencies of the personalities of doctors or by mediating 
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social factors: arising as a possibility through the a-personal, 
a-social power of pure scientific enquiry. 
At least this was what I thought was in the data. Careful 
attention supplied something rather more complex. 
AW: .. the scientific way of looking at the world, is 
that your belief? Is that how 
Anne: I don't really know 
AW: I mean do you feel it has a rational explanation, MS? 
Anne: yes 
AW: it's not random or 
Anne: at the moment it's pretty random, but I feel that 
ultimately the, it will be put on a much firmer 
scientific basis when more is known about the cause 
of it and how to combat it, 
* 
Meg: and I do respond to cortisone very well so that I 
suppose that my own sort of psychological defense is 
that every time I get ill I'm going to have cortisone 
I'm going to get better and that'll go on I suppose 
until they find a cure - is probably the way my mind 
thinks about it. 
* 
George: I'm reasonably optimistic, not that I think they'll 
find a cure, I mean I'd like them to'find a cure 
obviously but I don't think they'll find a cure but I 
do think they'll come up with something either to stop 
the progression of the illness or something in the next 
ten years or so. From what I've read, from what I've 
heard and the sort of general feeling, I mean, but 
you can't predict those sorts of things. I mean I 
could be wrong, completely up the creek. 
* 
Daniel: I'm quite confident that medical science will [find 
a cure] 1-1 Oh yes they'll find it, they'll find it. 
I'm sure they will. But for example there was a 
doctor [that we met] by absolute chance. He works Q 
for among other places the Bethesda Naval Hospital`12] 
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a big american and he was a specialist in of all 
things MS f-) he later on in the evening said what 
his research was based on and he said that well I 
don't think that in our time - and he was fifty years 
old - we're likely to see a discovering of what is the 
cause of it. Various possibilities, but it's so 
difficult to work on because of the remissions and so 
on but anyway, he said, the most interesting one we're 
working on at the moment is this triact-something and 
I said what do you mean? And he said well your 
blood plasma [-] well he says we've had some striking 
results with that. Not yet, not that we could 
confidently suggest it for general use, but one of 
the problems is that our machine - and he laughed - 
blew up. One of the patients, killed him. 
Really, we can -joke now. Well for the doctors 
it's a joke of course but for a hypothetical patient, 
not so funny. But anyway, as far as the MS is concerned 
yes I think MS, that medical science will... whether 
the atom bomb gets there first I don't know. 
it is only Anne, herself a scientist, whose response expresses 
complete confidence in the power of science to cure MS - "when 
more is known about the cause of it. " For her it is just a matter 
of time. 
None of the others are so unequivocal. Meg refers to her 
expectation of a cure being found as part of her psychological 
defence against full recognition of her situation, made possible 
to sustain because medicine seems to be in control of her attacks. 
George's hopes are modest, for control rather than cure, but he 
simultaneously implies his own lack of qualification to make such 
a prediction ("I may be completely up the creek"). Daniel's 
expectations of science are - with his story of the Bethesda 
experiment and his reference to the atom bomb - couched in the 
knowledge that what science can do may be too powerful: either at 
the expense of individuals or indeed of humanity. 
Thus although they each declare a belief in the power of 
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science, they also produce accounts of why it may fail - but this 
is failure in the specific case of MS rather than an impotence of 
science per se. Yet the very faith they express in science is a 
faith grounded in their own hopes and their need to hope; and as 
such, their predictions are biased by their desire for them to be 
true. 
It is in this way that 'science' enters the epistemology 
of the everyday. It is according to science that subjective 
desires contaminate the development of pure knowledge. In the 
light of what they take to be an axiomatic dictum of science, 
people are unable to say for sure that science can save them. 
ACCOUNTING FOR THE DIAGNOSIS OF MS 
These patients' accounts of the different categorisations into 
which knowledge may be divided are strikingly tautological. 
Beginning with the premise that what is wrong with them is indeed 
MS, a knowledge which is the pronouncement of scientific medicine, 
any knowledge that resulted either in a different conclusion or 
that came from a different source was by definition either in- 
correct or required expert confirmation. Doctors were the natural 
people from whom to seek correct knowledge; knowledge had thereby 
been gained and ergo it had been the right resource from which to 
seek it. 
What appeared prima facie to have been doctors' mistakes 
were accounted for as reasonable given the circumstances, and in 
any case were limited to failures of individual, specified doctors 
rather than doctors per se. The respondents' own mistakes were 
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attributed to their own lack of knowledge - in particular, their 
tendency to leap to conclusions because of their fundamental lack of 
theoretical grounding_which turns knowledge of individual facts into 
true knowledge. Doctors had been able, in the end, to deduce what 
was meant by those very same 'facts'. The patients found it 
possible to make intelligent guesses, but in every case, they 
needed expert confirmation before they could become accepted as 
the true fact of the matter. The experts were those who could 
make the correct diagnosis - of MS - the "specialists", the "con- 
sultants" and those who could, as in the cases of Meg and John, 
knowledgeably state that they did not (yet) know what was wrong. 
The axiomatic distinction between expertise and non-expertise 
enabled the maintenance of faith in a medical science disembodied 
as it were from both practitioners and its subjects. Their 
scepticism was confined to their own abilities to be expert, 
either about themselves or about what science could do. Although 
researchers could "laugh" about the explosion of an experimental 
machine and be condemned, as persons, for so doing, the knowledge 
science was held capable of producing remained in these accounts 
both immune from mediating factors - and demonstrably potent. 
For science, and only science, had been able to describe 'what is': 
another case*of MS. 
But how has this analysis come to this conclusion? 
The data I am using is part of a discourse about a disease, 
14S, but a discourse between lay people and a sociologist, myself, 
not between scientists or between scientists and researchers, (as 
is more usual in the sociology of science). 
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A major interest in considering this data is, for me, how it 
may bear on researching the lay use of a concept of science. 
looking for talk to use as data for that project - talk about 
science - how, since it is talk divorced from the persons and 
sites of scientific institutions, are certain sections of the 
talk discernible as being 'about' science? And what should that 
'about' include - the methods, the data, the theories, the know- 
ledge of science? 
Although 'medical science' appears to feature strongly in 
the data, in the talk both of myself and of the people with whom 
I was speaking, how can instances of it be picked out as being 
certain talk's topic without fie-supposing what is to count as 
'talk about medical science'? Our talk seems to provide for a 
hearing that our topic is substantively about knowledge: what 
is known and by whom and from whom knowledge may be sought. One 
could say that all along we are displaying the project of research 
into MS. 
The interviews were once criticised for my clearly not 
having known what to ask, the grounds for that 'knowing' being 
proposed as something I should have already known, given my 
training as a sociologist, my expertise; that is, the straight 
application of sociological interview methods to yet another 
topic - MS - would have told me what I needed - and ought - to have 
asked. That is to say, keep the form the same and the content 
will take care of itself. Indeed, keeping the form 'the same' 
will produce... another sociology of... To get away from the 
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kind of product that is the result of the traditional form 
involves paying attention to what form itself does: to the 
inherently reflexive relationship between form and content, theory 
and substance, method and findings. 
The question of how it might be possible to escape from 
a priori assumptions about what medical science, multiple 
sclerosis, are, is a question that requires an answer only if it 
is believed that such answers are both necessary and in-principle 
available. It is the pursuit of definitive answers that turns 
questions into problems. Questions though may be an occasion 
not for angst but for wonder. 
13 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE TRANS-FORMATION OF TALK 
Paul Ricoeur (1981) has argued that the human sciences may 
properly be regarded as appropriate for hermeneutical exegesis 
insofar as "meaningful human action" which, he says, is the 
object of their explanation and understanding, is in several 
fundamental ways analaaous to texts: 
(T)he human sciences may be said to be hermeneutical 
[. ] inasmuch as their object displays some of the 
features constitutive of a text as text[. ] and 
inasmuch as their methodology develops the same kind 
of procedures as those of Auslegung or text-interpre- 
tation. 
Ricoeur 1981: 197 
However, his argument is unnecessarily circuitous for while it 
may be agreed that "meaningful human action" is a substantive 
object of sociology (the human science in question here) - certainly 
in the kind of research project with which this thesis is concerned 
and arguably in (all) others - the data are not analagously but 
actually texts. 
This is not to say that 'all human life is text'. Rather 
that in order to be worked upon, 'raw data', (talk, observations, 
human action) is always first transferred to the written form. 
And it is that written form that is analysed. 
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According to the literature, talk, speech, "orality", in that it 
is "fully natural to human beings" (Ong 1982: 82), is both historically 
and ontologically prior to writing. 
1 
As such, it has special 
qualities of unmediated presence: to be present to people's talk 
is to be in the closest possible "proximity" to they themselves. 
Analyses based on talk, on speech, are assumed to inherit this 
proximity, to be dealing unmediatedly with its su'. bjects. To ana_lyse 
their speech is the same thing as to analyse the beliefs, actions, 
behaviours of the speakers. 
2 
The act of transcription of talk is generally taken for 
granted as a matter of pragmatics, the fixing in writing of what 
has occurred. But what is then also taken for granted is that 
the record and the original talk are the same thing: 
I shall now provide some transcribed pieces of talk and 
employ them for a discussion of some elementary procedures 
for analysing activities. Although I still plan to travel 
a little further with Austin, I think the journey will be 
more eventful if it leads us to confront the concrete 
problems of dealing with actual bits of interaction. 
(my emphasis) 
Turner 1970: 203 
But as I propose to show, the act of recording and the subsequent 
act of transcription are not procedures which simply transfer 
talk to a convenient form but are acts of constitutive trans- 
formation which have profound consequences for analysis. For there 
are many ways in which, being fixed by recording, speech, talk, 
the raw data, becomes something other than talk, both in itself 
(whatever that could mean) and in terms of its place in analytic 
discourse. 
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In order to convey how strange the taken for granted 
Isomorphism between talk and transcript is, an actual tape 
recording should be played here, followed by a transcription. But 
because this is a written text the tape 'itself', let alone 'the 
talk' cannot be present; the difference between them has to be 
conveyed through a single medium, through writing, through 
absence. 
There are two aspects to the constitutive transformation to be 
considered here: one is to do with the tape record itself, the 
selection and fixing of a fragment of the world. The second is to 
do with the subsequent move from the auditory to the visual form: 
from the heard to the written. 
5.1 TALK TO TAPE 
What counts, what is allowed to count as data is only that talk 
which is recorded on tape. Thus talk that is authentic in 
that it has the essential quality of ephemerality (Ricoeur 1981: Ch 5) 
is by definition excluded from the body of data. 
Although it is every researcher's experience that talk 
occurs between researcher and researched before and after what 
has been preserved, none of that, though part of the interaction, 
may count for analysis. 
By being recorded, any possibility of further things that 
might yet be said, as more always can be, is closed off. Nothing 
can be added and nothing taken away from what is on tape. 
3 
Further- 
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more, what remains, the substance of what can be re-heard not 
only is fixed but becomes shaped by that enclosure: shaped as 
narrative. To quote Ricoeur, at first quoting Aristotle: 
'Now a thing is a whole if it has a beginning, a middle 
and an end'; but it is only in virtue of poetic 
composition that something counts as a beginning, middle 
or end. What defines the beginning is not the absence 
of some antecedent but the absence of necessity in the 
succession. [The ideas of beginning, middle and end] are 
not taken from experience. They are not features of some 
real action but the effects of the ordering of the poem. 
Ricoeur 1984: 38-9 
Here it is not, "in virtue of poetic composition", but analagously, 
the fact of starting the tape, letting it run for so long, then 
switching it off, work to order that which would otherwise not 
have had that order: confers form. By having a beginning, a 
middle and an end, the talk is formed as if "a whole" and as such 
seems to consist of a completeness (here a sufficient account of 
MS) because the tape is complete. 
Talk becomes reified by being fixed on tape and thus in another 
way unlike talk. For talk, if one draws on experience, is not, 
cannot be, accurately remembered - the precise words each person 
said and in what sequence. Rather what happens is that there is 
a rememberance, if it is thought about in retrospect at all as a 
discrete 'talk'; a wild paraphrase which does not distinguish 
between the actual words spoken from what each thought the other 
meant, interpretations of what lay behind the appearance of what 
was said perhaps; the other's intentions, deceptions, significant 
silences, things not said; interpretations made in the light of 
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what was already known about the other and revealed as a result 
of that conversation among others. Such a paraphrase, a loose 
translation based on recalling not the words but the understood 
meaning of what was 'really going on' would be closer 
than an exact record to a representation of the work of talk in 
the world. 
By being fixed on tape a further violence is done - this time to 
the instant death of all speech at the moment of its being said. 
By virtue of being recorded, interactions are lifted out of the 
instant of the present in which the talk is occurring into any 
time, all time; into the orbit of any hearers. 
Methodological texts on interviewing techniques draw attention 
to the possible effects on the participants of knowing that their 
talk is being recorded, as. a source of possible bias/influence 
that must be taken into account during analysis. 
5 
But there is 
a record (sic) of a different kind of 'knowing' about the tape. 
Daniel has just said he thought that the first prodromal6 symptoms 
of his MS began when he had gone to Africa; 
AW: Did you go there as an adult or did you go there as a 
child? 
Daniel: No I was an adult. Went there at the age of twenty-one 
first and of course back then many times afterwards. I 
lived there I suppose in all two calendar years spent 
in Africa. 
AW: Where were you? 
Daniel: Senegal in West Africa, Ghana, the Congo as it used to 
be called. I first went there to join my father when he 
was in Katanga and then I got interested in Africa and 
wanted to study it and so 
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AW: I taught in Uganda for .a while, I did VSO 
Daniel: Where, where in Uganda? 
AW: Kako, that's outside Masaka 
Daniel: Gosh I don't know Uganda at all I 
AW: It's only a village 
Daniel: Where is it, in the north or 
AW: No on the west coast, west coast of'Lake Victoria 
Daniel: of the lake, yea. Well we I guess shouldn't consume the 
tape's valuable time- 
AW: No. 
Daniel: but er gosh - it's terrible what you hear about that 
place now. Aaah. But you were there, what years...? 
The words I have underlined say something not of tape-induced 
self-consciousness or inhibition - but of the public presence, a 
third party of possible hearers of the tape to whom the talk is 
directly addressed and for whom the talk is taking place; silent 
yet present participants in the talk, for whom a discussion of 
the political tragedy in Uganda is acknowledged by both to be 
irrelevant. 
Not only is there this third presence actively present in 
the dialogue, there is also, in "the tape's valuable time" el- 
lipticaZ reference to the presence of the future; the speakers 
are speaking into the future beyond the temporality of the present 
in which the talk took place, the future embodied in the presence 
of the technological apparatus for the talk's preservation.? 
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5.2 
Already, then, by being fixed on tape, what has become fixed is 
not merely an accurate record which conveniently holds in place 
what has now passed, but in several crucial ways has thereby a 
form and therefore a content which is a consequence of that form, 
A form, that is, not selected by an author for its aesthetic 
effect (Aristotle's poetics) but a conferred structure that 
resonates for readers with, for example, narrative; stories which, 
furthermore, in that they are addressed beyond the other person 
present, Confers on 'the original talk' one of the characteristics 
not of talk but of the written. 
TAPE TO TRANSCRIPT 
In the literature however speech and writing are conceived to be 
fundamentally different (Ong 1982; Ricoeur 1981 for example). The 
comparison is however as between two discrete phenomena: talk- 
intended-as-talk and writing-intended-as-writing. The practice 
of transcription however is the process of reproducing, replicating 
in writing what was once talk. The transcript is neither writing 
nor talk, but writing-standing-for-sound. 
Perhaps musical notation is an illuminating analogy through 
which to pursue this difference. 
8 
In the composition of music, 
what is fixed by the system of notation (notes, tempi, instrument- 
ation, key, rests and so on) is, in performance, turned into 
sound. 
9 
What is necessary on the score are sufficient instruct- 
ions with sufficient detail to enable the piece to be played. 
10 
In transcription from the sound of talk to its being written down, 
this process is reversed in that the music, the aural noise, 
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comes first and by the conventions of notation, pinned to the 
page: the written fixes the sound which comes before it. 
11 
To 
pursue the musical analogy a little further, no score, however, 
replicates any performance of a work; a performance - and each 
performance is different - always contains an excess that does 
not lie in the score itself. The score is only as it were a set 
of basic instructions upon which a performance is based, 
which constitute the minimum definitive code for a performance of 
that work in particular. But the performance is, as it were, 
always underdetermined by what is written in the score although 
is dependent upon it. 
Putting this round the other way, assigning signs to sounds is 
not simply a question of correspondence. To hear and to transcribe 
is to have to make decisions about what is to be recorded. 
Whilst at the technical 
12 
level it could be said that this 
is because there are insufficient notations - even with Gail 
Jefferson's exquisite schema (see Chapter Three; Figure 3.1) - for 
everything that is hearable, that is not the most consequential 
point. For in the same way that it has become accepted that 
perception, what is visually perceived, is inexorably theory-laden 
13 
(Gregory 1977), so is what is hearable. An a priori sense of 
the structure of a language is necessary in order to be able to 
hear from a stream of sound words and spaces-between-words (which 
is not of course to say that it is necessary to be able to 
articulate the structural rules, syntactical rules, before hearing 
is possible), 
14 
rather that which sounds could make up which words 
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has to be known before they can be heard (like they are). The 
hearing of a tape is a matter of making sense of the sounds it 
consists of, and what that sense could be is constituted by what 
is already known by the hearer as possible to hear, as individual 
words and as overall sense, each essential to the other. 
An illustration of this is provided by a comparison between 
transcripts of the same tape, produced by different transcribers/ 
hearers. One of the data tapes was transcribed for me first by 
someone else. The context of the extract, shown overleaf (Figure 
5.1), concerns the effects George's incontinence has on his social 
life; specifically, on going to the pub. 
As can be readily seen when they are laid out in this way, 
the second transcript includes more words than the first; at the 
end of lines 04 and 14 and at the beginning of line 11. Whilst 
one could argue that these omissions/additions do not alter the 
sense of what was being said in any strikingly significant way, 
the differences in line 14, where the first version omits/the 
second version adds reference to a wheelchair-as the cause of 
George's shame/embarrasment, whilst the first includes/the second 
excludes reference to his "ignorance" are of more consequence, 
: especially when such differences will in all probability occur 
throughout the transcript(s), subtly and not so subtly altering their 
readable meaning. Of most consequence is that, as written on the 
page, there is nothing to signal either transcript as being more or 
less correct than the other. For despite the conflict between the 
two records of what was said, each is internally consistent. 
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An even more striking example of this managed consistency comes 
at a later point in the same two transcripts of the tape: 
FIRST TRANSCRIPTION 
01 John yes, lose their balance, I've never lost my balance 
02 or indeed my powers of putting my finger where I want, 
03 where I can reach. I can't move myself easily. 
04 That's what I can do. 
05 AW They don't think 
06 John They don't think so, no, the hospital doesn't, no. . 
07 They don't think it's the polio, no. I saw a specialist 
08 six years ago and he thought it could be the polio. 
09 He too didn't think it was MS. 
10 AW He said it's very very rare 
11 John It's very rare but it does happen, it does happen. 
12 That's what I can tell you. Otherwise I feel OK, 
13 1 feel weak 
14 AW So your eyes aren't affected at all? 
15 John No. 
16 AW So you can move around? 
17 John No my arms are affected, I can't walk, I can stand 
18 but I have to hold on to something, I'm not very 
19 strong. 
SECOND TRANSCRIPTION 
O1 John Yes, lose their balance, I've never lost my balance 
02 or indeed my powers of putting my finger where I want, 
03 where I can reach. I can't move myself easily. 
04 That's what I can do. 
05 Tina They don't think 
06 John They don't think so, the hosptial doesn't, no, no 
07 AW They don't think it's that 
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08 John They don't think it's the polio, no. I saw a specialist 
09 oh six years ago and he thought it could be the polio. 
10 He too didn't think it was MS. 
11 Tina He said it's very very rare 
12 John It's very rare but it does happen, it does happen. 
13 That's what I can tell you. Otherwise II feel OK, 
14 1 feel weak. 
15 AW So your eyes aren't affected at all or anything? 
16 John No. 
17 Tina The arms, you can't move the arms 
18 John No, my arms are affected 
19 Tina His legs, he can't walk 
20 John I can't walk, I can stand providing I'm holding on to 
something but I'm not very strong. 
Most strikingly, the first version of the transcript records an 
exchange between two people, AW and John. In the second, there is 
a third participant, who enters at 05. However the first version 
reads as a script perfectly sensibly (although maybe more awkwardly 
alcethe anomoly is pointed out). The transcriber has managed to 
allocate the third person's utterances intelligibly between John and 
AW, with a few crucial adjustments here and there: I can't walk at 
17 to he can't walk at 19 in the second, for example. 
By referring to what I remembered had gone on and who had also 
been actually present (Tina, John's Italian wife), I was able 
myself to make the correct transcription. Although in this second 
example I have used it is implausible that my recollection of the 
numbers of speakers involved is the incorrect one, the conflicts 
in the record of the words of the utterances, relying as they do 
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on a less gross level of recall (and see above re. the remember- 
ance of the meaning of talk rather than its words) are much less 
easily resolvable by reference to my own memory. 
15 
By the compari- 
son of these two versions it is clear that the production of a 
sensible transcription - in both cases - is indeed a production 
and not the replication of 'pure sound'. Meaning has been (and 
has to be) brought to the act of transcription in order to make 
sense. Indeed, if transcription was merely a matter of carefully 
notating what is heard independent of meaning then it ought to 
be perfectly possible to transcribe tapes in for example Serbo 
Croat or Swahili, 
16 
Sound and sign-for-sound are not simply co-terminous. Written 
words are simply not the sounds that make them up. Pitman's 
Shorthand provides an interesting example in that it is a sign 
system which claims to be entirely based on phonetics and is in 
everyday use - from Parliament to the ubiquitous office; provenly 
practicable. 
Shorthand is the art(17) of representing spoken sounds 
by written signs. Pitman Shorthand provides away of 
representing every sound heard in English words. 
Ordinary longhand spelling is seldom phonetic. Pitman 
Shorthand is phonetic; that is, words are generally (18) 
written as they are sounded and not according to ordinary 
longhand spelling. (My emphasis) 
Pitman Shorthand New Course: viii 
But this theoretical claim cannot be sustained in practice. For 
to hear spoken words simply as combinations of sounds has to be 
arduously learnt and it is as I know to my cost, excrutiatingly 
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difficult not to be distracted by the visual images of words in 
taking dictation. 
19 
But even taking the rubric of Pitmans at its face value, 
that rubric assumes that the sets of'sounds that will go together 
to make each word, and-the spaces that will separate one group of 
sounds from another are unambiguously self-evident. By thinking 
of what I can only hear as a continuous undifferentiated flow of 
sound when overhearing people speaking Gudjerati, for instance, 
it is clear that they are not. Furthermore, which of 'the same' 
sounds turn back into which words has to be done by reference to 
the meaning contexts: where .S records 
here or hear, where 
is 
to 
be transcribed as where or were or ware - and so on. 
These are still, it could be objected, technicalities that only 
make transcription problematic if the object is to produce a 
precisely accurate record of talk, the object perhaps only of 
Conversational Analysis or linguistics which are concerned with 
structure; that generally speaking, "in practice it is clear from 
the context which words are appropriate. But of course 'the context' 
is also that which has been/has to be transcribed. 
Transcription operates not just with phonetics, the sounds 
of words, but with meaning, which has to be ascribed to the sounds. 
And in that ascription lies the space in which literal transcription 
becomes impossible. The a priori necessity of knowing what it 
would be sensible to have been said makes it clear that this is 
not merely a technical matter, but rather of consequential 
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I 
significance. For, excepting CA and linguistics, it is the 
meaning of talk, the speakers' meanings, that are the object of 
analysis. It is not, thus, just that transcripts may be differently 
interpreted to produce different meanings, but that between 
the hearable 'data' and the written record, interpretation has 
already taken place. 
What about the translation now not into words but the trans- 
formation of sounds into a visual form, signs, marks on a page? 
Writing, the placing of words on a page, is by definition linear - 
even if the lines go backwards vis 
a 
vis written English - and 
sequential. Talk it may be said is also linear and sequential; 
but the two media cannot precisely map each other. Conversational 
analysis takes a close interest in the turn-taking procedures of 
sequential speech, as has been referred to in Chapter Three. on 
the page the basic form of, for example, question and answer 
(adjacency pairs), interruptions and overlaps are indicated by 
transcription conventions: 
(4. a. 2) [Her: 0I: 7: 5-6) 
Barnaby: Okay; 
Merrie: 0: tkay? 
Barnaby: 'hh (. ) Fair enough? - 
Merrie: 
=I* 
h 
Barnaby: -. Wu1? 
(0.2) 
Merrie: The be[st'v luck. ) 
Barnaby: Once agai: n. 
(0.3) 
Merrie: 'hhIh 
Barnaby: thenk1you:? 
Merrie: I- 
1 
Jefferson (1984) 
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But the sound of overlaps cannot be exactly represented: the 
nearest one might get in the written form would be, perhaps: 
Daniel: and when I went to the doctors and asked if I 
had that, they just laughed. 
AW/Daniel: Did they say vhatt#eg hafidthtnp reading those 
books. 
which is unreadable. The space of a page is only two dimensional, 
a flat plane. The space of speech is three-dimensional - or 
rather only metaphorically space at all - in which simultaneity 
of sound is not a problem. 20 
Daniel: and when I went to the doctors and asked if I 
had that, they just laughed. 
AW: Did they say 
Daniel: 
what you had then? 
[yes they said stop reading those books. 
Being transcribed onto a flat plane, speech appears ordered, con- 
sisting of an order that is an artefact of that visual space. In 
the scoring of music this space is ordered differently: the parallel 
lines of the staves running from left to right across the page 
mark the whole horizontal plane of the page as a simultaneous 
time-space. Sounds therefore can be represented as being made 
together in the same time; notations of the individual voices 
carried by each instrument or family of instruments produce music 
in the play of one sound or absence of sound against others. On 
transcripts, the simultaneity of voices or of spaces, the pauses 
of no-speech, cannot be represented, only indicated linearly and 
sequentially in a written text of speech. And in that difference, 
the ordering imposed by the conventions and limits of the visible 
imposes a particular form on talk that has consequences for its 
re-reading, 
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One consequence is that each speaker is assumed to be 
addressing the other: that each utterance, to use CA's term, is 
in response to the previous one and directed towards that other, 
with important consequences for interpretation. An example of 
the power of the illusion that this might be is Garfinkel's 
'counselling' experiment, in which one turn-taker used only a 
randomly selected but binding response repertoire of "yes" or 
"no" in response to clients' questions (Garfinkel 1967: 76-94). 
Another might be the ELIZA programme (Weizenbaum 1966: cited in 
Boden 1977), the possible consequences of which assumptions are 
described with some relish in David Lodge's Small World (1984). 
A further consequence is that, as the grouping-and-separ- 
ation between groups of words on the page seem to mark, there is 
an assumption that there is more than one speaker present (and 
cf. the two versions of the tape transcript presented above, 
pp 11-12). To introduce an example not of transcription but from 
analytic writing, in Chapter Four, 'Accounting for Accounts of 
Multiple Sclerosis', I was trying to represent two different 
aspects of the same voice simultaneously. But, because of the 
linearity of the written, these had to be placed on the page 
sequentially. This has then been read as representing two (or 
three) separate voices in dialogue, equal but competing inter- 
locutors (see Mulkay 1985: 77, fn 2), 
21 
a fundamentally different 
reading than the one I had been trying to evoke of a single voice 
speaking and questioning the grounds of that speech at the same 
time. 
22 
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The visual appearance of transcripts unavoidably embody a repre- 
sentation of time passing vertically down the lines of each page, 
the time of the talk which is not `real time'; a stately uni- 
directional flow along the arrow of time. 
23 This works to make 
talk appear always to be moving onwards, away from, and towards, 
developing from what went before as in an Aristotelean cumulative 
progression from ignorance towards enlightenment (Blum 1974). 
Unlike speech as it is occurring in which anything may happen in 
the time-yet-to-come, the physical presence not only of the words 
being read at any moment but of all the words that are yet to 
come and have already passed, being within the field of vision 
and anticipated in the pages present and yet to be turned, remind 
readers that what is to come has already been fixed; what might 
have happened already has. 
24 
The point at which one is reading vis a vis the proportion 
of the pages already read and those yet to come lends to the 
words on any page a place in the "whole", if the whole is taken 
to be, as I argued earlier, resonant with the form of a narrative. 
First the tape and now the text confers form on 'talk'. 
In talk, the identification of who is sneaking which words is 
usually distinguishable by the sound of each individual voice 
land in any case witnessed by the other's moving jaws). In tape 
recordings, this self-identifying presence and difference between 
speakers in the timbre of each voice remains (although they may 
be. difficult always to distinguish). In both modes, presence is 
embodied in voice. But in transcription, notation has to be 
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brought in by the transcriber from as it were outside the inter- 
action in order to indicate on the flat plane of the paper, in 
the margins of the page that lie outside the talk that is being 
represented, whose talk each utterance is. 
25 
AW: Did you have any theories about 
Jon: Yes I thought I might have had a tumour on the, in 
the brain 
AW: Aaah. What gave you that idea? 
John: I don't know, it was the only thing I could 
think of. 
Tina: Your spine 
John: Not the spine, I didn't think of, I thought my brain 
actually, but they said I was clear, nothing at all, 
couldn't find nothing so I went back regularly every 
two weeks for check ups and I got progressively worse, 
very slowly, very very slowly. 
This continual, necessary, externally applied allocation of 
words-to-speaker provides on the page a framework that distances 
the reader from 'presence', and constitutes a concrete reminder 
of an outside to the talk that interferes with the flow of hearing/ 
reading as if they were one, placing the reader with the writing, 
outside, conscious of the frame that the written demands, its 
artefactuality. The practical solution to the absence of self- 
identifying voice in transcripts in effect mediates between the 
spoken and the read, the speaker and the hearer/reader. 
This constant reminder - "AW". "John", "Tina" - of a writer 
who must be producing the written (giving instructions how to 
read), and of the flat visual plane of the text as other to the 
space of speech works something in the way that according to 
I 62 
Phillipson (1985), the written signature of the artist on the 
flat plane of a canvas: 
(S)erved to remind us of what we already know very 
well - that the space was indeed a constructed space, the 
site of an illusion, and not a reproduction of the world 
as 'it really was' outside the painting. The signature 
faces us with the paradox that the painting's image lies 
behind or beneath the signature, while at the same time 
lies within that same image; in our act of reading the 
signature, this apparently mundane convention affirms 
that the painting is other to the world. 
Phillipson 1985: 105-6 
The form of the transcript, the signature of the writer on the 
page yet absent from the interaction reminds readers that the 
transcript is not the thing itself - the 'raw data' - but something 
that has been made of it. 
Thinking of space now in another way in talk, the presence and 
absence of sound which constitutes the noise of talk, the spaces 
between the words cannot be replicated in writing. Although in 
Conversational Analysis for example the pauses in talk are 
measured and marked: 
(4. a. 3. ) [GTS: I: 2: 57: R: 1j 
Roger: I: H: APPEN dub wea: r (. ) bl: ue jeans constant fly. 
- (0.2) 
( ); eh 
Ken: -" 
[tWell 
ý 
Roger: 
Ken: 
(0.2) 
Even i, n ý 
*ý i so do I now, 
c. i toger: formal occa: sions yihknov hheh'hhn 
Jefferson 1984 
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(0.2) for example or (. ), the tiny spaces that by definition must 
exist to mark one word from another are not. But in its repre- 
sentation, the time marks fill in the spaces with a measurement 
of time which becomes not the representation of the absence of 
sound but again a reminder of another presence, an intermittently 
appearing commentator or instructor how to read which again, 
like the notation of speakers, is brought into the text and 
reminds readers that the talk which the transcript appears to 
replicate is a managed construction. 
In hearing live speech, variations in tempo, in volume, 
of absences of sound, all add to the richness of the interpretive 
repertoire. Although the spaces - the pauses - are marked and 
measured on CA scripts, the tempo of the words, the sound, is 
not marked. It would be possible to play around with the idea 
of this, perhaps by writing the transcriptions on paper graded 
with time spaces -a graph or a matrix in which each square could 
stand for an element of time - and maybe thus speech, or at 
least its tempo could be visually represented in its presence, 
absence and consequent harmonics. But still this would not be 
talk. 
To again invoke Phillipson, it could be said that writing, the 
written, can never recover talk; that talk cannot 
be subdued by 
the written word but has to remain something other (1985: 161). 
What that 'other' is is embodied in the means used to attempt 
that unachievable recovery. 
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One could remark, invoking Lyotard (1979) that transcription 
turns talk into a commodity, data to be sucked dry as it were 
of its use-value, as evidence for something else that method 
demands analysts say. If these scripts were not texts but merely 
data they would, once analysed, have nothing more to say, no 
possible or necessary re-readings (Nisbet 1977). 
26 
The idea of 
data for use and then discarding rests, however, on the assumption 
of a single meaning and ignores the endless indexicality of 
texts. One could say, with Sharrat (1982) that the written 
always has a surplus value. It is always more, in excess of any 
reading of it. Data, re-recognised as datatexts, go on offering 
further occasions for thought, a possibility paradoxically opened 
up by speech's seeming violation by being fixed and trans-formed. 
If the original talk cannot be isomorphically represented but 
undergoes a doube transformation, first by being fixed as a 
permanent record and then by being transcribed into the written, 
then what it is to 'analyse data' both demands and allows for a 
radical rethinking. 
27 
For, as I said at the beginning of the 
Chapter, what. is available for analysis is not talk but texts. 
But it is not that much has been lost in the transformation, 
but that much may have been gained. For to reconceive of 
transcripts as texts is to open up profound possibilities; for it 
shifts the work of analysis into the discursive field of 
hermeneutics and of literary theory which may offer other ways 
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of thinking about the aporia produced by the concept of reflexivity 
which threatens, if recognised in its full ubiquitous seriousness, 
to reduce sociology to either silence or self-immolation. 
166 
PART TWO 
RE: READING DATA 
167 
CHAPTER SIX 
READING AGAINST FORM : OF THE QUESTION OF THE SELF 
The assumption of readability, which is itself consti- 
tutive of language, cannot only no longer be taken for 
granted, but is found to be abberant. There can be no 
writing without reading but all readings are in error 
because they assume their own readability. Everything 
written has to be read and every reading is susceptible 
to logical verification, but the logic that establishes 
the need for verification is itself unverifiable and 
therefore unfounded in its claim to truth. 
de Man 1979: 202 
But if the dtexts are texts, what kind of texts are they, and how 
does that affect their interpretability? Prima facie, they 
differ substantively from the 'object texts' and the concerns of 
both philosophy and literary theory. They are not fiction, if 
fiction is taken to mean writing which is primarily the product 
of the creative imagination, about invented lives, invented situ- 
ations, where the concern is with literary effect. Neither are they 
philosophy. Although they may involve and have a bearing on philo- 
sophising, a concern with the nature of understanding and of knowledge, 
they are not philosophical texts, concerned with pure argument. 
For sociology, here, the essential question of the dtexts concerns 
their epistemological status, their status as knowledge; and there- 
fore their relation, qua texts, to their sources of authority, to the 
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knowledge of people with MS. For it is their epistemological 
status which will constrain the problem of their interpretability. 
This may be pursued as a question of their relation to their ostensive 
referents, a question which is perhaps uniquely three-fold: to the 
selves whose speech they are, to the lives they are about, and to 
the event, the interview of which they are the record. and in 
which the knowledge was produced (each relation already problematised 
in Chapter 5). 
As a way of opening up the question of this three-fold problem of 
reference (which will also be a way of considering the difference 
data makes), the first fold of the question that will be addressed 
is their relation to the speakers whose speech the dtexts represent. 
For the status of the knowledge that the dtexts are taken to 
represent (the basis of their interpretability in its particulars) 
depends first of all on its relation to the knower, to their 
putative source, the self who is speaking about him/herself. 
As a way of beginning, the dtexts will be read against what has 
been called the key question for contemporary philosophy or, to 
be more precise, that philosophy which in having taken its route 
via phenomenology, has had at least historically, an intersection 
with the route taken by ethnomethodological sociology; 
1 
the 
Question of the Self. 
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THE QUESTION OF THE SELF 
In his Introduction to a collection of papers by a number of 
French philosophers (including Derrida and Bordieu, Lyotard and 
Ricoeur) which were written in response to his question of what 
it is to be a philosopher today, Alan Montefiore2 identifies the 
question of the self as one of the only "motifs" he was able to 
find common to all the responses. This question appeared not so 
much as the objective of philosophy, but rather as a problem- 
atic which was involved in the very possibility for the philosophers 
qua philosophers, of describing their own work: 
If. for instance, 
the possibility of a subject or agent conscious of itself as such is 
bound up with that of its own self-expression or articulation 
thrpugh concepts: if the possibility of the formation and 
meaningful employment of concepts has to be understood as in 
effect the possibility of language: if language has to be seen as 
essentially social or public in terms of its own primary possibility: 
and if the meaning of what is said or thought at any one moment 
lies as much in the ways in which it differs from what else, within 
the whole open range of possibilities that language may provide 
or suggest. might have been said or thought as in the words that 
have in fact been pronounced in the thoughts that have in fact 
occurred: then the networks of relations, both social and coneep- 
-tual. on which the practical and constitutive possibility of lan- 
guage depend, or in which they consist, must always precede in 
order of both logical and temporal priority the formation of any 
individual consciousness as such. 'I he subject, and a fortiori the 
subject as individual consciousness, is thus displaced from its role 
as source and author of meaning. It has to learn to look upon itself 
as a secondary or derivative phenomenon dependent for its own 
self-conscious existence on those networks of meaning that 
precede it - networks which are themselves, moreover, never 
eompletable. never closed, never definitively systematizable into 
assured and self-consistent unities. 
montefiore, 1983: xvi 
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For the rhetorician Paul de Man, literary criticism has a unique 
contribution to make to thought about this difficulty: 
Because it implies a forgetting of the personal self 
for a transcendental type of self that speaks in the 
work, the act of criticism can acquire exemplary 
value... Literary criticism, in our century, has con- 
tributed to establishing this crucial distinction 
between an empirical and an ontological self; in that 
respect, it participates in some of the most audacious 
and advanced forms of contemporary thought. 
de Man 1983: 49-5o 
The contemporary questioning of the concept of the self which 
Montefiore found arose from the consequences of theorising, a 
result of doing that philosophy which takes its own practice as 
that which also has to be questioned. For de Man, it emerges 
through the practice of the critique of literature and the develop- 
ment of literary theory. 
3 
Philosophers, by their own definition, write at the level 
of the abstract, a hermetically sealed language game, rooted 
only in language and the force of reason and logic. Literary 
critics write about what has been written by others, about literary 
works. But in both their analyses, mundane speech or common sense 
understanding is constantly invoked as an essential buttress to 
their arguments: what 'people' would say or understand. 
4 
It is 
rare for these discourses to draw on texts documenting the way 
people talk, away from the discourse of academic theorising. Rather, 
in these two disciplines, the question of the self is a question 
which is debated with free recourse to invented examples from 
'real life', and otherwise confined to the writings of other 
philosophers, other critics. This constant invocation of "ordinary 
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discourse" (Martin 1982) and what everybody knows about it, 
stated as if it were irrefutable, is an argumentative manoeuvre 
which is highly irritating, driving one to want to counter-claim 
that such assumptions are unwarranted; to say that ordinary 
discourse is simply not like that: drives one back into a corner 
where resort to empirical data (transcripts of talk) would be 
produced in counter evidence, and thus back into making the-claim 
for a special status for properly empirical data and therefore 
for analyses based upon it. Although I have discarded the 
possibility of taking talk data in such a way (Chapter 5), never- 
theless there still remains, even having relinquished any claim 
for an exemplary faithfullness of data to its referent upon 
which empirical work is premised, a difference between that 
writing and that of the other two disciplines. But what difference? 
What would happen if one asked what 'the self' was contemporarily 
held to be through re-reading the dtexts, first person narratives, 
11 
ordinary discourse that whatever else they may be, are not invented? 
The dtexts are particularly appropriate for such a consideration 
because, as a place to start, one could propose that it is not 
5 
only the ontological self which MS deconstructs, but the unity 
and order of the material body, that sine qua non of an empirically 
conceived individual, which is violently and involuntarily 
disrupted by the distortion or the numbing of the very medium of 
the empirical self - the Central Nervous System: that which 
according to modern-medicine (and underlying much sociological 
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discourse) 
6 
is the essence of sentience, the medium of self- 
awareness, of life at all. 
According to Goudsblom: 
The democratization of the humanist-tradition has placed 
the 'nothing is true' theory within everyone's reach. 
Perhaps in earlier centuries the odd individual had 
similar problems. The psychological and social 
constellations which make people receptive to the problem 
may not be new: what is new is the existence of nihilism 
as a common cultural property, ready to be incorporated 
into society and personality in all kinds of ways. 
Goudsblom 1980: 179 
To read the dtexts now is to see clearly laid out all the essential 
ingredients which would make the irruption of MS and the failure 
of science to produce effective knowledge of it (See Chapters 3& 5) 
the ultimate exemplar not only of ontological but of epistemological 
nihilism. 
And yet there is in the dtexts no chaos, nothing that 
resembles the abyss. There is no pain: indeed everything 
is 'just normal, just life, you know' (George). The 
worst is always over, or somewhere else, never in the 
present, the present of the dtexts' time. Yet that 
remarkable absence of chaos is also 'in' the dtexts. 
This extraordinary absence of 'madness' of nihilism, is 
pace Goudsblom, paralleled in academia - although there 
too maybe the acutest sufferers have became silent. 
And yet to 'use' the dtexts, talk about MS, is also utterly in- 
appropriate. For academics, for those sociologists of science 
whose programmatic response to the methodological horrors is to 
write to 'celebrate' reflexivity, their writing, their analyses, 
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are something that they do. Both they and the subjects whose 
talk they use (scientists) are voluntary practitioners of the 
knowledge game. For philosophers, 
7 
for literary critics, the 
question of the self is literally academic. But to have MS is 
not (pace chapter 3) a breaching experiment, that is set up 
and performed for an analytic purpose and terminable at the will 
of the researcher or of the subject: it occurs by default not 
decision. It is not academic. It is non-optional, terminable 
only with death. Thus for people with MS (as for Nietzsche's 
New Philosophers) 
8 
theorising is not an intellectual pursuit 
practiced always within the option of stopping, but something 
in which the stakes are of the very highest. For what knowledge 
could achieve for them if it were true would be literal life as 
against untimely death. What is at stake for them is not an 
aspiration to the Habermasian or Platonic "good and true life" but 
life at all. With MS there is no option either of retiring from 
the questioning or of resorting to silence. 
In any case, silence is not a risk to be dared, but for 
all the only certainty: 
Let us beware of saying that death is the opposite 
of life, the living being is-only a species of the 
dead, and a very rare species. 
Nietzsche 1974: 109 
To use the dtexts as the occasion, the excuse, for theorising, 
demonstrating the power of or the question of method would be 
for 
violently to appropriate them (Phillipson 1985: Chapter 6). Yet 
these dtexts are the occasion, in the Heideggerian sense, for 
theorising about the very possibility of theorising, sociologically 
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or at all. For if this kind of theorising is worth anything at 
all, then it has to be risked concerning such a topic which is not 
playful: which concerns the literal death of others not merely 
the metaphorical death of itself. 
Having reached Moscow by a morning train, Levin went 
to stay at the house of his-brother-in-law... The 
professor was engaged in a fierce polemic against the 
materialists... The question was a fasionable one, 
whether a definite line exists between psychological 
and physiological phenomena in human activity, and if 
so, where it lies... 
He had seen in the capers the articles they were 
discussing and had read them because they Interested him 
as a development of the bases of natural science - fam- 
iliar to him. as he had studied in that faculty at the 
(university; 
but he had never connected these scientific 
deductions as to man's original origin, reflex actions, 
biology and sociology, with those questions concerning 
the meaning to himself of-life and death, which had of 
late more and more occurred to him. 
Tolstoy 1980: 23-24 
6.2 THE RELATION OF BODY AND SELF 
For Montefiore: 
Not the least of the difficulties [of the question of 
the self] lies in the fact that the principle of 
individuation of persons as a plurality of inhabi- 
tants of a common world of experience would seem to 
have to lie in the body and its spatio-temporal 
history. 
Montefiore 1983: xiii 
Because of the bodily occurrence of MS, the problem of the self 
would thus most likely arise in the dtexts in terms of the 
relation between the self and the body: between the'ontological 
and the empirical self, to use de Man's distinction. 
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A distinction between "ontological" and "empirical" 
selves is applauded by de Man as part of, "the most 
audacious" modern thought. But to ask, what is the 
self? is to ask a question that already concdals part 
of the problem about this distinction: the copula 'is'. 
And in so doing, grounds the possibility of seeking an 
answer to this question because of the metaphysical 
predicate of the verb which presumes being as the 
referent of 'is'. 
'91 
Although it makes sense to 
speak of various levels of the self, simultaneously 
existing as it were in real time, a continuous sub-text, 
it, that is the self, cannot be anything but represented 
in language, read into language by language: and 'is' 
is part of what language can say. The self which is 
written down is literally embodied in writing, given a 
body, its form of existence, by language. What 'is' 
means, refers to, is unsayable in (except by) language. 
According to the dtexts, there is no question but that there is 
a relationship between the body and the self: but with MS it is 
one full of contradictions and terrible implications. The over- 
whelming problematic appears to have to do with the body as the 
source of meaning of and for the self, with the threatened 
distortion of its representational function. 
I 
6.2.1 (Nis)representation 
For according to the dtexts, what the body with MS does opens the 
self to misrepresentation, opens a gulf between appearance and 
actuality. What the body appears to be doing is misread by 
others (although what others then do, the actions of their 
bodies, is held to be more simply interpretable): 
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Meg one of the other things that happened to me was that I 
had something that they call drop attacks so,. when I 
got back the use of my right leg and I was sort of 
walking OK they um kept sending me out for walks, and 
I used to get these drop attacks when you walk along 
and literally the next minute you're on the ground. And 
you can get up again but I suppose some message doesn't 
get through to the brain and bang, you go down. And 
that I found particularly terrifying because you had to 
do all sorts of things like, you can no longer just 
afford to run across a road when you see a gap, because 
if you have a drop attack in the. middle of the road, the 
bus goes over you. Things like that. And when you're 
coming up and down stairs you sort of think, oh I'd 
better hold on 
AW10 and all those things like being in public, I mean to 
actually fall down in public is such a 
Meg well II mean I remember the first time it happened was 
walking round Queen's Square outside the National 
Hospital and I could not actually believe that no-one 
helped me up. I mean eve body looked away I mean 
obviously through embarrassment but er II was absolutely 
shocked. I thought everyone would leap to my aid. 
The appearance of the body may provoke fear in others: 
AW Would you say though that the body of a man is more 
important to his self? I suppose that sounds contradictory 
in a sense. 
Daniel Could be.. 
AW and t1j amen are 
[.. ] I've just read somebody called Peter 
Hunt LL who said that people were afraid of the disabled 
Daniel yes 
AW because they represented undeniably you know the existential 
dilemma, everybody's inevitable dissolution. 
"Daniel Yes. This is absolutely certain. I noticed that when I 
was, here on this street, kids pointing me out when I was 
walking around with the stick, when I was first walking 
around with the stick, it was with real fear. 
AW But why that fear should be different for men and for 
women? 
177 
Daniel fear, fear and scorn both. Oh there are women who 
react similarly. Certainly there are. But all the same 
I think there's a general law - it's not a law - it's a 
generalisation that men are;.. presumably because they're 
more.. possibly this is complete rubbish but er 
AW it feels like there's something there. 
Daniel There's something there. There certainly is something 
there. How to get it into words I'm not sure. I don't 
know if it doesn't go back to er primitive times. Man 
the hunter whose body is 
AW crucial 
Daniel crucial, yes. And to whom aggression is central and 
that if, and yea, I don't know, and yet and yet. I 
mean the people that I'm thinking of, that have reacted 
so, in a in an embarrassed and unhelpful way really in my 
knowledge and presence, these are all university people - 
or if not university people but intellectuals of a sort. 
It's very odd I mean but if the survivors of the hunter- 
gatherer as it were -you'd not really expect to find in 
some of those people. But I suppose it could be there. 
It could. 
AW Do you think they fear it? 
Daniel I'm certain they do. Yes. Deep down. There's something 
really primitive there, I'm certain. And well when you 
get to know somebody really well, or see them a lot , 
it's 
forgotten. But with somebody you first meet. " . you can see 
it. In gestures, in looks, but yes it's there. In a way 
I suppose people who are not themselves disabled or 
obviously ill or seriously ill, people who are outside that 
there again might not recognise it so readily themselves. 
But being yourself very ill does sharpen the perception in 
that area, considerably. 
And even in the self; of its own body: 
AW Do you think that is one of the things you have to fight 
when you are yourself told of the diagnosis - that maybe 
you have that fear? 
Daniel Sorry? How so? 
AW I wonder whether part of that fear that you have to fight 
against, or that you experience when you are first diagnosed, 
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that is, you as a member of the general population, if 
we're suggesting that there is this very primitive fear 
of other people's sickness 
Daniel Yes, yes I suppose that's right 
AW would also be directed towards your own sickness. 
Daniel Yes. Yes that makes sense. I hadn't thought about it 
before, but you're right. 
** 
The body appears to represent the self, the person embodied, to 
others in ways which are untrue: 
George I always scare people though when I get out of the 
wheelchair cos they don't think that you could possibly 
walk when you're in a wheelchair, so it shakes them. 
AW Do you think that they feel you're mentally deficient? 
George Oh yea I'm sure they do. 
AW So the body and mind goes together. That seems to be a 
very priori- I was going to say primitive, but unchallenged 
belief, really. 
George Some people are so bad about it I really feel like doing 
something to scare them you know. 
AW Like what? Something really mad? 
George Yea, really bite their arm or scmething you know, just 
because of the way they're behaving. 
But even when known to be untrue, those 'ways' threaten the 
idea of the self: 
AW I suppose it very much depends whether you er see your- 
self, that is your in personal worth as E{ninished by 
having to go about in a wheelchair and all that syn: L. clises, 
or whether you really feel that doesn't touch the inside 
person 
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Anne Well one tries not to. But it does, it does make you 
feel..... 
AW I mean do you not think about that side of it? 
Anne Oh you do think about it. But one tries not to think about 
it. One tries to forget it. I mean this is why I don't 
delve too thoroughly into the literature and why I don't 
um participate in any MS rallies or outings ar anything 
like this t"ecause I don't want to admit that um that I am 
so different. 
Yet the body may also represent the truest account of the state of 
inner feelings: 
AW .. how did you react when (the neurologist] 
told you? 
I mean had you an idea it might be 
Des Well we didn't know what it was. I mean MS was just 
words. We didn't know what it was at all. 
AW I mean were you terrified? 
Des Well I must have been worried about it. Um cos this 
headache which I had went on and on for quite a few 
weeks I think. And it shouldn't have done really. And 
er the other doctors said it was psychosomatic. I don't 
honestly know. 
Although by definition, that is unknowable for certain: 
AW So did you, did you feel that what you had could be a 
bodily representation of something that was going on 
inside you? 
Daniel I don't think so - at a conscious level. There may 
have been such things lurking at the back of my mind. 
AW But she ja pEychiatristl wasn't interested in looking 
at that? 
i 
Daniel No. No she wasn't. I asked her if it could be a psycho- 
somatic business and she said, well anything can be 
psychosomatic but er I don't think in your case... And 
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0 I left it at that. I thought that - and obviously to 
believe that it had been psychosomatic would have been 
in a sense reassuring 
AW Because reversible? 
Daniel Sorry? 
AW Because reversible. 
Daniel. Because reversible. Exactly. 
** 
Persisting within the body there remains the undamaged self, or 
at least an idea of it, a perception of a self independent of 
the body: 
Jane I think too if you've been born with a disability 
you know abc'ut it and you've never known anything 
different. Whereas I wasn't born with this. You, 
every so often yoi think 'my god, Seven years ago I 
was getting on the bus in the little village in 
Derbyshire, six months pregnant, six bags over each 
arm, striding up the hill, and then you'd come back 
and go for long walks. ' I mean you remember what 
you were able to do and you still, that person who 
was able to do those things is still there in you. 
And there may be a time when the memories fade and you 
get used to what you've now become. I don't know. I 
don't know whether you ever can. I mean I dream a lot 
about it, about running 
AW Do you? 
Jane yes running along the beach and going for long walks 
you know. I mean really you know, you don't need any 
Freud to explain that! (.. ) I'm an active person 
mentally and I can't, m} body doesn't do what I want 
it to you know. There's another me inside here 
struggling to get out almost. 
s 
lei 
The body thus may become an object - of the self's anger for 
instance: 
AW But do you feel it attacks you very personally, having 
the disease? How you feel about yourself? 
George Yes I suppose so, I mean I say to people I'm not bitter 
but I suppose I am. But I don't know who to take it 
out on so there's no point being bitter about it. Who 
can you take it out on? It's no-one's fault anyway. I 
know I could go up to someone and say it's your fault 
that I've got this illness, that's fair enough. But 
there's no-one. You get angry. I get very angry with 
myself not being able to do something. I probably take 
it out on me more than anyone. 
AW But can you disassociate yourself from your body? 
George Yes sometimes I forget. No. I'm not sure. I don't really 
forget I've got it. 
Although a healthy body may remain as it were within the idea of 
the self: 
AW Do you feel that your body doesn't represent you, 
your internal, private self? 
George Yes I do, definitely do that, yes. 
AW That it doesn't represent..? 
George it doesn't represent me, no. Inside I'm very fit, 
healthy person. 
AW Normal. - 
George Normal feelings and normal everything and doing what I 
attempt to do, so I get very angry inside because I 
can't do them. 
AW So when you're getting angry are you getting angry 
with your body then really? 
. 0. 
George oh yeah. 
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AW Not your internal self? 
George No. It's my body I get cross with really. I'd kick 
myself if I c: idn't think I'd miss, this sort of thing. 
But Eh that is true yes it is, my inside my internal 
self is very much fit and healthy. 
** 
But what may remain as the self is not a pale remnant of the 
self-that-once-was, but a self vhick has become refined, purified, 
the essence of self: 
Daniel .. and also it gives you, I couldn't say, a more 
accurate sense of what to value in life. At least I 
think so. 
AW And also what to value about yourself? 
Daniel Yes. 
AW essential self? 
Daniel Yes, yes. Well for exý, r: ple, put it this way, er.. when 
others around me are not overstrained and so on, I 
laugh much more readily than I used to - and less 
me^"liciously. That would be'hard to work out exactly 
what that means. But I've noticed it. It just 
bubbles up-and then a self-, mocking laughter. Yes. 
AW Whet, at bits of yourself that are er remnants from the 
old days? 
Daniel Probably (laughs) 
AW I mean that are r. o longer so part of you. 
Daniel Yes. 
Or a self that remains as it was, although with all its 
characteristic faults and virtues exaggerated: 
Jane .. but I'm sure you're going tc meet people 
like that. 
But they'd be like it whatever comes along. 
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AW Yes. Very true. It just seems to make the person more 
like they were before. 
Jane Yes. True, yes. 
or which may have become more gross, more self-obsessed: 
George And meeting other people with MS as I have done recently, 
I hadn't done really until I went to this ARMS thing in 
Southampton - not because I was reluctant to, though I 
dare say in the back of my mind I was a bit reluctant to 
meet other disabled people; but I discovered that they're 
all very wrapped up in themselves and all very concerned 
about themselves. 
or more brutal: 
Daniel But apart from that I think that there's er.. an increased 
precision in one's judgement of people 
AW really? 
Daniel oh yes. One has reason to. there's a need to form 
judgements of people in the sense of 'will they be any 
help to me or not? ' That brutal sense. And scary. How 
quickly it can be ascertained. 
AW Do you feel it's made you become more egotistical then? 
Daniel No. No I don't. No I don't think so. No, that latter 
formulation but I don't think that ... er.. it has a bit. 
Yes of course it has. 
AW Perhaps I'm using egotistical in the wrong sense. 
don't mean in a hubris sort of sense. 
Daniel Yes. No, there is something there. I mean, maybe 
egotistical isn't wrong. 
** 
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Above all, reading the dtexts, the problematic of the self 
induced by MS is a question of representation. The body is as 
a text, with a structure, a syntax, a grammar, but most obviously, 
qua body, a text awaiting reading; a document which carries 
(embodies) meaning, that cannot be conceived of without (a) mean- 
ing. That which always has to be interpreted. 
To state that MS forces the body to become an object, a 
text, to the self, assumes that the self and the body 
are normally presumed to be a unity: and at the same time, 
that there is always already a hair-line crack down which 
they can be divisible into two, given the right kind of 
pressure. 
To speak thus assumes a priori that the unity is 
always already a spurious and fragile bonding of really-two 
components - the endemic possibility of 'a subject' and 
'an object'. Since the body by this definition cannot be 
aware of itself cognitively (because cognition is the 
exclusive property of the self), which part may be the 
subject iii the self-body pair and which the object is not 
itself open to variation. Thus the argument is already 
foretold, pre-formed by the epistemology involved in 
putting the proposition in the form of a binary dichotomy: 
self-body. 
It is the reading, the interpretation and translation of the 
text, the body, which is the ever-present, the never-to, be- 
forgotten work of those who are embodied in this way. 
But the body defeats confident reading. It is a text 
which, because it is known to have the potentiality (having MS), 
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to distort any faithful correspondence between that which seeks 
meaning and a meaning which is found, always defies reading, 
even of itself by its own(er) reader. Yet it might also be the 
most reliable document of things that are beyond sensation 
(the idea of psychosomatic illness where, for. Daniel, the body 
is not itself read but as it were involuntarily acts for itself; 
that act then readable for the meaning-which it alone makes 
manifest) 
The body is understood to be a deceiving text, understood to be 
such against the idea of an ideal text in which all that has to 
be understood and explained can be: an ideal text which is itself 
conceivable only as an opposite to this present far-from. ideal 
one. But its difference from the ideal is incalculable, because 
the distorted body cannot itself be fully and stably known 
(interpretable), that being part of its definition, that which 
makes the body with MS different. 
By extrapolation, if the body is an unreliable text to its in- 
habitor, then also must that body be to others: 
What it seems to be doing, deceives others; 
seems to be standing up and listening; 
seems to have fallen down through drunkenness; 
seems to be clumsy because it is ill-disciplined; 
seems to be self-sufficient when it is desperate; 
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seems to be normal when it is utterly fatigued. 
A surface which conceals, deludes, exaggerates, obliterates... 
Seems, Madam? nay, it is, I know not 'seemsº. 
'Tis not alone my inky cloak, good mother, 
Nor customary suits of solemn black, 
Not for the fruitful river in the eye, 
Nor the dejected 'haviour of the visage, 
Together with all forms, moods, shapes of griefs 
That can denote me truly. These indeed seem, 
For they are actions that a man might play, 
But I have that within which passes show, 
These but the trappings and the suits of woe. 
Hamlet Iii 
12 
What MS has done is to rip apart what seems and what is - the 
body and its meaning. The body ceases to be faithful to the idea 
of the self - that it first once made possible (before MS); the 
idea of unfaithfulness entailinq not only its ceasing to be a true 
copy, but also the idea of betrayal, betraying the self precisely 
because it once seemed, or rather once was, faithful. For it is 
only possible to betray where once there was a mutual bond that 
made each what it was, a third, bonded, entity: the self-body. 
The body has become faithless, adulterous, betraying in a 
perverted sense; not just as a surface appearance but 'as a medium 
of sensations that inform, orientate, carry, embody existence. 
Indeed the betrayal is often that the body - in the early stages 
of MS or between relapses - retains its form ("looks normal"), 
seems unchanged and yet is not the same. 
Being different, its communications to the inner self have 
always to be interpreted, translated, its language having become 
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foreign, alien. So the self has to become a translator, a 
process that is always inadequate since one language is not 
the same as another: -what is possible in one is never exactly 
expressible in-another; languages cannot be faithfully trans- 
lated. This applies both to the self understanding itself, its 
body, and those of others. 
To betray is to turn away to other gods, other purposes. But 
for those diseased, the bond between the self and the body cannot 
be so severed, but remains, in its faithless mode. The relation- 
ship remains, a terrible perversion of what it once was: 
indissolubly bound. Because of the relation between. the idea of 
the self and the body, the 'self' cannot be sufficiently 
distanciated from the body, and thus has to be profoundly affected 
by what the betrayer has become. Distance can never be achieved, 
although always striven for. With MS, it is this that happens 
rather than a conclusion that the self was never discrete, always 
only ever constituted by its embodiment. Rather betrayal than 
self-annhilation. Thus as the later extracts cited show, the 
idea of the self remains, beneath the appearance: brutalised, 
refined or purified through the suffering of this betrayal: and 
yet in some sense utterly unchanged. 
For what in spite of everything seems to be preserved is the 
abnormality of their experience. The body inhabited by MS may mark 
out what is normally, was once, taken for granted about the body 
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as the embodiment of the self. But that breach has not produced 
anything that is beyond understanding. In the dtexts there is 
no fall into nihilism. For all that has happened is a replication, 
albeit in an extreme form, which is an intensification or a. 
reversal of what is already known about what bodies are in 
relation to selves. The knowability of the body, the givenness 
of the self is not undermined by MS, nor the knowledge of it, as 
knowledge of what is. There is no 'Question of the self'. 
** 
But this is to have read the dtexts as transparent, to have read 
the referents of the dtexts in the first fold as isomorphic with 
the text, to have read through them to the 'experience of MS'. 
I have slipped from my intention to raise the question of 
rather than assuming the relation of the texts to their referents. 
How may i step back from this fall? What if the question of the 
self is re-considered in terms of the language with which the 
self who speaks is referred to? 
6.3 SPEAKING OF THE SELF 
Taking the first hundred lines13 of one of the dtexts as a basic 
text, and re-reading them against their form of self-reference, 
as the form of speech, what can be read of the self to which they 
refer? On what grounds does that self appear as the referent of 
the speech? 
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To be able to read the dtexts at all, certain things have 
to be held as stable, heuristically if not literally; the 
'authors' whose words they are; the readers within the 
text - the parties who speak to each other (read each 
other's words as texts), who hold each other present as 
stable at that moment, but also in the past and in the 
future of which they also speak; the referents - the world 
of events, actions and actors who are invoked by the words. 
Also, critically, at least the possibility of knowing 
(assuming) if not actually verifying the relationship 
between these things: and absolutely fundamentally, an 
underlying schema of logic/reason/epistemology which holds 
together in an ordered and thus decipherable way the 
documents and their relationships, the words and their 
meanings. 
Also to be held as stable is the reader of the text 
whose reading it is; and the text which_is read. Language 
which is spoken, written as having been spoken and then 
read, is the only available present document of what the 
dtexts are about: and yet 
language can only be about something such as man 
(ie conceptual) but in being about man, it can never 
know whether it is about anything at all including 
itself, since it is precisely the aboutness, the 
referentiality, that is in vuestion., 
de Man 1979a: 161 
To read the dtexts with the question of their referential 
status in-mind is to hold already in mind a knowledge of what 
reference could be: what the criteria could be against which 
the substance and degree of the dtexts' aboutness could be 
evaluated. And to assume that their referential status is 
the question which is key to their proper reading: that 
which has to be addressed (first) in order to produce a 
sociological reading: before interpretation. 
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1 Daniel Well I think it would be best if you ask me a question 
2 and then 
3 AW Well the question I start with is the beginning really 
4 Daniel My work? 
5 AW Your MS. 
6 Daniel Oh the MS. 
7 AW with perhaps a bit of your background. 
8 Daniel The diagnosis.. I'rr. not sure. I'm I was certain that I 
9 had something seriously wrong with me in 1969; suddenly 
10 it was, that the right leg as I recall, slightly weak, 
11 foot dragging and at the same time the eye and the hand 
12 on the same side or.. 
13 AW And how old were you then? 
14 Daniel Pardon? 
15 AW How old were you then? 
16 Daniel I was well I was born 4th July 1941 and you can work it 
17 out from that, and I gather that's the prime time for 
18 catching MS so the doctors assured me... But 'I didn't 
19 know that it was, what it was. I knew it was serious 
20 because obviously it had to he neurological if it was 
21 three things on the same side of the body which were 
22 otherwise far away from each other-and I didn't know 
23 what it was and the doctors.. First I went to an eye 
24 doctor because that's what was worst affected. 
25 AW And that was here in England? 
26 Daniel 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
That was here. And the eye doctor said neuritis. I 
didn't believe that but I realised that obviously you 
can't have optic neuritis that affects your leg and your 
arm. At the same time, I think, some people say, I 
certainly krow other MS patients who say, that doctors 
#re too shy of telling patients that they have the dis- 
ease. And I can understand their being shy I mean from 
just a human poirt of view. It's a nasty thing to tell 
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34 somebody. But I also think that the patient's point 
35 of view is possibly to be te. ken into account theze. I 
36 knew damn well that I had something serous and I knew 
37 damn we'_i that the neuritis wasn't the whole story by 
38 a long way. If I'd really wanted to find out, I could 
39 have shouted at the doctors and got them to tell me. 
40 AW So you think they diagnosed it at that time did they? 
41 Daniel I'm pretty sure they did, yes. I remember when I was 
42 in Lambeth Hospital, I ended up at UCH but Lambeth 
43 Hospital was where I started - we lived in that part of 
44 London then. This was with the eye and so on. And they 
45 were doing knee tests and reflex tests and two of the 
46 doctors, the consultant and the registrar I remember were 
47 doing these tests with me I was, it was the knee reflex 
48 test at the same time as they'd done the hand test, the 
49 eye test and so on. And they just looked at each other, 
50 with that chilling way that doctors have and I knew there 
51 and tleri I mean that it was extremely serious and if I 
52 had had the desire to know the worst I could have found 
53 out. I was afraid. I didn't want to know the worst so.. 
54 AW Did you know 
55 Daniel don't blame doctors for everything, for sure. 
56 AW Did you know what it might be? I mean did you know 
57 about MS? 
58 Daniel No, no I didn't. And I didn't want to know. I actually 
cg looked, somebody, I've forgotten who, did it for me. It 
60 wasn't my wife. Scmebody else, read up something in a 
61 medical handbook thing. Some other mad disease. But i 
62 had a lot of the Eymptoms of it certainly and it was a 
63 very very nasty thing. And when I went to the doctors 
64 and asked if I had that they just laughed. 
65 AW Did they say 1at you had then? 
66 Daniel 
kes 
they said stop reading these books! 
67 AW 'Amateurs', yeah. 
68 Daniel I didn't ask again! And I only found out by accident. I 
69 was in er X Hospital and it was just a routine, every six 
70 months visit sort of thing and they, there was the 
71 registrar there and a student in the corner. And as I 
72 was being, just passing the time. of 
day with the registrar 
73 who I rather liked, he just mumbled 
into the corner of 
74 the room who I was and er what I had. And I thought my 
75 ears were deceiving me. I stopped ard I said 'wait a 
'7E minute. Did I hear you right? Was that what you said? ' 
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77 And he said, 'you haven't been told? ' And then he 
78 talked for an hour or so.. 
79 AW Hcw long after was this then, I mean how long had you 
8o been going? 
81 Daniel It was four years after the initial 
82 AW was it. 
83 Daniel attack. Yeah. 
84 AW Ar. d were you getting worse or 
85 Daniel Oh I was.. as I am now I'm considerably recovered from 
86 the - it got-you know the way the disease goes. But 
87 there were several, the first four years, five years 
88 there were a lot of attacks, mostly in the eye but also 
89 in the leg. 
90 AW So what were the doctors telling you it was then? 
91 Daniel Neuritis. 
92 AW In the leg..? They didn't provide any explanation 
93 Daniel No no actually I'm misleading you. The trouble was that 
94 the first attacks were all in the eye. It was only the 
95 very first attack, that one individual first attack that 
96 affected the leg and the hand. 
97 AW Oh. I see. 
98 Daniel But then there were a whole series and they were all in 
99 the eye are it wasn't until 1974 or'5 that I really had 
100 a very bad attack in the leg. 
most basic as a condition of possibility for the interpretation 
of this interchange is that it is possible to ask a subject 
about their life; that every subject has a life which may be 
asked about, spoken of, referred to: that the subject who speaks 
is the same as that whose life is spoken of: that this speech 
is self-referential. 
i 
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What are the indicators in this passage of the self-reference of 
speech? 
o The speaker is marked as a unique and empirical individual, 
as the referent of the I by the tying by calendar time - of 
his birth date - and his story to particular times and places: 
"England", "1974"; and so on6 
o The speaker is the self of his own speech by virtue of his 
ability not only to describe what happened to him: "the 
diagnosis, "six monthly visits" and so on, but by virtue also 
of his ability to describe what he (the same 'I') had thought 
at those times in the past: "I didn't know what it was. I 
knew it was serious" (18-19), "I didn't believe that" (26-7), 
"I knew damn well that the neuritis wasn't the whole story" 
(37-8); but also the thoughts unexpressed bj' that past self: 
"and I. thought, my ears were deceiving me" (74-5) (and a rather 
clearer example in the next passage that will be cited (14-22). 
o He, the speaker, is able also to re-interpret the actions of 
the past self: "If I'd really wanted to find out" (38-9), 
and can interrogate as it were any past self when requested 
to do so: "Did you know what it might be? " "No, no I didn't" 
(56,58). 
o Furthermore, the context of that past self can be, now, 
filled in, a context a particular past self was unaware of: 
"So you think they diagnosed it at that time, did they? " 
"I'm pretty sure they did, yes" (40-1). 
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o And, as for example line 93, "No no actually, I'm misleading 
you" indicates, there is a version that is incorrect of 
what happened, and therefore a record that is to be put 
straight that he, the speaker, knows and is concerned to 
have correctly (re)presented. He, the speaker, is the 
authoritative knower of, ergo, his own story. 
But: fifteen pages on comes another reference to the events 
reported in lines 98-100. 
1 Daniel I began to wonder what would be the limits of non- 
2 recovery. If the legs didn't recover and I had already 
3 had attacks several, and eyes and so on.. clearly it 
4 could end up with paralysis, and how would I face that? 
5 AW Did you fear the brain going too? 
6 Daniel No. I hadn't really thought about that. I had been told 
7 by one of the doctors that treated me that the brain's 
8 internal functions were not broadly affected by it and 
9 that I... but all the same, with total paralysis... 
10 Very difficult thing to face. And I di-, I was.. 
11 AW Especially If the brain's alright 
12 Daniel yes. And I was thinking er then of the, the weight that 
13 that put on my wife particularly, my family more 
14 generally and wondered whether whether life was worth 
15 living really. And that, seventy-four, seventy-five and 
16 whether I shouldn't just get a big bottle of sleeping 
17 pills and take them. I thought about that. That was 
18 the trough, seventy-four, five. 
19 AW Did you talk about that to anybody? 
20 Daniel No. 
21 AW So you saw that as your decision to make? 
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2? 
24 
25 
26 
27 
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Daniel Yeah. Clearly it was. I mentioned it much later to my 
wife, but long after I had decided against it, because 
then clearly, it's one thing to do it and another thing 
threatening to do - it's blackmail and er even telling 
my wife long after I had decided not to do it she became 
extremely upset and I felt I just shouldn't have told her, 
kept it to myself. I never told anybody - no. But er 
29 Aw Did you begin to change ycur mind when your body was 
30 recovering? 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
Daniel Yeah. That, partly, but also my mind, and it was, it 
really was a decision whether.. it could happen again, yes 
it could. If I got into the state of facing total 
paralysis I don't think suicide would be an illogical thing 
to do. But that's something I'll just have to face when I 
capoe to it. Won't make any preordained plans. On the 
basis of past experience, all I can say is, you just don't 
know what you'll do if put in great, severe situations. 
You cssl't predict. You may say when you're able bodied 
that it would be better to be dead than totally paralysed; 
but you mightn't feel like that when you are totally 
paralysed. You quite likely wouldn't. So I just don't 
know, what, what lies in all that future. 
Here is a second reference to the same story, the events of 
'74, '75: but this time a terrible description of despair - 
a meaning that has lain behind the earlier 'impersonal' recounting 
of the facts; an action contemplated but not (yet) taken: the 
absolute destruction of the self contemplated because of the in- 
escapable effect of the body on the self. It is not only the 
past that is being re-presented, but that re-presentation is 
re-representable. So what is 'the knowledge' that the knower, 
the speaker, is uniquely knowledgeable of, if that is not 
merely represented in (his) speech but infinitely representable? 
What does the speaker say about his own knowledge of his 
self? "On the basis of past experience, all I can say is you 
don't know what you'll do if put in great, -severe situations. 
s 
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You can't predict" (36-9). Attached to the referent of "You" 
(which although a generalised 'you' by the same token includes 
any 'you' in particular) is a 'law' about selves which states 
that they cannot know themselves enough to predict the actions 
of their future self, cannot have complete self-knowledge. Yet 
paradoxically that is itself an axiom concerning the self, a 
negative form of self-knowledge, which has been achieved through 
experience ('knowing' the experience of the self). Not only 
that, but the law is itself a prediction, the very thing that 
selves have insufficient knowledge to make. 
In tension with this paradoxical statement of the impossi- 
bility of complete self-knowledge, at once reinforcing the 
paradox and undercut by it, is the progressive accumulation of 
self-knowledge effectuated through the chronological sequence of 
his story: where it was always the earlier selves who (are now 
known to have been) less knowledgeable than the present-one-who- 
speaks. "I mentioned it much later to my wife" (22-3); "I felt I 
just shouldn't have told her" (27-8); and, again, perhaps most 
clearly in the passage previously cited: "if I had had the desire 
to know the worst" (51-2) in which the present speaking-I can 
face the alternatives the "I" then could not. If self-knowledge 
is, as the accounts of the past selves have demonstrated, always 
to be superseded (by each 'present' self), the self knowledge of 
the self is that it thinks itself always more knowledgeable than 
it ever really is. 
So self-knowledge, the possibility of self-knowledge upon 
which the isomorphism of the speaker with the selves spoken of 
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is predicated, is itself denied by the speaker as he speaks. 
To object that this undercuts only the claim to facticity- 
of the dtext and not the speaker-as-the-unmediated-referent and 
origin of his own speech is to assume the continuity and unity 
of the selves through the past to the present of speech; that 
the referent of 'Daniel's speech' is Daniel himself: that, 
"the instance of discourse is self-referential" (Ricoeur 1981: 
198) (my emphasis); that to know his speech is to have access 
to him, and the task therefore to understand or explain the 
difference(s) between what his speech means and what he himself 
intended it to mean (which may include the intention to disguise, 
mislead, omit and so on). That to interpret the dtext in order 
to understand MS from Daniel's point of view, his story of his 
life, is a question therefore of interpreting Daniel's 
interpretation of his life. To interpret the dtexts by de- 
interpretation. All that, to repeat, premised on the identity 
of the speaker with the spoken of. 
But. let me push this further: What, then is to be understood 
by the referents in this passage from another of the dtexts?: 14 
1 George If I wanted to I could be one of the biggest scivers 
2 out, I really could. I could get away with a heck 
3 of a lot. 
4 AW So why do you think you don't? 
5 George 'Cos I get bored at home. 
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6 AW But you have sane sort of moral feeling that that's 
7 wrong do you? 
8 George Oh yes I have because, I mean I know I've had a day 
9 off when I haven't felt terribly well, and I've sat 
10 here and thought about it, well you don't really 
11 feel that bad, you could have gone. And I say no. 
12 You know I'm really cross with myself, I haven't 
13 bothered to make the effort. 
14 AW You're very critical in this dialogue, aren't you, 
15 with yourself? 
16 George Oh yeah, but I am critical of myself. People annoy 
17 me who aren't critical, well not annoy me, but people 
18 annoy me when they don't, they think they're perfect. 
19 Praps they don't or p'raps I'm wrong but they think 
20 they are great or something. 
Here the referents for the pronouns "I", "me", "you" are not simply 
the co-present questioner and questioned, "AW" and "George". The 
questioned, George, also becomes the narrator of 'himself' and of 
yet another 'himself' who carried on a dialogue with yet another - 
who appears to have some autonomy in that it resists: "you could 
have gone. And I say no" (11). The "you" that AW then seems to be 
responding to with. her comment (14-15) is George, the present 
narrator of the story of those other selves who are yet himself. 
What of the "I"s in the first line? Who are they? The 
present George? The George always present? And the "you"s in 
the third? Are their referents the same 'you' or different? The 
first the you present in the interview, the teller of the tale, and 
the second the you(s) of the past? What "I" is cross? and with 
which "I"? (12-13). The referents of the "I"-who-is-speaking, who 
is doing the speaking would appear to be multiple selves - not, as 
in the previous passage in the sense of past selves, selves in each 
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point in the past - but some at least simultaneously existant 
(9-13). 
Yet this appears an absurd observation; despite the extra- 
ordinarily complex use of pronouns, the exchange appears mutually 
comprehensible (as the absence of any requests for clarification 
may bear witness). If the argument outlined just previously 
were to be followed, the very knowledge of the George-who-speaks 
of that internal dialogue would be supportive of the view that 
George is his story - because of the demonstrated insider's 
knowledge of the protagonist that, because no-one else knows what 
people say to themselves (outside the world of fiction), the 
demonstration - by example - that he is (ie. constantly, always) 
a person with particular standards about "sciving" works in turn 
to support that supposition. But: it is the protagonist(s) who 
act, "I've sat here and thought about it (9-10); "I'm really cross 
with myself" (12); and George who describes the protagonist's 
actions which are as if fixed (the history which underlies the 
historical record): although they may be re-interpreted by the 
narrator, they may not be altered. In order to be able to speak 
of the self, there is a split made/assumed between the narrator 
and the protagonist of the narrative, one present (speaking) and 
one/many not present. There is a difference between them. But 
this difference has been opened up by speaking of the self. The 
'multiple selves' are therefore the product of the mechanism of 
self-reference, the language of 'speaking of the self'. The di- 
unity of the self therefore appears to be not a quality of the 
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self, 'Daniel's' or 'George's' view of a problematic of the 
concept of the self which has given rise to and therefore can be 
worked back from the dtexts, but an effect of language: an 
artefact. And therefore one may go on pre-suming the unity of 
the self, of the self who speaks with all those other selves in 
the past. 
But: this relief has in turn to be put into question. For 
there are passages in the dtexts where knowledge which, according 
to the speaker, if learnt of by the self - who is also in the 
present - would utterly destroy its tranquility and yet which is 
nevertheless spoken of. 
1 AW Do you um how do you feel about the no treatment bit? 
2 Does that I mean I don't know what your view of medicine 
3 is, whether 
4 Meg 
5 
6 
Yes -I can't say that I've ever thought about it very 
much, I mean I've always known there's no treatment 
and no cure, I mean 
7 AW I mean that makes it different than having measles, 
8 doesn't it? 
9 Meg er yes 
10 AW In what way? 
'll Meg I've never actually thought to myself you know how 
12 awful that there isn't a treatment or or because I've 
13 I have in fact always known that there isn't so it's 
14 never crossed my mind to worry about whether there 
15 was or not. I do respond to cortisone very well so 
16 that I s'pose that my own sort of particular psycho- 
17 logical defense is that every time I get ill, I'm 
18 going to have cortisone, I'm going to get better. 
19 And er, that'll go on I suppose until they find, a cure 
20 is probably the way my mind thinks about it, I mean 
21 I've never thought it through. But I suspect if I 
22 didn't respond to the cortisone I might feel quite 
23 differently. I mean I've never thought it. through. 
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Here Meg refers to "my mind" (14,20) as if independent of 
the self who is offering the account, objectifying it as a 
self or a part of the self that is not present at the moment 
of revelation (the interview); about whom/which, as at privileged 
yet not co-extensive raconteur, it is possible to speculate 
".. is probably the way my mind thinks about it.. " (20). To 
which "I" is AW addressing her questions: "how do you feel 
about.. " (1); to the present person, the narrator? Or to the 
one who seems to be the subject for both speakers, an absent 
"I", the protagonist whose delusions about treatment are the 
subeject of discussion by, it seems, a pair of disinterested, 
distant conversationalists? This protagonist is not a self 
distanced by the past as in the example of George above; but is 
in the same present (and presence) as the speakers. And yet it 
cannot, it seems, hear what is being said. 
The more closely the referents of the pronouns are considered, 
the more extraordinary the exchange becomes. It is as if by 
distancing technique (which cannot be a mere technique) the 
terror and the pity evoked by the "I"s situation become an 
Aristotelean spectators' catharctic experience of tragedy, 
15 
this 
about. which it is possible then to speak a Wordsworthian "emotion 
recollected in tranquility: '; 
16 
and thus both parties, not just 
AW but also Meg, are protected from experience's immediacy. 
But if there is a current self who 'cannot hear', the self who 
speaks cannot be the same as the one whose story is being narrated. 
The speaker is not the protagonist. 
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And a final example: 
1 AW .. 
but you don't think, you don't wonder how other 
2 people see you? 
3 Anne Well I try not to think about how other people see 
4 me. Because I try and think of myself as normal as 
5 possible. If I start thinking about how other people 
6 see me um then you start thinking about how abnormal 
7 you are. So I try not to, I should think, I should 
8 think I consciously try not to, think about it. 
In order for the narrator to be able to say, "If I start thinking 
about how other people see me then you start thinking about how 
abnormal you are" (5-7), she has to know already that she is 
abnormal. And yet to which "she" does that knowledge belong? That 
the speaker can say, "I should think I consciously try not to, 
think about it" (7-8) that is can speculate how that "I" that 
knows its abnormality defends itself-from that knowledge but 
not know how "she" does it, reinforces the distance, the differ- 
ence between the speaker and the protagonist. If it was 'the 
same self', the knowledge would not be hidden. And yet the 
narrator, the person who speaks, can speak both of the knowledge 
and the distancing technique as a technique: as if it was nothing 
to do with her. As if, therefore, she who speaks is not the 
origin of the knowledge, although a knower of it. 
Which returns us once again to the question of the self and its 
knowledge. According to Mead: 
It is the characteristic of the self as an object to 
itself that I want to bring out. This characteristic 
is represented in the word 'self' which is a reflexive, 
and indicates that which can be both subject and object. 
Mead 1934: 145 
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For Mead, the splitting between the narrator and the protagonist. 
in the dtexts, far from being 
.a 
puzzlement, would be a confirm- 
ation of his delineation of what the self is. The dtexts would 
simply exemplify that delineation, for such splitting would be 
the distancing necessitated by reasoning itself, the pre-requisite 
of the process of being objective, rational: 
The apparatus of reason would not be complete unless it 
swept itself into its own analysis of the field of 
experience (... ) reason cannot become impersonal unless 
it takes an objective, non-affective attitude towards 
itself; otherwise we have just consciousness, not self- 
consciousness. And it is necessary to rational conduct 
that the individual should thus take an objective, im- 
personal attitude towards himself, that he should become 
an object to himself. For the individual organism is 
obviously an essential and important fact or constituent 
of the empirical situation in which it acts; and without 
taking objective account of itself as such, it cannot 
act intelligently or rationally. 
Mead 1934: 146 
The argument takes the form that, since it is to be assumed that 
people do act rationally (at least some of the time), they must 
be able to regard themselves-as-objects and therefore the self 
is that which can take itself as object, "be both subject and 
object". 
But to say that is to take as axiomatic that which is 
being questioned here through-the dtexts: what it is to be a 
self. It would be to take as unproblematic the question 
of referents and of representation; that the referents of the dtexts 
are, and that the dtexts have therefore arisen from, selves, 
conceived of as lying outside, behind, originating, the text. 
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Even more critically, 'Mead is taking a feature of the grammar 
of (our) language, that the word self, "is a reflexive" as 
the axiom - which allows what then follows in the argument to 
be said: it is only by assuming 'the self' to be the referent 
of the word that the argument can get off the ground. 
Why could the world which is of any concern to us - not 
be a fiction? And he who then objects: 'but to fiction 
there belongs an author? ' - could he not be met with 
the round retort: w_L? Are we not permitted to be a 
little ironical now about the subject as we are about 
the predicate and object? Ought the philosopher not 
to rise above the-belief in grammar? All due respect 
to governesses; but is it not time philosophy renounced 
the beliefs of governesses? 
Nietzsche 1984; Note 34 
And of course according to Mead's dictum, the dtexts would be 
acceptable as. evidence of an-extra-textual reality, as a passive 
literal record of what happened. 
*** 
In order to think about what kind of texts the dtexts are, the 
question of their relation to the speaker as referent is one of 
the ways marking them as, at least not-fiction. And yet there 
is an analogy with a certain kind of literary theory about 
fiction: 
As they have been-read, In order to speak about the self 
as in the dtexts, the self has to put itself in the place of 
the other - but the other who is also the self - in order to refer 
to and 'translate' it, thus the self who speaks has always to 
be and yet be outside itself. 
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Bernard Sharratt writes of this oscillation, this extasie, 
as being taken, insisted on, as the quality whose presence ;- 
evoked by a reading marks certain texts. out as literary: that, 
precisely, being its value, placing oneself as reader voluntarily 
17 
within this process of "suture". But in the case of the 
'speakers' in the dtexts, the vertigo induced by this constant 
oscillation between always having to read, play the part of the 
self and of the other self produces not the 'pleasure', the 
'extasie' of reading (Barthes' Pleasure of the Text' (1976)), as 
if the flickering was an heuristic freeing from the prison of 
the self, but a threatening, obligatory trembling on the brink 
of nothingness: no self at all. 
But this is an effect of speaking. of the self, of the 
language of self-reference, insofar as the dtexts are not-fiction. 
'There is thinking: therefore there is something that 
thinks': 'this is the upshot of all Descartes' argumentation. 
But that means positing as 'true a priori' our belief in 
the concept of substance - that when there is thought there 
has to be something 'that thinks' is simply a formulation 
of our grammatical custom that adds a doer to every deed. 
In short, this is not merely a substantiation of a fact but 
a logical-metaphysical postulate. Along the lines followed 
by Descartes one does not come upon something absolutely 
certain but only upon the fact of a very strong belief. 
If one reduces. the proposition to 'There is thinking 
therefore there are thoughts', one has produced a mere 
tautology: and precisely that which is in question, the 
'reality of thought', is not touched upon - that is, in this 
form the 'apparent reality' of thought cannot be denied. 
But what Descartes desired was that thought should have, 
not an apparent reality, but a reality in itself. 
Nietzsche 1968: 268 
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Because what happens is attached to "I" and the narrator speaks 
in the "I" form, it can (only) be assumed that the person who 
is entitled to use the pronoun "I" is her/himself that "I". 
Except: in fiction the author can use the. pronoun "I" to denote 
any first-person narrator s/he chooses - Robinson Crusoe, 
Jane Eyre, Ishmael. '(And where, whatever the voice of the 
fiction, critics read the story as autobiographical, the writer 
using another's voice as a device to disguise her own. It is 
assumed). So you have to assume, presume the dtexts to be not- 
fiction, to go back to the beginning, pesume their referential 
relation to 'the self who speaks'. 
6.4 THE EFFECT OF THE NARRATOR18 
But: there is also the 'whole form' of the dtexts (that cannot 
be represented here, but only referred to) against which the 
question of the question of the self plays; the form as a 
narrative, unified by the narrator as a unity, unifying the 
narrative of the self through each dtext. 
To read the dtexts according to this way (suspending our 
own work of reading them) would be to understand 'the narrator' as 
the reader of what s/he has brought to discourse, in the process 
through time (the time speech takes) of referring to, reading 
his/her own life. - 
Thinking then about the form within the form, of the 
tai-folding of the dtexts as a story in the process of being told, 
an event in time, referring back on itself as it is being un- 
folded, it is possible that, as the past is re-understood in 
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being spoken of, 'the self' (in all its forms) rather than 
lying there awaiting dis-covery, is being produced in front of 
that re-understanding, by the reading of the past by the self 
who then speaks. 
In his analysis of the activity of reading, Paul Ricoeur 
refers to the hermeneutical relation between distanciation and 
appropriation as qualities held in tension. According to Ricoeur, 
"'(D)istanciation' is the condition of understanding" (1981: 144), 
and thus the condition of understanding the self (the reader, 
understanding 'herself' as a text is read) and produced in the 
narrative. 
"By appropriation I understand this: that the interpretation 
of a text culminates in the self-interpretation of a subject 
who henceforth understands himself better, understands 
himself differently, or simply begins to understand himself. 
This culmination of the understanding of a text in self- 
understanding is characteristic of the kind of reflective 
philosophy which, on various occasions, I have called 
'concrete reflection'. Here hermeneutics and reflective 
philosophy are correlative and reciprocal, On the one 
hand, self-understanding passes through the detour of 
understanding the cultural signs in which the self documer. ts 
and forms itself. On the other hand, understanding the text 
is not an end in itself; it mediates the relation to himself 
of a subject who, in the short circuit of immediate re- 
flection, does not find the meaning of his own life. Thus 
it must be said, with equal force, that reflection is nothing 
without the mediation of signs and works, and that explanation 
is ncthing if it is not incorporated as an intermediary 
stage in the process of self-understanding, In short, in 
hermeneutical reflection - or in reflective hermeneutics - 
the constitution of the self Is contemporaneous with 
the constitution of meaning. " 
1 
(Ricoeur 1981: 158-9) (emphasis in the original) 
Amongst the "cultural signs in which the self documents and forms 
itself" could be, in the dtexts, for example the signs of the 
body, which are imbued with cultural neanings (cf. Douglas 1973; 
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Turner 1984; the first section of this chapter) and cannot be 
understoo3 cuLside of meaning: not "the signs" per se, but the 
signs' meanings brought to the account of the life as it is being 
referred to; the understanding (in the present of the narration) 
of what the past (is now understood by the narrator to have) meant. 
And as the talk unfolds, may not what has already been said 
become the text(s) in front of which, from moment to moment, the 
self is constituting itself; the way in which the self and the 
life have been referred to-the basis of that constitution in the 
immediate, the 'self understanding' of the narrator of his own 
self. 
1 AW You said that it took you a long time to come to terms 
2 with the idea of having it.. 
3 Daniel Yes. 
4 AW .. can you remember 
how you came to terms with it, I 
5 mean beginning, you know, did you begin with anger, 
6 did you begin with horror, or not thinking about it? 
7 Can you remember it in sort of,. 
8 Daniel Anger Anger certainly there was, yes. I mean thi-, 
9 cliches. 'Why me? ' and 'What did I do wrong that caused 
10 the, the MS if any? ' 
11 AW Morally or physically? 
12 Daniel Not really either specified. 'Did I do something wrong? ' 
13 that 'wrong', that's again, too, that's not the right 
14 word. 'Could it have been avoided? ' Did i make 
15 some foolish step and therefore brought it on myself? 
16 The way I think about it now -I mean it's such a 
17 mad line of reasoning I can hardly believe I used to 
18 do it - but I 
Aid. 'What did I do to bring it on myself, 
19 if anything? ' And then I would run through a checklist 
20 of possibilities but er they were such wild... 
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Is this -'splitting' - of the narrator 'Daniel' from that past 
self - "I mean it's such a mad line of reasoning I can hardly 
believe I used to do it - but I did" for example - Ricoeur's 
distanciation? The condition of understanding that cannot be 
done in the "short circuit of immediate reflection", for to 
understand a life is to have lived and passed on. 
And as for appropriation : 
Ultimately, what I appropriate is a proposed world, The 
latter is not behind the text, as a hidden intention would 
be, but in front of it, as that which the work unfolds, 
discovers, reveals. It is not a question of imposing upon 
the text our finite capacity of understanding, but of 
exposing ourselves to the text and receiving from it an 
enlarged self, which would be the proposed existence 
corresponding in the most suitable way to the world 
proposed. So understanding is quite different from a con- 
stitution of which the subject would possess the key. In 
this respect, it would be more correct to say that the 
self is constituted by the matter of the text. 
Ricoeur 1981: 143-4 (emphasis in the original) 
Is Ricoeur's "I" who appropriates equivalent to 'Daniel' as he 
reappropriates his own life and the world of which MS is a part, 
proposed and revealed by, through, the distanciation of narrator 
from protagonist, the narrator learning of the world the pro- 
tagonist experienced (the "matter of the text")? the narrator 
engaged in a "hermeneutical reflection" on his own life? 
Unlike with Mead's theory of the self, this would be to 
say that what there is to be understood is not being reproduced 
but produced, for the very first time. Every production of an 
account of the self, every re-reading of the protagonist by the 
narrator is another first time, constituted by what has been 
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produced before, another "meaning of his own life". 
George Well what's anyone else done to deserve it, what 
has anyone done to deserve any illness or anything 
you know that harms them in any way? So that was 
my answer anyway, you know, we're all being tried 
for different things, it just so happens, it's just 
run of the mill, it's just life you know. 
AW So you're saying that you believe we're all tested 
in various ways? 
George No, not really cos ah, who's testing us? I don't 
know. . 
AW Did you mean that under. 
George I don't know not really. I.. you see.. ah it's very 
difficult to say.. I.. x don't know you see it's like 
what is the meaning of life? There's no real answer 
is there? 
But still that is to propose that to read the dtexts is to dis- 
cover the self (the narrator) in the act of producing new under- 
standings of himself as he 'reads' his own words, recalls his own 
selves in the past: to retain, albeit in a dynamic and continuous 
mode, the narrator as the referent of the dtexts and therefore 
as the unmediated origin of the knowledge of the self, ("the matter"), 
independent of any effects of the form of the dtexts, effects 
produced by the technical structuration inherent in the language of 
self-reference. 
*** 
So: what difference do the dtexts make to the question of the self? 
For in this chapter, both the absence and the presence of the 
question of the self has been discerned 'in' the dtexts: first 
made absent through looking at the substance, the matter of the 
dtexts in respect of the concept of the body-self relation as 
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conceived through the irruption of MS; second, made present through 
looking at the constraints engendered by the form of the language 
of self-reference. So: the referential relation between the dtexts 
and their speakers, the first 'fold' of the question is not in- 
determinable, but dependent upon what is questioned about that re- 
lation, what is held, 'philosophically' or otherwise, to be the 
problematic of their interpretation, dependent upon the question 
against which they are read. 
But this dis-integration of the authority of the speaker as source 
of the dtexts qua knowledge, produced by these questionings, have 
emerged insofar as the dtexts are read as the representation of 
speech. That is, insofar as they are read as a particular form 
of text: voice-in-writing. 
But "their form" is not inherent in the dtexts. 
19 
For. they are also 
a form of autobiography, the representation in writing of a life, 
in which the uniqueness of the life and the authority of the author 
seem to re-cohere the disintegration of the authority of the 
speaker. Read against, not a philosophical question but against 
a literary genre, not as speech-in-writing but as writing, another 
mode of interpretability comes into effect. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
READING AGAINST FORM : OF AUTOBIOGRAPHY 
The story of Ivan Illych's life was of the 
simplest, most ordinary and therefore the 
most terrible. 
Tolstoy 1960: 109 
The second 'fold' of the question of the three-fold referential 
relation of the dtexts, as it was posed at the beginning of this 
Section, is that of the text to the life. 
As works of writing, in that each is rooted in a single 
subject who is the author of the text which is about that subject's 
life, the dtexts seem to share the essential characteristics of 
the form of writing that is autobiography. To re-read them 
against the idea of autobiography is not only to think about 
what effects that has on their interpretability, but at the same 
time to recognise that what has been done so far has been done 
simply in terms of particular passages, forgetting that it is 
their whole form that provides the context within which extracts 
are interpretable; a context which lends a coherence to 
particular passages as parts of a whole form. What, then, to 
reiterate, is the relation of the dtexts to the life? 
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But what is particular about autobiography as a form of writing? 
For literary theorists it is, according to de Man, problematic 
in two major ways, for it does not seem precisely to fit into 
that kind of writing classifiable as literary: first because of 
its quasi-factual status and second because of the difficulty it 
presents in terms of aesthetics, generally regarded as the mark 
of literature (de Man 1979: 918) It is the nature of these 
difficulties concerning what autobiography is as a genre of text 
which resonate with the problematic of the dtexts qua texts and 
which suggest that this re-reading may be a fruitful way of 
thinking further about them. 
In the first place, according to de Man, it is uncertain apparently 
whether autobiography may indeed by "properly" elevated to the 
status of a genre, for then, as literature, it would be at once 
placed in the domain of the aesthetic. And yet: 
Compared to tragedy, or epic, or literary poetry, 
autobiography always looks slightly disreputable 
and self-indulgent in a way that may be symptom- 
atic of its incompatability with the monumental 
dignity of aesthetic values. 
de Man 19 79 : 919 
To read the dtexts from the concerns of aesthetics, that is with 
regard to the effects aspired to or achieved by their authors on 
their readers, would be to consider such matters as the tone and 
the style of their writing, to consider the language in which they 
are written in its difference from language used 
literally. To 
read the dtexts in this mode would be to put aside questions of 
their epistemological referential status as irrelevant, such 
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matters traditionally being regarded as incompatible with, or 
rather as incommeasurable with, language used in its poetic 
or literary mode. 
The Doctor 
You are not looking at all well, my dear 
In fact you are looking most awfully queer 
Do you think the Pain is more than you can bear? 
Yes, I find that it is more than I can bear, so give me some 
bromide 
And I will go away for a long time and hide 
Somewhere on the seashore where the tide 
Coming upon me when I am asleep shall cover 
Me, go over entirely, 
Carry beyond recovery. 
Stevie Smith 1938 
Given the present context, the central question of the dtexts' 
referential status, the concentration here has to be on the 
former, the epistemological problem rather than on the latter. 
Yet it would be absurd to deny that the dtexts provoke in 
their readers pity and terror which were, as has already been 
said, for Aristotle, the very marks of Tragedy: their power to 
do so magnified insofar as they are writings about lives that 
are not-fictional. 
1 
I began to wonder what would be the limits of non- 
recovery. If the legs didn't recover and I had 
already had several attacks, eyes and so on-clearly 
it would end with paralysis and how would I face that? 
And I wondered whether life was worth living really 
and whether. I shouldn't just get a big bottle of 
sleeping pills and take them. I thought about that. 
For literary theorists, the problematic suitability of autobiography 
for aesthetics is entailed and canpounded by its second character- 
istic, lying as it is held to do, peculiarly athwart the modes of 
fact and fiction. 
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For: 
Autobiography seems to depend on actual and potentially 
verifiable events in a less ambivalent way than fiction 
does. It seems to belong to a simpler mode of referent- 
iality, of representation and diegesis. It may contain 
lots of phantasms and dreams, but these deviations from 
reality remain rooted in a single subject whose identity 
is defined by the uncontested readability of his proper 
name. 
de Man 1979: 920 
As a form of the written, the dtexts too "seem to depend on 
actual and potentially verifiable events. " In that our 
question3 is concerned with what that "seems" involves, to re- 
read them against the form of autobiography to which they are, 
prima facie, similar, is a way to think about what the dtexts 
are as texts and the kind of interpretive work that is involved 
in their reading. For sociological readers, the crucial issue 
lies in the dtexts' possible similarly "quasi-factual" status, 
a problematic which would be conferred by their similarity to 
autobiographical writing. 
To think first about their similarity will be consequent- 
(ial)ly to think about their difference. 
7.1 READING FOR SIMILARITY 
As one form of written text, autobiographies require, as each 
kind of text does, a particular framework for reading, an inter- 
pretation that recognises them in their particularity; their 
difference from other kinds of writing. 
What is involved may be opened up through playing on their 
characteristic as essentially partial: a play against which the 
question of the dtexts will at first be present only by implication. 
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Each of the many respects in which autobiography is recognisably 
partial invites a cautious interpretative response yet at the 
same time seems to provide a strategy for their interpretation, 
an interpretation, it will be emphasised here, that is rele- 
vant to the question of the dtextssthat is chiefly concerned 
with their factual status, the author's text as a representation 
of her/his life. (This strategy is thus already a partial 
reading). 
Autobiographies are partial-as-opposed-to-whole in many respects. 
Being written from a single viewpoint, the scale is necessarily 
small, individual, personal. Events, what happened, the substance 
of the life can only be represented from the author's view, from 
the author's knowledge. Being rooted in a single life, the 
story cannot go beyond the arc of time and the geographical sites 
on which the author has lived the life. Others' viewpoints may 
be included in them, but these are represented through the 
author's (limited) understandings and interests. Any references 
to matters beyond the first-hand experience are to be understood 
therefore as less authentic, less factual. 
Because of this inherent limitation to a single view, a 
personal perspective, it follows that there must be gaps in the 
story of the life as given. Not only is the viewpoint necessarily 
partial, but also the context. Crucial events perhaps happened 
off-stage that the author was unaware of or only partially knew 
of; other events, persons, forces that were hidden to the 
author operated on the life that, if known, might have made the 
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story of the life altogether different; a hidden hand, deus ex 
machina, that made the life as it seemed to be rather than what 
it was. 
In that autobiography is written at a particular point in 
a life, it may be assumed as the time at which the author had 
something to say, deemed it for some reason to be an appropriate 
time from which to reflect back on the life. But by the same 
token, autobiography is partial in that the point of writing 
is not the end of the life and unknowably distant from it. The 
author is still in the midst of the plot, and what is to come 
might change everything, make the time of writing of greater or 
in any case of different significance. The meaning of the life 
might utterly change. 
Autobiography is also partial in the sense of being subject 
to the technical limitations inherent in the form: by the author's 
capacity for insight or for self-expression; by her writing skill. 
Partial because subject to the technicalities and. fallability of 
memory; because of its retrospection (differing from a diary 
or a letter), partial in that what is recalled is necessarily 
mediated by the present of writing: can only be an interpretation 
of the past, never 'the past' itself. 
4 
They are partial in that most of the life is not included 
in the writing. No-one can refer to everything that happens? It 
follows that what is written has been selected, consists of 
episodes in the life chosen as representative of it, of the 
chosen theme or period, or which present the life most desirably. 
which is the other face of their -partiality. 
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In the sense that they are written by the author about 
her own life, the author has an interest in what is written, 
a concern with the way she and the life is displayed. For 
the text will be a representation remaining beyond the death 
of the author. 
At the grave of Henry James, Auden asked intercession 
for the vanity of the writer's calling, for the 
treason of all clerks. Vanity and treason there were.. 
but there was also the hope of creating against time, 
of making language outlast death. That is the essence 
of classic literacy. Not very many, today, adirri t to 
the arrogance, to the obsessive aloneness neeeded for 
that hope. 
Steiner 1975: 178-9 
That which is written down as autobiography may also be delib- 
erately partial, full of omissions, suppressions or lies. In 
any case, cannot be taken at face value. 
This double implication of partial-ness as a framework for 
the interpretation of writing which is autobiography is precisely 
apposite here, for it involves the complementary ideas of a 
whole and of truth: that there is a complete. or at least a more 
complete story which could be (have been) related, and that 
there could be (have been) an objective, less partial, more 
dis-interested, more truthful version. The differences between 
the partialities of autobiography SM form and the wholeness 
of its referents, which it cannot but fail to represent, 
constitutes a space - for the essentiality of interpretation. 
As writing, the autobiography is. essentially an interpretation 
'the life'. As a text to be read, it is an interpretation 
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of a life which it is the work of reading to (de)interpret. 
For how could the overwhelming partialities of autobiography 
as a form of the written be compensated for, except by what 
the reader can bring to the text? Which principally. is the 
very idea that what is written is (only) partial and that 
the partialities have to be compensated for. To be able to 
fill these spaces is the task and triumph of expert readers, 
to add to, to complete or at the very least to supplement the 
text, particularly incomplete by the nature of the genre to 
which it perhaps belongs. 
In that the dtexts are autobiographical and, ergo, partial, 
but in particular ways, particular kinds of interpretive work 
are made possible, required, demanded by their form. 
One kind of reading that may be opened up by their need 
for supplementation might be a concentration on the veracity 
of the accounts. Did what the author said happened, happen 
in fact? Thus checking with their GP or hospital records for 
confirmation of the status of their condition for example or 
their date of diagnosis; with their spouses for congruent 
details of family life; or with their employers for their 
current and past employment history, for example; to know 
that about some points of the life referred to would be, 
according to such a reading, to have a criterion against which 
to interpret the general referential status of the whole 
story via an assessment of the credibility of the author on 
at least some of the elements of the life. 
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Or supplemented by psycho-analytic theory, for example, 
a reading could work to compensate for the dtexts' obvious 
incompleteness vis ä vis the life in terms of the psyche of 
the author; of the power of the unconscious to block from 
consciousness and thus from what can be referred to by an 
individual, the deep trauma or psychic conflicts which, in 
the absence of a skilled Analyst, has to remain as the hidden- 
but-readable-truth of the life: 
If one considers the problem 
(6) 
from a psychoanalytic 
viewpoint, the first and most obvious explanation would 
be this: 'Instead of talking about their psychic feelings 
directly, they talked about these feelings by talking r 
about physical matters; consciously unacceptable thoughts 
and feelings are repressed into an unconscious mode of 
experiencing, and it is possible that your subjects could 
not tolerate a conscious experience of their feelings 
about their disability, so they repressed them and when 
asked about them, displaced them onto physical matters. ' 
This process is called 'somatization', 'Soma' = the body, 
so 'somatizing = body-izing. feelings, as a substitute for 
consciously experiencing them, and representing them 
through the explicit medium of words. (emphasis in original) 
James 1981: 25 
Read through constructivist sociology (and see Chapter 1.3) 
that which was absent would be absent by virtue of the premise 
of such a reading, that no one individual can ever refer to, 
because they cannot by definition comprehend, the full social 
context within which all are necessarily partially ignorant or 
deluded. Such a reading might look in the dtexts for the 
social forces constituting and constraining 'the life' as 
represented: class, economic circumstance, institutional practices 
and so on (cf Wright & Treacher 1982; Chapter 1 and this thesis, 
passim). 
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For example: 
It is argued [in our paper] that readiness to accept 
responsibility for one's health depends partly on views 
held about the aetiology of illness and this position 
is explored using material on causation and the circum- 
stances where blame is attributed, derived from semi- 
structured interviews with a sample of 41 working class 
mothers... Roughly half the sample held fatalistic views 
on the aetiology of illness and thought they were only 
morally accountable in very restricted circumstances. 
These women tended to be less well-educated than the 
rest of the group and they were less likely to be buying 
their own homes. 
Pill & Stott 1982: 43 
The incompleteness of the authors' accounts of MS in the dtexts 
may also be read as technical, owing to the interviewer's 
inadequacy, her failure to elicit a fuller account by failing to 
ask the most fruitful or pertinent questions (see Chapter 4: 138-9) 
or by failing to pursue what more there was that could have 
been said. Who had let pass the surface account which should 
have been recognised as partial at its face value: a face value 
which was a mask for the true or at least more complex, more 
complete story of the life. 
These forms of reading however would all be explanations of 
absences in the dtexts, absences which in their particulars 
become visible as such to such readers by virtue of the ex- 
planations themselves and read(able) into the spaces of absence 
by an expert reader who knows what is lacking: brings to their 
reading and understanding of what was written what ought to 
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have been there, but that which also, by virtue of the same 
work of reading, cannot but be absent from them. The explanation 
of absence(s) as well as the substance of what is absent has 
to be extra-textual, brought into the partial text by the 
reader yet verifiable from the text itself (whatever that could 
be) by a particular supplementary reading. 
And: as the hypothetical or actual readings above showed 
(as does my use of them here), although those readings concur 
that there would be absences in the dtexts, they do not concur 
in what those absences are. The relation of what is present 
in the dtext to what is readable as absent is not the same in 
each case. 
* 
So: whatever else, the relation of autobiography as a form of 
writing to 'the life' it represents is one which consists of 
distance. Given this generous and necessary space for inter- 
pretation, predicated on the dtexts' similarity to autobiography 
as form, that space may at the same time also be supplemented 
by their difference(s) from it. 
We will look at them in two respects. To re-cite de man; 
Autobiography seems to depend on actual and potentially 
verifiable events in a less ambivalent way than fiction 
does. It seems to belong to a simpler mode of referent- 
iality, of representation and diegesis. It may contain 
lots of phantasms and dreams, but these deviations from 
reality remain rooted in a single subject whose identity 
is defined by the uncontested readability of his proper 
name. (my emphasis) 
de Man 19 79 : 920 
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7.2 READING FOR DIFFERENCE 
7.2.1 (A Simpler) Mode- of Refereritiality 
As autobiographies, the dtexts require to he brought into being, 
have no existence except that they are read; a reading which is 
essential in order to bring the life (back) to life. 
I was scandalised when I read that thing, 'Living 
with MS' book by a doctor, whatever, I can't think 
of the lady's name, I have it upstairs. I'll look 
for you. Ransome? Elizabeth Ransome? (8] But, 
she's a medical doctor and she went through all this 
business of being considered hysterical and so on. 
And her husband left her. And I, admittedly her 
story may not give as full an account of the other 
side's motives as one might have, but all the same, 
I was scandalised that anybody could do that. It': s 
all very well to say in general what people might or 
might not do, but when you read one person's 
account of what actually did! And I know of other 
cases where husbands also, in most cases, walked 
out on their wives like that. 
Dani el 
As autobiographies, the dtexts are addressed to someone, to 
those both contemporaneous and in the future who will be their 
readers (although circuitously, via AW and the tape-recorder; 
cf Chapter 5). They are inherently addressed communications, 
produced for some reason, intended to communicate - something. 
What that intention is held to be makes a difference to their 
interpretation, to the supplementation of that aspect of their 
inherent partiality. 
Unlike autobiographies, however, the dtexts cannot be 
construed to have originated in the desire of their authors 
to place their own voices permanently in the world to transcend 
the silencing of death; rather perhaps that they gave their 
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consent to relate their lives in order that the life may be 
laid out for the scrutiny of experts, laid out in order to 
contribute to knowledge about MS; to provide, in being so picked 
over, unwitting evidence for an explanation of the disease. 
9 
In any case, told for the virtuall purpose of knowledge about 
the disease and thus for the sake not of the authors but of 
others; not the readers of the dtexts perhaps but for those on 
whom the readers may then have an effect (the analyst as 
first reader, her analysis then, perhaps, influencing others who 
read her text who will then, perhaps, understand MS differently, 
more clearly, and may use that knowledge in their relations with 
people, other 'people with MS'). 
As a consequence of the assumption of this greater yet 
narrower communicative purpose than autobiography in general, 
it would follow that, far from attempting to conceal, to disguise 
or to delude their audience (to present themselves in the 'best' 
way), the language in which the life is described is an effort 
to be literal rather than literary, for it would be only by 
. relating that 
life literally that they could be so fruitful for 
those greater purposes. Thus for readers, the task would become 
that of disentangling the literal referents from the literary 
effects inherent in the form in which the life is given. 
Read, then, for that which is literal in them, the dtexts 
as writing contain more than is required, that will have to he 
(readily can be) discarded. For it is not in that they consist 
of a whole story of a life that this usefulness may come, but 
from small pieces (which happen to be tied together within a 
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a whole story); events, material for the readers to pick out 
and piece together - the circumstances Prior to the onset of 
the disease for example or the process leading towards its 
diagnosis - the rest to be cast away, leaving only the essential 
components exposed. But which elements are essential? Those 
which would have this "(simpler) mode of referentiality"; 
those directly related to MS. 
Would it be preferable to say, then, that the dtexts are 
(more) like history, the record of a network of stable and 
actual facts which, although they may have to be carefully de- 
interpreted by readers (insofar as the record is in autobiographical 
form), remain as it were the basic text to be read? their 
author-narrator properly able to refer to such a stable set 
(even though partially)? 
But: there is a peculiarity in the dtexts in that the domi- 
nance of the theme of MS in the life appears as the explanandum - 
that which is to be explained - by virtue of the biographical 
details. Yet those very details, the details of the lives which 
are referred to are those very details which explain, further, 
the theme of MS; provide the context against which the difference 
MS makes, what MS is, takes on its poignancy and concreteness: 
(I) tend to push myself a bit too much sometimes, I 
know, and then I regret it the next day. Well my 
legs feel very wobbly, well one thing, I do come 
back very quickly. I can't read. That's the one 
thing that really annoys me. Well I can read for a 
reasonable period but whereas before I'd get into a 
book and start enjoying it, I, there's no point in me - 
well there is a point in me picking up a book and 
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doing it, but I can't do it continuously. Have to 
have a long rest in between you know because the 
eyes start playing up (after) say half an hour, 
the eyes start to merge.. 
George 
Each detail, read as having been told for its significance 
towards the theme (of MS) has been chosen, presumably (by 
virtue of the dtexts' communicative purpose) for its force of 
signification, selected from all possible things that might 
have been referred to. And as such, what that significance is 
is constituted by the episode itself, tied to it (as if the 
'descriptive rhetoric' could be stripped away, leaving the - 
literal - essence, the "actual and verifiable events" that 
autobiographies at least partially consist in). Insofar as 
the details of a life are used to illuminate, to explain 
about a disease, the details that are chosen by the author - 
that are in the text - are those that produce that understand- 
ing: constitute that which there is to be understood. 
Furthermore: insofar as the dtexts were elicited in response 
to a request to be told, not about the life but about the disease, 
the possibility that they may be peculiarly occasioned accounts 
arises, to fill this aspect of their partiality. 
11 
For it may 
be the case that "M5" features throughout each one (one of the 
"essential elements") and in many ways structures and dominates 
them simply because of that request. Left to themselves, it 
would follow that each person may not have accorded such a 
potent presence to MS in their own unsolicited or differently 
227 
solicited accounts of their lives: their genuine autobiographies. 
And as such, the dtexts may seriously mislead if the purpose of 
reading them is, as it may be, not only for information about 
MS but in order to understand the place of MS, the difference 
having MS makes in a life, or the way knowledge of MS is accounted 
for. In that sense, far from the surplus in the dtexts being 
that which is not directly of relevance to MS (which may be 
"cast away"), it may be the case that there is too much 'about 
MS' in the story of the life. But by the same token, it follows 
that since there is the possibility that the prominence of MS 
in the life was an artefact of the occasion of their telling, 
neither can it be concluded that the prominence is not what 
would have been given to MS in any case. 
They are not, in any case, by virtue of their autobiographical 
partialness, a "whole life" but selections, on request and in 
regard to their communicative purpose. But that which has been 
'selected' to refer to is unverifiable in terms of its degree 
of representativeness of the life, because no other 
details 
are available to readers about the life apart from those given 
in the dtexts (and those selections, selected from again in 
this text). 'The life' as referent of the words and the 
silences has to be extrapolated from the-assumption of their 
typicality, of their power to reveal the character of the indi- 
vidual referring (partially) to his/her own 
life, and thus 
the dtexts have a readability predicated on the possibility of 
making at least intelligent and 
defensible guesses, as reader, 
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about other aspects of that life not present(ed) in the dtexts. 
And: to do this, it has to be assumed that what is 
sought does indeed exist prior to its being sought 'in' the 
life that is being referred to (and that it is representable 
in speech/writing). Thus in order to read the dtexts as being 
about the life, about MS, what that aboutness could consist of 
and how it may be readably discerned beneath the surface, as 
the referent of the dtext, also has to be already known, under- 
standable. (And this would account for why the dtexts are not 
surprising: to me as reader, they describe what it is like to 
have MS in the very way I would expect. It would also account 
for why, for me, that absence of surprise is itself surprising 
and that it is not). 
So it seems that even if the language in which the life is 
described is understood as tending towards the literal and away 
from the literary to an extent significantly different from 
that in 'genuine' autobiographies (cf. 7.1), nevertheless, in 
that even to begin to assess the referential relation between 
the dtexts and the life they are about demands supplementation 
by readers, a supplementation that has itself no verifiability 
outside what they already know or are concerned with, the dtexts' 
'literalness' vis 
a 
vis the life is both assumed and imposed. In 
that sense, it is the reading of the dtexts that tends towards 
the literal. 
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Furthermore: This reading work is working on at dtext that as 
much forms as is formed by 'the life'. 
12 
Rather than the life 
(lying as a reservoir of all that could have been drawn on, 
certain aspects of which are drawn to the surface so to speak) 
giving rise to the autobiography which partially represents it, 
there are ways in which autobiography as a form of writing 
gives rise to 'the life' that it ostensibly (if problematically) 
describes (literally). 
For instance: the idea of discrete facts. To seek for at least 
some literally described events as that which the author's 
interpretation interprets presupposes a neat, linear, sequential 
and therefore divisible thread of a life: into 'events'. Yet 
it would seem that the representation of a life is made according 
to the exigencies of narrative form - of "temporality and 
emplotment" (Ricoeur 1984); 
13 
the requirements of narrative 
inexorably conferring form. It follows that that which is (re) 
told must in another way form rather than be formed by the life 
'itself'. 
AW And so, how does the pattern go? ' I mean does 
it have a pattern of remission and 
Anne Fortunately, well I hope not. I had aa major 
relapse in seventy-four, and I lost most of the 
use in both my legs and that was when I was in 
hospital for about two and a half months, same- 
thing like that. But then I had physiotherapy 
and ACTS - you 
know that do you? 1 141 - and got 
back a considerable amount. Then I had, two 
years later another relapse and I lost the use of 
my right hand, and then I had another relapse 
about two years later and I started losing the 
sight of one eye but since then I've not had a 
relapse, so I'm hoping the pattern is broken. 
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To say this then is to say that the chronology of a life is 
undercut by the fact that everything, every 'event' related 
(can) mean something else later, to a later self, to someone 
else (to another reader); is at general figure of this reading. 
And those second interpretations themselves may be replaced 
with yet another: "it" was incontinence ... then venereal disease.. 
multiple sclerosis.. no longer MS (Bob). 
15 
But it is not that 
"it" comes to mean different things, be differently defined, 
but that the referent of the "it" is not itself stable. There 
is no stable 'chronology' or even successive re-interpretations 
of 'the same' facts: no "it". 
So whilst in their language, the dtexts may represent the 
(impossible) attempt on behalf of their authors to be clear 
(literal) about the life: yet, qua autobiography, there are 
ways in which it is only this that can be achieved. only 
things that are now clear, at the time of producing the auto- 
biography, are referrable to: things about which it is 'now' 
possible to know what 'clear' would be. So it is impossible to 
represent chaos - and thus chaos is not (re)presentable, not 
here. Although the (original) authors do refer to what they 
do not know, they can specify what it is they do not know and 
why. The reason given for not knowing is for example because 
they are not themselves knowledgeable about that thing ("I'm 
not a doctor" for instance: cf 130 above), not that anything 
about the life referred to is non-sense, meaning-less to the 
person whose life it i-s. So in that sense, the clarity with 
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which the life is described cannot be taken as arising from 
the life, as the knowledge about the life held by the person whose 
life it is, but is imposed on it by the limits of language. 
It seems, then, that there is a residue which cannot be brought 
to language; that cannot be represented, cannot be presented 
except as an absence, and therefore can only be read into the 
dtexts by those who could understand what else could have been 
there. And even that has to be speculation. 
[MS seems to be] the ultimate exemplar not only of 
ontological but of epistemological nihilism. 
And yet there is in the dtexts no chaos, nothing 
that resembles the abyss. There is no pain. Indeed 
everything is "just normal, just life, you know" (George). 
The worst is always over, or somewhere else, never in the 
present, the present of the dtexts' time. Yet that re- 
markable absence of chaos is also 'in' the dtexts. This 
extraordinary absence of 'madness', of nihilism... 
Chapter 6: 172 
And yet in a sense that is pre-figured in/by the dtexts themselves. 
The authors state that "others" cannot understand what it is like 
for them, even those who share the same situation ("other people 
with MS" who are, according to George, for example, "so self- 
centred"), an existential isolation that cannot itself be repre- 
sented as such, only referred to as referent of an absence that 
can be spoken of: the absence of "understanding". As authors, 
referring to their own lives, it appears that they know that their 
lives cannot be truly, literally, represented 
(to others). As 
communicative texts, the dtexts cannot but fail to communicate. 
And yet of course they do. But what it is that is (appears to 
have been) communicated is unknowably related to the author's 
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intentions, to their view of their own lives. Others cannot know 
whether they really understand (or fail to understand) about that 
life: on! y feel as if they might by reading, re-enacting the 
words, "bringing the life (back) to life" (above: P223). What they 
understand is what they can, not what there is. 
*** 
But all that just written is also interpretation. 
How have we got here? By reading the dtexts in terms of their 
author's intentions - of a particular communicative purpose, 
to contribute to knowledge about MS - from which arose the 
interpretation of their texts' tendency towards "simpler refer- 
entiality": a beginning from which'all else has followed. All 
that has just been written depends on the concept of 'the 
author's intentions', which is to say, has been predicated on 
the assumption of the dtexts' representing, or rather the 
question of the dtexts being that of the relation between the 
text and their authors' intentions. Which brings us, or rather 
returns us, to the other question of difference between the 
dtexts and the form of autobiography. 
7.2.2 The (Uncontested) Readability of the Proper Name 
It seems that the word [person] originally and exclusively 
meant a 'mask'. Naturally, the explanation of the Latin 
etymologists that persona came from per-sonare, the mask 
through (der) which the voice (of the actor) sounds, was 
invented retrospectively. (Despite the fact that there 
was a distinction made between persona and j2ers)na,, muta, 
the mute role in drama and pantomime). 
Nauss 1973; 78 
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According to traditional literary theory, the verifiability of 
autobiography as a text of the author's own life (its epistemo-- 
logical status qua quasi-factual text), rests on "the subject 
r 
whose identity is defined by the uncontested read$bility of 
his proper name" (de Man 1979; 920) which uniquely identifies 
them; places an individual on the point of intersection of 
time and space, amongst those others, past and present, to whom, 
s/he is related and distinguishes her/him from all those others 
to whom s/he does not relate, is not; the proper name of a 
person which authorises and authenticates a text as auto- 
biography. 
The authority of a work qua autobiography rests on an 
identity between the voice of the author of the text and 
the nominated author who has affixed her name to the work. This 
naming of/by the author marks the claim of. the text that the 
life written about is not fictional; that, even though only 
partially representable, even though the interpretation and 
significance of those elements which make up the life might have 
been glossed over, (cannot be taken at face value), in its 
bare bones of events and actions, what happened according to the 
text did in fact occur, and to that person. 
De Man, however, contests, "the uncontested readability of the 
proper name", contending that, insofar as autobiography, as 
writing, cannot represent the person themselves, autobiography 
as a particular form of writing, is "a figure of reading", that 
produces effects, the effect of representation which, in being 
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representation and not the thing itself, masks the author-as- 
origin of the story: removes them beyond ascertainability by 
readers. Autobiography, as figure, both giving and taking 
away a face. 
To the extent that language is figure (or metaphor 
or prosopopeia), it is indeed not the thing itself 
but the representation, the picture of the thing, 
and, as such, it is silent, mute as pictures are 
mute. Language, as trope, is always privative.. 
To the extent that, in writing, we are dependent on 
this language we are all.. deaf and mute - not silent. 
That is to say eternally deprived of voice and 
condemned to muteness. 
de Man 19 79 : 930 
Thus "the author", whose proper name seemingly authorises the 
facticity of the life that an autobiography is about, is an 
effect of the figurality of the text, the form of writing that 
is autobiography. But for de Man, this is insofar as it is a 
literary rather than a referential form of text, "made up of 
16 
tropological substitutions". 
Socrates: You know, Phaedrus, that's the strange thing 
about writing, which makes it truly analogous 
to painting. The painter's products stand 
before us as though they were alive, but if 
you question them, they maintain a majestic 
silence. It is the same with written words. 
Plato The Phaedrus: 275e 
What of the dtexts then? For their authorisation is effected 
differently: there is a deliberate disconnection between the 
dtexts and the proper name of the individual. The practice 
of anonymysing sociological data, regarded as part of the ethic 
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of the discipline towards its subjects, of altering "the proper 
name" (eg Chapter 4, Fn 4) violates, then, one of the ground 
rules of autobiography. The point is that the story(teller) 
cannot be identified. 
The pseudonyms used to identify the dtexts do however 
refer to that proper name, or rather to the space where the 
proper name could have been. It is the space that identifies 
the words as the words of a (once) extant person; that refers 
to the face to which the words belong (out of which they once 
issued). But that face is masked by the name of anonymity, 
the mask (to follow de Man) re-masked by any-name: Daniel, 
George, Anne. The (only proper) name that is affixed to the 
dtexts is that of the researcher, my name, Anna Wynne ("All"); 
a signature which works at once to protect the privacy of the 
individual, (for it is that proper name that identifies the 
names used in the dtexts as pseudonymous) and at the same time 
works to authenticate the relationship between the dtexts' 
actual authors and the life the dtexts refer to. The "contract" 
concerning the veracity of the name that has been hidden is made, 
in the dtexts, by surrogate, by the researcher stepping into 
the space left by the anonymising of the author(ship) of the 
original: authenticating the relationship between the empirical 
individual and the tale told; through the rhetorical figure of 
ethos17 persuading the readers of her own authority. Thus the 
author/ity of the dtexts as not-fictional is the name of the 
researcher, not only of her own part in the dtexts - as "AW" - 
but of the whole dtexts. 
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But it is not the researcher's proper name which authorises in 
itself, but insofar as it links her to the patronymy of tradition, 
refers back to the discipline from which 'she' takes her 
authority, 
18 
a linkage/lineage'by which the analyst, /author is 
uniquely distinguished from other authors, authors of other 
kinds of writing: fiction, autobiography. And thus establishes 
the dtexts as - not those kinds of text. Authorises them as 
what, at least, they are not. Insofar as, that is, the 'life' 
to which they refer is not hers, its meaning not hers. It is 
that reference back to the authority which is also the referent 
of her proper name which empowers the analyst-as-author (an 
author no less de-faced by the "readability of (her)proper name") 
as the impenetrable interface between - readers and the originary 
authors of the dtexts. 
But this is only the first turn of the "de-facement" of the 
original author(ship) of the dtexts. For the mask of anonymity, 
whilst masking each individual, works to unify each of the 
dtexts as one, their original authors as a collectivity. 
It was by conferring this unity on the authors that 
the reading of the dtexts as addressed 
communications 
in the previous section was made possible. 
For what matters for analysis, for analytic 
interpretation, for 
reading the dtexts (here), is that all their authors are members 
of a collectivity, collected for their: -. sameness 
('people with 
MS' rather than the individuals (re)named George, Daniel, Meg). 
19 
Thus while each individual's autobiography represents that 
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individual and that unique life, at the same time it represents 
(to follow this reading) an experience presumed to be common to 
all or at least these particular people-with-MS (the claim may 
be more or less modest). To begin with, in order to begin, it 
was assumed by the researcher (a presumption of research) that 
MS imposes a certain symmetry amidst whatever individual 
differences there may be in the people's lives. And that in 
the individually produced, elicited, autobiographies, that 
symmetry will be unwittingly produced by each author and available 
to be discerned by a reader who knows what to look for, who 
expects that certain symmetry. The anonymising of the dtexts 
works to make the differences between each person as epiphenomenal, 
as it were, rather than fundamental. Each individual is a 
(2U) subject. 
Thus although the dtexts may be autobiographical, it is as 
a collectivity rather than as a collection that they are presented 
for sociological interpretation. But that subjecthood, that 
collectivity, is an effect - made possible by its presumption and 
inserted in the space opened up by the dis-placement of the 
original Proper Name. 
Thus reading, the dtexts as being about 'people with MS' 
is an essential de-facing the face that autobiographical writing 
confers: gives the authors, but now as a collectivity, an 
autonomous, recognisable existence. But at the same time taking 
it away, to be read beneath to the common phenomenon of MS. 
Assuming that all lives in which MS occurs have a commonality 
which makes them into one life - one form of life - makes any 
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individual life stand for MS and stand for any individual-life- 
with-MS. So the individual is created and de-faced. Through 
the work of language in the mode of reading to create and 
destroy. 
*** 
So: what has happened to the author/authority of the dtexts 
as texts whose putative referent is 'a real life', this second 
fold of the three-fold question of their reference? 
First, the original author, whom the figure of autobiography 
already masks, is de-faced by a pseudonym; dis-placed by the 
proper name of the analyst, whose own name also has as its 
authenticating referent the discipline in whose name the work 
is produced. 
But the pseudonym does not only open up the possibility 
for that different source of authority: it also makes all the 
original authors as one, the collective referent of 'any name', 
which in turn allows for the finding of a cohere-ing referent 
as 'the life' of that any-name - the life-with-MS, 
And it is that tradition, the discipline which author- 
ises the epistemological status of the dtexts which provides 
the substance of that referent - the life-with-MS, the know- 
ledge of which that discipline consists. In that sense, then, 
one could say that indeed, like all autobiographies, the 
author and the life the author's text is about (insofar as 
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they are readable; produced by reading) are identical. That 
in this respect there is no difference between the dtexts and 
'genuine' autobiographies. 
But then, what has happened to the question of the literalness/ 
literariness of the language in which the life is represented? 
If we retain this latter reading that the author of the dtext is 
the discipline, then the tendency towards literalness is still 
predicateable on the intentions of that de-facing, dis-placing 
author: that it is the (sociological) intention of the dtexts 
which tends towards the literal. All that was said about the 
de-stabilising of that tendency/intention by the form of 
autobiography, qua genre, however, still holds. 
*** 
. 
Since we have come to this point having begun with de man, let 
me return to him in order to move away once more. 
For de Man, the defacement of the subject and thus of the 
life as the life of that subject which is the effect of the 
figure that is autobiography is a consequence of the tropes 
exclusive to and definitive of literary language: its literary 
form. What I am doing is saying that in reading the dtexts 
against the form of autobiography (and it is my contention that 
this is not optional), the same stabilising/destabilising occurs. 
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But, pace de Man, this is not insofar as the dtexts are literary 
productions but as a consequence of the very nature of the 
reading to which they have been here submitted. It is in their 
being written down which makes it possible to read them 
(impossible not to read them) against the form of autobiography 
in the first place. In their being in writing, independent of 
its possible genre. Which seems to bring us again to Plato: 
but to oppose him. For far from "maintaining a majestic silence", 
the dtexts, as writing, never cease responding to (my) questions. 
BUT: This has been to read the dtexts paying attention only 
to one voice: the person-with-MS; to autobiography as a figure 
of reading that is essentially mono-logic, a reading that has 
produced an argument about the interpretability of the dtexts 
that has, perhaps consequentially, ignored the fact that the 
dtexts are also dialogue. Which brings us to the third fold 
of the three-fold question of the dtexts' referential status 
with which this Section began: of the dtexts to the interview 
as the event which is their most immediate referent. 
The question of the dtexts as dialogue also raises at last 
the question of the difference between writing and speech: a 
difference which has, unintentionally perhaps had its own 
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effects on the last two chapters. For the Question of the 
Self was concerned with self-reference in speech, and the re- 
reading against autobiography concerned the dtexts as writing. 
This-third fold of the question of the dtexts' referential 
status concerns for the first time both speech and writing: 
writing as the representation of an event, writing whose 
putative referent is an event in speech. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
READING AGAINST FORM : OF DIALOGUE 
This essential drifting, due to writing as an iterative 
structure cut off from all absolute responsibility, from 
consciousness as the authority of the last analysis, 
writing orphaned and separated at birth from the assist- 
ance of its father, is indeed what Plato condemned in 
the Phaedrus. If Plato's gesture is, as I believe, the 
philosophical movement par excellence, one realises what 
is at stake here. 
Derrida 1986: 316 
So: to the third fold of the three-fold question of the dtexts' 
referential status, to that which gives the dtexts their uniqueness 
visa vis other forms of the written: the relation of the dtexts 
to the event - the interview, the conversation - that is their 
"most immediate" ostensible referent. 
* 
By certain typographical conventions, what each dtext represents 
as it lies on the page is a dialogue. But how does that bear on 
the question of their referential status? For the written form 
of dialogue does not in itself necessarily entail that it has as 
its referent an actual event. 
The description of writing as 'majestically silent', cited 
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in the previous Chapter (p234) is from the Phaedrus, one of the 
Dialogues of Plato (1952), which are perhaps the classic exemplars 
of the form. 
1 
But Plato's Dialogues are generally regarded as 
having a highly complex and mediated relation to the events to 
which they refer: 
Socratic Dialogues 
This term may be conveniently given to the dialogues 
which on stylistic grounds may be assigned to the 
earliest period of Plato's writing: probably before 
his last visit to Sicily and Italy in 387 BC. It is 
possible that he began writing even before Socrates' 
death... Towards the end of the period the dialogues 
become more and more elaborate and Plato is beginning, 
it seems, to wrestle with the problems for himself. 
Ferguson 1970: 352 
As Plato, however, began "to wrestle with the problems for him- 
self" (and the Phaedrus is generally assigned to the later 
Middle Period of Plato's writing), 
3 
as the Dialogues become ever 
more distant from their originating source, 
Plato retained the 
dialogue form, not for the sake of its representational faith- 
fulness to those long past events, 
4 
but, it is argued, for its 
unique appropriateness as the vehicle 
for his philosophy. 
5 
The reason for its appropriateness is, according to Rowe 
(see Figure 8.1 overleaf) eminently plain (cf. also Hamilton 1988; 
Nussbaum 1986: 87-8 and passim; Rowe 1984: Chapter 4); 
Plato regards the dialogue form as capable - at least 
to a degree - of transcending the limits of ordinary 
written discourse... One of the dangers of such compo- 
sitions (as Socrates tells us) is that they inevitably 
give us a false impression of certainty. 
Rowe 1987 (Fig 8.1) 
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Living 
dialogue 
Sil[-Knqwiedeeln Pisto's PhoeQryw 
by Charles L. CriswddJr 
Yak University Press, 328pp, 128.50 
ISBN 0 300 03594 2 
The Phaedrur is generally recognized 
as a rich but deeply problematic work. 
Two problems in particular confront 
the interpreter. One is- that while 
Socrates is allowed in the course of the 
dialogue to lay down dear rules for the 
airangeo; ent of written (and spoken) 
compositions, the dialogue itself seems 
to disobey, those rules, and indeed to 
lack a unifying structure or theme of 
any kind. The first part consists largely 
of three set speeches on love, the third 
of which contains the famous image of 
the soul as a charioteer and his horses, driven upwards by erotic impulse too-~ 
wards knowledge and truth; then, in 
the second part; Socrates and Phae- 
drus embark con a long discussion of 
rhetoric which appears completely to 
lose sight of the substantive topics of 
the first part. 
The second problem concerns the 
final- section of the conversation, 
where Socrates devalues the written 
word by comparison with the spoken - 
or with one . form of it, the living 
conversation between philosopher and 
pupil. This alone. he suggests, can lead 
to genuine intellectual progress. Does 
Plato then-m to devalue his own 
written products (in n the Phaed- 
rurhself)? But why then did-hwrite 
aö much! Or is the -criticism of w`ntie8 
undermined by the very fact that it 
itself made in a written work? 
On this second problem, Griswold 
firmly sides with what is probably toe 
majority view, that Plato regards fhe 
ialogue form as capable - at leas dc 
oflinär wßtserrrdiscoarse. - But he 
argues the case in a thoroughly original 
'way, which is dosely linked to his 
ac wer to the first problem, about the 
of the Phoedrus. Through its 
atic ajmgcrncrtt--t Oswold 
ks, th"taalogue form deli"tely 
f 
i. tS L" 
02 
e- of vansoendingý16esiniits of 
; ut to mirror that of real dial 
to distance itself from " 
n compositions". One of 
'dangers of such composiuons 
Ctatt ýaeils'tu) is itsat inc7 
C. 
UY 
the 
So- 
tabty 
Plato 
pve 0 
've/oonvusation avoids this danger 
use of the constant possibility 
tbo questioning of any Idea as It is 
forward; while its written count 
the PhaedN achieve h same 
eeýB by means-oF at Griswold 
idenýfies as a dial l or "palinodic" 
relatio een its various sec- 
tions, whereby each successive section 
partially undercuts and qualifies the 
. one 
before. 
So in the third speech of the first half 
Socrates recants the result of the 
earlier two, but eoes beyond anything 
be an justifyin räaona terms; thhe 
section on rhetonc en ve cps an 
account of a technical dialectical 
method, which while it allows some 
advance towards clan is, seen as 
incapable of illutwnating many of the 
essential dimensions of the objects it 
studies (hence, according to Griswold, 
the stripping away of the "metaphys- 
ical, mystic, and religious" aspects of 
Socrates's main speech in the account 
Oven of it in this section); and finally, 
in a kind of Hegelian synthesis, the last 
section proposes a third form of dis- 
course - actual, living dialogue - which 
will combine both the "madness" of 
Socrates's speech anjjbci r techni- 
way. 
as read- 
ion with it 
The pur> ft exercise is that 
self-discovery (the "self-knowledge" 
of Griswold's title) which Socrates 
identifies as his project at the begin- 
ning of the dialogue. " This Griswold 
sees as the unifying theme of the work. 
What Socrates seeks, and each of us is 
to be persuaded to'seek, " is tO know 
"7* cSt3.3 "$ý 
himself both as an individual and as a 
member of the human spedca;, which 
will include knowing those things. that 
are truly desirable for him. But. the 
continuing reflections: on. method 
themselves already teach the -import- 
ance of one dimension of the Socratic 
concept of self-knowledge: knowledge 
of one's ignorance, and p1 the limits of. human understanding. The immediate question. according 
to Griswold's own strict rules of inter- pretation; is how much of this is in any dear way verifiable from the text. The 
answer is perhaps about half. Down to 
the end of Socrates's central speech, 
there is much that is genuinely illumi- 
nating in Griswold's treatment; from 
then on, however; hisjnterpretation 
looks increasingly forced. Why, for 
example, does tbd; discussion of the 
rhetoric so consistently pretend to be, 
about the right way, of speakie :, d" 
writing if it is really about'an inferiors 
sort of, ialectic? Irony, Griswold wil 
reply, and there is certainly plenty oEj that in the Phaedra; but if it is quite assns{{{{ 
cxtcnqca as nc suQ¢csu 
nt ess an Nc crtbeless, this is a book, 
whi cq, amour y to a full 
comme on the dialogue. But its 
special merit is that it makes- an imaginative attempt, of a kind that has 
rarely been made in any detail, to 
come to terms with the Phaednv as an 
artistic (and philosophical) wbok. 
Christopher Rowe 
Dr Rowe it reader in classics at the. Univerfi y of Bristol. 
Figure B. 16 
245 
If to that suggestive depiction of the virtues unique to the 
form of dialogue is added not only the question of the relation 
between the form(s) and the interpretability of the dtexts already 
under discussion here, but also of the consequences of the 
difference held to exist between writing and speech (opened up 
in the previous two chapters as fundamentally involved in the 
problematic of the dtexts), (writing about) a re-reading of the 
dtexts against the Phaedrus becomes rich with possibility. 
Having come to a point where the question of the difference between 
writing and speech and all that is held to entail - began to be 
pressing, and alerted to the interpretive relevance of the form 
of the dtexts as dialogue by Rowe's review, I was reminded? that 
Walter Ong (much cited in current sociological interest in the 
question of writing) 
8 
substantiated his summary of the classical 
opposition to writing in this same Dialogue: 
9 
Writing, Plato has Socrates say in the Phaedrus, is 
inhuman, pretending to establish outside the mind what 
in reality can only be in the mind. It is a thing, a 
manufactured product... Secondly, Plato's Socrates 
urges, writing destroys memory. Those who use writing 
will become forgetful, relying on an external resource 
for what they lack in internal resources. Writing 
weakens the mind... Thirdly, a written text is basically 
unresponsive. If you ask a person to explain his or her 
statement you can get an explanation; if you aska text, 
you get back nothing except the same, often stupid, words' 
which called for your question in the first place... 
Fourthly, in keeping with the agonistic mentality of 
oral cultures, Plato's Socrates also holds it against 
writing that the written word cannot defend itself as 
the natural spoken word can: real speech and thought 
always exist essentially in the context of give-and-take 
between real persons. Writing is passive, out of it, 
in an unreal, unnatural world. 
Ong 1982: 7910 
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Having never read Plato, I myself turned to the primary text: 
ll 
and read something quite different. It should go without saying 
that this is as much reading the Phaedrus against the dtexts and 
the general concerns of this thesis as the other way. about. it 
cannot perhaps go without saying that the' interpretation of the 
Phaedrus which is to be advanced in this chapter is in fundamental 
opposition, so far as I am aware, 
12 
to that of traditional and 
even not so traditional philosophers' interpretations (Derrida 
1981; Nussbaum 1986). 
Although certainly throughout the Phaedrus continual refer- 
ence is made both to the spoken and the written word, what is at 
issue are the differences between bad and good, proper and improper 
writing-and-speech - as media for the pursuit of knowledge. To 
read the Phaedrus as consisting of Plato's injunction against 
writing as such is to ignore the form in which the dialogue is 
written. 
13 
On the contrary, the substance of the Dialogue occurs 
within the folds of such a convoluted form that no "statements" 
can be taken at their face value. For in reading any particular 
passage of the text, the whole form of the Dialogue as dialogue 
and the movement of the argument within it are set in play against 
each other. In a similar way, no few lines may be taken to stand 
by (for) themselves in the dtexts without remembering (an idea of) 
the whole form of the text. Although in both cases, when I. say 
"no few lines-may be taken", I mean that it is only when they 
are so extracted that it is possible to interpret them with 
confidence: to extract the things that Plato held against writing, 
what people say about their MS. It is only close reading that 
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makes either text difficult, sets each part into oscillation, 
At first reading, both are excessively simple to understand, 
One of the things that makes them so simple and, if. thought 
about, so difficult, is their common form - as dialogue. 
So: what effects does the form of dialogue have on the interpret- 
ability of a text's substantive matter? What may be learned 
about the dtexts as knowledge, the knowledge of people with MS, 
from the Phaedrus? Or, to put it more ccanplexly, what is 
engendered14 in the reading of the two dialogues against each 
other? 
8.1 EFFECTIVE FEATURES OF DIALOGUE 
As a form of the written, dialogue: 
I Refers to a unique event: 
i in space and time; 
ii involving actors; 
iii in relation to each other; 
iv occurring in a particular way. 
II Refers to an event of speech: 
i in which speech represents speakers; 
ii which is about something. 
III Refers to the time dialogue takes: 
i giving a context for the interpretation of 
particular passages in their sequence, 
ii and their place in the whole, 
iii for action and re-action. For something to 
happen. For the movement of inquiry. 
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I DIALOGUE REFERS TO A UNIQUE EVENT 
i.... in space and time... 
r 
The first essential feature of dialogue is that it is an event, 
occupying a unique position in time and space. Insofar as a text 
in dialogic form claims through its particulars an identifiably 
unique position qua event, this marks its basis 
in and therefore 
the text's relation to reality. Such particulars do not only 
identify an event as the event it is (as referent of the text) but 
in their precise nature, become one of the means whereby the event 
is interpretable. 
i 
m SOCRAT&S : Where do you come fron, Phmedru: my friend, aqd 
CP HA ä DR U S: Lead on then. 
soCRATES: Please tell me. 
PHA£DRUS : As a matter of fact the topic is appropriate for your 
ears. Socrates, for the discussion that engaged us may be said to haw, 
concerned love. Lysias, you must know, has described how a hana. 
some boy was tempted, but not by a lover-that's the clever part of it. 
He maintains that surrender should be to one who is not in love 
rather than to one who Is. 
souaA -r ss: Spiendfd 1I wish he would add that it should be 
to a poor man rather than a rich one. an elderly man rather than a 
4 young one, and, in general, to ordinary folk like myself. What an at. 
tractive democratic theory that would bel However. Tm so eager to 
beat about it that I vow I won't leave you even if you extend your 
walk as fss a MQgaM Va 
dw wans mW beck again as recant, 
,,. 1 0A hv Hero '+ S 
where are you going? 
P xA aDRVs: I've been with Lysfas. Socrates, the son of Cepli. 
alus, and I'm off for a walk outside the wall, after a long mornings 
sitting there. On the instructions of our common friend Acumenus 
I take my walks on the open roads; he tells me that is more-invigorat. 
ing than walking in the colonnades. 
b SOCRATES: Yes, he's right in saying so. But Lysfas, I take it, was 
in town. 
PKAEDRDS : Yes, staying with Epicrates. In that house'where 
Morychus used to live, close to the temple of Olympian Zeus. 
socawrss : Well. how were you oecupied? No doubt Lysfas was 
giving the company a feast of eloquence. 
PxA EDa us: Ill tell you. if you can spare time to come along 
with me and listen. 
socRArss: What? Don't you realize that I should account it, 
in Pindar's words. 'above all business' to hear how you and Lysfas 
passed your time? 
Figure 8.2 
From Plato's Phaedrus, translated with Introduction 
and commentary by R Rackforth (Cambridge & NY 1952) 
in Hamilton & Cairns (1962): 475-525. 
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There is a difference in the means by which the event referred 
to is represented in the dtexts and in the Phaedrus. For example, 
whereas in the Phaedrus the place of the event in time and space 
is vividly established within the first few exchanges (Fig 8.1; 
227a), 16,17 in the dtexts such details as occur, occur as if 
incidentally, dispersed throughout the texts and never all those 
necessary. Thus although both texts powerfully assert a present 
in which the event occurred, the very richness and sufficiency 
of the detail given so early in the Phaedrus, when compared to the 
way real dialogue (the referent of the dtexts) only incidentally 
and tangentially refer to their own setting marks the former, by 
its very artistry, as the invocation of (rather than the record 
of) an actual dialogue; the text a product of skillful writing. 
18 
As such, the details of the Phaedrus' setting may not only 
be understood as a fictional 'literal' description but, because of 
the reading invited by language used literarily, the movement of 
the text's interpretation is urged towards figure, the descriptors 
in/of the Dialogue as figuratively evocative as they can be: 
occurring outside the city walls, through the 
heat of the afternoon 
and so on, adding to or even providing the 
key for an interpretation 
of the whole text as a philosophy (cf. Nussbaum 
1986; Ferrari 1987). 19 
The details in the dtexts, insofar as each dtext is by 
comparison understood as the record of an actual event, on the 
contrary it seems require only to be read literally. The identi- 
fication of the dtexts qua event occur in the main outside the 
event 'itself' - given for example in Appendix 
3.2, this text. 
They too however work as 'more' than literal in that being cited 
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outside the main text, in an Appendix, they symbolise, stand as 
evidence for the status of the dtexts as authentic, the dtext 
as the record of a dialogue which actually occurred (. and see 236 
above). 
I. ii ... a unique event involving actors... 
What happens in a named time and place is... activity. To name 
a setting presumes activity; awaits, forecasts, demands the 
presence of actors. In the Phaedrus the speakers: present them- 
selves and their setting together, at the very. beginning. Thus 
there seems to be no author producing effects by writing but 
rather the unmediated immediate presence of Socrates and Phaedrus 
come upon by us as they come upon each other, revealing who and 
where they are in their speech. The dtexts do not set themselves 
up in this way: the scene is explicitly set by the presenter, 
the author/analyst who places the speakers on the appropriate co- 
ordinates and then as it were steps back into silence (cf Chapter 
3.3). Because of the 'actual' or 'artefactual' absence of the 
author in/of the dialogues, in both texts the voices become read- 
able as speakers speaking for themselves. But the quality of that 
becoming is tied to the quality of the absence of the authorship. 
The fact that the dtexts appear unauthored in this sense makes 
their reading as voice, unmediated presence, much stronger: no 
'Plato' using dialogue to express his philisophy, playing on the 
possibilities of form. Consequently, the interpretation of the 
dtexts' substance appears to be free of the problem of author's 
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intentions; what an author, a third party, presumed living 
dialogue to be like or the form to be useful for, but simply 
arising out of the event itself; an event reciprocally authenti- 
cated as the unmediated and actual referent of the dtexts. 
Insofar as there 'is' no intervening author, this in turn has an 
effect on the relationship of the reader with the text. For 
rather than the reader's position being the one addressed by the 
text (as is still the case with prose for certain contemporary 
literary theorists, even given 'the death of the author', cf. 
Tompkins 1980), 
20 
with dialogue the reader is placed in the 
position of (as if in the position of) being, rather, a witness 
to the communication between others: the communication occurring 
discretely within the (referent of the) text, the referred to 
event. This position of the reader as over-hearer renders the 
object of interpretation the interlocutors themselves, via their 
own words; of seeing how the speakers understand or fail to under- 
stand each other on the basis of how one responds to the other. 
But insofar as the absence of the author in the Phaedrus 
is a stylistic choice (cf. 243 above), 'Plato' may be re-invoked 
and the involvement of the reader. as the author's addressee 
restored: the interpretative relationship the problematic one 
of reader-text-interlocutors-author. Insofar as the absence of 
an author in the dtexts is deemed actual, the reader's inter- 
pretative position apparently remains simpler: reader-text- 
interlocutors. 
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I. iii ... involving actors in relation to each other.., 
The kind of event a dialogue refers to offers a further context 
for its interpretation. How the speakers speak together, the 
relationship between them, opens the interpretation of the sub- 
stantive matter of their talk in a particular way. 
In the Phaedrus, the relationship is named at the very first 
as friendship: "Phaedrus, my friend" (Fig 8.2; 227a). Insofar as 
we know what friendship is (then, still now), their talk is then 
yet another instance of what it is to talk between friends, to 
be interpreted in that light. Intractable additional interpre- 
tative problems are thereby opened for the reader of such a written 
dialogue, who then cannot ignore the possibility that the tone of 
the original speech might have been informal, teasing, sarcastic, 
familiar; possibilities unmarkable in speech in its written form 
but which, insofar as the dialogue is deemed to be authored (the 
very specification of the relationship as friendship of 
significance) may be part of the author's intended meaning. If one 
were to retain 'Plato's intentions' as essential to the interpre- 
tation of the Phaedrus, this very ambiguity of the written as 
opposed to the spoken word could arguably be part of his 'case 
against writing'. 
The dtexts appear to represent a different kind of relation- 
ship between the interlocutors. In several of them AW asserts 
at the beginning "I know nothing about you", and 
in any case,. as 
the event unfolds, her questions and her interlocutors' replies 
demonstrate their lack of mutual personal knowledge. As strangers 
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then, following this interpretation, their talk will differ from 
talk between friends; as writing, the wild disruptive effects of 
tone almost certainly absent from the dtexts not because un- 
markable in writing but because they were unlikely to have been 
there in the original event. 
I. iv ... coming about in a particular way. 
In the Phaedrus, the setting of the talk describes what is to come 
as that which has occurred by chance, Socrates and Phaedrus 
coming upon another out walking (Fig 8.2; 227e). Introducing 
themselves as friends, meeting each other by chance, it follows 
that they can talk about anything that occurs to them. The fact 
that philosophy is what they talk about echoes/exemplifies what 
Socrates will later say and with which Phaedrus will agree, that 
to have a concern for philosophy is to have a concern that consumes 
all that life, is that life (257b). 
21 
But that interpretation is 
dependent upon the 'chance nature' of their encounter, the nature 
of the unique event represented in/by the text of the Phaedrus. 
By contrast, as a pre-arranged meeting between strangers, for 
a specified purpose ('tell me about your MS' - cf. 190 above), the 
dtext dialogue is more closed in its potential scope than the 
Phaedrus, or rather readable as closed: - the substance to be 
about MS, the interest in talking about it not necessarily mutual; 
the occasion of the unique event thus reinforcing the 'fact' that 
it is between strangers and to be interpreted as such. The dtexts 
thus do not conform to Rowe's demarcation between "living dialogue" 
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and the written as lying in the former's comparative open-endedness. 
For the very idea of open-endedness at every moment which Rowe 
describes (Fig 8.1) is an effect that lies within the power of a 
writer (Plato-as-author) to represent. (Rather undercutting his 
endorsement of Griswold's argument, Rowe, in deploring the lack of 
a unifying theme in the Phaedrus, ie the Dialogue's very open- 
endedness, is pointing to the very success of Plato's conformity 
to the idea (Rowe's idea) of the unique characteristic of living 
dialogue). 
After the first time of reading, the opening of the Phaedrus can 
also be read as opening up from the very beginning the possibility 
of reading the dtext, its form and its substance, in play against 
each other. For the question, Socrates' very first inquiry - from 
whom and from whence Phaedrus comes - are to be precisely those 
questions which Socrates will later reproach him for asking: he 
will admonish Phaedrus that the proper question concerns only the 
truth or falsehood of what is said, not who speaks or what country 
he comes from (275c). But by then, it will have been that very 
question of who the speaker is which has been set up as the enquiry 
of philosophy, the question of the self inextricably bound with 
the pursuit of knowledge of the truth (230a). Except: yet again 
to anticipate, the method which is apparently being favoured in 
the Dialogue for that pursuit is precisely dialogue; the process 
of statement and refutation in which Socrates needs to have Phaedrus 
say that which appears to be important but will be shown not to be 
so; to state that which is obvious in order for its grounds to be 
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put into question. In which case it is critical who says which 
words; that it is Phaedrus who replies to this question. And so 
on (and s--a III. i below). 
The infinite contestability of any proposed interpretation 
of the Dialogue's meaning that is advance in/by the text that is 
to unfold is present from the beginning; made present through the 
possibility of re-reading passages of'the texts against the context 
of others. In that that possibility is given by writing which 
evokes the event of dialogue, the content of the text is 
rendered doubly ironic; attention oscillating between the form 
in which it is written and the event to which the writing purports 
to refer: to the difference (pointed to) between its appearance and 
the reality which it could have been representing as referent. 
Ironic play in the event of the dtexts is readable inthe 
voice of the narrator as was discussed in Chapters 7 and 8; but 
this is a different mode and attribution of irony. And besides, 
such potential for irony of the dtexts comes after, in the writing 
about them (rather than in the re-. reading of their substance). 
22 
This difference between the two dialogues makes in turn a differ- 
ence; unlike with the Phaedrus, it turns attention away from the 
form of the dtexts as writing towards their referent as that 
which is interpretable (and see the early chapters of the thesis 
and the break at 4/5). 
But: the readable presence or absence of irony in the dtexts 
is effected by their referential relation to an actual event, a 
relation that cannot be determined from the texts themselves. 
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t 
II DIALOGUE REFERS TO AN EVENT OF SPEECH 
i ... in which speech represents speakers... 
The event which written dialogue represents is an event in and of 
speech. What follows (although differently in each text because 
of how the absence of the author is construed) is that the words 
on the page represent speech which represents speakers, present in 
their own words. What is involved in the reading of dialogue inso- 
far as it refers to an event in speech is an apparently unproblematic 
instance of the classical (and currently contested) 
23 
prioritisation 
of voice over writing. For as the representation of an event in 
speech, the written form (would be that which) clearly comes 
after the speech. This is vital to the argument (by Rowe, for 
example, Fig 8.1) that being (written) in dialogue, the Phaedrus 
represents Plato's preference for speech as the medium for philo- 
sophic enquiry. It is also, of course, vital to the interpretation 
of the speakers through the dtexts (of their 
'understanding of 
science', their 'experience of MS'). 
24 
That (written) speech represents the speaker is apparently a premise 
of the Phaedrus. 
it first, Phaedrus evinces reluctance to report 
(paraphrase) Lysias' speech, but baring been teased 
into the admission that he has been practicing its 
oration for just such an occasion, consents to begin. 
But before he can, Socrates interrupts: 
socaalss : Ysry wdl. my dear fkfow, but 1r show 
me what ft fs that you have In your left band for I 
surmise that It fs the actual discourse. If that is so. Ist me assure you ZS 
Of this, that much as I love you I am " altogether Inclined to let " 
you pract4oe your acatoey on at when Lysias himself I. ben present. 
Caine now. show It me. 
Figure 8.3 
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That is, Lysias himself is brought to the present of the dialogue- 
as-event in his "actual discourse. " 
At the level of the event, read after the first time, after, 
(to concur with Ong, p245 above) what will be said by Socrates 
against writing, in that Socrates then proceeds in fact to 'misuse' 
and 'abuse' Lysias' argument about love without Lysias having any 
opportunity to defend his own words, this passage becomes inter- 
pretable as an exemplification of one of the very things about 
the written that he is later (held) to denigrate. the fact that 
writers cannot protect their own work from abuse (275e). But 
speakers can. Actually being "here present" in his speech, 
Phaedrus can defend his own opinions of Lysias' speech to Socrates 
(234c/e). At the level of the text, in that Phaedrus' speech is 
itself in written form, that he cannot now defend his words 
from my 'abuse' (p 263 below) merely endorses the contrast with 
and this ground of preference for speech. However, in that the 
Phaedrus is written, the 'abuse' that Lysias' speech is subjected 
to can be put into question, . re-interpreted 
by reading this 
passage in the context of what is to come after: a possibility 
unique to writing. , 
What at the level of the event appears as an irony against 
writing reappears, read at the level of the text, as one of the 
virtues of the written, the play offered 
by one reading against 
the other itself a virtue unique to the written form (and/or 
that very play, that very indecipherability of the intended 
meaning, a further mark against writing, demonstrable only in a 
written text about the difference between writing and speech). 
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However, the opposition being discussed in this passage of the 
Dialogue is in any case not as simple as speech as against writing. 
Lysias' 'speech' is a written text, delivered orally. Phaedrus' 
offer was to recite what he remembered of it, a recitation that 
would represent only its essential gist (228d/e). 
25 
Socrates, 
then, is asking to hear the written speech because it is the 
primary source, not because it is written by and 'is' Lysias 
himself here present; unmediated by another's interpretation. 
But re-read in the light of what is to come, perhaps the crucial 
target of Socrates' attack is the fact that Lysias' speech is an 
argument designed to persuade an audience to his view of a 
question, that is not written in dialogic form, giving thereby 
a "false impression of certainty" (Rowe 1987) about the question; 
the fact that it is monologic, making it an example of the 
improper use of the art of rhetoric: for the sheer amoral joy of 
manipulating an audience (see 291 below). 
At this point in the event, the presence that is directly being 
put into question is the presence of Lysias-in-his-writing, the 
presence of author-in-text. At the level of the interpretation 
of the Dialogue as a whole, form against substance, the double 
questioning of presence expands to that of 
'Socrates' in 'his 
own speech'; and of 'Plato' in 'his writing' -a play made 
possible by (reading) writing in the form of 
dialogue which in- 
vokes a referent though it does not have one 
("Play", that is, 
in the engineering sense, of the slack that allows, 
'is essential 
for the movement of one surface against another: for movement). 
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As in the Phaedrus, in the dtexts the presence(s) invoked by speech 
at the level of the event is not just that of the interlocutors. 
But the others who are brought into the dialogue as if they were 
"themselves here present" are brought to the present of the dialogue's 
time as event through reports of their speech (see for example pl91 
above)(and pace the ostensive reference held, for example by 
Ricoeur, to be the differentiating and exclusive mode of reference 
of spoken-as-opposed-to-written discourse (Ricoeur 1981: 148-9)). 
In the Phaedrus it is Lysias' absence from the time of 
the dialogue which is present in the text, his possible presence 
invoked through his writing. In the dtexts, those others are also 
absent, but brought to the present of the dtexts' dialogue by the 
invocation of their speech: that is more immediately. Indeed, the 
dialogue of the dtexts to a great extent consists of the reports 
of dialogues with or between others:. "I stopped and I said, 'wait a 
minute. Did I hear you right? Was that what you said? ' And he 
said, 'you haven't been told? '" (Daniel); "I was talking to my 
neurologist about it and he said, 'well fine.. '"(Mea)26 and so 
on. To tell of a life is to tell of dialogues with others, through 
speaking of which the life is represented. 
But the referred-to-speech of others is not given verbatim. 
This opens towards an interpretation by the reader of the dtexts 
of the referer, the speaker present in the. dtext-event who is 
referring to them. For in reporting the speech of the absent others, 
their meanings and intentions, the speakers in the dtext dialogues 
in exposing (only) their own interpretations of the original 
speech, offer insight to the character and understanding of them- 
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selves - as persons who would interpret others' speech in the 
ways they do, revealing how they make sense of 'the world'. 
Thus the reader's work of interpreting the interpreter, 
how the 'author', the speaker in the dialogue, is interpreting 
those to whom/whose speech s/he is referring, is intermittantly 
operative. This produces as an effect a constant shifting of 
the reader's relation to the dtext and to its referents beyond 
the immediate, in a way different from the reader of the Phaedrus 
(in that the latter has no actual referent, but a consistently 
mediated appearance of a relation to one). 
But this effect is a concomitant of the premise that 
speech recorded vertabim (the speech of the dialogue-as-event) 
is the unmediated representation of speakers' speech, a premise 
of difference that holds only insofar as the form of dialogue-in- 
writing is held to be neutral in effect. 
There is yet another interpretive effect of the reference to 
past speech with others in the dtexts: for in that those referred 
to dialogues, qua dialogues, share the effective features of 
the form - as event, having a relation to reality and so on - the 
time of the past in which the life was lived through is brought 
not only to the present of the dialogue's time but straight 
through to the present of the reading of the dtexts. A continuous 
time-dimension is thus effectuated as the environment, as it 
were, in which (all) speech occurs, the present to which the 
dtexts refer a continuity with the time of reading which is always 
now: connecting the reality of reading, this event, to the 
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referent of the dtexts. thereby producing the reality of that to 
which the dtexts refer - beyond the textual record itself. It is 
this continuity of the past present of speech with the present of 
reading that engenders the obviousness of interpreting the dtexts 
through what the reader (now) knows. (at every time of reading). 
But it is an interpretative opportunity effectuated by virtue of 
the constitution of the continuity of time by the interlocutors' 
reference to dialogues which are/were in speech and not, as in 
the Phaedrus, in writing. 
At the same time, in that the constitution of a seamless 
web of time as the dimension in which speech occurs is one of the 
effects inherent in dialogue qua form, once rendered visible, 
rests in turn on an adherence to a difference between presence 
in writing and in speech. 
III DIALOGUE REFERS TO THE TIME IT TADS 
As written form, dialogue not only refers to an event at a point 
in time, it has as its referent the passage of time: the time 
talk takes. As the dialogue as an event presages actors, so the 
dialogue as an event which itself takes time presages action; 
something that happens through the dialogue, the speech of one with 
another. Action and re-action. 
This time dimension opened up by the form once again operates 
differently as an interpretative context in the case of the 
Dialogue and of the dtexts. (a difference, to reiterate, engendered 
not least by holding a difference between them as referential texts). 
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In that the Phaedrus is a representation rather than the record of 
an actual event, unlike with the dtexts, its order could have 
been written otherwise; it thus invites a reading which pays 
attention to the precise topography of the speeches, their 
relation in the internal order of the dialogue-event; to the 
argument of the text as a whole. 
Thus: that which occurs (is said) early in the Dialogue is 
that which is open to change, to development, through the time 
dialogue takes. Phaedrus, having read the text of Lysias' speech 
aloud to Socrates, asks for his opinion: 
2! i 
. 
ARA ; -In fact It struck me as an ex- 
travagant performance, to demonstrate his ability to say the same 
thing twice. in different words but with equal success. 
rlrAEDRVS : Not a bit of it. Socrates. The outstanding feature b 
of the discourse is just this, that it has not overlooked any important 
rispect of the subject, so making it impossible for anyone else to 
outdo what he has said with a fuller or more satisfactory oration. 
SOCRATES : If you go as far as that I shall find it impossible to 
agree with you; if I were to assent out of politeness, I should be con- 
futed by the wise men and women who in past ages have spoken and 
written on this theme. 
P it AEaRUs: To whom do you refer? Where have you heard any- 
thing better than this? 
SOCRATES. I can't tell you offhand, but I'm sure I have heard 
something better, from the fair Sappho maybe, or the wise Anacreon, 
or peps some prose writer. What ground, you may ask, have I 
for saying so. o sir, there is something welling up within my 
breast, which makes me feel that I could find something different. 
and something better, to say. I am of course well aware it can't be any. 
thing originating in my own mind, for I know my own Ignorance; so 
I suppose it can only be that it has been poured into me, through my 
tars. as into a vessel, from some external source, though in my stupid d 
fashion I have actually forgotten how. and from whom. I heard it. 
Figure 8.4 
Given time, he can then be shown to have been drawn by the move- 
sent in/of the dialogue from confidence in his own opinion towards 
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a recognition of. the fallibility of his pretentions to knowledge: 
his own ignorance. Or rather, readers, overhearing the event 
as it proceeds, can understand Phaedrus to have understood nothing 
about his own ignorance, as he repeatedly agrees with whatever 
Socrates says: "Yes indeed"; "Of course" (rig 8.9: 258c/d). 
Indeed his final utterance in the Dialogue will be to say that, 
"friends have all things in common" (279c), apparently surrendering 
to Socrates the entire onus of the work of thinking. 
27 
The - 
potential for change, for an increase in his knowledge opened up 
by the time dialogue takes marks Phaedrus' failure. 
28 
And our 
own success at noticing his failure, a mark of our own enlighten- 
ment effected, unlike him, by Socrates, reading the Dialogue 
through time (a time that may be repeated, re-lived through, 
which is the exclusive virtue of the written): the time of the 
dialogue 'itself' however crucially being uni-directional, mono- 
linear. In fact it is the irreversible linearity of speech that 
allows for the self-questioning movement that is the Dialogue's 
quintessential virtue as a form of enquiry. Inquiry which needs 
time. 
By contrast, and in that the order of speeches arises in the dtexts 
from the event and not as a consequence of decision, not arranged 
as constituting an argument, it is not so much the sequence of 
the speeches that is the relevant context for interpretation but 
rather the 'whole'; the period of time it takes to transfer the 
experience/knowledge of MS from one to another, for all that 
ideally could have been transferred, the question then becoming 
264 
one rather of how sufficient, how complete, that transfer was. 
But when it comes to their reading, the temporal dimension 
of the dialogue qua referential form suggests a way of interpret- 
ing the substance against the sequence in which the speech occurred 
during that period. Given the effective features of the form, in- 
sofar as the dtexts' referent is a dialogue which began between 
strangers, the time to which the dtext refers provides the time 
for a deepening level of intimacy, of trust, of frankness. Read 
in this way, a horizontal dimension of movement is discernible in 
the dtexts that offers a criterion for the interpretation of 
passages according to where they occurred along this time dimension. 
As strangers, not friends, not everything can be spoken of 
at. first: what is spoken of rather beginning with the neutral and 
most distant events; reaching in those interviews which were the 
most successful (the experience of MS the most faithfully trans- 
ferred) intensely private talk of life and death: winding up again 
to the surface, to end the interview at the level of the everyday., 
the reversion to strangerhood. Marks of such a cadence such as, 
"I've never told anyone this before... " (James) and, as already 
referred to in Chapter 6, Daniel's return to an incident the 
second time revealing it to have been in fact utterly negative, 
utterly bleak and despairing, themselves rely on time: both 
revelations occurring well on into the time the dialogue took. 
To identify a cadence of intimacy developing through the 
time of the dtexts' referent however relies on taking the usually 
unspeakable as the most significant; to interpret through the 
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fore-knowledge of what is. usually sayable in such circumstances: 
above all, that that which is the most terrible is the most 
true (what is said most faithful to the experience itself). This 
sits in stark contrast against the Phaedrus' portrayal of the 
true as, "the right, the beautiful and the good" (278c). 
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But 
that is a contrast arising. from the other effective features of 
the reference of dialogue; the sequence of speech through a 
period of time between strangers. 
As a context for interpreting the matter of the text, then, the 
temporal dimension of talk opened up by dialogue works in the 
dtexts to offer the idea of a whole experience (the time for 
every aspect of MS to be referred to) against the idea of the 
depth of the experience, the closeness of the words to the ex- 
perience, the matter to be transmitted. 
But in that sense, against appearances, the time referent 
of the dialogue increases the interpretative problematic of the 
dtexts, for the breadth/depth of what is conveyed does not 
cumulatively form a richer dimensionality to the experience as 
that which may be being conveyed. Rather they are in conflict. 
For whilst the cumulation towards the completion of a full account 
requires each reference to the experience to be equivalently 
faithful to it, the 'cadence of intimacy' developing through the 
time the dialogue takes suggests that each reference cannot be 
equally faithful. 
However, the relation of particular passages of talk to 
the experience spoken of, neither their breadth nor depth (their 
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completeness nor their faithfulness) can be ascertained either 
from the words themselves or from their place in the context of 
the time the event took without reference to the dimension of 
time opened up as an effect of the form, effectuated in/by the 
dtexts as dialogue-in-writing. 
The passage cited in Figure 8.4 from the Phaedrus also raises 
another aspect of the effect of temporality on interpretation 
(the consideration of which will prepare the way for the second 
part of this chapter, concerning the kind of inquiry dialogue 
represents), which has to do with the kind of movement of 
argument that the form of the dialogues allow. 
Compared with Phaedrus' early claim to knowledge (Fig 8.4: 
p262 above), Socrates' early claim to an ignorance of himself 
in the same passage marks (as) the beginning of an unfolding 
through the time of the Dialogue of what it would be to pursue 
his own questioning. At this point in the Dialogue, that Socrates 
may be ignorant and still speak authoritatively, qua philosopher, 
is a puzzle that may be accounted for by reading the text rather 
than through to the event. For what at this point he feels 
"welling up" in him to say does not, he says, originate with him. 
He knows himself (refers to himself as) merely a "vessel" for the 
"something better to say" on love than Lysias, the precise source 
of which he has "actually forgotten" but the general source of 
which is the works (writings amongst them: 235a) of others more 
knowledgeable than him. His speech, his knowledge, originates 
elsewhere. 
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But this reference to the authority of his speech residing 
in the works of others, his endorsement of the authority of 
others, will be undercut in its turn (in time). For the speech 
on love he is then "impelled" to make (237-241d) is the very 
speech that he will regret (see Fig 8.8). This endless refutation 
of statements (deemed to be the essence of Socratic dialogue) is 
dependent an the monolinear temporality of dialogue. (To pursue 
this point here: this passage, ironicised by what comes after - 
by a particular passage, that is, that comes after - is then 
re-interpretable as meaning that the fault lay not so much in his 
reliance on sources from elsewhere which should have been 
rejected tout court, but his failure to engage them in dialectic, 
the movement towards truth that requires the (works of) others in 
order to begin but requires that the other be questioned. (That 
'Plato' is not 'against writing' is arguable upon this basis: 
that the dialectic essential to enquiry is the mode made possible 
by the representation of speech in writing rather than in speech 
itself: in the Phaedrus's referential form). 
Initial claims to ignorance are also made early in the dtexts' 
dialogic event - by AW: thus it is the people with MS who are 
deemed 'the others', those who are knowledgeable about the matter 
under inquiry, of themselves and their knowledge of MS. They 
tell AW through the time the dialogue takes more than she tells 
them: it is they who respond to her questions; she questions only 
them. During the course of the dialogue it follows that the 
latters' knowledge is similarly being "poured into" AW. 
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If the claim is at this point in the Phaedrus that knowledge 
does not originate in an individual but that each individual 
is a medium through which the knowledge of others more knowledge- 
able speaks, the same may be said of AW as an individual, through 
whom her tradition speaks. But this would be to. say that both 
interlocutors in the dtexts' dialogue were passive: that what 
the people with MS 'pour into' AW as vessel is what they want to, 
and is all that they have to say. But on the contrary, being 
knowledge produced in dialogue, action and reaction through time, 
responses are evoked from/by the other. She, speaking from her 
tradition, asks the questions which set the grounds, the domain 
for response. Thus although what the others know about themselves 
may be being transferred through the time of the dialogue, what is 
transferred is only 'what they know' that she knows how to ask, 
and, what they can hear her to be asking. 
Nevertheless, given this limitation, it appears that at the 
level of the event to which they refer, there is offering and 
acceptance of knowledge: the transferral of the matter, knowledge 
of MS, from one to the other, its substance terminating with the 
end of the time of the event. In this sense the time dialogue 
takes is not, as in the Phaedrus a time, at least potentially, 
for mutual change. 
But as a text to be read, the time of the event of the dtexts 
in effect opens up to rather than marks the end of dialogue; opens 
to the use of the event of speech for the development of a thesis 
through the other no longer present; the action opened Indefinitely 
to a silent dialogue between dtexts and reader, reading against 
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the event, questioning the grounds of speech, a dialogue which 
continues the movement of what passes in the dtext quit event. 
In the Phaedrus, this movement of/by dialogue, the shifting of the 
grounds, occurs as the exchanges proceed (as if) through the 
time of the event. In Figure 8.4 above (p262): 
Phaedrus: says Lysias' speech is as the final word 
on this aspect of the subject of love; 
Socrates: says that he cannot agree because he knows 
that better arguments have already been made 
on the topic; 
Phaedrus: demands, who said better? Identify your 
sources. 
Socrates: does not only not cite his authorities but 
refutes Phaedrus' assumption that Lysias, 
or anyone, could be the source and origin of 
their own speech - thereby putting into 
question the grounds upon which Phaedrus' 
opinion was premised. 
Socrates does not only point out that Phaedrus is mistaken, but 
to a deeper ground that his question concealed, that he had failed 
to be aware of. The movement in the Dialogue is not question-and- 
answer; "When were you first diagnosed? " "Well it was about... 
and so on. Not the transferrence of information but a shifting, a 
movement beneath what is said; a movement that will continue, can 
be interpreted as having continued by virtue of the time dialogue 
was to take. The temporal monolinearity of speech as referent 
of the Dialogue is critical for this under-cutting; the identi- 
fication of this movement of theorising in/by the text; engendered 
in the activity of reading against form. 
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It is not, pace Rowe (Fig 8.1), the similarity of the Phaedrus 
to "living dialogue" but its difference from it (at least in 
the case of the dtexts as the basis of comparison) that the 
open-endedness of the Dialogue lies: its being written, not 
its being dialogue that allows for the representation of a 
proper uncertainty. 
*** 
*** 
To re-capitulate in order to move away: questioning the 
referential status of the dtexts, their relation to actuality, 
ends in an aporia: their immediate characteristics, their 
immediacy - as a unique event, of speech, 
between interlocutors - 
conferred on 'the referent' by their form as dialogue. One 
can see how they may be read as having/read through to those 
origins (as was done in Chapter 4), but not 
how one may securely 
ground a claim that they do. 
The question of the interpretation of the dtexts has been tied 
since the beginning of Chapter 
6 to a question of reference. 
Implicit in this pursuit, in the sequence of the thesis, has 
been that their sociological interpretation cannot begin until 
that question has been addressed. Yet it 
has been'in the work 
of interpretation that their status is engendered, interpre- 
tation which is effected - in specific ways - by the form in 
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which as texts they are structured; the form(s) against which 
the dtexts have been here read. 
What happens if we suspend the problem of referential status 
at this point but nevertheless continue with re-reading the 
dtexts against the Phaedrus, moving towards what becomes its 
substantive matter, the nature and limits of enquiry? For 
each of the dtexts is, like the Phaedrus, itself an inquiry, 
the production-of-knowledge-through-dialogue. 
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8.2 AGAINST THE FORM OF INQUIRY 
Unique to inquiry in the form of dialogue, its most obvious 
feature, is that it is person ified; is the engagement of one 
person with another. For the movement of dialogic enquiry, the 
other is essential to each interlocutor. 
As a way of beginning: what difference does it make that 
what the inquiry consists of happens as a response of one to the 
other, that movement of responsiveness the impetus for the happen- 
ing of 'what happens'? What is this requirement for the other? 
As far as the dtexts are concerned, to enquire into the experience 
of MS, into lay conceptions of science, to do this research, it 
is that knowledge is to be passed in/by dialogue from one to the 
other, that the researcher is face-to-face with a spokesperson of 
the world of experience that is being enquired about, that it is 
the latter who is questioned by the former, that exemplifies what 
such inquiry is. In each other's presence, in the immediacy of 
speech, inquiry occurs closest to the original source of experience. 
Furthermore, it is only in co-presence that the other can be 
questioned according to the interests of the 
inquirer, pursuing 
the matter. It follows that the other is absolutely and obviously 
necessary to the inquiry (at this first stage: although as has been 
remarked, their subsequent absence is no inhibition'. 
when it comes to the work of interpretation of the dtexts). 
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According to Rowe (Fig 8.1), in the Phaedrus, true philosophic 
inquiry is that which occurs through speech with the other, "the 
living conversation between philosopher and pupil. This alone 
(Socrates suggests) can lead to genuine intellectual progress, " 
through the use of the other's responses. 
Most obviously, the "intellectual progress" is that 
of "the pupil", 
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for whom the "philosopher" is the essential 
other through whom enlightenment may be effected, the source of 
education. But "the other" is also essential for "the philosopher. " 
Much of the substance of the Phaedrus qua inquiry concerns 
an exposition of the relation between the erotic form of love --E)OW5 
(eros) - with the love of Wisdom - OPIý10"Tr41' - philo-sophia. It is 
love of the other, the beautiful (male) other which is the 
essential impetus which begins a man on the quest for wisdom, is 
essential to the beginning of his aspiration. For through and 
only through the love aroused by the beauty of his beloved will 
he be reminded of the vision of the ideal world of truth that 
all souls once glimpsed, in the time when, before birth: 
pure was the light that shone around us, and pure 
were we, without taint of that prison house which 
now we are encompassed withal, and call a body, 
fast bound therein as an oyster in its shell (250c). 
Only through love of the other will he be prompted to recapture 
that vision - of wisdom itself (246-257). Which is why there 
is no question so fundamental for this philosophy, the question 
of love not only its project but its origin. Mere introspection 
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is sterile: the desire for wisdom only engendered through 
desire for the other. 
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POCRATEs: Lead on then, and look out for a place to sit down. 
PHAEDIUs: You see that tall plane tree Over there? 
SOCRATES. Tobesure. 
bp it A EDRu s: There's some shade, and a little breeze, and grass 
to sit down on, or lie down if we like. 
SOCRATES: Thenmakeforit. 
pHAEDRUS: Tell me, Socrates, Isn't it Somewhere al; out bete 
that they say Dorcas seized Orithyla from the river? 
SOCRATES: Yes, that is the story. 
PHA EDE US: Was this the actual spot? Certainly the water 
looks charmingly pure and clear; It's just the place for girls to be play- 
ing beside the stream. 
CS 0C RAT Es: No, it was about a quarter of a mile lower down. 
where you cross to the sanctuary of Agra; there Is. I believe, an altar 
dedicated to Boreas close by. 
PHAEDRUS: I have never really noticed it, but pray tell me, 
Socrates, do you believe that story to be true? 
SOCRATES: I should be quite In the fashion If I disbelieved it, 
as the men of science do. I might proceed to give a scientific account 
of how the maiden, while at play with Pharmacia, was blown by a 
gust of Boreas down from the rocks hard by, and having thus met her 
d death was said to have been seized by Boreas, though it may have 
happened on the Areopagus, according to another version of the oc-' 
currence. For my part, Phaedrus, I regard such theories as no doubt 
attractive, but as the invention of clever, Industrious people who are 
not exactly to be envied, for the simple reason that they must then go 
on and tell us the real truth about the appearance of centaurs and the 
Chimera, not to mention a whole host of such creatures, Gorgons and 
a Pegasuses and countless other remarkable monsters of legend flock- 
ing in on them. If our skeptic, with his somewhat crude science, means 
to reduce every one of them to the standard of probability, bell need 
a deal of time for it. I myself have certainly no time for the business, 
no and Ill tell you why, my friend. I can't as yet 'know myself. - as the 
inscription at Delphi enjoins, and so long as that ignorance remains 
it seems to me ridiculous to inquire into extraneous matters. Conse- 
quently I don't bother about such things, but accept the current beliefs 
about them, and direct my inquiries, as I have just said, rather to my. 
self, to discover whether I really am a most complex creature and 
more puffed up with pride than Typhon, or a simpler, gentler being 
whom heaven has blessed with a quiet, un-Typhonic nature. By the 
b way, ism t this the tree we were making for? 
Figure 8.5 
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In both cases, for the inquiry represented by the dtexts and by 
the Phaedrus, the other is essential for their very existence. 
But what is the purpose of inquiry, its matter, that is made 
possible in/by dialogue? And here it seems the texts substantively 
diverge. 
Taking a passage this time out of the chronological sequence in 
the event, (as if) before the inquiry of the Phaedrus properly 
gets underway, before they have found the plane tree under which 
they will sit and talk, Socrates makes the famous statement that 
his concern is with seeking only to "know myself" (230a) (Fig. 
8.5). This is regarded not only as an explicit statement of the 
matter of the Phaedrus in particular: 
The purpose of the exercise is that self-discovery 
(the 'self-knowledge'of Griswold's title) which 
Socrates identifies as his project at the beginning 
of the dialogue... the unifying theme of the work. 
Rowe 1987 (Fig 8.1) 
but is agreed upon by scholars to be the fundamental key to Plato/ 
Socrates' entire philosophy: 
The inscription 'know thyself' upon the temple of 
Apollo at Delphi expresses the essence of the philo- 
sophy of Socrates, who turned philosophy away from 
the study of external nature to that of man as a 
moral being. 
Hamilton 1986: 25 
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the matter of all Socratic inquiry. 
What Socrates seeks... is to know himself both as an 
individual and as a member of the human species. 
Rowe 1987: (Fig 8.1) 
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The enquiry which the Dialogue represents is personified, then, 
to follow this line, because it is knowledge of persons, as 
individuals and as members of a species that is the matter for 
inquiry, that grounds philosophy. To enquire about persons 
requires persons to enquire from/with. 
As characterised by Rowe, this telös of Socratic 
philosophy appears in one sense the same as the telbs of socio- 
logical inquiry (at least that represented by the dtexts); 
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knowledge of the individual and of society, of persons. Knowledge 
of a genus of persons, 
'people with MS' in their particularity, 
derived from knowledge of the individuals through whom the 
inquiry is (has to be) effectuated: Daniel, Meg, George. 
But whilst in both cases it seems the knowledge of the other is 
the object of inquiry, what of knowledge of the self? How is 
this related to the form of inquiry represented in/by dialogue in 
the Phaedrus and in the dtexts? For in the former we appear to 
have knowledge of the self as the first priority; in the latter, 
a concern only for the knowledge of the other to the inquirer. 
Indeed, the inquiry directed towards and based upon the 
dtexts appears to fall under the mockery directed by Socrates 
against the "men of science" (Fig 8.5: 
229c/d) in that it too 
is about "extraneous matters, " about others not in their 
'nature' but in their experience, 
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a matter for inquiry which, 
like with that of the men of science, seems to operate with a 
presumption that it is possible to distinguish the truth of 
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certain statements as distinct from unlikely myths. In fact one 
might say that the matter for the dtexts' inquiry is to find good 
grounds for disbelieving myths - what everybody (thinks they) know 
about what chronic illness is like, how non-scientists regard 
science. The question of what the self is - the nature of the 
inquirer or the inquired of - does not seem to be the question 
at the heart of the dtexts. 
And yet: dialogic inquiry, in being conducted between/by human 
beings, being personified, is predicated-on a knowledge of 
'human nature' - of the self-and-other, a knowledge of human nature 
that, however, both inquiries deny to be fully possible (denials 
which in turn are grounded upon what they deny). 
According to Ong, the limits to 'self-knowledge' are those which 
could not have been known to 'Plato/Socrates himself': 
In fact, as Havelock has beautifully shown, Plato's 
entire epistemology was unwittingly a programmed 
rejection of the old, oral, mobile, warm, personally 
interactive lifeworld of oral culture... Plato of 
course was not at all fully aware of the unconscious 
forces at work in his psyche to produce this reaction, 
or overreaction, of the literate person to lingering, 
retardant orality. 
Ong 1982: 80-1 
This is however to begin with a universal theory of the self: 
to take the existence of "the psyche" as axiomatic, beyond the 
possibility of question. With an ironic twist, to accept the 
"word of the men of science" (229d); not to take seriously the 
pursuit of knowledge of the nature of the self as that with 
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which inquiry has to begin, but rather to proceed with the dis- 
covery of the nature of others - "Plato" for example - as the 
first and achievable necessity. 
To Ong, Socrates' project of knowledge of himself is 
limited by the irrecoverability of the unconscious; to Socrates 
himself, it is limited by the difference between gods and men who, 
being members of different species, do not have equal access to 
knowledge. Whilst gods exist in the presence of wisdom, souls 
are torn by birth from its contemplation, and life is the struggle 
to return to a position that is possible only, and only for some, 
beyond life. Both limits to self-knowledge are premised on 
knowledge of what human nature is: the bottom line of their inquiry 
(pre) formulating what (else) can be dis-covered about the nature 
of human beings, the self and/or others. 
But: this is to identify a flaw at the heart of the Phaedrus 
qua inquiry, based on a confidence in the power of reason to lead 
to the truth. However, the Pha edrus does not allow. tlg matter to 
be so--sim'ly settled. 
whilst knowledge of 'humans' in their nature is not the object 
of the dtexts, the 'matter' of their inquiry 
is similarly pre- 
dicated on a concept of the nature of persons as the ground for 
the pursuit of inquiry with/of the other. For basic to the 
representation of inquiry as two speakers speaking with one 
another is the very normality of, the inherently human possibility 
of, communication - one mind, consciousness with another, the 
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words the media of this communication, the transmission of 
understanding, of meaning. That it is simply in the nature of 
persons that they can and do communicate: the very predicate of 
intersubjectivity. 
At the same time, one of the limits of human under- 
standing of oneself by others is, it is said many times in the 
dtexts, limited by the impossibility of knowledge without the 
same experience. That is, although the whole inquiry of the 
dtexts as a dialogic event is premised on the possibility of 
understanding what the other experiences through communication 
with them, one of those communications is that without experience 
of MS, no explanation or description can convey the whole 
authentic lived experience to another: that only one-self can 
know what it is to be that self. To say that though is to 
presume one can know that another does not know what it'is like; 
is predicated on what it denies: the possibility of comprehension, 
of knowing the other. . 
(And to understand that that is 'what the 
dtexts say' is to accept as knowledge that each self is beyond 
speech, in utter isolation. And that that knowledge, by the 
same token, has no groundsl. 
Furthermore, for the dtexts as a form of inquiry, it is 
also necessary that the others, the people with MS, know them- 
selves, over and above whether they are-speaking of that knowledge, 
whether the 'experience of MS' can be represented in/by their 
speech, their responses to questions. That they can and do have 
'self-knowledge'. 
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Both dialogues then stand witness to the absolute necessity of 
the self and the other for the engendering of their practice of 
inquiry. In being personified, inquiry, pursued one with 
another, is inexorably represented - as a feature of the form - 
as having its fundamental ground the nature of the self as the 
predicate of all knowing, all inquiry. And yet that ground is 
the matter of inquiry: that which is not known. In being 
personnified, dialogic inquiry is formulated as apooretic. 
Deeply contradictory. 
Far from this being a "flaw" discovered in the argument, 
there is in the Phaedrus, in the very passage quoted in Fig 8.5, 
a perfect self-descriptive image within/of the text: 
no and IT tell you why, my friend. I can't as yet 1now myself, ' as the 
inscription at Delphi enjoins, and so long as that ignorance remains 
it seems to me ridiculous to inquire into extraneous matters. Conse- 
quently I don't bother about such things, but accept the current beliefs 
about them, and direct my Inquiries, as I have just said, rather to my. 
self, to discover whether I really am a more complex creature and 
more puffed up with pride than Typhon, or a simpler, gentler being 
whom heaven has blessed with a quiet, un-Typhonic nature. By the 
way, Isn't this the tree we were making for? 
ý 
Figure 8.6 
The latent significance of the couching of the question of the 
nature of the self in a comparison to the nature of the Typhon 
was released by a coincident reading of Melville's Moby Dick (1988) 
during the second drafting of this chapter. 
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According to Tanner's Introduction, the Typhon occurs in a 
myth from Plutarch's Isis and Osiris: 
Osiris is a priest/god/king who sails the seas 
hunting Typhon, an aquatic monster. Once a year 
Typhon dismembers Osiris who then disappears from 
the earth and the land is infertile. In a vernal 
phallic ritual, Osiris is healed and the fertility 
of the land is restored. 
Tanner 1988: xxvi 
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Tanner is suggesting that Melville's whale stands for that which 
cannot be captured in words, in writing; for "the hopelessness 
of our categorizing ambitions" (viv) for knowledge of what 
things are; for inquiry; the whale which bears on its body scars 
that are "hieroglyphical", a self-describing writing that is 
both mythical and indecipherable. 
Socrates' comparison between the question of the nature 
of the self with that of the Typhon, as that which creates and 
destroys Osiris, whose name represents dominant power that is 
both secular and sacred yet dependent on the Typhon for its 
existence, explodes. 
Here in the Phaedrus, 'in' the very project of knowledge 
of the self, a perfect analogy for enquiry; having no ground to 
begin and yet having to. For philosophy which cannot begin 
with the empirical question as the "men of science" do, but 
has to be concerned with the grounds upon which their questions 
depend, a project that engenders its own death in that there is 
no stable ground for that or any other kind of inquiry to begin. 
No true knowledge of the nature of the self because no true 
knowledge of the other. No true knowledge of the other because 
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always contaminated by ignorance of the self. No ground for 
inquiry, only movement: the movement involuntarily engendered by 
response one to another. Yet the engendering, preservation and 
death of the sacred - truth, the human - only in/by inquiry. 
In its self-description, the Dialogue trying to grapple with 
the double face of inquiry: its true monstrosity, no less 
monstrous because disfigurement, disintegration and death are the 
source of fertility, the endless and essential cycle in which 
death and generation are not opposed but the same thing. 
Having come so far and in such a way, this passage becomes 
key to the decipherment and the indecipherability of the Phaedrus: 
the central destabilising principle at the core of the text 
perfectly represented by the perpetual instability between its 
form and content. The fatal personification of inquiry in/by 
all dialogic forms. 
And yet: there appears in both dialogues tobe some kind of 
progress, some kind of movement, development, about the matter 
in hand, the impetus arising as a response to the other's state- 
ments, what is said by the other to each: a movement towards 
clarity that appears not to be dependent, upon knowledge of the 
(self or) other themselves but upon their works. To revert to 
the chronology of the text: 
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S . 
Phaedrus urges Socrates to respond with his own speech on the 
question: 
Z366 
soc*ATES : But, my dear good Phaedrus, It will be courting 
ridicule for an amateur like me to Improvise on the same theme as 'in 
accomplished writer. 
PHAEDRUS : Look here. Ill have no more of this affectation, or 
I'm pretty sure I have something to say which will compel you to 
speak. 
S0CRATES : Then please don't say it. 
PHAEDRUS: Oh, but I shall, here and now, and what I say will 
e be on oath. I swear to you by-but by whom, by what god? Or shall it 
be by this plane tree? I swear that unless you deliver your speech here 
in its very presence. I will assuredly never again declaim nor report 
any other speech by anly author whatsoever. 
SOCRATES: Aha. you roguei'How clever of you to discover ark. 
means of compelling a lover of discourse to do your bidding I 
Pit A ED RUS: Then why all this twisting? 
SOCRA TES :I give it up, in view of what you've sworn. For how 
tyidºaýr s+ah hiiwewýs siw+Y 1 p. sssW º dr 
Figure 8.7 
In declaring himself to be a lover of 
discourse, it is not only 
Phaedrus himself "here present" but the works of others which 
Socrates is saying he could not do (philosophy) without. 
Is it then that it is not the presence-in-speech of others 
that is essential to dialogic enquiry but their works? That the 
personnification-in-dialogue is vital not 
in that it represents 
co-presence but that it represents the 
duality of inquiry? An 
impetus for inquiry that can occur even given the essential 
absence of self-knowledge? 
But this possibility is immediately driven 
down in its turn. 
Socrates proceeds to argue against the case about 
Love put by 
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Lysias, but he breaks off his speech before Phaedrus expects: 
SOCRATLs: That was a terrible theory. Phaedrus, a terribly 
theory that you introduced and compelled me to expound. 
PHAZDAUS: How so? 
socs: ATEs: It was foolish, and somewhat blasphemous, and 
what could be more terrible than that? 
!HAEDaus: I agree. If it merits your description. 
SOCRATES: It T Well, do you not hold Love to be a god, the child 
of Aphrodite? 
PHAEDRUS: He is certainly said to be. 
socRArxs: But not according to Lysias, and not according to Ale that discourse of yours which you caused my lips to utter by putting a 
spell on them. 
I 
Figure 8.8 
He has, he explains, been carried away by arguing point-by- 
point against the case put forward in Lysias' speech, by the 
requirement to make a response symmetrical to Lysias' own. 
Has been lead to say what he did not mean to say at all. It 
was the symmetry that invited completion that was determining 
the argument of his own speech in response. 
To answer a case (the work of others) by refutation, 
point-by-point, is to respond to its underlying form, to 
complete the circle of symmetry but, as Socrates has demonstrated, 
in thus responding, to collude in the case's grounds. Given 
the need for all discourse for-the works of others, this 
acceptance that form is symmetrical (or a-symmetrical, which 
is within the same concept), it is not surprising that inquiry 
appears to be an accretion which suggests cumulative movement 
"towards clarity", through the negation or reversal, in any case 
oriented 'against' and engendered by what went before. 
1 
2 85 
Through recognising that he said what he did not mean 
because of responding to the structure of Lysias' argument, and 
thus to its false premise, Socrates appears to be rejecting the 
imposition on substance by form, by positing an independent 
criterion. 
However: the pivot-of Socrates' refutation of Lysias' 
and then his own speech half completed in response rests on the 
rule of non-contradiction. Halting his own con-forming speech 
Socrates steps outside, or rather underneath, and is thus able 
to see that the fault of both speeches was their unexpressed 
assumption: that Love can be evil. If Love is a good (which it 
is), it cannot at the same time be bad. The identification of 
a contradiction reveals there to have been a mistake. On the 
basis that we know at least something (what a contradiction is: 
that something is a contradiction) 
36 
we may be sure that the 
argument is false even if we do not know what the true statement 
of the argument would be. 
But that axiom of non-contradiction is precisely a con- 
comitant of the rule of form - something cannot be both a 
triangle and a circle because.. . forms are 
like that. The 
concept of form is itself part of the old mea geometrica 
(Johnson 1983); profoundly epistemological, essentially linear; 
and is operating not only beneath Lysias' mistaken speech but 
Socrates' refutation of his conformity with it. (The spatial, 
geometrical, epistemological metaphors - 
"beneath", "outside" 
and so on themselves inescapably involved in the demonstration 
of the inescapability from the epistemology of form). 
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This responsiveness, the need for the other even at its most 
abstract - for Lysias' monologic argument - its most a-personal, 
pre-formulates inquiry. 
And yet: to move with the text, even if (by demonstration) 
form is inescapable, Socrates appears to offer a way of escape 
for inquiry. For his response to Lysias was not only foolishly 
based on a contradiction but, he says, blasphemous. It was 
against the gods. Since the gods are/know the truth of things, 
inquiry that leads towards blasphemy must not be true (or should 
not be pursued? ). At first sight, this transcendental moral 
criterion seems utterly alien to the practice and evaluation of 
sociological inquiry. 
And yet: what still obtains as that which 
is to be held sacred - 
beyond question - is the idea of 'the human', the very absence 
of which in the works of deconstruction 
(and of ethnomethod- 
ology in earlier times: see Chapter 
3.1) is the criterion invoked 
by critics to vilify such works as being 
beyond the pale. Over 
and above where theorising may lead-is 
the anathema pronounced 
37 
on all works which are read as de(con)structive of the idea 
of the human. One may attempt to unravel 
the question of how 
man came to be what he is but not question 
what is involved in 
saying "that he is". 
38 
One may inquire, but is bound (for shame) 
to hold back from anything that leads to 
infinite regress: to 
the abyss. For such paths lead, blasphemously, 
to nihilism: 
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a(n-axiomatically derived) contradiction of 'what is'. But by 
the same token, the sanctity of reason/method as that which 
drives inquiry is diminished, for it may not, for fear of the 
anathema, be freely followed to such a bitter end. 
Yet: the question of responsibility, of the author for the text 
as it is written, the interviewer towards the interviewed , remains: 
deeply troublesome. 
And yet: even Socrates' certainty about the moral criterion of 
blasphemy is dissolved as the dialogue proceeds. 
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RHETORIC DIALECTIC TRUTH 
SOCRATES: Tell me then, when an orator, or a king, succeeds 
in acquiring the power of a Lycurgus, a Solon. or a Darius, and so 
winning immortality among his people as a speech writer, doesn't he 
deem himself a peer of the gods while still living, and do not people 
of later ages hold the same opinion of him when they contemplate his 
writings? 
PHAEnRUS: Yes, indeed. 
SOCRATES: Then do you suppose that anyone of that type, 
whoever he might be, and whatever his animosity toward Lysias, could 
reproach hint simply on the ground that he writes? 
PHAF. L) RUS: What you say certainly makes that improbable., 
for apparently he would be reproaching what he wanted to do him. 
self. 
Q58 ds 0C PA TES: Then the conclusion is obvious, that there is notti- ing shameful in the mere writing of speeches. 
PHAEDRUS : Of course. 
SOCRATES. But in speaking and writing shamefully and badly, 
instead of as one should, that is where the shame comes in, I take it. 
PHAEDRUS : Clearly. 
SOCRATES : Then what is the nature of good writing-and bad? 
Is it incumbent on us, Phaedrus, to examine Lysias on this point, and 
all such as have written or mean to write anything at all, whether in 
the field of public affairs or private, whether in the verse of the poet or 
the plain speech of prose? 
F`igure 8.9 
For how may praise or blame be properly attributed? 
In/by the Phaedrus it is addressed by Socrates as a question 
of the relation between rhetoric, dialectic and truth. Both 
rhetoric and dialectic are techne - which concern the ordering 
of discourse, formulations which wrest the virtual potency of 
discourse into powerfully effective methods. They are both 
methods that Presume an other to discourse in that they are 
essentially addressed communications. In that they are techne, 
at the same time they presume a 'technician', with the capacity 
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to release discourse's latent power; a technician who may thus 
be praised or blamed according to the uses to which s/he puts it. 
The uses are in turn adjudged according to their consequences, 
the telös which every inquiry moves towards. 
According to traditional interpretation, the thrust of the 
Phaedrus is to elevate dialectic and to denegrate rhetoric as 
the proper mode of writing-and-speech, for inquiry. 
43 
However: 
According to Rowe (Fig 8.1), having dealt with the topic of love: 
Socrates and Phaedrus now embark on a long discussion 
of rhetoric which appears completely to lose sight of 
the substantive topics of the first part. 
Rowe 1987 (Fig 8.1) 
But to read the text: 
SOCRATES: Must not the art of rhetoric, taken as a whole, be a 
kind of influencing of the mind by mews of words, not only in courts 
of law and other public gatherings, but in private places also? And 
must it not be the same art that is concerned with great issues and 20 b small, its right employment commanding no more respect when deal- 
ing with important matters than with unimportant? Is that what you 
have been told about it? 
PHAEDRUS: No indeed, not exactly that. It is principally. I 
should say, to lawsuits that an art of speaking and writing is applied 
-and of course to public 
harangues also. I know of no wider applica- 
tion. 
Figure 8.10 
Phaedrus surrenders to Socrates' contention: that rhetoric occurs 
in all inquiry, it is an effect inherent 
in inquiry per se (and 
operative, then, pace Rowe, in 
"the substantive topics of the 
first part") in that the objective and the effect of inquiry is 
to influence others, whatever its substantive topic. 
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Phaedrus also surrenders another belief about rhetoric, 
its relation to that which is true: 
t RA aDR Us: what I have beard is that 
the intending orator is under no necessity of understanding what Is no 
truly just, but only what is likely to be thought just by the body of 
men who are to give judgment; nor need be know what is truly 
good or noble, but what will be thought so, since it is on the latter, not 
the former, that persuasion depends. 
Figure 8.11 
For on the contrary, Socrates argues, the rhetorician has to 
have true knowledge - of the soul in its nature and its vari- 
ations in order to, "influence men's souls", the object "on 
which our discourse is brought to bear" (270a), the souls of 
his audience. ' 
10c It ATFs: Since the function of oratory is in fact to influence 
men's souls. the Intending orator must know what types of soul there a 
are. Now these are of a determinate number, and their variety results 
in a variety of individuals. To the types of soul thus discriminated 
there corresponds a determinate number of types of discourse. Hence 
a certain type of hearer will be easy to persuade by a certain type of 
speech to take such and such action for such and such reason, while 
another type will be hard to persuade. All this the orator must fully 
understand, and next he must watch it actually occurring. exempli- 
fied in men's conduct, and must cultivate a keenness of perception in e following it, If be is going to get any advantage out of the previous in- 
struction that he was given in the school. And when he is competent to 
say what type of man is susceptible to what kind of discourse; when, 
further, he can, on catching sight of so-and-so, tell himself, That is 272 
the man, that character now actually before me is the one I heard 
about in school, and In order to persuade him of so-and-so I have to 
apply these arguments in this fashion'; and when, on top of all this, 
be has further grasped the right occasions for speaking and for keep- 
ing quiet, and has come to recognize the right and the wrong time for 
the brachylogy, the pathetic passage, the exacerbation, and all the rest 
of his accomplishments-then and not till then has he well and truly 
achieved the art. But If in his speaking or teaching or writing be fails 
in any of theme requirements, he may tell y.. e. that be has the art of c 
speech, but one mustn't believe all one is told. 
4 
a 
Figure 8.12 
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But whilst the rhetorician (the inquirer) has to have a precise 
and ordered knowledge of souls in order to address each 
particular audience in the way that will be most effective, this 
knowledge may be put to any kind of use. Though Socrates 
deplores those who employ it merely, "for the sake of speaking 
to and dealing with his fellow men" (273e) (and see 258 above), 
its proper employment, "to speak what is pleasing to the gods" 
(273e) appears to be a matter of choice rather than necessity. 
Rhetoric is a techne that is a matter of structuring discourse 
in certain ways (expounded in the text in some detail: see Fn 45), 
a formal organisation that produces effects irrespective of the 
contents of what is communicated. It is then the form, the 
rhetorical structuring, that makes (aZ) content persuasive. 
Nevertheless this cannot be done without true knowledge 
also of the topic in hand, or at least the effectiveness of 
rhetoric lies in the degree of the rhetorician's knowledge of 
the truth of it. Even were a rhetorician him/herself unconcerned 
with the truth but believed what was most effective was reference 
to the probable (as Phaedrus suggested: see Fig 8.10) (see also 
Fig 8.5: 229e, where the reduction of the question of the 
existence of centaurs, 
39 
the Chimera and so on by "the men of 
science" to the "standard of probability" is precisely the 
business which Socrates himself has "no time for"): 
The multitude get their notion of probability as a 
result of a likeness to truth, and we explained just 
now that these likenesses can always be best dis- 
covered by one who knows the truth (273d). 
Knowledge of the truth, then, is essential to successful discourse, 
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but successful discourse need not in itself be true or have 
the telös of truth. It is then in knowing the truth and 
deliberately turning away from it that the reprehensibility, 
the proper attributability of "shame" to the discourser lies. 
The more effective the discourse, the greater the knowledge 
of the truth the rhetorician must have possessed and the 
greater his blasphemy. (Hence the deep disgrace of Socrates' 
response to the rhetorical form of Lysias' speech, the speech 
which, in responding with his own rhetoric, persuaded Phaedrus 
that he was hearing the truth fran Socrates). Rhetoric, that 
is, persuades those to whom it is addressed into taking that 
which appears to be the truth as true. 
Given the a-moral, virtual, ubiquitous effectiveness of the 
techne of rhetoric but the necessity of knowledge of the truth 
for its most effective employment, it is the method of dialectic 
which, Socrates urges, is the means by which truth may be 
approached - the apparently a-personal method of argument which, 
if followed rigorously, will lead inquiry in the right direction. 
Within the text, dialectic is described as the method 
of division (Nussbaum 1986: 228); of things into their genus 
and species, the one as the one of many - the method by which 
Socrates has already dis-covered the immortality of the soul 
(245-246). 
40 
But it is a form of inquiry which is concerned not 
simply with questions and answers about what things are, but 
with the grounds of questions and the relation of those grounds 
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to possible answers (see p269 above), dependent therefore on 
responses from and to the other. In that sense, the personi- 
fication of inquiry in/by the Phaedrus represents in its own 
form the method of division, which by dividing inquiry between 
interlocutors is able to show what inquiry is. It seems then 
that the co-presence of the interlocutors is essential to 
activate the process, between whom dialectic may move. 
Following this line of interpretation, Phaedrus' failure 
to understand his own ignorance by the end of the Dialogue, the 
ease with which he surrenders himself to whatever Socrates says, 
is, then, in itself an exemplification of the inadequacy of 
rhetorical techne, that it can evoke agreement that is not 
knowledge; that pacifies rather than incites further questions; 
fails to incite the desire for wisdom in those to whom it is 
addressed. Socrates' entire discourse has, then, been rhetorical. 
The dialectic in the Phaedrus, then, consists of Socrates' 
speech against himself, his pursuit of the knowledge of what is 
through the questioning of his own arguments, a dialectic that 
does not need an external other, 'present' or not. For dialectic 
the personification id not essential. If this 
is the case, 
then the remedy of the attributability of shame and responsibility 
upon the criterion of blasphemy for the aporia consequent on 
holding knowledge-of-the-self-and-other as the essential ground of 
inquiry, of the nature of souls (and see 281-282 above) is in 
turn dis-solved. 
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For if dialectic is self-driven, interminable, what comes before 
modifying what comes after, to whom could shame or praise be 
attributed? Indeed the more rigorously the techne of dialectic 
was followed, the greater the impossibility of attributing shame. 
But there are three elements to inquiry, not only rhetoric and 
dialectic but also its telös: at its most ideal, "that which is 
pleasing to the gods". The proper writing-and-speech is that 
which moves towards truth. But if no-one is responsible for the 
telös of dialectic-driven inquiry, does it follow nevertheless 
that if followed, it moves towards the truth of things? Striking- 
ly, whilst the identification of the immortality of the soul-is 
arrived at through dialectic (245-246), whilst dialectic is 
shown capable of producing the axiom: that the soul is movement 
and therefore immortal, the nature of the soul is approached 
only by analogy, couched in a rhetorical figure, in the image 
of the winged charioteer and his winged, disparate horses, 
thrashing between heaven and earth (246-257). On the one hand 
this is firmly stated to be merely a likeness of the nature of 
the soul and not what the soul is (the Truth of the soul) (246) 
and yet dialectic has come no closer. Truth itself is beyond 
both dialectic and rhetoric, behind. the appearance of language. 
Inquiry cannot reveal it. How then could inquiry be blasphemous 
since what is true (what would please or 
displease the gods) 
is beyond mortal knowledge? 
But in that case, the virtuousness of proper inquiry might 
lie in the acknowledgement of the ignorance of all humans; in 
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that inquiry which has the telös of uncertainty: the putting 
into question not only what we thought we knew but its grounds 
upon which we thought we could be confident, the inexorable 
movement of dialectic/rhetoric towards the truth. 
.. 
Then, in that Socrates claims to have come to know the truth 
about Love, the soul, and the nature of proper philosophic 
inquiry (227a-279), the Phaedrus is an inquiry which is not 
proper, which has blasphemy as its telös. The dialogue as 
event has failed to induce "geniune intellectual progress". 
Dialogue is not, then, necessarily dialectical: does not need 
and need not incite the love of wisdom, true philo-sophia, in 
its interlocutors. May fail in effect. 
But as a text, the Phaedrus effectively incites absent readers 
- absent that is from the event but present-to-the-text in the 
movement of reading; its very open-endedness soliciting their 
participation in the inquiry which has clearly failed to reach 
a satisfactory conclusion (in that Socrates has reached one), an 
open-endedness engendered in reading its written form. In which 
case, in reading, reading the. play of the form against 
content has produced an effect on the reader, engaging her in 
dialectic with the text about which it is possible only to be un- 
certain. In which case the Phaedrus is not blasphemous, but a 
proper inquiry. 
But this is not pace Rowe because Plato deliberately wrote in 
296 
palinodic form, designed the text intentionally to engage the 
reader in dialectic. The effect is not inherent in the dialogue 
form, in the text. For it may, as with Rowe himself, invoke a 
response that regardes the uncertainty of the meaning of the 
text as, "deeply problematic" in that the irony (uncertainty) 
which Rowe perceives, "if it is quite as extended as he (Griswold) 
suggests is the case-begins to look pointless and perverse" (Rowe 
1987 (Fig 8.1). 
It does not incite 'the same reading' from all readers, 
but depends on what it is read against: the essential other that 
formu-lates inquiry, not least an inquiry into the meaning of a 
text. 
But let us go back a little: it is not enough to aspire to, to 
have a desire for knowledge of the truth, nor even to follow the 
dialectical method in order to move towards it, for it cannot be 
dis-connected from techne. Rhetoric is the art of effective 
communication, of engendering agreement by the other to the appear- 
ance of truth: yet it is involved in any use of words that carry 
influence. Dialectic 'is' questioning, particularly the grounds 
of statements. But that questioning, in that it is discourse, in 
that it is not ineffective, involves at rhetorically induced 
response with/from its audience. Therefore the knowledge that 
may be so reached cannot be relied upon insofar as it is knowledge 
produced in discourse, achieved by discourse. 
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The traditional interpretation of this central theme of the 
Phaedrus is that it represents Plato's preference for the 
method of dialectic as the proper means of philosophy and his 
rejection of rhetoric. However, as I have striven to show, the 
relation between rhetoric and dialectic is represented in/by 
the Phaedrus as chiasmic: rhetoric is dialectical in its 
dependency for its effects on the other and dialectic is rhetorical 
in that it is influential discourse: the truth is that which, 
because of the chiasmic potency of techne in inquiry is 
produced and denied by that relation. 
This despair, this 'nihilism' - engendered in inquiry - is what 
inquiry is. It is not that inquiry needs the other but rather 
that the other already and always is - whether absent or present. 
The personnification of inquiry that produces the chiasm of 
dialectic/rhetoric - the personification 
inherent in dialogue 
as a form of writing - points to the fallibility of all forms: 
the epistemology inherent in all discourse. Inquiry, like the 
image of the soul as the charioteer, doomed to thrash through 
the sky, perpetually ungrounded and yet bound to move by the 
irreconcilability of its essential elements which can never 
become the whole of which they are parts. 
But is this Typhonic, mythical, hieroglyphic, indecipherable, 
decipherable self-inscribed image of inquiry peculiar to a 
dialogue that resembles inquiry in its very form, embodying the 
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inquiry of what inquiry 'is'? Because the Phaedrus is the 
invocation of dialogue, the appearance of dialogue, written 
with consummate art? 
So: to turn explicitly to the dtexts, to their form as/for 
inquiry in respect of rhetoric, dialectic, telös: 
What of rhetoric? Within the event read through the text, as 
dialogue the discourse can be identified as movement-through- 
rhetoric on both sides. The interlocutor with MS appears to 
draw the other, AW, along towards a comprehension of their own 
experience, that is, persuaded in the sense that she may then 
know something of what it is like to be the other - known to 
have been persuaded by her consent to the version given - "f see", 
"and then what? ", the movement from one aspect of the experience 
to another turning where comprehension appears to have been 
sufficiently achieved. And rhetorical in the other direction 
by the same token in that she is interested in what the other 
has to say and is prepared, committed to an uncritical acceptance 
of the other's knowledge. In that sense the rhetoric is not a 
persuasion from one view to the other's but from 'no view'. 
That is, within the dialogue, the movement of j. nquiry 
as communication but above all as active and reactive (speech) 
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has a rhetorical impetus: effected in that the matter of inquiry 
unfolds. This is not to suggest that the rhetorical effect- 
iveness of the dtexts dialogue is achieved by the knowing 
application of the techne of rhetoric - the ability to name 
and use its constituent elements; rather from concurrence 
with the Socratic definition of the presence of rhetoric in 
all uses of words which "influence men's minds" - and what 
words would have no influence? Were one an expert rhetorician, 
the formal structures could be nonetheless identified in the 
discourse, as Edmondson identifies the ethos, pathos and logos 
in sociological research texts (1984). It would then appear 
to follow that for the dtexts there is a way out of one of the 
paradoxes: in that the most effective rhetoric is based on the 
fullest knowledge of the nature of the other, that the 
hearer (the researcher/inquirer) is persuaded of the plausibility 
but is not convinced that she (I) know(s) the truth of the 
other's words, is a concomitant of their amateur and un-witting 
employment of the techne. Thus it is not essential to "know" 
the other in order for her to be persuaded, to be persuasive: 
An escape from the aporia of self-other-knowledge as the ground 
of inquiry inherent in inquiry personnified. 
At the same time, the failure in the event to question-the grounds 
of the other's statements, the very absence of critical refutation, 
is a mark of the absence of. dialectical method; the dtexts at 
the level of the event representing an inferior kind of inquiry, 
marked by the engendering through co-presence only of agreement 
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(this difference pointing up, by its difference, the effective- 
ness and expertise of the Phaedrus qua dialogic inquiry). 
What, then, of their tel6s? What are they, as inferior 
inquiries, towards? at the level of the event? 
In the Phaedrus, the point of proper rhetorical/dialectical 
inquiry is to both reach towards-and persuade the other of the 
truth, and thereby please the gods: in the dtexts, dialogue 
has as its tel6s rather the gathering of the experience/knowledge 
held by the other: the telös the faithfulness of, the correspondence 
of the representation of that experience to the experience itself 
(for which there is no criterion). 
Yet this would appear, then, also to be a virtue unique 
to the dtexts: insofar as the interlocutors ineffectually employ 
rhetoric/dialectic, then so far are they free of the predominance 
of form-on-content, escaping by a twist of irony the fate of 
inquiriesrigorously conducted according to the formal rules of 
the-technes. By the very lack of skill of the interlocutors. 
That is insofar as they are inquiry personnified. 
At the same time, as with the Phaedrus, there is a dis-embodied 
form of responsive argument that drives their inquiry, apparently 
irrespective of their personnified dialogic form. There is a 
form formulating the inquiry, a presumption of what elements 
are required in order to elicit all those things necessary for 
the understanding of the experience of the other; for the 
responding, its full representation - of autobiography, the 
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form of a life, a narrative structure(Chapters 6& 7). Structures 
which order that which is said and in so doing, produce an 
unbridgeable space between what the discourse consists of and 
what it could have, an unknowable distance between the referent(s) 
of the dtexts and their ordered representation. 
There is also moment-by-moment the rationality, the 
epistemology inherent in language as a system, a structure 
of grammar 
41 
of subject-object-verb - ordering and categorising 
and inexorable as far as the discourse - qua text - is intelligible, 
which it indisputably is. Formulating the movement of inquiry, 
irrespective of its personnified form. 
But at the level of the text - and there is no other level - 
the form of dialogue is itself rhetorical - persuasive in all 
the respects brought out by reading the dtexts against the 
Phaedrus in 8.1; of the reality of the event as a unique, identi- 
fiable occasion, of a particular kind, between speakers, about 
something: the effectiveness of the form of dialogue (and: 
persuasive that these are the effects of the 
form). 
The art, the technZ of rhetoric is, as the Phaedrus persuades 
us, to make something appear in a certain way; it is the manipu- 
lation of appearance predicated, according to Socrates, on 
knowledge of what is. If the form of dialogue in writing is 
rhetorical in that it has effects on interpretation (for readers 
who are thinking about what dialogue entails) that reading is 
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predicated on knowledge of what living dialogue is, even if 
it is at one remove, knowledge of the knowledge of others of 
what living dialogue is (reading the text against Rowe). 
But this truth is not ascertainable, for to inquire into the 
question, the dtexts have to be read, and reading is inexorably 
work upon the text in which it is not the case that the text is 
the passive object of the work of reading. The activity of 
reading belongs neither to the reader nor to the text nor to 
its readable referents. Although the truth of the dtexts may 
not be ascertained, nevertheless it is the telös of their reading. 
Reading is a form of inquiry. 
Reading them as the record of an actual event, a dialogue 
between two speakers in communication about something in which 
that something is the object of the reading-inquiry, is 
predicated on the effects engendered by their form as dialogue 
rather than necessarily arising from the event represented. In 
that sense it is their form that persuades readers that there is 
a referent to which they refer. The form of dialogue produces an 
effect: it therefore itself rhetorical rather than referential. 
As readers we are persuaded by the form of the text (and here 
dis-suaded) that they are referential. 
The dtexts as a written form are rhetorical in effect - and the 
question of their referential status, whilst it is a question 
that may be addressed as I. have been doing since the beginning 
of Chapter 6, is dialectical as an event of reading. Reading 
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that puts not only questions to the questions and answers of 
which it apparently consists but that puts the grounds of 
reading into question, as the attribution of the form's 
rhetoricity. 
The relation between reading and text is chiasmic: as 
with the Phaedrus, the necessity for the personnifjcation of 
inquiry in dialogue is at the same time its undoing. 
But: the metaphor of chiasm - the likening of inquiry to the 
greek letter chi -X- represents the ontology of binary-ism. 
A parallel and a cross between only two. in only two movements. 
Essentially misleading. Essentially leading. 
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NON-MEDICAL LITERATURE ON MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS 
As has been indicated (Figure 2.2; p40), the epidemiological/ 
neurological/clinical/laboratory-based research literature on 
MS is extensive. 
The contribution of the social sciences to the study 
of MS has been on a far more modest scale. Chiefly it concerns 
psychological or socio-psychological aspects of the condition, 
descriptions of pathological or normative 'adjustments' to the 
disease or detailed accounts of certain psychological symptoms 
seen to be either manifestations or concomitants of it (for 
example Miles 1979; Brooks & Matson 1982; Maybury & Brewin 1984; 
Simons 1984). Medical sociologists do not appear by and large 
to have been interested in it (exceptions are Davis 1970; 
Cunningham 1977; Pollock 1984; Stewart & Sullivan 1982 - the 
first three unpublished MPhil or Doctoral dissertations), 
Apart from these two categories of research literature 
are what might be called 'lay texts': books on its management 
and advice for other sufferers written by people who themselves 
have the condition (Dowie, Povey & Whitley 1981; Graham 1981), 
or by members of the medical profession (Matthews 1978; Burnfield 
1978). There are also articles published in booklet form by 
the two major MS charities (the Multiple Sclerosis Society and 
Action for Research into Multiple Sclerosis), educational 
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series written by 'experts' specifically for an MS audience 
(as in the ARMS Education Service series (eg: Batchelor & 
Fielder (1931); Bauer (1978); Budd (1977); and Greer (1980), 
and autobiographical accounts, published either in book form 
(Forsythe 1979 for example) or in popular and/or paramedical 
journals or magazines (for example the article by Maggs (1981) 
in the Nursing Times). 
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THE 'DISCOVERY OF MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS' AS INVOKED IN THE LITERATURE 
"Almost every authority since Valentiner (1856) who has written 
about Multiple Sclerosis has mentioned the occurrence of remissions. " 
Brown & Putnam 1939: 913 
"Multiple Sclerosis has been recognised as a disease for a long 
time. According to Sällstrom, it was probably mentioned first 
by Cruveillher in 1848. " 
Limburg 1950: 15 
"The first pathological accounts of the disease were given by 
Cruveillher in 1835 and Carswell in 1838. " 
Brain 1951: 512 
"(T)he question of the role of heredity in Multiple Sclerosis was 
posed by Charcot himself after hearing of a familial case from 
Duchenne (see Charcot's Oeuvre Completes 1894). Yet almost one 
hundred years after Charcot's definitive description of the 
symptomatology and pathology of the disease, to which little has 
been added since, the relative role of genetic and environmental 
influences in the etiology of Multiple Sclerosis has not been 
assessed with certainty. " 
Myrianthopoulos 1970: 88 
"Credit for the first description of the clinical manifestations 
of Multiple Sclerosis is generally accorded. to Charcot in the 
mid-nineteenth century, who became familiar with the disease 
through watching its gradual development in one of his servants. 
He was unable to identify the cause but suggested a relationship 
to an antecedent illness and cited cases that had developed 
following typhoid fever, cholera and smallpox. By the turn of 
the century, the condition had become well established in medical 
literature and knowledge was widening with regard to both its 
clinical manifestations and prevalence. " 
Office of Health Economics 1975: 4 
"Although there had been earlier partial descriptions, Multiple 
Sclerosis was first identified as a distinctive disease in 1868 
by the great French neurologist working at the hospital of the 
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Salpetriere in Paris. It may seem strange that a disease that now 
seems so well defined should have remained-so long unrecognised, 
but the methods of examining the patient with organic disease of 
the nervous system were only then being developed and Charcot's 
great contribution to medicine was in linking the careful 
observation of symptoms and signs of disease in life with the 
pathological findings in the nervous system after death. He called 
this new disease that he had separated from the many causes of 
paralysis to be found in the wards of the Salpetriere, 'scle'rose 
en plaques', a phrase that in his original lecture he feared would 
sound barbarous to his audience. The 'scl¬rose' or sclerosis of 
his title means hardening and refers to the scarring that is the 
end result of damage caused to the nervous system by Multiple 
Sclerosis. " 
Matthews 1978: 1 
"In his classical work on MS in 1868, Charcot regarded nystagmus, 
intentional tremor and scanning of the speech as the clinical 
triad. In 1894 Devic considered cases of optic neuritis 
accompanied by myelitis as optic neuromyelitis. According to 
their original descriptions of the clinical manifestations 
MS and neuromyelitis could be easily differentiated. In recent 
years however Charcot's triad is observed only in 10% of chronic 
cases. " 
Baoxun et al 1980: 260 
"Although the first pathological descriptions of Multiple Sclerosis 
were published by Cruveillhier in 1835 and Carswell in 1838 it was 
not until 1872 that Charcot provided the first extensive clinical 
description of the disease. The first clinical case of Multiple 
Sclerosis in England was reported by Moxon in 1873. " 
Poskanzer at al 1980a: 232 
"It was first classified as a disease entity distinct from what 
was then largely described as 'choeriform paralysis' - 'chorea' 
being the name given to disorders involving loss of muscular 
control - by Charcot whose life's passion 
it was to sort out the 
neurological diseases nosologically, thereby improving their 
status. 
He identified Multiple Sclerosis largely thanks to his 
charwoman. 'In spite of her costing him a small fortune in broken 
plates, ' Freud was to recall, Charcot 
kept her for years in his 
service; when at last she died, he could prove in the autopsy 
'that 'choreiform paralysis'. was the clinical expression of 
multiple cerebro-spinal sclerosis. ' 
L.. ] (O)ne obvious possibility 
[of cause is the presence of psycho-social risk factors. Multiple 
Sclerosis, Charcot observed, was commonly related to long-continued 
grief and vexation. " 
Inglis 1981; 207 
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"Multiple Sclerosis was first described by a French pathologist, 
Jean Cruveillhier in 1830, and then by the Scottish physician 
and pathologist, Sir Robert Carswell in 1838. The French 
pathologist Jean-Martin Charcot studied several cases between 
1860 and 1869 and observed three distinctive clinical signs: 
nystagmus, intention tremor and scanning speech. " 
Maggs 1981: 414 
309 APPENDIX 3.1 
'OUTCOMES' OF MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS 
The degree of depression found in spinal MS patients is related 
significantly to selected illness, demographic, and social 
variables. The most significant correlations were found between 
depression severity and both Perceived Social Support Friendship- 
based and Family-based scores. The loss of emotionally significant 
others, whether they be family or friends, apparently adds a further 
threat to the already severe burden of loss of functional ability 
and knowledge of the presence of the disease. According to Caplan 
(1976) emotionally significant others act as 'buffers' for a person 
pressured-by short-term crisis or long-term difficulty. These 
patients may see themselves as abandoned, mis-understood, and 
rejected, and may feel responsible for the fact that the important 
people in their lives are turning away from them. It is conceivable 
that a part of the depression seen in these Ss is due to 'grief' 
over the loss of those significant others. 
Reizen 1984: 
The fact that hysteria and multiple sclerosis may occasionally both 
be present adds to the difficulty of diagnosis. An examination of 
the cerebrospinal fluid should always be made in any case of hysteria 
when doubt exists as to the possibility of a concomitant organic 
state. 
A hysterical overlay in multiple sclerosis is by no means 
uncommon. It should-be suspected if a degree of unsteadiness or 
apparent weakness of the limbs, accompanied by an unwillingness to 
walk without support, cannot fully be accounted for by the physical 
signs. This situation may arise in the early stage of the disease 
either because the patient, knowing the nature of the complaint, 
anticipates its downward course, or from the anxious over-protection 
frequently shown by parents, relatives and friends. The detection of 
this overlay is important, since a simple rational explanation follow- 
ed by persuasion and walking exercises often results in a marked 
improvement. 
McAlpine 1972: 253 
310 
The Interviewees 
Mike 
Ian 
Des 
Georqe+ 
Dan ie 1*+ 
Hilary 
James+ 
Bob+ 
Meg 
Jane+ 
John+ 
Anne 
+ 
NS 
Status 
diagnosed 
diagnosed 
diagnosed 
diagnosed 
diagnosed 
Sister of diagnosed, deceased. 
Husband of diagnosed, deceased. 
diagnosed 
under diagnosis 
diagnosed 
under diagnosis 
diagnosed 
APPENDIX 3.2 
obtained from the ARMS Research Unit's Research Register 
++ obtained from personal contacts 
All interviews were conducted in the interviewee's own 
homes except for James', interviewed in mine. 
All names are pseudonyms. 
All tapes, notes and transcripts are held 
in the Brunel-ARMS Research Unit, Brunel 
University, Uxbridge, Middlesex and are 
available for perusal on request from the 
Director. 
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ITEMS NOT DIRECTLY CITED IN THE CHAPTER, BUT CRITICAL TO 
ITS WRITING. 
Barth 1967 
Barth 1972 
Borges 1964 
Bradbury 1985 
Cage 1970 
Calvino 19 77 
Calvino 1981 
Culler 1982 
de Man 1983 
Eagleton 1982 
Eco 1983 
Foster (ed) 1985 
Gray 1981 
Lyotard 1979; 1982 
Nietzsche 1968,1974 
Norris 1982 
Parker 1985 
Ray 1984 
Sharratt 1984 
312 
CHAPTER ONE : FOOTNOTES 
1. The Contents page of Wadsworth and Robinson (1976) nicely 
encapsulates the range of topics which constitute the 
domain of this kind of medical sociology. 
2. "One of the central problems of the sociology of knowledge 
is the status of logic and mathematics. These branches of 
knowledge are so impersonal and objective that a sociological 
analysis scarcely seems applicable. Time and again, in his 
Ideology and Utopia (1936) Karl Mannheim's determined advocacy 
of the sociology of knowledge stops short at this point. He 
could not see how to think sociologically about how twice two 
equals four. " 
Bloor 1973: 173 
3. See for example Spector & Kitsuse (1977) and the debates on 
their work. Also and especially the debates in the social 
study of science, for example: Latour & Woolgar 1979; Barnes 
& Edge 1982; Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay (eds) 1983. 
4. See especially Ashmore 1983; Woolgar 1983. 
5. The same applies to Woolgar's paper on Irony (1983). 
6. This discussion is based on extensive notes taken at Bury's 
presentation of an early draft of this paper (subsequently 
published, Bury 1986) to the London Group of the BSA Medical 
Sociology Society, 11 July 1984, much of which was taken 
down verbatim. All the phrases within quotation marks are 
such: 
7. Bury explicitly referred to Wright & Treacher's edited 
collection (1982) and to Berger & Berger (1975) as researchers 
working within the perspective of social constructivism. 
See Bury (1986) for a full list of those he was referring to. 
8. See Geilner 1975; Russell 1983 - and Chapter 3: 72-3 above. 
9. In their footnote, Wright and Treacher cite Macleod 1977 
and Lecuyer 1978. 
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CHAPTER TWO : FOOTNOTES 
1. According to Firth, the account of MS given by d'Este is 
so "vivid" that: "the veriest tyro in medicine, reading it, 
could not fail to reach a correct diagnosis. " (1948: 18) 
2. According to Kurtzke: 
For over a century, MS has intrigued workers in all 
the neural sciences, with perhaps more publications 
resulting than for any other neurological disease. How- 
ever, we face today a situation little different from 
that of Charcot: it is still really a disease of unknown 
cause, inadequate treatment, and unpredictable outcome. " 
Kurtzke 1980a: 170 
3. According to Bauer: 
It may appear curious that after more than a hundred years 
of clinico-pathological experience and research, the 
diagnosis of MS is still a problem: on the other hand, the 
influence of virologic, immunologic, biochemical, morpho- 
logical and neurophysiologic data obtained with modern 
research technology confronts us with baffling questions: 
for example, do we really know what multiple sclerosis is 
and is it a specific disease entity? To remain on solid 
ground in the face of such questions we need a well-defined 
clinical basis of description and classification, re- 
considered from time to time to meet the challenge of 
changing concepts and new knowledge. " 
Bauer 1978: 659 
4. The benefits to be derived from 'triangulation' also applies 
according to Kurland and Westland (1954) to the relation 
between clinical, laboratory and epidemiological modes of 
research into MS : 
The epidemiological approach may be considered as one of 
the three general methods by which we develop knowledge 
of disease, the others being the clinical study of the 
individual patient and the experimental approach in the 
laboratory. 'No single one of these suffices to the 
exclusion of others; each has its individual usefulness 
and the fullest measure of progress is to be expected 
when all three are brought into action. '(Gordon 1948; 
1951). Indeed, we can expect that even slight progress 
in one field will potentialize progress in the others. 
Kurland & Westland 1954: 682 
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5. See Footnote 1. 
6. This constitutes another problem with the use of 'history' 
as a means of tracing the social construction of medical know- 
ledge (See Chapter 1.3). 
7. One of the few epidemiological studies which are based on pro- 
spective data is the series carried out in the late 1960's, 
early 1970's, by a research team including Kurtzke, Beebe, 
Nagler etc on the medical records of US Veterens of World 
War II and Korea. See for example Kurtzke et al 1979. 
8. This is of course only a rough indicator, since each term 
in the title of articles is listed separately in the Index. 
However, it seems reasonable to suppose that the proportion 
of terms to numbers of articles would not differ significantly 
over a single decade. 
9. Kurtzke, in two overviews of epidemiological literature, 
categorises extant studies into four levels of reliability 
(liberally citing his own work), and discusses the technical 
criteria by which such a categorisation should be made. He 
reserves for his Grade A those studies which "(A)ppeared 
reasonably complete as to case ascertainment... had followed 
appropriate (Kurtzke 1977) survey methodology and had used 
well-defined diagnosis criteria. " In his conclusion he remarks: 
(T)he problems and pitfalls of population-based surveys 
are numerous (Kurtzke. 1°77). It is not possible for one 
person to know each site of survey so intimately that 
all the potential biases can be neatly discounted. My 
specific ratings of A, B, C for these surveys can certainly 
be contested and even in the 'A' works there are definable 
differences among many of the surveys. Still, the alter- 
native is that, if only one's own study is 'correct', the 
situation as to the world-wide distribution of multiple 
sclerosis would remain that which would have been produced 
at the Tower of Babel. 
Kurtzke 1980a: 78 
Cf. the discussion of Bury's views on social constructivism 
in the previous chapter. 
10. See Bauer, 1978, for a version of this view: 
Five years ago I went through all the research that was 
being done, the money that was being appropriated for 
KS research worldwide and I found that it was equivalent 
to the price of two bombers or, to put it in a less sombre 
vein, it was the amount of money that is spent in three 
days in West Germany for the consumption of beer. 
Bauer 1978: 3 
315 
il. In their 'Nationwide survey' of MS in Japan, Kuroiwa et 
al (1975) found: 
Prodromal symptoms: There were no prodromal symptoms 
in 43% of the series [of 1,084 case notes of MS]. 
The most common prodromal symptoms were headache (17%), 
fever (11%), upper respiratory infection (7%), nausea 
and vomiting (6%) and skin rash (1%). 
Kuroiwa et al 1975: 847 
12. There are crucial issues here about how MS is researched, 
the kinds of auguments made as warranting one method rather 
than another and, most importantly, the interdependence of the 
relation of method to findings. See Wynne & Robinson (1983) 
for a detailed exposition of this argument in respect of the 
'sex ratio' in MS (commonly held to be predominantly female) 
and the development of research towards what is seen to be 
peculiar(ly) female physiology/psychology. 
13. See Footnote 6. 
14. Cf. the effects of the atomistic technique of Conversational 
Analysis in respect of talk, discussed in Chapter Three. 
15. This still, even though, with the introduction of NMR scanning 
techniques, there has been found a puzzling lack of correlation 
between lesions in the Central Nervous System (the identifiers 
of MS) thus made visible and manifested symptoms in a patient; 
the fact that autopsies sometimes reveal lesions of MS un- 
suspected during the person's lifetime; and the possibility 
of asymptomatic or benign forms of the disease (See: McAlpine 
1961; Castaigne et al 1981; Gilbert & Sadler 1983; Herndon & 
Rudick 1983). 
16. There are also references in the literature to the role of 
the medical profession's expectations: for example 
Myrianthopolus (1970), who refers to the effects of expectations 
on the proffering of the diagnosis of MS; and Dean et al (1981) 
who suggest that because doctors in Sicily (where their research 
was located) expect MS to be rare, it is underdiagnosed. 
This further complicates the matter of 'counting cases' of 
MS. It also of course reinforces the contention that 'the 
facts' do not simply arise from the documentary evidence, being 
made here. If the very possibility of MS is not amongst the 
'already knowns' being brought to bear on a case, then the case 
for all practical purposes is not one of MS. 
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CHAPTER THREE : FOOTNOTES 
1. The concept of "theoretical auspices" is tstken from 
McHugh et al (1974i2-3): 
For the analyst any speech, including his own, is 
of interest not in terms of what is says but in terms 
of how what it says is possible, sensible, rational 
in the first place. Our interest [isi in what we 
call the grounds or auspices of phenomena rather than 
in the phenomena themselves. (Authors' emphasis) 
The theoretical auspices which have produced the problematic 
of reflexivity as the issue with which the thesis is 
struggling have already constituted what has been written so 
far. 
2. It should be reiterated that the question of theorising is 
not confined to this chapter but pervades the thesis in its 
entirety. 
3. This use of the term technical is intended as the antonym 
of 'theoretical' or 'epistemological'. Rendering the latter 
as the former is one of the means by which, according to 
Woolgar (19 83), the 'methodological horrors' are managed in 
practice. 
This has the uncomfortable concomitant that 
the horrors are recognised prior to their 'management'. As 
will be argued later in this chapter, the fact that the 
'horrors' are horrors already for the people with MS appears 
to preempt this particular difficulty. 
4. The concept of the parallax effect was explained by James 
Burke in his television programme on the historical rela- 
tivism of scientific knowledge 'The Day the Universe Changed' 
(1985). 
5. By which I mean the epistemology, the means by which absent 
knowledge is identified and then produced. 
6. That is, the thinking that machines can be'imagined to be 
doing in the freedom of fiction is essentially recognisable 
as such. The very concept of 'thinking' precludes the 
absolute alienness of 'aliens'. 
7. cf Horace Miner's paper, 'Body ritual among the Nacirema' 
(1965) for a witty and serious attempt to apply the making 
strange device to the reader's own (American) culture. 
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8. See Fn 3. 
9. Quite which of the many studies described in Chapter 2 of 
Studies in Ethnomethodology (1967) properly come under this 
rubric of breaching is not altogether clear: but there are 
at least the following seven, in which Garfinkel instructed 
his students to: 
i. report on what was said in a conversation, and what was 
understood by each party to have been talked about; 
ii. ask subjects to clarify their commonplace remarks; 
iii. to view the activity in their own homes as if they were 
boarders; 
iv. ditto, but to act as boarders; 
v. engage in a conversation, but respond on the assumption 
that the other is lying; 
vi. bargain for fixed-price goods; 
vii. to breach normal body space in the course of a con- 
versation with friend or family member. 
10. In the book's dedication to Cicourel, "For Aaron, who first 
served us the sweet poison. " 
11. For example: 
Conversational Analysis is currently the most productive 
and prolific form of analysis which has been developed 
with ethnomethodological concerns in mind. 
Benson & Hughes 1983: 154 
12. BSA Sociology of Language Group Conference, 'International 
Multi-Disciplinary Conference on Interaction and Language 
Use' (1984). 
Speakers included: G Jefferson; EA Schegloff; W Cosaro; 
J Heritage; JM Atkinson; C Heath; S Levinson; A Pomerantz 
and, in theory but not in the event, H Garfinkel. 
13. I have for the most part not named the originators of the 
various comments I report, although their names were included 
in my fieldnotes. 
14. It cannot of course be presumed that silence indicated agreement. 
I have concentrated in this informal ethnography on the 
contributions of self-avowed practitioners of CA, a strategy 
designed for my immediate purposes and which should not be 
taken to represent the views of all the participants. 
15. Figure 3.3 shows an audiogram, developed by IBM as part of 
the drive to reproduce human talk on (in? ) (by? ) machines, 
which makes the same kind of presumption. 
It was notable that at the Symposium held at the 
University of Surrey 'Language and Knowledge: AI and 
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Sociological Approaches' (1984) it was the work of CA's 
that was of most interest in terms of its practical 
relevance to the participants who came from the field of 
AI research. 
16. See Birnbaum et al 1984; Szuchet & Sh 1984. -See also 
my comment on p54 and Chapter 2, Footnote 14, regarding the 
effect of the detail in Broman's diagnostic criteria for 
MS vis a vis Schumacher et al's. 
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CHAPTER FOUR : FOOTNOTES 
1. To be more precise (and see Appendix 3.2) two of the 
twelve people interviewed were relatives of people who had 
had HS and had died, and two had not at the time of the 
interview been confirmed as having MS. The interview 
material from the former has been excluded here: the latter 
has been used (and its status indicated in the text). 
2. There is a debt to be acknowledged here to Barthes S/Z 
(1975) and Hofstadter's Gädel, Escher, Bach (1980), not 
so much in terms of content but for their confirmation 
of the substantive necessity of resisting conforming to form. 
3. In the theoretical sense of Alan Dawe's proposal of: 
Another metaphor for sociological analysis than 
that of science: the metaphor of the conversation. 
Dawe 1978: 409 
4. The names are pseudonymns. 
S. An extrapolation from advice tendered to postgraduate research 
students in the Methodology Seminars of the Department of 
Sociology, Brunel University 1982-3, and at the ESRC Post 
Graduate Summer School, University of Surrey, July 1983. 
6. Although George had recalled that it was the faith healer 
who had told him he had MS because, as will be seen below, 
he referred to his doctor's confirmation of the diagnosis as 
the end of his quest for knowing what was wrong, I am taking 
the status of the faith healer's knowledge as being by George's 
account, 'less than' that of the doctor even though 'greater 
than' his own. 
7. cf. 'The Discovery of the Diagnosis' (Brunel-ARMS Unit 1983) 
for accounts of the distress sometimes caused by this not 
infrequent initial doctors' response to patients' presenting 
symptoms (and see Appendix 3.1), interpreted by the latter 
as meaning that in the doctors' view, - their troubles were 
'all in the mind'. There are three cases on record in the 
Unit where the early diagnosis of hysteria lead'to admission 
to psychiatric hospitals and in one case to Electro-Convulsive 
Therapy. Whether these individuals would have regarded these as 
instances of 'incorrect' or incorrect diagnoses, and whether 
they would have accounted for them in a similar manner, is 
a moot point. There were no such instances in my resesarch 
group. 
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S. This respondent - Bob - had reported that he had under- 
stood his earliest symptoms - incontinence and blurred 
vision - to be connected with his practice of "self- 
abuse" and somehow then with syphillis when an uncle, 
returning from the trenches of the First World War had 
told him of the lectures on VD given to the troops. This 
had prevented Bob from seeking treatment for twenty years 
and severe physical and social suffering - because he 
'already knew' what was wrong. 
9. See Chapter Two which could be-interpreted along these 
lines. 
10. See Chanter Two, 49-55 and passim. 
11. See Chanter 7'#o, 34-35,37 above. 
12. The Clinical Epidemiology Branch, National Cancer Institute, 
Bethesda Naval Hospital was one of the research bases for 
the unique series of prospective epidemiological studies 
of MS which drew on the records of 5,305 Veterans of the 
Second World War and the Korean Conflict. See for example 
Kurtzke et al 1979. 
13. Theoretical life [to the Greeks] meant more than 
science because it was not conceived as arising 
from mere curiosity or from practical necessity, 
but out of wonder, as an attempt to escape from 
ignorance. 
Blum 1971: 303-4 
See also Blum's later book (1974) in which he draws a 
fundamental distinction between the Aristotelean model of 
theorizing as a progression (through questions and answers) 
and the Platonic, for which the form is rather a continuous 
questioning of theorizing's own grounds. 
A version of this chapter was subsequently published in 
Woolgar (ed) 1987. 
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CHAPTER FIVE : FOOTNOTES 
1. See Appendix 5.1 which lists those works whose reading in- 
formed the writing of this chapter but which are not cited 
within the text. 
2. For example: 
The speaker is an enthusiastic supporter of Spencer. 
But on this issue he accepts that Spencer may be wrong, 
although personally he doubts it, and he constructs two 
alternative accounts of what is happening in current 
research into stoichiometries. 
5. We are seeing many experiments done now on 
stoichiometry. I don't think the question is 
solved yet, so let's keep an open mind and let's 
pursue both possibilities... 
Muikay & Gilbert 1982: 171 
and 
Although 'medical science' appears to feature strongly 
in the data, in the talk both of myself and of the people 
with whom I was speaking, how can instances of it be 
picked out as being certain talk's topic without pre- 
supposing ihatis to count as 'talk about medical science? ' 
Our talk seems to provide for a hearing that our topic 
is substantively about knowledge: what is known and by 
wham and from whom knowledge may be sought. One could 
say that all along we are displaying the project of 
research into MS. 
Chapter 4: 138, above 
3. Putting aside, that is, the possibility of fraud. 
4. Cf. Marcel Proust for the classic fictional representation of 
the creativity of remembrance (1981). See also Gerrard 
Genette's Narrative Discourse (1980) for a modest and 
infinitely. rich analysis of the narrative structure readable 
as producing the text's effects. He concludes, however: 
"Perhaps the best thing would be, as with Proustian narrative 
itself, never to 'finish', which is, in one sense, never to 
start. ' (1980: 268). That is, there can never be any end or 
beginning to the phenomenon of recall. 
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6. See Chanter Two: fn 11. 
7. Cf. fn 12; pace Steve Fuller (1987). 
8. The idea of music as having a relation to questions of 
philosophy - to which this is only the most superficial 
reference - reaches its apogee in Thomas Mann's (1949) 
Dr Faustus: the life of the German composer Adrian 
:. everkühn, as told by a friend, which is 'about' Nietzsche. 
9. This is not to become involved in the question of how 
composers actually compose but rather a means of thinking. 
10. I am indebted to Gerhard Baumann (pers. comm) for a caveat: 
that there are two. forms of notation, prescriptive and 
descriptive, the former instructing players what to do 
the latter describing the sound which the player then produces 
in any way that s/he can. As Baumann commented, scores which 
use the second form can be read and enjoyed; the first 
requires that the reader has a knowledge of how the instrument 
could be played. My reference seems to be to the prescriptive 
system. 
11. Ong makes a point similar to this in an essay published after 
this chapter was first drafted (Ong 1986). 
12. The use of the term 'technical' in this way is itself 
questionable. I use it here in the sense other analysts have, 
as an assumed antonym for 'theoretical'. As is increasingly 
recognised, and as this paper itself witnesses, things 
'technical' have an epistemological import. For the most 
profound exegesis, see Heidegger's 'The Question Concerning 
Technology' (1978). Cf. also debates on Artificial Intelli- 
gence; Torrance 0.984) for example. 
13. Again I am indebted for a comment from Baumann, who informed 
me that in Kantian terms, this means a perception not based 
on previous sensory experience but on logical deduction, a 
philosophical definition of which I was not aware, used as 
a technical antonym to a posteriori,. induction, from effect 
to cause. In the sense I am usinq it here, it is intended to 
make the point that a knowledge of the structure of grammar 
has to come before the hearing of sound as words, a knowledge 
that is based on experience which 
in turn is based axiomatical 
on logic; ie in a reflexive rather than either a deductive or 
inductive relation. 
14. I am reminded of Searle's much cited example of The Chinese 
Room - which he uses to sustain the claim that it is possible 
to manipulate symbols effectively without understanding or 
intentionality. This claim he then employs to attack the 
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proponents of 'strong' AI - that machines can be intelligent 
(Searle 1984). 
15. Aad sec above re. remembrance of the meaning of talk rather 
than of the words themselves. See also Garfinkel's 
breaching experiment (Garfinkel 1967: 38-42). 
16.1 am assuming this is not possible. 
17. NB: an art based on science: 
Isaac Pitman devised his system after a profound 
and epoch making study of the phonetic structure 
of the Enqlish language. The system is a result of 
his scientific analysis. 
Pitmans New Era Shorthand: iii 
See also Nisbet (1977). 
18. The "qenerally" is added in order to exclude those signs 
known as 'short forms' which are non-phonetic abbreviations 
of common words and phrases such as Dear Sir, The Chairman 
said and so on. 
19. See Fn 11 above. In the same article, Ong points to the 
utter impossibility for members of a literate society not to 
think of words "vaguely perhaps, but unavoidably - in hand- 
writing or typescript or print. "(Ong 1986: 24)-. 
20. Sign language, I understand, allows the deaf a literally 
three-dimensional space for speech, the space in front of the 
body in which the signs are placed. The question of the 
relation between the form and the possibilities of language 
this suggests appear extraordinarily interesting. 
21. The idea of the Textual Commentator is taken from a 
paper by Anna Wynne (1983). Wynne distinguishes 
between comment and original text by changing the 
typography, as I have done above in Introductions. 
Mulkay 1985: 77, fn 2 
22. Cf. McHugh, Raffel, Foss & Blum (1974) On the Beginning of 
Social Inquiry, a book written collaboratively "of necessity",.. 
. through the standard terms of ego and alter. Ego, 
for us, is the speaker who, by speaking, necessarily 
forgets his reason for speech. Alter reminds ego 
why he speaks by formulating ego's auspices. 
1974: 4 
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For their text, this collaboration requires,. it appears, 
different speakers-and- responders. But they add: 
in so far as ego and alter and collaboration are 
serious ideas there can be nothing that 'corresponds' 
to them in the real world. 
1974: 6 
23. A peculiarly western conception of the metaphor for tempor- 
ality. On the epistemology of metaphors of time cf. de Man 
(1969); Ricoeur (1984). 
24. Jane Austen made precisely this point towards the end of 
Northanger Abbe (1979): 
The anxiety which in this state of their attachment 
must be the portion of Henry and Catherine, and of 
all who loved either, as to its final event, can hardly 
extend, I fear, to the bosom of my readers, who will 
see in the tell tale compression of the pages before 
them that we are all hastening together to perfect 
felicity. 
Austen 1979: 237 (of 239 pages in total) 
25. For more on the question of the assumption of things that 
lie outside the margins of 'the text proper' see Derrida (1979) 
on Nietzsche's marginal (sic) note regarding his umbrella. 
For an exposition of what should be included, see 
Ellmann's Preface to the recently published Corrected Text of 
Joyce's Ulysses (1986). Which raises another difference 
than that between the oral/aural and the written - between the 
handwritten, the drafted, and the 'final printed version' of 
texts (a question dealt with technically by the traditional 
hermeneutic exegesis, according to Ricoeur (1981). 
26. (T)here is, after all, a limit to what a young physicist 
can learn from even a Newton. Having once grasped the 
fundamental points of the Principia, he is not likely 
to draw very much as a physicist from re-readings (. ) 
How different is the relation of the sociologist to a 
Simmel or a Durkheim. Always there will be something 
to be gained from a direct reading: something that is 
informative, enlarging, and creative. 
Nisbet 1977: 490 
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Nisbet's argument is applied, however, only to sociological 
works , to the writings of great sociologists. Such an 
author was: 
(W)ith deep intuitions, with profound imaginative 
grasp, reacting to the world around him, even as 
does the artist, and, also like the artist, objecti- 
fying internal and only partly conscious, states of 
mind. 
Nisbet 1977: 477 
However, their works : 
(F)or all the deep artistic sensitivity and intuition, 
no more belong in the history of art than the works 
of Balzac or Dickens do in the history of social 
science. 
Nisbet 1977: 481 
Although Nisbet's theory of reading, upon which his argument 
about the benefits of re-reading texts rests, belongs to the 
now displaced Romantic tradition, it is not without irony 
that I acknowledge that it was re-reading this article that 
partly provided the impetus for the current chapter's 
re-approach to the question of analysis. 
27. There have been some 'beginnings' of a "radical rethinking" 
of the implications of the fact that analytic writings are, 
as texts, "involved in all the technical problems of words, 
including rhetorical problems" (Frye, cited in Marcus 1980: 
507), particularly as applied to the genre of ethnography in 
anthropology (cf. Clifford 1981,1982; Marcus & Clifford 1985). 
The problem, for Marcus (1980), admits however of a means of 
solution: that is that once readers are aware of the rhetorical 
content of such texts, s/he may then as it were subtract those 
superfluous effects and thus recover the unrhetorical essence. 
For them-the lesson is that: 
(F)ieldwork and cultural description emerge as 
newly complex practices rather than observational 
empirical or inductive research activities. 
Marcus & Clifford 1985: 267 
A similar consciousness of the effects of analytic writings 
is manifest in the works of discourse analysts within the 
sociology of science (see Ashmore 1985; Mulkay 1984a, 1984b 
for example), effects which they have employed in their 
attempts to draw attention to reflexivity in/by analysis. 
However, and see Fn 2 above, for them 'data' retains a 
curious - once thought about - immunity from their re-thinking. 
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CHAPTER SIX : FOOTNOTES 
1. The intersection is at the writing of Husserl (eg: 1964) although 
the relation of each, of continental philosophy and of ethno- 
methodology to Husserl and of phenomenology, either philo- 
sophical or sociological, to Husserl's philosophy are not 
simple to trace, and perhaps await writing, 
But see, for sociology, Wolff's 'Phenomenology and 
Sociology' jr Bottomore and Nisbet (eds) (1978) and for 
philosophy, Derrida's 'Speech and Phenomena: Introduction to 
the Problem of Signs in Husserl's Phenomenology` (1973). 
2. Hilary Lawson, whose book 'Reflexivity: The Post-modern 
Predicament' (1985) discusses the concept against Nietzsche, 
Heidegger and Derrida, and who has been an occasional member 
of the Discourse Analysis Workshops which have been concerned 
with the implications of reflexivity for their own practice 
in the sociology of science, was a student of Montefiore's 
at Oxford, a connection I only learnt of after the first 
drafting of this chapter, 
Lawson does not discuss sociological work with 
reflexivity in his book. There is as yet as far as I am aware 
no text which relates the former explicitly and in depth to 
philosophy. 
3. Particularly arising from his strategic concentration upon 
texts of those writers who, like Rousseau, were themselves 
critics as well as practitioners of literature. Because, 
according to de Man, "(c)ritics are a particularly self- 
conscious and specialised kind of reader", in the writings 
of such authors, "the complexities of reading are displayed 
with particular clarity" (de man 1971: viii), In that essay, 
however, de Man reserves the "complexities" as being the 
consequence of "the distinctive characteristics of literary 
language" (ibid: ix). It is only later that he comes to argue 
that the figurality of language brings a complexity to the 
reading of other kinds of writing - notably to philosophy 
(see his 'The Epistemology of Metaphor' 1978). 
4. For example: "(L)iterary fictions do refer by virtue of 
their referring components, which (exactly as in ordinary 
discourse) we take literally, approximately, or metaphorically 
so as to adjust their relation to reality. " (Martin 1982: 235); 
and, "In sooken discourse, this reference by discourse to the 
sneaking subject presents a character of immediacy that we 
can explain in the following way. The subjective intention 
of the speaking subject and the meaning of the discourse 
overlap each other in such a way that it is the same thing to 
understand what the speaker means and what his discourse 
meens. " (Ricoeur 1981: 200). 
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5. The word 'deconstruction' has become as polysemic in terms 
of the concept to which it refers as the word reflexivity 
(or the word ethnomethodology). A use perhaps unique to 
sociology is where it appears as the opposite process, to 
c:: n. tx activism, ie to designate the process by which the 'sccial 
construction' of, for example, knowledge, is exposed/brought 
to analytic visibility (See for example Woolgar 1988a: 8). For 
the most explicit account of deconstruction as not only a 
philosophical but as a political strategy, see Derrida's 
'Time of a Thesis: Punctuations" (1983) and also the last 
section of his 'Signature Event Context' (1982), 
6. Although, according to Bryan Turner, "(T)he social sciences 
hav. - often neglected the most obvious 'fact' about human 
beings, namely that they have bodies and are embodied. When 
they have taker. this factual substratum into account, the 
results have often been trivial. " (1984: 227) 
What I mean here is that that "neglect" is not an 
absence but on the contrary, it is from its being taken as 
the axiomatic grounding of "empirical selves" that certain 
consequences have arisen. Turner, after (some might say a 
long way after) Foucault (1977) takes up the body's significance 
for the order of the political. One of the arenas where 
knowledge of the body ("this factual substratum") is taken as 
the grounding of analysis medical sociology/medical anthro- 
pology - and some of the consequences of that axiomatic 
basis has already been discussed in Chapter I, although in a 
way that would now at this stage of the thesis be seen to be 
perhaps enviably naive about the reading and interpretation 
of texts. 
7. Athough, not for Socrates for whom, according at least to 
two thousand years of subsequent commentators, knowledge of 
the self was philosophy; and for whom philosophy was "a 
preparation for death" (See Book X of the Republic)(But also 
Chapter 8 of this thesis). And perhaps I have no right to 
presume this to be the case for other philosophers/literary 
critics/sociologists. 
8. Cf: 'Beyond Good and Evil'. And, for Nietzsche perhaps him- 
self: "Philosophy, as I have hitherto understood and lived it, 
is a voluntary living in ice and high mountains" (Ecce Homo, 
Foreword). The propensity to read the man in the work, 
despite the declamation, "I am one thing, my writings are 
another" ('Why I Write Such Excellent Books' in Ecce Homo: 69) 
is not confined to biographical accounts (Hayman 1980 for 
example) and 'fiction' (Mann's 'Dr Faustus'), but is used by 
philosophers as the basis of the interpretation of his 
writings, the Introduction to 'Ecce Homo' being an excellent 
example of the latter. 
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9. As is stated in the Introduction to 'Being and Time', 
(A) dogma has been developed which not only declares 
the question about the meaning of Being to be super- 
fluous, but sanctions its complete neglect. It is 
said that 'Being' is the most universal and emptiest 
of concepts... Nor does this most universal and hence 
indefinable concept require any definition, for 
everyone uses it constantly and already understands 
what he means by it. In this way, that which the 
ancient philosophers found continually disturbing as 
something obscure and hidden has taken on a clarity 
and self-evidence such that if anyone continues to 
ask about it he is charged with an error of method. 
Aeidegger 1962: 21 
For a much later re-addressal of the Question of Being, see 
'What is Metaphysics' (1978) where it is approached through 
the Question of the Nothing. 
As I have come recently to comprehend, the direction 
of Derrida's work is to uncover the metaphysical predicate 
of presence - presence exemplified in the assumption of the 
immediacy of speech to self, of self-presence in speech 
an uncovering 'against' what was the founding insight of 
Husserl's phenomenology, itself formulated by Husserl 
against Descartes as the foundation of modern philosophy. 
Perhaps the most interesting thing about this chapter is that 
it came to a concern with the effects of the presumption of 
the self through another route than the discipline of 
philosophy, through the close reading of the dtexts. 
10. It has been suggested that there is a need for a footnote 
addressing "the effects of AW's utterances" and the extent 
to which the dtexts might only exhibit "occasioned pronounce- 
ments on self, body etc rather than what the victims felt" 
(Woolgar 1988b), 
Certainly if one reads the dtexts with that kind of 
concern, the role of "AW's utterances" in eliciting the 
topics is far from passive. 
But certainly here in this chapter the intention has 
nothing to do with representing (and subsequently analysing) 
"what the victims felt"; the case made out in Chapter V for 
the unknowable difference between the dtexts and 'the 
original interview' precludes any such intention. That it is 
so difficult not to read them in that way, to resist that 
frame for their interpretability is precisely the theme: 
the assumption of 'speech as immediate self-presence'. 
In this section of the chapter the invitation, the 
temptation, to read the dtexts as referring directly to 
'empirical selves' has been deliberately courted, both by 
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the extent of the passages quoted and their matter 
(cf. the generally trivial substance of the texts which 
certainly early CA worked on) in order put up the hardest 
case for re-consideration. 
11. "For the able-bodied, normal world, we are representations 
of many of the things they most fear - tragedy, loss, dark 
and the unknown. Involuntarily we walk - or more often sit - 
in the valley of the shadow of death. Contact with us throws 
up in people's faces the fact of sickness and death in the 
world. No-one likes to think of such things which in them- 
selves are an affront to all our aspirations and hopes. A 
deformed and paralysed body attacks everyone's sense of well- 
being and invincibility, People do not want to acknowledge 
what disability affirms - that life is tragic, and we shall 
all soon be dead. " 
(Hunt 1966) 
12. Ircluded in the recently published 'The Anthropology of 
Experience' (Turner i Brunner (eds) 1986) is a paper by 
Phyllis Gorfain, 'Play and the Problem of Knowing in Hamlet: 
an Excursion into Interpretive Anthropology', 
in which she 
interprets Hamlet as, "not only an expressive text through 
which our culture tells itself about itself, but also a 
reflexive text"(1936: 200). 
13. The lengthy passages quoted here which allow for the long 
sweep of narrative to get under way are being used to 
seduce the reader into another 
form of resistance to the 
question of the referent. That the content is so terrible 
is also cart of this strategy (see also Footnote 10). 
14. I could, on reflection, have used another passage from 
'Daniel's' dtext here. Perhaps the use of a different dtext 
weakens the argument by opening it to the accusation that 
'different people' speak differently of themselves. But I 
would contend that any of the dtexts contain similar passages. 
The ones I have used here are those which first struck me as 
intensely puzzling. 
15. "Tragedy, then, is a representation of an action that is 
worth serious attention, complete in itself, and of some 
amplitudes; in language enriched by a variety of artistic 
devices appropriate to the several parts of the play; present- 
ed in the form of action, not narration; by means of city 
and fear bringing about the purgation of such emotions. " 
(Aristotle 1981: 39) 
16. Wordsworth thus describes the position of the poet to the 
experience he writes about in 'The Prelude'. 
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17. This comes from his reading of Lacan. 
18. For Aristotle (see the passage quoted in footnote 15), the 
presence of narration disqualifies a text from the genre of 
tragedy. By this criterion, the presence of the narrator 
in the dtexts would by the same token qualify them as - 
whatever is the opposite to the poetic mode of writing. 
19. This will be returned to as the question of the difference 
between writing and speech as discussed in dialogue in 
Plato's Phaedrus. 
t7 I 
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CHAPTER SEVEN : FOOTNOTES 
1. As will become aooarent, this view is not that of de Man. 
2. See Chapter 6's Footnote 15. 
3. The use of this collective pronoun in preference for the 
singular which is the approved practice in sociological 
argument (and which differs from much of philosophy, which 
uses the "I" form as a matter of course) involves some not 
inconsequential rhetorical (epistemological) effects. To 
anticipate a point that will be made later (235-6), 
it is this collective pronoun which invokes the authority 
of the discipline as part of the referent of the proper 
name of the researcher. It also works to bind readers to 
writer, anticipating their agreement by including them 
in(to) the collectivity (see Blum: 1974). 
4. There are throughout this chapter many returns to questions 
raised earlier in the thesis, only some of which are made 
explicit. Here, for example, to the earlier reading of the 
Diary of the Comte d'Estef (Chapter Two) and the issues 
concerning the theory of history in Chapter 1.3. 
5. And another: a re-iteration, but which is not the same, 
of the point made in Chapter 5 passim and in its Footnote 4, 
returned to in a new context. Such cross-referrals, such 
cross-referability, which supplement the text read in the 
con-text of the thesis as a whole make a substantive 
point: the interminable and yet very specific supplementations 
brought to a text in reading. 
6. This is an extract from a letter written to me by James in 
respect of an earlier research project. As he put it: 
I understand from XX that you have been interviewing 
some MS sufferers, and that they have been responding 
to questions which were intended to elicit responses 
about psychological feelings by talking about material 
phenomena, including their bodies and arrangements 
surrounding the maintenance thereof. I understand 
you are pondering why this might be. 
7. An extract from the Abstract of their paper. Pill & Stott's 
research was not about MS (cf Chapter 2, Appendix 2.1 for 
the relative paucity of sociological research into MS). I 
have used this example because their data was not dissimilar 
to mine ("semi-structured interviews") and because it is 
not implausible (see Chapter 1) that such an approach would 
be taken to the 'patients' perspective' on MS. 
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8. I add, with some diffidence, that the correct reference 
is to Elizabeth Forsythe (1979). Also see 7. 
9. .. as the concomitant of participation in a research 
project. 
10. I use this term for its polysemic resonance: the sense 
of non-persuasive; of virtuous; and 'in essence or effect 
though not nominally' (OED). 
11. See Chapter 6, Fn 10. 
12. See also Chapter 6.4. 
13. Elements Ricoeur takes from Aristotle's Poetics (see Chapter 
6, Fn 15). The presence of narrative, incidentally, is, 
for Aristotle, incompatible with the form of Tragedy, which 
must be the representation, rather, "of an action". 
14. ACTH is a steroid often given as an immunosuppressive 
therapy during acute episodes of MS to control symptoms. 
15. See Chapter 4: 119 and its Fn 8. 
16. According to de Man: 
The interest of autobiography, then, is not that it 
reveals reliable self-knowledge - it does not - but 
that it demonstrates in a striking way the impossi- 
bility of closure and of totalization (that is the 
impossibility of coming into being) of all textual 
systems made up of tropological substitutions. 
de Man 1979: 922 
From which he excludes non-literary textual systems. 
17. According to Edmondson, Aristotelean rhetoric consisted of 
three elements which, in combination, produced the persuasion 
of speech: ethos (self presentation of qualities of the 
speaker which suggest they are worth listening to, such as 
reliability, maturity and moral authority); pathos (sensi- 
tisation of the audience, putting them in the desired frame 
of mind); and logos (the form of argument which constitutes 
reason and logic). (I am paraphrasing her version of 
Aristotle). 
For Aristotle, apparently, rhetoric is essentially 
manipulative, a view that is also by tradition attributed to 
Plato (but see Chapter 8). Edmondson opposes this, arguing 
that "sociological communication cannot be achieved without 
rhetorical uses and rhetoric is concerned in the first place 
with conveying meaning suasively" (1984: 28). For Edmondson, 
though, these are figures which facilitate the conveying of 
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the meaning of the text from author to reader but which 
have no effect on its 'meaning' as such. Nor does she 
appear to have any problem with the question of reference. 
It is worth noting, in view of what is to come in 
Chapter 8, that the techniques and effects of rhetoric 
identified by Aristotle were those in speech. Edmondson 
transfers them unproblematically as applying to writing. 
18. See Fn 3 above. 
19. Although of course the appropriateness of the inclusion 
or exclusion of particular individuals or groups of 
individuals may be and is contested, as is the relationship 
of one set of subjects to the 'whole-set' of society. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT : FOOTNOTES 
1. It is, I am coming to realise (see Fn 12) impossible to 
over-estimate the influence of the Dialogues - by which I 
mean the influence of the interpretive tradition of Plato - 
not only on the subsequent course of philosophy but on 
academic enquiry. Even Derrida -whose constant struggle 
is against the metaphysics of logo-centrism - in tracing 
its origins back to Plato as responsible for the "philo- 
sophical movement par excellence" substantially concedes 
to that tradition. For his concept of 'general writing' 
is dependent on a de-construction and dis-placement of 
the prioritisation of voice over writing which he attributes 
to Plato (cf. Derrida 1982, but also 1977; 1981). 
2. A major element of philosophical debate concerning the 
Dialogues is, precisely, which ideas are attributable to 
which of the two philosophers. As Ferguson explains in 
his Preface: "(I) have assumed on the evidence of Aristotle 
... that the 
Theory of Forms belongs to Plato not Socrates" 
(1970: xi). "(T)hrough contact with the Pythagoreans in 
Sicily and South Italy in 388-87BC he (Plato) came to the 
Theory of Forms as a solution-and propounded it in 
Phaedo; he elaborated it in Phaedrus; the Banquet (Symposium) 
and the Republic" (1970: 2). It is on this ground amongst 
others that Ferguson in fact excludes all except two short 
paragraphs of the'Phaedrus from his book which is, as its 
title makes clear (Socrates: A Source . 
Book) concerned only 
with the "main source material about Socrates" (1970: xi). 
A further complication, and a further ground for 
asserting that the Dialogues are not literal records is that 
as Ferguson explains, there are two major extant sources for 
Socrates who did not himself write; not only Plato but 
Xenophon. But whilst, "both knew him personally... and both 
depict him in dramatic situations-ih the pages of Xenophon, 
Socrates appears as an eminently worthy but dull, prosy and 
sententious moralist-in the pages of Plato he is witty, 
humorous and a great metaphysical thinker as well" (1970: 1). 
3. According however to a more recent edition of the Dialogues 
(Saunders 1987), this certainty about the dates and the order 
in which they were written is currently replaced by un- 
certainty, except "within rather broad limits". 
4. For example: "(W)e are not to suppose that the dialogues 
written by Plato actually took place in the form in which 
he has written them. Obviously they must be based on some- 
thing historical: but their literary elegance suggests an 
extensive degree of Platonic manipulation. In the end, how- 
ever, what matters is not their historical accuracy but 
their philosophy. " (Saunders 1987; 18). 
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5. For example: "The dialogue form permitted Plato-the 
playfulness and the bitterness, the irony and the fairness 
for which the dialogues are also famous. it allowed him 
almost the freedom of the contemporary novelist. As a form 
it imposed no limitations on his poetic imagery, and it 
allowed him the utmost philosophical seriousness. But not- 
withstanding his unrivalled mastery of the dialogue, he 
never subordinated meaning to form. Contentless art, he 
held, is not art" (Hamilton: 1962: xiv). 
6. To be noted is the ease with which the absence of the 
text referred to - Griswold's book - fails in practice to 
inhibit readers from forming their own view of it which may 
differ from the view of the text which refers to it, here 
Rowe's critique. How is it that it seems so plain that 
Rowe has missed the point of Griswold's book? It was 
what I took to be Griswold's point about the Phaedrus that 
persuaded me to read the Dialogue for myself. 
7. "Socrates: If men learn (writing) it will implant forget- 
fulness in their souls: they will cease to exercise memory 
because they rely on that which is written, calling things 
to remembrance no longer from within themselves, but by 
means of external marks... (it is) a receipe not for memory 
but for reminder. And it is no true wisdom... but only its 
semblance, for by telling them of many things without 
teaching them you will make them seem to know much, whilst 
for the most part they know nothing, and as men filled, not 
with wisdom, but with the conceit of wisdom, they will be 
a burden to their fellows" (275a/b). 
8. See Baumann (ed) 1986 for example. 
9. The capital is used throughout to denote the Phaedrus. 
10. This passage is from the chapter entitled 'Writing Re- 
structures Consciousness', in which Ong argues that "the 
use of a technology (such as writing) can enrich the 
human psyche, enlarge the human spirit, intensify its inner 
life" (1982: 83), an argument clearly refuting (his reading 
of) Plato's view, similarly based on a fundamental differ- 
ence held to exist between writing and speech. This also 
presumes, it should be noted in anticipation, that speech 
historically own before writing, originating not in 
consciousness but, "wells up into consciousness out of 
unconscious depths" (1982: 82). Whilst writing "heightens" 
consciousness, it does not "inevitably well up out of un- 
consciousness". The consequences and grounds for this view 
will be discussed later: here I am concerned to discuss 
the interpretability of that which is only in writing. But 
in that the dtexts (and the Phaedrus) readably represent 
speech, what the source of speech is held to be utterly 
affects that interpretability. The immediate and explicit 
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relevance of citing Ong here is to substantiate the 
relevance of reading the dtexts against the Phaedrus. 
11. That is, the text in translation. As reader of an 
already re-interpreted text I am involuntarily subject to 
the problematic both in practice - particular translator's 
reading of the greek - and in principle (see de Man 1986 
and the attached references). This is particularly 
frustrating when the argument is dependent upon close and 
rigorous attention to reading the text. (See also Fn 28). 
12. Although I have since studied Plato under the aegis of 
academic philosophy at the University of Sussex, the 
interpretation of the Phaedrus I am advancing in this 
chapter - produced originally as a response to the text in 
ignorance of how it is traditionally interpreted - although 
one I can now say with some authority differs from that 
philosophic tradition, is not one I would wish to substantially 
amend. 
13. There is the same kind of contestable traditional reading 
of Plato's being 'against poetry'. For example: "Plato's 
polemic against the poets is at its most vigorous and 
sweeping in Republic X. All the poets... speak to the 
lowest elements in us... The poets present us with false 
models for behaviour, false images of virtue. They make 
no distinction between good and bad and have no concern 
for the truth" (Rowe 1984: 148). See also Murdoch 1977; 
Sesonske 1966. 
14. I use this verb because it is particularly apposite in that 
it depicts an activity that produces a third by contact 
between two: the production of something which is new and 
yet which is at the same time rooted in both those things 
which have been conjoined. It also implies a birth which 
itself may become the source of the birth of others - an 
interminable continuity, a dynamic of becoming. Like all 
metaphors it is ontological and therefore epistemological: 
but faithful to the text: 
Socrates: ... the 
dialectician selects a soul of the 
right type, and in it he plants and sows his words 
founded on knowledge, words which can defend both 
themselves and him who planted them, words which 
instead of remaining barren contain a seed whence 
new seeds grow up in new characters, whereby the 
seed is vouchsafed immortality, and it possesses 
the fullest measure of blessedness that man can 
attain unto. (276e/277a1. 
15. With a few exceptions, the dtexts will not be quoted from 
in this chapter. 
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16. This is to follow the philosophic convention of reference 
to the text by paragraph numbers. 
17. And also throughout: see for example 230b; 242a. 
18. Cf. Nussbaum on the relation between the Dialogues and 
dramatic art, 'Interlude 1: Plato's anti-tragic theater 
(sic)' (1986: 122-135). She also writes: "Plato is said 
to have given up a promising career as a tragic poet to 
write them: scholars have observed that the dialogues 
show many traces of his former metier" (1986: 126). 
For another example of the technique, see the opening 
scenes of any of Shakespeare's plays in which the speeches 
describe the speakers, the setting in which the drama is 
to take place and the dramatic situation which will be 
unfolded. 
19. "Phaedrus... is going from the urban house where he has 
been conversing with Lysias to take a walk, for the sake of 
his health, outside the city walls, in-what we shall see to 
be a place of burgeoning sensuous beauty. It is also a 
dangerous place: a place where a pure young girl was carried 
off by the impassioned wind god-where the traveller risks 
possession by the power of eras at the hottest hour of the 
day. In this same way, some important features of Plato's 
thought and writing seem to have left the Republic's city 
house and to be moving in the direction of greater wildness, 
sensuousness and vulnerability" (Nussbaum 1986: 200). See 
also Fn 28 below. 
20. As the title of the collection of essays by contemporary 
literary theorists edited by Tompkins indicates - Reader 
Response Criticism: from formalism to poststructuralism - 
(1980), whilst the various essayists differ in their 
theoretical positions, "New Criticism, structuralism, 
phenomenology, psycho-analysis and deconstruction (and hence 
in) their definition of the reader, of interpretation and of 
the text" (1980: ix), their common ground is that the 
central issue, "the status of the literary text" is one 
which can only be addressed as the relation between reader- 
text. 
21. "The crucial point for the reader of the dialogue... is that 
when Plato explores through Socrates the difficulties and 
implications of Socrates' own assumptions and arguments, he 
is not exploring matters of purely theoretical interest. 
For to Plato and Socrates, philosophy is morals, philosophy 
is politics, philosophy is life" (Saunders 1987; 34). 
22. By which I mean that the theoretical grounds of statements 
made in the early sections of the dtexts are not put into 
question by those that come after. 
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23. Principally by Derrida (see Fn 1). it is upon this 
prioritisation of voice that Husserl's phenomenology is 
based (Husserl 1964; see also Hindess 1977); and also 
Searle's and Austin's work on speech as performative 
(Searle 1969; Austin 1962 but see also Searle 1977 in 
which he gives a critique of Derrida's 1982 critique of 
phenomenology). It is also drawn upon by Ricoeur for 
his contention that the human sciences may be addressed 
hermeneutically (Ricoeur 1981) (and see Chapter 5, this 
text). 
24. See Chapter 5. 
25. "Phaedrus: I didn't learn the speech by heart, Socrates, 
I assure you, but I will summarise point by point from 
the beginning of the argument almost all that Lysias said. " 
(228e). 
26. See Chapter 4,110. 
27. Nussbaum's translation is (and see Fn 11): "People who 
love each other share everything" (1986: 233) - one of 
her interpretive themes being the Dialogue's representation 
of the speech between Phaedrus and Socrates as itself the 
birth of eros one for the other, in which Phaedrus, being 
the: beloved, would be the one who properly submits to 
he who he loves. See also Fn 19. 
28. Or: the failure of dialectic at the level of speech and 
its success at the level of the written. See 8.3 below. 
29. According to Hamilton, the greek word kalon means both 
the fine and the beautiful - as the term for the shameful 
aichron, also means the ugly. See Fn 11. 
30. "The twin purposes of education and philosophical investi- 
gation in principle always go hand in hand" (Rowe 1984: 27). 
31. According the the philosopher Agazzi, that philosophy 
allows introspection to be a valid and legitimate means of 
philosophic inquiry is that which distinguishes it from 
the human sciences -(Agazzi 1988). 
32. As implied by the discussion immediately following, and 
in 8.3, this interpretation that the two are alternatives 
is a misreading of the text. 
33. The claim does not, perhaps, have to be so carefully 
circumscribed. 
349 
34. See pp 278-278, below. 
35. Hamilton's translation uses the word "Typho" which, according 
to his footnote, is the name of the hundred-headed father 
of the winds, who may or may not be Typhon under another 
name (Hamilton 1988: 25). 
36. But cf. Nietzsche on the assumption of non-contradiction, 
which may only be a 'human' "inability", not an absolute 
guarantee of non-sense (Nietzsche 19 
37. See Chapter 3.1.1. 
38. See Fn 9, Chapter 6, on Heidegger and the Question of Being. 
39. The case of the centaur is a favourite example used by 
those philosophers interested in the question of language 
and reference in that the word has as its referent something 
known not to exist (an example often raised in discussions 
on the mA Philosophy course at Sussex). 
40. 
Socrates: our proof assuredly 
will prevail with the wise, though not with the learned. 
Now our first step toward attaining the truth 'of the matter is to 
discern the nature of soul. divine and human, its experiences, and its 
activities. Here then our proof begins. 
All soul is immortal, for that which is ever in motion is immortal. 
But that which while imparting motion is itself moved by something 
else can cease to be in motion, and therefore can cease to live; it is 
only that which moves itself that never intermits its motion, inas- 
much as it cannot abandon its own nature; moreover this self-mover 
is the source and first principle of motion for all other things that are 
a moved. Now a first principle cannot come into being, for while any- 
thing that comes to be must come to be from a first principle, the lat- 
ter itself cannot come to be from anything whatsoever; if it did. It 
would cease any longer to be a first principle. Furthermore, since it 
does not come into being, it must be imperishable. for assuredly if a 
first principle were to be destroyed. nothing could come to be out of it, 
nor could anything bring the principle itself back into existence, see- 
Ing that a first principle is needed for anything to come into being. 
The self-mover. then, is the first principle of motion, and it is as 
Impossible that it should be destroyed as that it should come into 
being. were it otherwise. the whole universe, the whole of that which 
comes to be, would collapse into immobility, and never find another e 
oource of motion to bring it back into being. 
And now that we have seen that that which is moved by itself is 
immortal, we shall feel no scruple in affirming that precisely that is 
the essence and definition of soul, to wit, self-motion. Any body that 
has an external source of motion is soulless, but a body deriving its 
motion from a source within itself is animate or besouled, which im- 
plies that the nature of soul is what has been said. 
And if this lam assertion is correct, namely that 'that which 
moves Itself' is precisely identifiable with soul. it must follow that soul ass 
Is not born sort dam tarv dis 
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41. Why could the world which is of any concern to us - 
not be a fiction? And he who then objects: 'but to the 
fiction there belongs an author? ' could he not be met 
with the round retort: w_Z? Are we not permitted to be 
a little ironical now about the subject as we are about 
the predicate and object? Ought the philosopher not to 
rise above the belief in grammar? All due respects to 
governesses: but is it not time philosophy renounced the 
beliefs of governesses? 
Nietzsche 1968: Note 34. 
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